Workshops

2014年4月8日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Michal Fabinger (University of Tokyo)

Why are Some Imperfect Competition Models So Much More Tractable than Others? How to Flexibly Approximate Incidence in Closed Form (joint with Glen Weyl)

For tractability, researchers often use models of imperfect competition that can be solved in closed form. This typically means imposing unintended substantive restrictions on incidence properties that are central to many policy questions. To overcome this limitation, we characterize the full set of joint supply and demand systems yielding closed-form solutions, a class that is broad enough to allow substantial flexibility and thus realism. We apply these more realistic structures to international trade, where closed-form monopolistic competition models are ubiquitous, deriving several applied insights. Beyond parametric examples, we provide a simple, general approach to characterizing and tractably approximating incidence.

2014年4月14日 （月　Monday）10:30-12:10 ※日時にご注意ください。

※　財政・公共経済ワークショップと共催

小川 光 (Hikaru Ogawa) (Nagoya University)

Municipal Merger and Tax Competition

This paper integrates the models of municipal consolidation and fiscal competition to examine governments' incentives for merging municipalities when countries engage in global tax competition. The result shows that the prospective tax competition leads to excessive municipal mergers.

2014年4月15日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

※　財政・公共経済ワークショップと共催

安藤道人（Michihito Ando) (Uppsala University)

Identifying the Effects of Grants on Local Policies in the Presence of Grant Endogeneity and Grant Effect Heterogeneity [PDF]

Although recent empirical studies on the effects of intergovernmental grants on local policies and other outcomes have increasingly taken into account grant endogeneity, most of them rely on a linear estimation framework with a constant treatment effect or do not explicitly consider treatment effect heterogeneity in their theoretical and empirical models. In this paper, assuming a two-stage grant allocation process and relying on the potential outcome framework, I explicitly consider the case where heterogeneous propensities of local governments for public services induce endogenous grant allocation and heterogeneous grant effects on local policies. Then I discuss how a Regression Kink (RK) design with a kinked grant allocation rule can be utilized to solve the problem of grant endogeneity under the assumption of grant effect heterogeneity. Finally, using Japanese municipality panel data, I examine the causal effects of fiscal equalization grants on local policies wit

h the RK design. Results imply that, for a specific subgroup of relatively affluent municipalities, expenditures for non-personnel education costs are arguably most significantly affected by the grants. Effects on other various expenditure categories and policy indicators are also estimated and interpreted.

2014年4月22日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

尾張圭太 (Keita Owari) (University of Tokyo)

A regular extension problem of monotone convex functions arising in the theory of convex risk measure

The basic interest in this work is to provide an efficient and unified way of dealing with convex risk measures (AKA monetary utility functions modulo change of sign) for unbounded risks. Our basic strategy is to extend a ``good'' risk measure originally defined on L<sup>∞</sup>, a ``fairly nice and universal space'', preserving the ``good property'' so that a number of formal applications of results which are known to be true on L<sup>∞</sup> are justified with minimal efforts. This leads us to a ``regular extension'' problem of monotone convex functions. More specifically, we focus on an order regularity property, called the Lebesgue property, an analogue of the dominated convergence theorem in measure theory. Given a finite valued monotone convex functi on on L^∞ having this property, we construct explicitly its maximum extension retaining this regularity. We then characterize the Lebesgue property on general solid space of measurable functions in terms of other topological regularity properties which often play essential roles in the so called convex duality techniques in convex optimization, especially in utility maximization problems.  

References (related articles):

[1] Owari, K, Maximum Lebesgue extension of monotone convex functions, J. Funct. Anal. 266, 3572-3611, 2014 [link]

[2] Owari, K, On the Lebesgue property of monotone convex functions, Math. Financ. Econ. 8,159-167, 2014 [link]

2014年5月13日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

田中隆一 (Ryuichi Tanaka) (GRIPS)

Immigration, Naturalization, and the Future of Public Education (joint with Lidia Farre and Francesc Ortega) [PDF]

This paper analyzes the eects of immigration on the education system of the receiving country from a political economy perspective. Specically, we extend the school-choice model by Epple and Romano (1996b) by incorporating a subsidy to private schools, a distinguishing feature of Spain's education system. We calibrate the model to match key moments of Spain's economy and education system in year 2008, the end of a large episode of immigration. By means of simulations we evaluate the eects of immigration on the size and quality of Spain's public education. Our main ndings are as follows. First, immigration will lead to a small increase in the size of public education in terms of enrollment. However, this increase in size masks an important composition eect. There is a large native ight away from public schools that is oset by the large in ow of immigrant children into public schools. Secondly, we predict a large reduction in the quality of public education, an 11 percent reduction in public spending per student. Our analysis suggests that these eects will unfold unevenly over time. While the changes in the size (and student composition) of public schools will take place promptly upon arrival of the immigrants, the reduction in funding will be more gradual and only fully take place once the immigrant population has been enfranchised. We also provide estimates of the results separately for each region (autonomous community) of Spain.

