Workshops

2006年4月4日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Hiroyuki Nakata (University of Essex)

Modelling Choice of Information Acquisition [PDF]

This paper constructs a static model of information acquisition when the agent does not know exactly what pieces of information he is missing. The paper shows a representation of preferences over information channels by adapting the model of unforeseen contingencies by Dekel et al. (2001), which is an extension of Kreps (1979, 1992). One implication of the paper is that one can define the value of an information channel even if one cannot define the value of each piece of information the channel would deliver. Some possible applications of the results are discussed.

April 11, 2006 （Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Masaki Nakabayashi (Osaka University)

Hedonic Prices and Multitask Incentives [PDF]

Human tasks are often multidimensional. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) concluded that "high-powered" incentives cannot work unless all dimensions of these tasks are observable in the firm. However, as this study shows, if the firm can observe the price vector of its products in the market, distinguish each dimension of the price vector, and connect the information with signals from workers in the firm, then the use of multitask "high-powered" incentives becomes feasible. Product differentiation with committed quality satisfies those conditions, which has been practiced by Japanese, but not by Western, manufacturing for a century.

April 13, 2006 (Thursday)　１0:30-12:00 ※TIME CHANGED、時間帯に注意

*都市経済ワークショップ、ITPUワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Clifford Winston (The Brookings Institution)

Competition and Welfare in the US Airline Industry

We develop a structural econometric model of competition in U.S. domestic airline markets to assess how traveler welfare may be　affected by the exit of an industry competitor. We find that Southwest provides the greatest welfare to travelers while other low-cost carriers also contribute significant benefits to the flying public. Of the legacy carriers, only United and Delta substantially raise traveler welfare while American, US Airways, and Continental actually reduce traveler welfare. We conclude that the market is efficiently determining which airlines remain in the industry and that financial assistance to carriers that may otherwise be liquidated is unwarranted.

April 18, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Sayaka Nakamura (Northwestern University)

What Makes Hospitals Refer Patients to Their Affiliated Hospitals? [PDF]

here have been many hospital merger cases in which a tertiary care hospital (the acquirer) acquired a community care hospital (the target) in the past fifteen years. Researchers found that such mergers sometimes lead to increased referrals from the target hospitals to the acquirers. This paper studies in what cases the targets are more likely to refer patients to the acquirers. I develop a theoretical model in which patients' preference toward community care hospitals is influenced by the ratings given by the prior users. It predicts that a community care hospital attaches greater weight on its patients' preference in making referrals when demand is more responsive to a change in a patient's evaluation. Based on this model, I estimate a structural model of referral choice for cardiac surgery. I find that when the acquirers are not among the top hospitals in the region, the target hospitals with more responsive demand are equally or less likely to refer their patients to the acquirers. On the other hand, the acquirers renowned for high quality of care are more likely to attract referrals from target hospitals with more responsive demand. These findings suggest patients conceive that there are quality gains from vertical integration of hospitals only when the acquirers are one of the top hospitals.

May 2, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Chongwoo Choe (University of New South Wales)

Diversification Discount, Information Rents, and Internal Capital Markets [PDF]

While many existing studies report that corporate diversification destroys shareholder value, two recent studies challenge these findings. Schoar (2002) finds that plants in conglomerates are more productive than those in comparable single-segment firms, although conglomerates are traded at discounts. Villalonga (2004) employs more comprehensive database than that used in the existing studies, and shows that there is a significant diversification premium, rather than discount. This paper develops a model that highlights the costs and benefits of corporate diversification. The diversified firm trades off the benefits of more efficient resource allocation through its internal capital market against the costs of information rents to division managers, which are necessary for effective workings of the internal capital market. We provide an argument supporting Schoar’s findings, and identify conditions under which there can be a diversification discount or a premium.

May 9, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Nobuyuki Yagi (University of Tokyo) [paper]

Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multi-Task Agency with Hidden Information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to individuals. The individuals form a group as a single agent and share their private signals in order to maximize their average payoff. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss due to risk aversion. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes.

