Workshops


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Macroeconomics Workshop 2017

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“ϊŽž

May 11, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj17:00-18:30 ¦ŽžŠΤ‚ΖκŠ‚Ι’ˆΣ

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κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ2ƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Neil Wallace (Pennsylvania State University)

Models of money based on imperfect monitoring and pairwise meetings: policy implications [Slides]

Abstract

The presentation will review work that deals with optimal policy in models in which money plays a role because of imperfect monitoring. Three settings will be studied: a setting with no-monitoring in which fiat (outside) money is the only asset; a setting with no-monitoring and in which money and higher-return assets coexist; and a setting in which some fraction of the population is not monitored at all and the rest are perfectly monitored. In each case, I will present examples of optima—the majority of which have policies that will seem surprising.

“ϊŽž

May 18, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

May 25 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Michele Modugno (Federal Reserve Board)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

May 31, 2017 i…@WednesdayjTBA@¦—j“ϊ‚Ι’ˆΣ

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Ricardo Reis (London School of Economics and Political Science)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

June 8, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

΄‘κMOiNobuhiro Kiyotaki) (Princeton University)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

June 12, 2017 iŒŽ@Mondayj16:50-18:35@¦—j“ϊ‚Ι’ˆΣ

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Wataru Miyamoto (Bank of Canada)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

June 15, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Russell Cooper (The Pennsylvania State University)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

June 23, 2017 i‹ΰ@Fridayj16:50-18:35@¦—j“ϊE‰οκ‚Ι’ˆΣ

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j2ŠK ¬“‡ƒRƒ“ƒtƒ@ƒŒƒ“ƒXƒ‹[ƒ€
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

“c’†‘Žj (Satoshi Tanaka) (The University of Queensland)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

June 29, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Ke JI (The University of Tokyo)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

July 5, 2017 i…@Wednesdayj16:50-18:30 ¦—j“ϊ‚Ι’ˆΣ

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Evi Papa (European University Institute)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

July 6, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

“Φ‰κ‹M”V(Takayuki Tsuruga) (Kyoto University)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

July 13, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

July 20, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Ό—Ρ—mˆκ (Yoichi Matsubayashi) (Kobe University)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

October 12, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Indraneel Chakraborty (University of Miami)

TBA

Abstract

 

“ϊŽž

October 26, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Parantap Basu (Durham University)

Redistributive Innovation Policy, Inequality and Efficiency (join twithYoseph Getachew) [paper]

Abstract

Using a heterogenous-agent growth model with in-house R&D and incomplete capital markets, we examine the efficiency and distributional effects of alternative public R&D policies that target high-tech and low-tech sectors. We find that such policies have im- portant implication for efficiency, inequality and social mobility. A regressive public R&D investment financed by income tax could boost growth and welfare via a positive effect on individual savings and effort. However, it could also discourage them via its effect on the efficiency-inequality trade off. The relationship between public R&D spending and welfare is therefore hump shaped admitting an optimal degree of regressivity in public R&D spend- ing. A case for optimal progressive public R&D investment, however, can be made with a properly designed R&D policy that combines consumption tax and investment subsidy policies.

–{”N“xI—Ή•ͺF

“ϊŽž

April 5, 2017 i…@Wednesdayj16:50-18:35 ¦—j“ϊ‚Ι’ˆΣ

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Francesco Zanetti (University of Oxford)

State Dependence in Labor Market Fluctuations: Evidence, Theory and Policy Implications

Abstract

This paper documents a novel fact: the volatility in the unemployment rate and the job separation rate is larger in periods with low aggregate productivity. A Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model with endogenous job separation and on-the-job search replicates these empirical regularities well. Endogenous job separation embeds powerful state dependence. The volatility of the job separation rate is larger in states with low aggregate productivity and in response to contractionary shocks. State dependence implies that the effect of labor market reforms is different across the business cycle and it depends on the state of aggregate productivity. A permanent removal of layoff taxes is welfare enhancing in the long run, but it involves distinct costs across states of productivity in the short run. The welfare gain of a tax removal enacted in the state with low aggregate productivity is 3.5 percent higher than the same reform in the state with high aggregate productivity.

“ϊŽž

April 13, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Pedro Pinto Franco (Musashi University)

Securitization, Non-Recourse Loans and House Prices [paper]

Abstract

We study the effects of securitization and recourse (limited liability) laws on housing markets. Securitization allows originators to pass on the risk of loans they originate. As a consequence, originators stop screening due to the absence of credible signalling to securitizers. This allows speculator borrowers to start receiving loans and, when these loans are non-recourse, there is a put option that pushes up house prices during a demand boom. We thus predict that the interaction between securitization and non-recourse status should lead to higher house prices. We use heterogeneity in recourse laws in US states to test this. As predicted, non-recourse status roughly doubles the size of the positive relationship between securitization and house prices and can explain 75% of the difference in prices between recourse and non-recourse states. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we propose a new instrument for securitization, the distance of a housing market to the headquarters of 'originate and securitize' institutions, and find further empirical support for our prediction.

“ϊŽž

April 20, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

“z“cŒ΄Œ’Œε (Kengo Nutahara) (Senshu University)

Can the Laffer curve for consumption tax be hump-shaped? (joint with Kazuki Hiraga) [paper]

Abstract

This paper characterizes the shape of the Laffer curve for consumption tax analytically. The Laffer curve for consumption tax can be hump-shaped if the utility@function is an additively separable one in consumption and labor supply. Conversely, it cannot be hump-shaped if the utility function is the one employed by previous researchers. The difference in the utility functions has quantitatively significant effects on the peak tax rates of the Laffer curves for labor and capital income taxes.

“ϊŽž

April 27, 2017 i–؁@Thursdayj16:50-18:35

κŠ

“Œ‹ž‘εŠw‘εŠw‰@ŒoΟŠwŒ€‹†‰Θ ŠwpŒπ—¬“ i¬“‡ƒz[ƒ‹j‚PŠK ‘ζ‚PƒZƒ~ƒi[ŽΊ
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

•ρ

Yong Wang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology & Peking University)

Trade and Non-convergence of Middle-Income Countries (joint with Shang-Jin Wei)

Abstract

We develop a tractable growth model to show how a middle-income country (M) can be sandwiched by an innovating north country (N) and an imitating south country (S) through international trade. An increase in labor productivity of existing varieties (intensive margin) or in the number of varieties (extensive margin) produced in S may result in non-convergence of M to N, but this chasing effect from S disappears when S is sufficiently unproductive. Meanwhile, an increase in innovation in N not only enlarges the income gap between N and M (pressing effect from N) but also makes M more vulnerable to the chasing effect from S. We characterize how M should optimally allocate its resources between production and R&D to respond to the chasing effect from S and pressing effect from N.