2014年5月20日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Hyunchul Kim (Sungkyunkwan University)

Estimation of Store Choice Model with Endogenous Shopping Bundles [PDF]

This paper examines the eects of measurement errors in household shopping plans and
price beliefs on the estimates of price elasticities in retail outlet choice. Previous studies
parsimoniously use realized purchases as a proxy for unobserved shopping lists and assume
homogenous price expectation across all households and over the entire sample period. This
measurement error in forecasting expected basket costs introduces attenuation bias in store-
level price elasticities toward zero. I show that the bias is reduced with my improved measures
of expected basket costs by estimating shopping lists of households and by constructing
household-, time-, store-, and goods-specic price expectations.

2014年5月27日 （火　Tuesday）14:00-18:20

※日時に注意。ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、CIRJE特別セミナー　と共催

14:00-15:00 Michal Fabinger (University of Tokyo)
　　　　　　　　　Applications of analytically tractable models to trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms

15:00-16:00 Drew Griffen (University of Tokyo)
　　　　　　　　　Fertility and Maternal Labor Supply in Japan: Conflicting policy goals? [paper]

16:00-16:20 break

16:20-17:20 Juan Pantano (Washington University in St. Louis)

17:20-18:20 Gil Shapira (The World Bank) *Schedule Changed

 

2014年6月3日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Chamna Yoon (The City University of New York)

Estimating a Dynamic Game of Gubernatorial Elections to Evaluate the Impact of Term Limits (joint with Holger Sieg) [PDF]

We estimate a dynamic game of gubernatorial elections to provide a new empirical evaluation of the impact of term limits on electoral competition and economic policies in the U.S. Building on recent theoretical advances in mod- eling repeated elections, we consider a model in which candidates from two parties compete in statewide elections. Politician cannot credibly commit to policies prior to an election. Candidates are drawn from dierent distributions of ideological positions, which share a large common support. Equilibria can be characterized by asymmetric election standards, which depend on the party of the candidate and the history of the game. We show that our model is non-parametrically identied and propose a semi-parametric estimator. The empirical analysis draws on data from U.S. gubernatorial elections between 1950 and 2012. Our ndings suggest that term limits provide strong incentives for a moderate governors to move towards the center of the ideological spectrum during his rst term in oce. We also nd evidence that the distribution of voter ideal points is similar to the distribution of political candidates providing support for citizen-candidate type models.

2014年6月9日 （月　Monday）12:10-13:10　 ※日時にご注意ください。

※　ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

Nicolas Jacquemet (Paris School of Business)

Coordination with Communication under Oath (with Stéphane Luchini, Jason F. Shogren and Adam Zylbersztejn)

Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.

2014年6月16日 （月　Monday）16:40-18:20　 ※日時にご注意ください。

Glen Weyl (University of Chicago)

Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets [PDF]

The originally announced topic "Quadratic Voting" has been moved to the new Rationality and Society Workshop taking place from 14:50 to 16:30 on the same day, Monday, June 16.

2014年6月24日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

山本裕一 (Yuichi Yamamoto) (University of Pennsylvania)

Stochastic Games with Hidden States

We study infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find a condition under which the limit feasible payoff set exists and is invariant to the initial prior about the state. Building on this result, the folk theorem is established for games with observable actions. Moreover, for some special cases, the folk theorem remains valid even if actions are not observable.

2014年7月1日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

菅史彦 (Fumihiko Suga) (Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)

An Equilibrium Model of Pension Provision and Wage Determination [PDF]