May 16, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30  *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Hisashi Nakamura (University of Tokyo)

A Continuous-Time Analysis of Dynamic Debt Contracts:  Theory and Applications

 This paper presents a new approach for modeling continuous-time defaultable debt contracts. It studies an optimal competitive debt contract in continuous time by exploring a dynamic costly monitoring model under asymmetric information in a common-agency setting. Consequently, it shows that, under an optimal debt contract, a fully informed debtor defaults strategically and recurrently. On the other hand, a less informed creditor expects default to occur stochastically based on an exponential probability distribution under which the arrival rate of default is increasing in monitoring ability. This paper provides a mathematically tractable framework to analyze firms’ financial structure and dynamic auditing problems in labor and insurance contracts.

May 23, 2006 (Tuesday) 12:00-13:30 *Empirical Micro Forumと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第3共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.3 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Bram Cadsby (University of Guelph)

Sorting and Incentive Effects of Pay-for-Performance: An Experimental Investigation

Agency theory highlights potential losses in productivity that can occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay-for-performance (PFP) has been proposed as a potential solution to this problem. Using a real-effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we examine the impact of PFP versus fixed-salary (FS) compensation. PFP achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected PFP, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under PFP. However, more risk-averse individuals were both less likely to select PFP and less responsive to PFP incentives.

May 23, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30  *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Eiichiro Kazumori (University of Tokyo)

Auctions with Package Bidding:  An Experimental Study

This paper reports the results of auction experiments to evaluate auction designs when agents have super additive values for heterogeneous objects. The first factor of the experimental design is auction choice. We considered generalized Vickrey auctions, simultaneous ascending auctions, and clock-proxy auctions. The second factor is the value structure of agents. In addition to a benchmark case of additive values, we considered super additive value structures which feature the exposure problem and the coordination problem. The third factor is subject characteristics. We ran experiments with professional traders and university students. We found that clock-proxy auctions outperformed generalized Vickrey auctions. Clock-proxy auctions out-performed simultaneous ascending auctions with the exposure problem value structure, and did statistically equally well with the additive and the coordination problem value structure. The result suggests a trade-off:between efficiency improvements and complexity in package bidding. An ANOVA of outcomes demonstrated that auction designs were significant, and the interaction terms were often significant. We estimated the effect of auction design on efficiency and revenue and found that its magnitude depended on the valuation structure and subject characteristics. The result suggests that market design is not one-size-fits-all but that a successful design builds on an understanding of problem specific issues.

May 24, 2006 (Wednesday) 12:00-13:30 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Bram Cadsby (University of Guelph)

Competitive Burnout: Theory and Experimental Evidence [PDF]

We examine equilibrium selection in a two-stage sequential elimination contest in which contestants compete for a single prize. This game has a continuum of equilibria, only one of which satisfies the Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE) refinement. That equilibrium involves “burning out” by using all of one’s resources in the first stage. It is Pareto- dominated by many other equilibria We find that CPNE predicts well when four people compete, but not when eight people compete for two second-stage spots. Using a cognitive hierarchy (CH) framework, we show that when the mean number of players and the mean number of thinking steps are large, the CH prediction involves burning out. This provides a partial explanation of our results. We also develop a formal argument as to why CPNE logic is more compelling with more players. We conclude that more competition leads to higher bids, and that burning out is indeed a competitive phenonemon.

June 6, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Daisuke Oyama (Hitotsubashi University)

Strategic Implications of (Non-)Common Priors I:  Belief Potential (joint with Olivier Tercieux)

This paper studies the impact of a small probability event for strategic behavior in incomplete information games with non-common priors. It is shown that the impact of a small probability event has an upper bound that is an increasing function of the measure of discrepancy from the common prior assumption. In particular, the impact can be arbitrarily large under non-common priors, but is bounded from above under common priors. This result quantifies the difference between common prior and non-common prior models in terms of implications on the infinite hierarchies of beliefs.

June 13, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Utku Unver (University of Pittsburgh)

Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors:  A Characterization (joint with Tayfun Sonmez) [PDF] [powerpoint]

June 16, 2006 (Friday)　11:00-18:00  ※時間帯に注意

*Search Theory Workshopと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

11:00-12:00  Takashi Shimizu  (Kansai University) and Kamiya Kazuya  (University of Tokyo), "Real indeterminacy in dynamic general equilibrium models with cash-in-Advance constraint"

12:00-13:00  Takuo Sugaya (University of Tokyo), "The real indeterminacy and indeterminacy comparison among decentralized market, centralized market, and Walrasian market in the model combining job search and money search"

