財政・公共経済ワークショップ
Public Economics Workshop

2018年11月2日現在

※ 発表は原則として日本語で行われます。Presentations are basically in Japanese.

※ 経済学研究科教員・学生の方はご自由にご参加頂けます。

予定


日時


2018年11月27日(火)10:25-12:10

場所


東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)
1階 第1セミナー室 [MAP]

発表者・報告

長谷川誠 (Makoto Hasegawa) (Kyoto University)
Territorial Tax Reform and Profit Shifting by US and Japanese Multinationals

要旨

In 2009, Japan began to exempt dividends paid by Japanese-owned foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home-country taxation. This tax reform switched Japan's corporate tax system to a territorial tax system that exempts foreign income from home-country taxation. In this paper, I examine the impact of the territorial tax reform on the profit-shifting behavior of Japanese multinationals. I analyze the sensitivity of the reported profits of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries to the tax incentive for profit shifting, measured by host countries' tax rates, and the introduction of the territorial tax system, using US-owned foreign subsidiaries as a comparison group. I find that the profits of US-owned foreign subsidiaries, particularly intangible-intensive or large subsidiaries, are more sensitive to host countries' tax rates than are those of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries. I find no evidence that the sensitivity of the pre-tax profits of Japanese multinationals to corporate tax rates increased after 2009 relative to US multinationals. These results imply that Japanese multinationals are less sensitive to the tax incentive for profit shifting than are US multinationals.

備考

主催:ミクロ経済学ワークショップ 




日時


2018年12月7日(金)
14:55-18:35

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)
2階 第3セミナー室 [MAP]  

発表者・報告


1. 山口力(広島大学)
  TBA

2. 福村晃一 日本学術振興会特別研究員(東京大学経済学研究科)
"Minimum Wage Competition"
[download]

要旨

This paper challenges the view that factor mobility leads to shrinking minimum wages. By focusing on geographical mobility, we propose a minimum wage competition model and show that minimum wage rates may be increased after the significant increase in mobility. This result is consistent with the data on European countries in the period of the massive enlargement of the EU. We also show that minimum wage rates respond positively to increased geographical mobility when (i) mobile workers face significantly worse labor market conditions, (ii) the concerns of economic efficiency are small, and (iii) the share of mobile workers is relatively small. The model also yields a normative implication that coordination in setting minimum wages is needed to achieve a desirable outcome. 

備考

 




日時


2019年1月25日
(金)14:55-18:35

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)
2階 第3セミナー室 [MAP]  

発表者・報告

角谷快彦 (広島大学)
TBA

要旨

 

備考

 



 

今年度終了分


日時


2018年10月26日(金)
14:55-18:35

場所


東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)
2階 第3セミナー室 [MAP]

発表者・報告

1. 松本睦(立命館大学)
"Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and partial tax coordination"

2.西村幸浩(大阪大学)
"Taxing Multinationals: The Scope for Enforcement Cooperation (joint with Jean Hindriks)" [download]

要旨

1."Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and partial tax coordination"
Using a simple asymmetric capital-tax competition model where the allocation of mobile capital is distorted in non-cooperative equilibrium, this paper analyzes the welfare impact of tax coordination made by subsets of regions. Under the assumption that the ownership of immobile factors (e.g., business land) is diversified across regions, a new possibility of beneficial tax coordination arises which has not been identified before: reducing the difference in tax rates “between capital-exporting regions” or “between capital-importing regions” may improve the welfare of all regions. This is in contrast to the case without cross-ownership where tax coordination must be made “between capital-exporting and capital-importing regions” to achieve Pareto improvement.

2. "Taxing Multinationals: The Scope for Enforcement Cooperation (joint with Jean Hindriks)"
We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments: the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement (i.e., controls on profit shifting by multinational enterprises). Tougher enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. In a framework of noncooperative tax choices, we compare the equilibria of the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement choices. After showing that enforcement cooperation may not benefit the low-tax country, we indicate two drivers that promote enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is complementarity (imperfect substitutability) of countries’ enforcement efforts, taking into account that dispersed enforcement efforts among the involved countries are less effective. We show that cooperation is more likely with greater enforcement complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership, which reduces the extent of disagreement on tax enforcement.

備考