This paper proposes and estimates a structural model of screening by employer-provided pensions. The model illustrates how employed workers are sorted into pension jobs and non-pension jobs according to their time preferences and human capital levels, and can explain why firms provide pension plans and why workers with pensions earn more than workers without pensions. The basic structure of the workers' side of the model is a life-cycle model with heterogeneity in discount rates, human capital accumulation, and pension and non-pension asset accumulation. In the model, workers with low discount rates (low discounters) work harder and longer, and accumulate more human capital stocks. On the other hand, there are firms that have an incentive to hire such workers due to a fixed cost of hiring a worker. Firms cannot observe workers' time preferences due to asymmetric information, so the firms with a fixed hiring cost make contributions to pension plans and offer human capital rental rates that are lower than the competitive human capital rental rates offered by firms without fixed hiring cost so that low discounters who place higher values on future income are attracted. Although this paper focuses on a specific type of pensions, 401(K) plans, the basic idea can be applied to other forms of employer-provided pensions, which is the biggest advantage of the idea of screening by employer-provided pensions over the other competing hypotheses on the role of employer-provided pensions. I estimate the model by using U.S. data. The estimation results indicate that workers are sorted into pension jobs and non-pension jobs not only according to their human capital levels, but also according to their time preferences. The result of a counter-factual simulation shows that the tax benefit of 401(K) plans has a great impact on the way of workers to be sorted into pension jobs and non-pension jobs.

2014年7月8日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Carl Sanders (Washington University in St. Louis)

Decomposing the Native-Immigrant Wage Gap in the United States (joint with Rebecca Lessem)[PDF]

Immigrant workers in the United States earn significantly lower wages than observably similar natives. We study the wage path of immigrants on order to understand this gap, focusing on the contributions of two mechanisms for wage growth. First, the value of labor market experience may differ for natives and immigrants. Second, it may take time for new immigrants to be matched with their optimal occupation after moving to the US. To separate these two forces, we create a parsimonious model of human capital accumulation and job search which we estimate using representative data on recent immigrants from the New Immigrant Survey. Data on each person's occupation in their home country, which is not available in datasets previously used to study immigrant wage assimilation, allows us to compare immigrants who come from similar occupations but have different career paths in the US. Reduced form evidence shows that both returns to experience and job search drive immigrant wage growth. Counterfactuals show that placing immigrants immediately in their long-run occupations reduces the initial native-immigrant wage gap by about 7%.

2014年7月15日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

※　マクロ経済学ワークショップと共催

Liang Wang (University of Hawaii)

Job Search over the Life Cycle

2014年7月22日 （火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

林 貴志（Takashi Hayashi） (University of Glasgow)

Gains from Trade (joint with Christopher P. Chambers)[PDF]

In a social choice context, we ask whether there exists a system of transfers and regulations whereby gains from trade can always be realized under trade liberalization. We consider a resource allocation problem in which the set of commodities to be traded is variable. We propose an axiom stating that enlarging the set of commodities and reapplying the rule hurts nobody. We obtain two results. Suppose that we extend the allocation rule in two steps, first from autarky to a class of smaller sets of commodities and second to the entire set of commodities. Our first result is that if we apply the Walrasian solution in the first step, it is impossible to extend the rule in the second step in order to satisfy the above axiom, even when compensation or regulation is allowed. Our second result is that if the rule satisfies an allocative efficiency axiom and an informational efficiency axiom stating that only preferences over tradable commodities should matter, together with the above axiom, gains from trade can be given to only one individual in the first step.

2014年8月25日 （月　Monday）11:30-13:00　

※　日時と場所にご注意ください。ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

Ali Hortaçsu (University of Chicago)

Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (joint with Mark Egan and Gregor Matvos)

We develop and estimate an empirical model of the U.S. banking sector using a new data set covering the largest U.S. banks over the period 2002-2013. Our model incorporates rich consumer preferences on the deposit demand-side and endogenous bank bankruptcy decisions on the supply-side as well as competition between banks in the spirit of Matutes and Vives (1996). Our demand estimation results suggest that a bank's ability to attract uninsured rather than insured deposits depends critically on its nancial solvency. We use estimated demand elasticities for interest rates, CDS spreads and bank balance sheet information to calibrate the model. At the estimated parameter values, our model suggests that banks were nancially fragile at the height of the crisis in 2009. In addition to the realized equilibrium outcome, the same fundamentals supported additional equilibria, in which bankruptcy probabilities and interest rates in the banking sector were signicantly higher. We use our model to assess recent and proposed bank regulatory changes. In particular, we nd that increasing FDIC insurance could improve the equilibrium survival probabilities across the banking system, and could actually lower the cost of providing FDIC insurance. Conversely, we nd that certain interventions to bank risk limits may actually lower banks' equilibrium survival probabilities.

2014年8月25日 （月　Monday）16:40-18:20　

※曜日と場所にご注意ください。Rationality and Society Workshopと共催

小島武仁(Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University)

Stable Matching in Large Economies (joint with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim)

Complementarities of preferences have been known to jeopardize the stability of two-sided matching markets, yet they are a pervasive feature of many matching markets. We revisit the stability issue with such preferences in a large market. Workers have preferences over firms while firms have preferences over distributions of workers and may exhibit complementarity. We demonstrate that if each firm's choice changes continuously as the set of available workers changes, then there exists a stable matching even with complementarity. Building on this result, we show that there exists an approximately stable matching in any large finite economy. We apply our analysis to show the existence of stable matchings in probabilistic and time-share matching models with a finite number of firms and workers.