14:30-15:30  Masataka Iwata (University of Tokyo), "International currency, regional currencies, and foreign exchange market"

15:40-16:40  Ryoichi Imai  (Kyushu University), "Unstable Relationships with Wage Bargaining"

17:00-18:00  Yiting Li (National Taiwan University and University of Tokyo), TBA

June 20, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Yiting Li (National Taiwan University)

Currency and checking deposits as means of payment

Casual observations suggest that cash is very often used for everyday small-value purchases while checks are used for larger-value payments. We use a search monetary model to study issues related to multiple means of payment, in which checking deposits pay interest but have a fixed record keeping cost. If the cost of using checking deposits for making payments is lower than the liquidity return obtained from financing big transactions but larger than that for small transactions, checks are used only in big transactions and currency is the only means of payment for small transactions. 　 Inflation may have differential impacts on the terms of trade in transactions using different means of payment. Currency's liquidity value derives mainly from facilitating unexpected small transactions. 　 As people are more likely to engage in cash transactions, the precautionary demand for　money is higher and the balance of checking deposits is lower, resulting in a higher currency-deposit ratio.

June 27, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Hiroyuki Kasahara (University of Western Ontario)

Import Protection as Export Destruction (joint with Beverly Lapham) [PDF]

This paper develops a model of heterogeneous firms with both export and import, extending the framework of Melitz (2003). The model highlights mechanisms whereby import policies affect aggregate productivity and export activity. Based on the theoretical model, we develop and structurally estimate an empirical model that incorporates heterogeneity in productivity and shipping costs using Chilean plant level manufacturing data. The estimated model replicates the key features of plant-level data regarding productivity, exporting and importing. We perform a variety of counterfactual experiments to assess the positive and normative effects of barriers to trade in import and export markets. These experiments suggest that there are substantial aggregate productivity and welfare gains due to trade. Furthermore, because of import and export complementarities, policies which inhibit the importation of foreign intermediates can have a large adverse effect on the exportation of final goods.

July 4, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Noel Gaston (Bond University)

The Rise (and Fall) of Labour Market Programmes:  Domestic vs. Global Factors [PDF]

We study the political economy of labour market policies. First, we show that tax and redistributive considerations lead workers with little or no exposure to unemployment to prefer spending on active labour market programmes to passive spending, e.g., on unemployment benefits. However, globalization is shown to have conflicting effects on active spending. In the empirical work, panel data for OECD countries are used to examine the relationship between active and passive labour market spending and various controls relevant for analysing the political economy of labour market policies. Overall, we find that domestic concerns, such as government indebtedness, are more important determinants of labour market expenditures than globalization.

July 11, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30  *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Chiaki Hara (Kyoto University)

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Efficient Risk-Sharing Rules [PDF]

We show that for every collection of strictly increasing risk-sharing rules and every strictly increasing and strictly concave expected utility function, there exists a collection of strictly increasing and strictly concave expected utility functions for which the given risk-sharing rules are efficient and the given utility function coincides with the corresponding representative consumer's utility function. This result shows that the efficiency property imposes no restriction on the risk-sharing rules beyond the comonotonicity, or on the state-pricing rule beyond the positivity and antimonotonicity. We also obtain contrasting results when the individual consumers are assumed to exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion.

July 18, 2006 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Luis Rayo (University of Chicago)

Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness [PDF]

We model happiness as a measurement tool used to rank alternative actions.  The quality of the measurement is enhanced by a happiness function that adapts to the available opportunities, a property favored by evolution. The optimal function is based on a time-varying reference point -- or performance benchmark -- that is updated over time in a statistically optimal way. Habits and peer comparisons arise as special cases of such updating process. This updating also results in a volatile level of happiness that continuously reverts to its long-term mean. Throughout, we draw a parallel with a problem of optimal incentives, which allows us to apply statistical insights from agency theory to the study of happiness.