2014年9月12日 （金　Friday）11:00-12:30　※日時にご注意ください。

佐藤泰裕(Yasuhiro Sato) (Osaka University)

How Urbanization Affect Employment and Social Interactions (joint with Yves Zenou) [PDF]

We develop a model where the unemployed workers in the city can find a job either directly or through weak or strong ties. We show that, in denser areas, individuals choose to interact with more people and meet more random encounters (weak ties) than in sparsely populated areas. We also demonstrate that, for a low urbanization level, there is a unique steady-state equilibrium where workers do not interact with weak ties, while, for a high level of urbanization, there is a unique steady-state equilibrium with full social interactions. We show that these equilibria are usually not socially efficient when the urban population has an intermediate size because there are too few social interactions compared to the social optimum. Finally, even when social interactions are optimal, we show that there is overurbanization in equilibrium.

2014年9月30日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

John Stachurski (Australian National University)

Transaction Costs, Span of Control and Competitive Equilibrium (Tomoo Kikuchi and Kazuo Nishimura) [PDF]

The firm size distribution exhibits important regularities across countries, time and levels of aggregation. To date, attempts to explain these regularities have assumed either exogenous heterogeneity or exogenous idiosyncratic shocks. In this paper we pursue an alternative line of analysis, starting with fundamental ideas from the theory of the firm and examining their aggregate implications in a competitive setting with sequential production and symmetric costs. Key stylized facts for the firm size distribution are replicated in equilibrium, despite the absence of any intrinsic heterogeneity.

2014年10月1日（水　Wednesday）14:00-16:00

※日時・場所に注意、CIRJE特別セミナーと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

John Stachurski (Australian National University)

An Introduction to Python for Economists

Quantitative Economics

2014年10月6日（月　Monday）16:40-18:10

※日時・場所に注意、CIRJE特別セミナー、ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、Rationality and Society Workshop、経済史研究会、財政・公共経済ワークショップ、工学系研究科技術経営戦略学専攻、応用統計ワークショップと共催

James J. Heckman (University of Chicago)
The Market and Nonmarket Returns to Education

2014年10月7日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

平野 智裕 (Tomohiro Hirano) (University of Tokyo)

Lean Against Bubble versus Clean Up After Bubble Collapses in a Rational-Bubble Model

This paper analyzes lean against bubble versus clean up after bubble crashes in a rational-bubble model. The main results are as follows. Firstly, macro-prudential regulation can be justified in the case of over-sized bubbles which are more likely to occur when the quality of the financial system is relatively high. Secodly, although macro-prudential regulation reduces the over-sized bubbles, it may end up increasing boom-bust cycles in real variables. Thirdly, when the degree of externality (i.e., interconnectedness in production) is large, bailouts can improve taxpayer's welfare, but it creates a time-inconsistency problem, thereby generating welfare loss. Macro-prudential regulation can mitigate welfare loss due to government's inability to commit to future bailout policy. Under some conditions, macro-prudential regulation can function as a commitment device. Moreover, even if government can commit to future bailout policy, macro-prudential regulation can solve welfare loss associated with commitment equilibrium.

2014年10月14日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

国本 隆 (Takashi Kunimoto) (Hitotsubashi University)

Implementation with Transfers ( joint with Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun) [paper]

We say that a social choice rule is implementable with (small) transfers if one can design a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that speciÖed by the rule but the mechanism allows for (small) ex post transfers among the players. We then show in private values environments that any incentive compatible rule is implementable with small transfers. Therefore, our mechanism only needs small ex post transfers to make our implementation results completely free from the multiplicity of equilibrium problem. In addition, our mechanism possesses the unique equilibrium that is robust to higher-order belief perturbations. We also discuss the di¢ culty of extending our results to interdependent values environments.

2014年10月21日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Daniel Marszalec (University of Tokyo)

Auctions For Complements - An Experimental Analysis [PDF]

I evaluate the performance of four static sealed-bid package auctions in an experimental setting with complementarities. The underlying valuation model comprises two items, and three bidders; two `individual' bidders demand one item only, while the third bidder wants to win both. The rules being compared include the Vickrey and first-price auctions, as well as the Vickrey Nearest Rule and the Reference Rule. Auction-level tests find the first-price auction revenue dominant over the other three rules, while the Vickrey auction performs worst, with the other two rules ranking intermediate. Bidder-level tests of the experimental data reject the competitive equilibrium bidding functions that can be derived in this setting, and I find that overbidding is widespread in all four auctions, as is aversion to submitting boundary bids. I also observe behaviour consistent with collusive bidding by participants in the Vickrey auction. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the Vickrey auction performs worst on efficiency, primarily for this reason.

2014年10月28日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

相澤直貴 (Naoki Aizawa) (University of Minnesota)

Health Insurance Exchange Design in an Empirical Equilibrium Labor Market Model

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that all U.S. states establish regulated individual insurance markets, known as health insurance exchanges (HIX), to facilitate the purchase of health insurance. In this paper, I evaluate the current HIX system and examine its optimal design, accounting for adverse selection and equilibrium labor market interactions. I first develop and empirically implement a life cycle equilibrium labor market search model integrated with the pre-ACA health insurance market. Various forms of individual heterogeneity are incorporated to understand the welfare consequences of introducing HIX. I estimate the model by the method of simulated moments using a combination of micro data sources. Through counterfactual experiments, I find that the ACA substantially reduces the uninsured rate. However, it also decreases aggregate labor productivity because more workers choose employment in less productive firms. Next, I examine the optimal design of HIX by choosing the values of three major design components---individual mandates (tax penalties on the uninsured), premium subsidies and age-based rating regulations. I find that the optimal combination of these components makes it less beneficial for older workers relative to younger workers to purchase health insurance from HIX. Implementing the optimal structure leads to a substantial welfare gain relative to the HIX implemented under the ACA while achieving higher labor productivity and a slightly lower uninsured rate.

2014年11月4日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Seung-Gyu Sim (University of Tokyo)

On-the-Job Training and On-the-Job Search: Wage-Training Contracts in a Frictional Labor Market [PDF]

This paper analyzes the interaction among firm productivity, wage payment, and on-the-job training in a frictional labor market in which both unskilled and skilled workers engage in on-the-job search behavior and firms post skill-dependent wage-training contracts. It demonstrates that when firms take advantage of training as a means of delaying compensation as much as possible to extract more surplus in earlier periods, the training intensity of the market equilibrium is over-intensified relative to that of the constrained efficiency benchmark, and is also reinforced toward the Beckerian outcome as search friction is mitigated, under reasonable parametric and distributional assumptions.

2014年11月11日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Eduardo Faingold (Yale University)

The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring (joint with Martin W. Cripps) [abstract]

2014年11月18日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

中嶋 亮 (Ryo Nakajima) (Keio University)

Evaluating Professor's Value-added: Evidence from Professor and
Student Matching in Physics (joint with Yuta Kikuchi)

We measure a professor value added on graduate student’s research outcome. A unique matched panel data of professors and students of a physics department allows us to identify the quality of advising professors that contributes to increase their advisees’ research performance. To control for endogenous selection in mentor-mentee matching, we focus on turnovers of professors, and estimate a semiparametric lower bound of the variance in professor quality based on student’s research outcome measured by the number of top journal publications in physics.

2014年11月25日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10 ※時間にご注意ください。

Aniko Öry (Yale University)

Consumers on a Leash: Advertised Sales and Intertemporal Price Discrimination [paper]

The Internet allows sellers to track "window shoppers," consumers who look but do not buy, and to lure them back later by targeting them with an advertised sale. This new technology thus facilitates intertemporal price discrimination, but simultaneously makes it too easy for a seller to undercut her regular price. Because buyers know they could be lured back, the seller is forced to set a lower regular price. Advertising costs can, therefore, serve as a form of commitment: a seller can actually benefit from higher costs of advertising. Based on this framework, the impact of commiment on prices, profits, and welfare are analyzed using a dynamic pricing model. Furthermore, it is demonstrated how buyers' time preferences give rise to price uctuation or an everyday-low-price in equilibrium.