2006年7月25日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Shigeo Hirano (Columbia University/CIRJE)

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms [PDF]

2006年9月4日（月 Monday）12:00-13:15

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Myoung-jae Lee （Korea University）

Structuaral IVE for Dynamic Treatment Effects: Spanking Effect on Behavior

[PDF]   [PDF]

Finding the effects of multiple sequential treatments on a response variable measured at the end of a trial is difficult, if some treatments are affected by interim responses; e.g., assessing the effects of spanking on behavior when parents adjust their spanking level depending on interim behaviors. A headway, `G estimation', has been made in 1980's generalizing the usual static treatment effect analysis under `selection on observables'. But G estimation is hard to implement. In this paper, firstly, we propose a much simpler alternative to G estimation---a single or multiple IVE's for a linear structural model---and show that our proposal and G estimation identify the same effect under some assumptions. Secondly, we explore the relation between our proposal and Granger causality to show that our approach is more general, although the two become equivalent for testing non-causality under a stationarity assumption. Thirdly, our approach and G estimation are applied to find the effects of spanking on behavior. We find that mild spanking at early years reduces a child's behavior problems later, which seems to differ from most findings in the psychology literature.

2006年9月15日（金 Friday）15:30-18:30

※ITPUワークショップ、都市経済ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

山口勝弘 （東京大学）

International Trade and Air Cargo: An Analysis of US Export and Air
Transport Policy

吉田雄一朗 （政策研究大学院大学）

Dynamic and Static Productivity Measurement of Japanese Airlines: Can They Really Compete through the Liberalization in the Asian Aviation Industry?

2006年10月3日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Bradley Ruffle（Ben-Gurion University）

Which way to cooperate [PDF]

We introduce a class of games that captures many economic and social cooperation dilemmas such as bidding rings in auctions, competition for market share, labor supply decisions, queuing in line and courtship. Participants in these interactions cooperate by limiting their frequency of entry, since entry imposes a negative externality. We conduct two-player, repeated-game experiments with private values to entry where cooperation admits the form of either taking turns or using a cutoff strategy and entering only for high private values. We find that in environments with disperse private values, paired subjects coordinate on the same cutoff strategies. In environments with similar private values, cooperative subjects alternate. Our results offer insight into whether a cooperative norm will arise and what form it will take: for mundane tasks or where individuals otherwise have similar payoffs, alternation is likely; for difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or by preferences, cutoff cooperation will emerge.

2006年10月10日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30 *マクロワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Giacomo Corneo（Free University Berlin）

An Economic Theory of Symbolic Values [paper1] [paper2]

2006年10月24日(火 Tuesday) 16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Kazuko Kano （Queen's University / University of British Columbia）

Menu Costs, Strategic Interactions, and Retail Price Movements [PDF]

This paper　examines　a　state　dependent　pricing　model　in　the　presence of　fixed　adjustment costs of prices-menu costs. A model with menu costs has potential to explain an important characteristic of retail price movements: prices discretely jump. This paper shows that the assumption about market structureis crucial in identifying menu costs. Especially, prices in a tight oligopolistic market could be more rigid than those in more competitive market such as monopolistically competitive one. If so, the estimates of menu costs underthe assumption of monopolistic competitions in the past studies are potentially biased upwards due to the rigidity from strategic interactions among brands. In addition, the estimate could be biased downwards without controlling for the bene?ts from unobserved promotional activities.

2006年10月25日(水　Wednesday) 12:00-13:00 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Sudeshna Maitra（York University, Canada）

Population Growth and Rising Dowries: The Long-Run Mechanism of a Marriage Squeeze [PDF] 

India has experienced a much-documented inflation in dowries since the 1950s, which has been attributed to a spurt in population growth post-World War II. Will recent declines in fertility lead to a reversal of this trend and a regime of bride price? My paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of marriage markets, sex-ratio choice and population growth that is used to characterize the long-run relationship between population dynamics and marriage payments in India. I show that in the absence of exogenous sex preferences for offspring, and with no asymmetries between men and women except in desired ages of marriage (of self and spouse), the only sustainable steady state equilibria are characterized by dowry payments and an excess supply of women in the marriage market. This result holds for parameters consistent with marriage market indicators in India. 

2006年10月31日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30 *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Yupana Wiwattanakantang（Hitotsubashi University）

Big Business Owners and Politics: Investigating Financial Payoffs from Holding Top Office.[PDF]

This paper investigates the mechanisms that firms use to get state favors. We focus on a less well studied but common mechanism: business owners seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that business owners who rely on government concessions or are wealthier are more likely to run for top office. Once in power the market valuation of their firms increases dramatically. Surprisingly, the owners’ political power does not change their firms’ financing strategies. Instead, we show that business owners in top office use their policy decision powers to implement regulations and public policies favorable to their firms. Such policies hinder not only domestic competitors but also foreign investors. As a result, connected firms are able to seize more market share.