2014年11月25日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

※都市経済ワークショップと共催

Rainald Borck (University of Potsdam)

Green Cities? Urbanization, Trade and the Environment

2014年12月1日（月　Monday）10:00-11:15 ※日時ににご注意ください。

※ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

不破信彦（Nobuhiko Fuwa） (Waseda University)

This paper investigates the emerging credit arrangement called ‘ATM sangla (pawning)’ in the Philippines, with a focus on how it interacts with borrowers with different time preferences. We report on initial results based on a small survey of 300 factory workers in an industrial estate near the Metro Manila area. ATM sangla is informal loan arrangement where the borrower’s ATM card is used as the collateral and where the lender uses the ATM card to withhold the repayment from salary payment on every pay day until the entire amount is repaid. While almost all (93%) of our respondents are aware of ATM sangla, it is slightly less than half of our respondents (42%) who have actually utilized ATM sangla at least once, and the average amount of the loan (principal) is 15,000 pesos, which correspond to 1.3 times the average monthly salary. The main uses of loan proceeds include medical expenses, daily consumption and education of children. We find that 43% of our respondents have consistent time preferences while 34% of them are hyperbolic (present biased) discounters, and that hyperbolic discounters tend to rely more on ATM sangla loans than do consistent discounters. We also find suggestive evidence that those hyperbolic discounters are naïve, rather than sophisticated.

2014年12月2日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

Botond Koszegi (Central European University)

Using Information about Naivete to Price Discriminate (joint with Paul Heidhues)

We study the welfare effects of an increase in competitive lenders' information about borrowers' short-run taste for immediate gratification (beta) or naivete about this taste (beta-hat). We show that even if consumers are heterogeneous in both their tastes and beliefs, lender information always lowers welfare. Because non-sophisticated borrowers underestimate their willingness to pay interest on a loan, lenders raise the amount of credit above optimal. Information about consumers leads firms to raise inefficient lending to consumers more likely to be naive and to lower inefficient lending to consumers more likely to be sophisticated, while raising total lending. We identify precisely what kind of information is welfare-decreasing. We show that information that allows firms to learn about the naivete of consumers with given beliefs always strictly decreases total welfare, but information about a consumer's beliefs has at most distributional implications, while information about tastes is neither necessary nor sufficient to decrease welfare. We show that the logic of our results extends to other markets, such as bank accounts or hotels, where consumer naivete may play a role.

2014年12月9日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10 ※時間にご注意ください。

Fuhito Kojima (Stanford University)

Designing Matching Mechanisms under Constraints: An Approach from Discrete Convex Analysis (joint with Akihisa Tamura and Makoto Yokoo)

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents on one side of the market (hospitals) are required to satisfy some distributional constraints (e.g., a minimum quota for each hospital). We show that when the preference of the hospitals is represented as an M♮-concave function, the following desirable properties hold: (i) the time complexity of the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is O(|X|²), where |X| is the number of possible contracts, (ii) the generalized DA mechanism is strategyproof, (iii) the obtained matching is stable, and (iv) the obtained matching is optimal for the agents on one side (doctors) within all stable matchings. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for the preference to be represented by an M♮-concave function. These sufficient conditions are general enough to cover most existing works on strategyproof mechanisms under distributional constraints in many-to-one matching problems and enable new applications as well. These conditions provide a recipe for non-experts in matching theory or discrete convex analysis to develop desirable mechanisms in such settings.

2014年12月9日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

宇井 貴志 (Takashi Ui) (Hitotsubashi University)

Optimal Disclosure of Public Information with Endogenous Acquisition of Private Information

A public authority provides agents with public information, but each agent also acquires his own private information, and they play a linear quadratic Gaussian game. More provision of public information induces less acquisition of private information, yet this effect attenuates as the elasticity of marginal cost of information acquisition increases. The main result of this paper characterizes the optimal disclosure of public information in terms of an arbitrary quadratic welfare function, where the elasticity of marginal cost plays an essential role. To this end, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public information. We find that the welfare effect of public information is determined by a linear combination of the two extreme cases with zero and infinite elasticities of marginal cost.

2014年12月16日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10 ※時間にご注意ください。

菅谷拓生 (Takuo Sugaya) (Stanford University)

On the Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring (joint with Alexander Wolitzky) [PDF]

We provide simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a tight, recursive upper bound on the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. We show that this bounding set admits a simple recursive characterization, which nonetheless necessarily involves the use of private strategies. Under our conditions, this set describes precisely those payoff vectors that arise in equilibrium for some private monitoring structure.

2014年12月16日（火　Tuesday）16:40-18:20

松島 斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (University of Tokyo)

Implementatioin and Detection

We investigate implementation with a fixed set of states. We make very weak knowledge assumptions; prior distributions over states and sequences of information channels as well as payoff functions are not common knowledge. No non-trivial social choice function is uniquely implementable whenever the central planner accesses only the degenerate channel. On the other hand, if the central planner accesses non-degenerate channels to some extent, any social choice function is uniquely implementable in strict iterative dominance. This permissive result holds even if the information accessibility is almost negligible in probability and the central planner’s channel is irrelevant to the social choice function.