2006年11月7日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Christoph Kuzmics（Northwestern University）

Refined continuous time fictitious play [PDF]

Ageneral finite n-player normalformgameisplayedrecurrentlyby n randomly matched players each randomly chosen from their respec-tiveplayerpopulation. Agentsonlypartially observethe currentstate of play. Agents have heterogeneous prior beliefs about this state and after receiving information about a 1-ε proportion of all agents’ pure strategy choices,play amyopicbest reply totheir updatedbelief. This leads to a refined best-reply dynamic based on a minimal upper hemi continuous refinement of the best-reply correspondence. This corre-spondence is studied in detail. Its ?xed points, as well as notions of rationalizability and CURB sets based on this correspondence are definedandcharacterized.Implicationsforthe normalformsof extensive formgamesaregiven,and finally both convergence of andasymptotic stability under the dynamic process is discussed.

2006年11月14日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Iain Cockburn (Boston University)

Entry, Exit and Patenting in the Software Industry

We examine the effects of software patents on entry and exit in 27 narrowly-defined classes of software products, using a dataset with comprehensive coverage of both mature public firms and small privately held firms between 1994 and 2004. Reflecting the complex economics underlying the relationship between patent protection, entry costs and industry structure, we find that patents have a mixture of effects on entry and exit. Controlling for firm and market characteristics, firms are less likely to enter product classes in which there are more software patents. However, all else equal, firms that hold software patents are more likely to enter these markets. The net effect on entry of increasing the number of software patents is difficult to measure precisely: estimates of the effect of an across-the-board 10% increase in patent holdings on the number of entrants into the average market in this sample range from -5% to +3.5%, with quite large standard errors. Evidence on exit and survival is consistent with these findings?holding patents appears to enhance the survival prospects of firms after entering a market.

2006年11月21日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Ayako Suzuki（Osaka University）

Vertical Integration in the U.S. Cable Industry [PDF]

Theory shows that vertical integration has contrasting two effects, efficiency and foreclosure effects. This study empirically estimates the relative size of these two effects. Unlike previous studies, I focus on a single vertical merger in order to use a panel dataset, and estimate its average treatment effects on the several market outcomes. The findings suggest that there was a significant efficiency gain from the merger; the merged systems were found to carry affiliated networks more frequently; there was a larger price decrease in the merged markets. On the other hand, there was weak evidence of foreclosure.

2006年11月28日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Rieko Ishii（Osaka University）

Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auctions: a Study of Paving Market in Japan

[paper]

We present an econometric approach to the problem of detecting bid rigging in procurement auctions using bidding data in auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic price wars are caused by the participation of potential “outsiders.” Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive in the absence of these outsiders, we estimate the rule by which the ring selects the winner. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose time elapsed from the last winning is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.

2006年12月5日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Ching-I Huang（National Taiwan University）

Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone Service under Nonlinear Pricing [PDF]

Cellular phone carriers typically offer complicated nonlineartariffs. Consumers make a discrete choice among several rate plans. Each plan has a nonlinear price schedule, and price is usually lower for intra-network calls. Intra-network discounts reduce the compatibility among different carriers. Ipresent an empirical framework to estimate demand under such nonlinear price schemes and evaluate the impact of intra-network discounts on the market structure. I apply the method to analyze the cellular phone service market in Taiwan. While intra-network discounts increase consumer surplus modestly, there are considerable tipping effects on the market shares.

2006年12月12日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Fuhito Kojima（Harvard University）

Strategy-proofness of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism in Large Random Assignment Problems (joint with Mihai Manea) [paper]

In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001) is ordinally efficient and envy-free if all agents report their ordinal preferences truthfully, but not strategy-proof. However, we show that agents have incentives to state their preferences truthfully when the market is sufficiently large. Given a fixed set of object types and an agent with a fixed expected utility function over these objects, if the number of copies of each object type is sufficiently large, then truthful reporting of ordinal preferences is an weakly dominant strategy for the agent (for any set of other participating agents and their possible preferences). The better efficiency and fairness properties of the probabilistic serial mechanism, together with the non-manipulability property we discover, support its use in many circumstances rather than the random serial dictatorship mechanism.

2006年12月15日（金 Friday）12:00-13:40

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Marcel Fafchamps（Oxford University）

Matching in Rural Producer Organizations [PDF]

*COE Distinguished Research Seminar

Using a rich dataset from West Africa we study the determinants of membership in rural producer organizations (RPO). We find that on average it is the more fortunate members of rural society who belong in RPOs. In Senegal, the dominant criteria are land ownership. In Burkina Faso it is economic status and family ties with village authorities. Ethnicity also plays a role: RPO membership is less likely for ethnic groups that traditionally emphasize livestock raising. We also look for evidence of assortative  matching along multiple dimensions. To this effect we develop an original methodology based on dyadic regressions. We find robust evidence of assortative matching by physical and ethnic proximity as well as by wealth and social status.

2006年12月15日（金 Friday）15:00-16:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第4教室
at the Lecture Hall No.4 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Marcel Fafchamps（Oxford University）

Spontaneous Markets, Networks, and Social Capital [PDF]

*COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series と共催

2007年1月10日（水 Wednesday）12:00-13:10 * マクロワークショップ と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

Donghoon Lee（New York University）

Accounting for Wage and Employment Changes in the U. S. from 1968-2000: A Dynamic Model of Labor Market Equilibrium (joint with Kenneth I. Wolpin) [PDF]

2007年1月10日（水 Wednesday）17:15-18:45 *IO research group, Institute of Social Scienceと共催

東京大学社会科学研究所　1階中会議室
at the Coference Room on the 1st floor of the ISS Main Building  (Opposite the lift.)

Hiroyuki Nakata （University of Essex）

Informative Advertising with Spillover Effects [PDF]

This paper studies the effects of advertising in a Bertrand duopoly model with informative advertising, which is an extension of Grossman and Shapiro (1984). It introduces spillover advertising effects on top of the direct advertising effects. Also, the model involves R&D activities, which make the model dynamical. It is shown that the spillover effects would make the environment more monopolistic: higher prices and profits with lower R&D expenditures.

2007年2月6日（火 Tuesday） 16：50-18：20 *マクロワークショップと共催

Shintaro Yamaguchi (McMaster University)

Job Search, Bargaining, and Wage Dynamics [PDF]

What are the sources of rapid wage growth during a worker’searly career? To address this question,I constructand estimate a modelof strategic wage bargaining with on-the-job search to explore three different components of wages: general human capital, match-specific capital, and outside option.Workers search for alternative job opportunities on the job and accumulate human capital through learning-by-doing.As the workers find better job opportunities, the current employer has to compete with outside firms to retain them. This between-firm competition improves the outside option value of the worker, which results in wage growth on the job even when productivity remains the same. The modelis estimated by a simulated minimum distance estimator and data from the NLSY 79. The parameter estimates are used to simulate counterfactuals. The results indicate that the improved value of outside option raises wages of ten-year-experienced workers by 13%, which accounts for about a quarter of the wage growth during the first ten years of career. I also find that human capital accumulation affects wage profile not only because it directly changes labor productivity, but also because it altersjob search behavior due to low future productivity.

2007年2月8日（木 Thursday）16:50-18:30 *マクロワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Daiji Kawaguchi （Hitotsubashi University）

Wage Distribution in Japan: 1989-2003 (joint with Ryo Kambayashi and Izumi Yokoyama) [PDF]

Diverging economic inequality has become a common focus of economic debate in developed countries. In particular, the recent experience of Japan has started attracting international attention. We take advantage of a rich micro-level data set from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (1989-2003) to perform an in-depth analysis of the change in the inequality and distribution of the hourly wage. We observe that lower returns to education and years of tenure contribute to diminishing income disparity between groups for both sexes. A larger variance within a group contributes to the wage disparity for males, while an increased heterogeneity of workers’ attributes contributes to the wage disparity for females. The Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux decomposition also confirms the basic findings from a parametric variance decomposition.