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10　※時間にご注意ください。

齊藤紘多 (Kota Saito) (California Institute of Technology)

Testable Implications of Models of Intertemporal Choice: Exponential Discounting and Its Generalizations (joint with Federico Echenique and Taisuke Imai) [PDF]

We present the first revealed-preference characterizations of the models of exponential discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and other time-separable models of consumers' intertemporal decisions. We contribute to the axiomatic work that tries to describe the behavioral content of models of intertemporal choice. Ours is the first axiomatization of these models taking finite consumption streams and market purchases as primitives. The characterizations provide non-parametric revealed-preference tests. We apply our test to data from Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), and find that less than half the subjects are consistent with exponential discounting; only a few more are consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.

2015年1月9日（金　Friday）17:30-19:00　※日時にご注意ください。

※ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

山野峰 （Takashi Yamano） (International Rice Research Institute)

How does drought-tolerant rice help farmers? Evidence from a randomized control trial in eastern India [PDF]

By using data from a randomized control trial (RTC) of more than 1,500 farmers in eastern India, this paper investigates how a drought-tolerant rice variety, called Sahbhagi Dhan, helps farmers. In the RTC, farmers in treatment villages received 5 kg seeds of Sahbhagi Dhan before the main agricultural season, called kharif, in 2013. The paper finds that Sahbhagi Dhan enabled farmers adopt an additional crop, mostly wheat, after kharif because of its short duration. However, its impact on rice yields is inconclusive because a major cyclone and other non-drought stresses damaged rice production significantly in kharif 2013. Receiving a new rice variety seems to have a positive impact on farmers’ perception toward new agricultural technology among the treatment group. The investigation continues as the RTC continues for two more years.

2015年1月13日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10　 *Seminar Cancelled*

**This seminar has been cancelled.**

Bill Sandholm (University of Wisconsin)

2015年3月23日（月　Monday）　 12:00-13:30　 ※日時・会場に注意

※ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

Jonathan Haidt (NYU-Stern School of Business)

Two reasons why moral psychology should be of interest to economists: Wicked problems and changing values

The 20^th century settled the matter: There is no alternative to capitalism. The question for the 21^st century is: what kind of capitalism is right for each country? Economists are the experts we usually consult for advice on the economic order, but in my talk I will make the case that my field – moral psychology – has a great deal to contribute to discussions of the economy. First I will show why capitalism is so morally divisive in most economically advanced countries. I’ll show how people on the left and right – including economists – are influenced by the underlying moral narratives they embrace about capitalism. These moral divisions turn many economic questions into “wicked” problems, which warp the minds of problem solvers. Next, I’ll discuss research on how moral values change as societies get richer, leading to generation gaps and political polarization – as has happened in Japan and many Asian democracies (and of course in the USA). We’ll end with a discussion of how Japanese people think about capitalism, wealth, inequality, and the big question: What should a flourishing capitalist society look like for Japan in the coming decades?

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the following schedule might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

発表論文についてはCIRJEにて印刷し、当日会場にて配布いたします。つきましては、下記の期日までに最終稿のファイルまたはハードコピーをご提出ください。

発表論文提出期限（厳守）：

1月6日（火）発表者＝1月6日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月13日（火）発表者＝1月13日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月14日（水）発表者＝1月14日（水）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月 20日（火）発表者＝ 1月20日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月 28日（水）発表者＝ 1月28日（水）朝9:00（必着）まで

2月 3日（火）発表者＝2月3日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

提出先：学術交流棟（小島ホール）６階 CIRJE（cirje [at mark]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp）

1. 上記提出期限の日時を過ぎたものについてはいかなる理由があっても受け付けられません。ご自身で15部のコピーをご用意の上、当日会場にご持参ください。
2. 論文は必ず最終稿をご提出ください。提出後の差し替えは受け付けませんので、差し替えなければならない事態が発生した場合には、論文はご自身で印刷して（15部）当日持参して頂くことになります。
3. 添付ファイルが破損している等、ファイルが開けない場合は連絡を差し上げるため、ファイルで提出される方はお申し込み時に携帯電話番号等、当日すぐに連絡のつく連絡先をお書き添え下さい。
4. 別途、正式な修士論文口述試験が行なわれるので、修士論文提出時に大学院係 から配付される審査日程を参照のうえ、必ずご出席下さい。
5. パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。（プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。）

Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):
January 6 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 6 (Tuesday)

January 13 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 13 (Tuesday)

January 14 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 14 (Wednesday)

January 20 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 20 (Tuesday)

January 28 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 28 (Wednesday)

February 3 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., February 3 (Tuesday)

Make sure that

• Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
• The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
• You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）16:00-16:40