2007年2月13日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Takanori Ida （Kyoto University）

Simultaneous Measurement of Time and Risk Preferences: Stated Preference Discrete Choice Modeling Analysis Depending on Smoking Behavior [PDF]

Measuring time and risk preferences and relating them to economic behaviors are important topics in behavioral economics. This paper deals with these problems in two points. First, we develop a new method to simultaneously measure the rate of time preference and the coefficient of risk aversion. Second, we analyze individual-level relationship between preference parameters and cigarette smoking. First, we conclude that current smokers are more impulsive than non-smokers with respect to both delay and probability discounting. Heavy smokers are the most impulsive, while ex-smokers are the most patient. Second, there is no difference in risk and time preferences between male and female smokers and between male and female non-smokers. On the other hand, risk and time preferences are significantly different between male smokers and non-smokers and between female smokers and non-smokers.

2007年2月15日（木 Thursday） 12：00-13：30 *マクロワークショップと共催

Emiko Usui (Wayne State University)

Gender Occupational Segregation in an Equilibrium Search Model [PDF]

This paper studies an equilibrium search model in which jobs are differentiated on both salary and working hours, and men and women have different preferences for hours. In particular, the marginal disutility of an additional work hour is higher for women than for men. Employers have different production technologies, and they post a tied salary/hours offer that maximizes their steady-state profit (or utility) flow. Even without the presence of discrimination, women crowd into short-hour, lower-paying jobs, whereas men are in long-hour, higher-paying jobs. There are fewer women on the job when employers have a taste for discrimination against women, since these employers make their job offer less appealing to women by requiring more working hours. On the other hand, when women have a disamenity value to working on a job, women choose not to work in that job because of a loss in utility. The prediction on segregation is similar to the case with employer discrimination.

2007年2月20日（火 Tuesday）　※SCHEDULE CHANGED

1)12：00-13：30*EMFと共催 　

2)16:50-18:30

1) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

2) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Ofer Azar （Ben-Gurion University of the Negev）

1) Firm Strategy and Biased Decision Making: The Price Dispersion Puzzle

2) Are Transportation and Search Costs Independent of the Good's Price? Some Experimental Evidence

2007年2月27日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30 *マクロワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Ryo Nakajima （University of Tsukuba）

Dynamics of R&D Collaboration in IT Industry (joint with Nobuyuki Hanaki and Yoshiaki Ogura) [PDF]

This paper provides an empirical analysis of evolving networks of successful R&D collaborations in the IT industry in the United States between 1985 and 1995. We first show that the network has become more extensive, more clustered, and more unequal in the sense “stars” have emerged in the network. We then perform regression analysis in which we control for firm similarity, including unobserved similarities that we infer from the community structure of the network. The results indicate significant triadic closure as well as preferntial attachment biases.

2007年3月7日（水 Wednesday）

1) 12:00-13:30 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

2) 17:15-18:45 

1) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of the Economics Research Building.

2) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Tobias Kretschmer （London School of Economics and University of Munich, Germany）

1) Splintering and Inertia in Network Industries [PDF]

2) Usage and Diffusion of Cellular Telephony, 1998-2004 [PDF]

1) We analyze a stylized game of technology adoption with network effects and two new technologies. Potential adopters can adopt early, late, or not at all. We show that one of the reasons for the failure of new technologies can be the presence of multiple incompatible vari-ants of that technology. An adopter’s individual incentives to adopt are lower with two technologies than with one. Turning to aggre-gate expected welfare, we ?nd that two active technologies may be welfare-improving.

2) In this paper, we study the dynamics of usage intensity of second-generation cellular

telephony over the diffusion curve. We address two specific questions: First, does informationabout usage intensity over time allow us to draw conclusions about the underlying drivers of technology diffusion? Second, what effect does the existence and penetration of previous generations and other networks in the same generation on network usage intensity? Using an operator-level panel covering 41 countries with quarterly data over 6 years, we find that heterogeneity among adopters dominates network effects and that different technological generations are complements in terms of usage, but substitutes in terms of subscription.

2007年3月20日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Todd Kaplan （University of Exeter）

Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Uniform Distributions: Analytic Solutions to the General Case (joint with Shmuel Zamir) [PDF]

2007年3月27日（火 Tuesday）16:00-17:10 　※TIME CHANGED※

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Minjung Park (University of Minnesota)

M&A Incentives and Outcomes: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry [PDF]

This paper tests hypotheses about the incentives of acquirers and targets in the merger market. The first hypothesis of this paper is that principal-agent conflicts lead some companies to make acquisitions to obtain private benefits for their management rather than to maximize profits. The second hypothesis is that targets try to avoid being taken over by acquirers that do not maximize profits. I test these hypotheses using data on acquisitions among mutual fund management companies from 1991 through 2004. I find that companies whose managers have recently performed poorly and thus have an incentive to “gamble for resurrection” with the owners’ money are more acquisitive than others, yet have significantly worse post-merger operating performance. These findings support the hypothesis that motives other than maximizing profits drive some acquisitions in this industry. I also find that acquirers that do not maximize profits tend to match with lower-quality targets, supporting the hypothesis that targets have an incentive to avoid being acquired by such acquirers. To investigate the role of these incentives in greater depth, I estimate a matching model of the merger market for fund management companies jointly with equations representing the outcomes of mergers. IN addition to confirming the findings described above, the estimates show that targets’ aversion to inefficient acquirers is a powerful market mechanism that deters many inefficient acquisitions. My counterfactual analysis suggests that eliminating this market mechanisms would lead to an allocation in which inefficient acquirers dominate the merger market.

2007年3月27日（火 Tuesday）17:20-18:30 ※TIME CHANGED※

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Luz Marina Arias (Stanford University)

How do rulers rule? Coordination, coercion and compliance: Insights from Colonial Mexico.

※ 2007年1月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

下記の期日までにセンター研究支援室の田中まで発表論文のファイルを送るかハードコピーをセンター研究支援室（経済学研究科棟７階７０９号室）までご持参下さい。 提出されたファイルはすぐに印刷にまわしてしまいますので、その後の差し替えがないよう、最終稿を１度だけ提出してください。 期限内に届いたものについては当日配布用印刷物を用意いたしますが、間に合わない場合やその後の差し替えについては、当日ご自分で１５部ほどコピーをご持参下さい。期限内に提出されなかった場合は、印刷を受け付けられませんのでご注意ください。

※　印刷物は発表が始まる迄にご用意致しますので、発表直前にセンター研究支援室へお立寄りいただき、各自で会場までお持ち下さい。

発表論文提出期限：

1月9日（火）発表者＝1月9日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月16日（火）発表者＝1月15日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月17日（水）発表者＝1月16日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月23日（火）発表者＝1月22日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月30日（火）発表者＝1月29日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

2月19日（月）発表者＝2月19日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

January 9, 2007（Tuesday） 16:50-17:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

曳埜智

公共社会資本ストックが地価に与える影響

January 9, 2007（Tuesday） 17:40-18:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

藤嶋翔太

Optimal Cordon Pricing in the Presence of Public Transport

January 16, 2007（Tuesday） 16:00-16:40

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

佐野隆司

The bidding strategies in a combinatorial auction with complementarities

January 16, 2007（Tuesday） 16:50-17:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

上武康亮

Inter-term Competition and Intra-team Cooperation

January 16, 2007（Tuesday） 17:40-18:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

齋藤紘多

Social Preference Under Uncertainty

January 17, 2007（Wednesday） 12:10-12:50

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

菅谷拓生

The Market Integration and the Continuous Exisistence of Real Indeterminacy

January 23, 2007（Tuesday） 17:00-17:40

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

松田絢子

Public Provision of Weather Insurance under Tenancy Contract

January 23, 2007（Tuesday） 17:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

山田耕資

M&Aの実証分析

January 23, 2007（Tuesday） 18:40-19:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

蜂谷義昭

負債と企業パフォーマンスとの関係についての実証分析

January 30, 2007（Tuesday）16:00-16:40

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

川瀬仁志

持続可能性と環境

January 30, 2007（Tuesday） 16:50-17:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

山根達弘

利他的な親と相対所得

January 30, 2007（Tuesday） 17:40-18:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of Economics Research Building

伊神満

Entry's impact on incumbents: Evidence from Tokyo food supermarkets after deregulation

February 19, 2007（Monday） 13:40-14:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟4階 トレーディングラボ
at the Trading Lab. on the 4th floor of the Economics Research Building

青木拓郎

An experimental analysis of reputation system in internet auctions

February 19, 2007（Monday） 14:20-15:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟4階 トレーディングラボ
at the Trading Lab. on the 4th floor of the Economics Research Building

馬場一輝

A Role of Similarity in Stag Hunt Games: Experimental Approach