仲井玄暦 （Readers： 伊藤 澤田 （大橋） ）

不完備契約下における多国籍企業の国際化モード

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20

土方雄介 （Readers： 澤田 玄田 （大湾））

The Effects on Male and Female Competitive Behavior: Affirmative Action, Gender Stereotype, Types of Task and Single-Sex Schooling

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）17:20-18:00

黒石悠介 （Readers： 澤田 市村 （大橋））

Social Learning, Comparative Advantage in Technology Adoption in Uganda

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）18:00-18:40

伊藤　優 （Readers： 松井 尾山 （神取））

Two-stage Partitional Representation and Dynamic Consistency

2015年1月6日（火　Tuesday）18:40-19:20

チョウ　シガン （Readers： 松井 尾山 （神取））

An estimation of cost function in the telecommunications industry in China

2015年1月13日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20 16:00-16:40

※Schedule Changed / 時間が変更いたしましたのでご注意ください。

新田修平 （Readers： 林 井堀 （岩本））

労働供給と財の弱分離可能性の検定：条件付き需要システムの推定

2015年1月13日（火　Tuesday）18:00-18:40

坂本美南 （Readers： Fabinger 田渕 （市村））

The effect of an increase in imports from China on regional labor markets in Japan

2015年1月13日（火　Tuesday）18:40-19:20

足立大輔 （Readers： Griffen 市村 （沈））

Retirement behavior with health production

2015年1月14日（水　Wednesday）16:40-17:20

YE Xiuyuan （Readers： 中林 Fabinger （佐々木））

The impact of exchange rate on Sino-Japan trade

2015年1月14日（水　Wednesday）17:20-18:00

WU Cheng （Readers： 中林 玄田 （大湾））

Analysis of Japanese Working Hours

2015年1月14日（水　Wednesday）18:00-18:40

益田　拓 （Readers： 佐々木 大橋 （松村））

Effects of Discount Factor Distribution in Repeated Games

2015年1月20日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20

櫻井智祥 （Readers： 松島 神取 （尾山））

Ex ante Effect of Patent Pools

シン　オウ （Readers：松島 神取 （尾山））

A Study on the University Entrance Matching Mechanism in China

2015年1月20日（火　Tuesday）18:00-18:40

チョウ　カン （Readers： 神取 松島 （神谷））

The Evolution of Preference under OLG Model with Imperfect Information, Probability Election and Coalition

2015年1月20日（火　Tuesday）18:40-19:20

ユ　ウォンソック （Readers： 神取 松島 （神谷））

Voting under Costly Information Acquisition with Resale Market

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）14:20-15:00

東

京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

��橋雅生 （Readers： 飯塚 岩本 （林））

How Does Nonlinear-Pricing Mechanism Affect Provision of Health Care?

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）15:00-15:40

鬼山大樹 （Readers： 飯塚 林 （大橋））

Estimating the causality between child care availability and maternal employment in Japan

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）15:40-16:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economicc

s Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

猿谷洋樹 （Readers： 飯塚 大橋 （澤田））

Do Micro Panel Data Help Identification?An Analysis of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models with Individual Heterogeneity and Its Application to Medical Check-up Decisions

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）16:20-17:00

XU Chongyue （Readers： 大橋 佐々木 （松村））

Disfinet Behavior in TIBOR Data Across Time -Evidences to Potential coordination on TIBOR

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）17:00-17:40

及川雅斗 （Readers： 大橋 澤田 （飯塚））

An empirical analysis of power demand

2015年1月28日（水　Wednesday）17:40-18:20

内田　暁 （Readers： 飯塚 澤田 （岩本））

個人レベルのパネルデータを用いた献血者行動分析

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）15:20-16:00

中村光太 （Readers： 下津 大森 (大橋) ）

Quantifying the Effects of Tax Incentive for Eco-Friendly Car in Japan Using Random Coefficients Demand Model

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）16:00-16:40 *Schedule Changed

相原祐樹 （Readers： 林 田渕 （鈴木））

日本の製造業における集積の経済に関する実証分析

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20

寺島礼人 （Readers： 柳川 松島 （平野））

Are FTAs advantageous to FTA negotiation?

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）17:20-18:00

リ　ギョクケツ （Readers： 柳川 松島 （平野））

The bank system and private lending

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）18:00-18:40

山本哲也 （Readers： 柳川 松島 （平野））

金融危機と政府介入

2015年2月3日（火　Tuesday）18:40-19:20

広瀬浩介 （Readers： 松村 加藤(晋) （大湾））

Multi Store Paradox revised