財政ワークショップ 2023
Public Finance Workshop
すべて 「学術動向調査研究会」 との共催 |
Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について (Online Seminars Using Zoom) 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認の上ご準備をお願いいたします。 Please read the following instruction for participation.
※ 登録 (Registration) 事前登録が必須となります。 下記よりご登録頂きますとミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。 事前にご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。(Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID、パスワードでサインインして頂くことも可能です。) ご登録URLが変更しております。これまでご登録頂いている方も新規登録が必要となりますので下記ご案内のURLにて改めてご登録ください。 Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email. Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.) 事前登録はこちらから(**2023年度** のURLが変わりました。新規登録をお願いいたします。Zoom URL has been changed from the one of FY2022. Please register again for participation.) https://u-tokyo-ac-jp.zoom.us/j/85690615803?pwd=ZTg3aHJBVDBWZVdYSnRSdlFuckJ3dz09 参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website. ※ 注意 (Note) 1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。 Please register your full name when you participate. 2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。 Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.
※ セミナー中 (During Seminars) ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session. 音声OFFの手順 (Muting Participants in Zoom)
幹事 (Organizer): 小川 光 (Hikaru Ogawa)
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日時 |
2023年9月22日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 盛本圭一(明治大学) Global Corporate Income Tax Competition, Knowledge Spillover, and Growth (joint work with Noritaka Maebayashi) [Paper] |
要旨 | We analyze the welfare consequences of global corporate income tax competition, using a two-country model of endogenous growth with international knowledge spillovers. Although the Nash equilibrium tax rate can be excessively high or low, according to the degree of spillover, this does not lead to significant welfare losses. The key to this outcome is that corporate income tax competition for growth maximization, which we consider hypothetically, attains the maximum growth rate, despite complex externalities and strategic interactions. |
日時 |
2023年11月24日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 大野太郎(財務省) TBA |
要旨 |
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日時 |
2023年12月22日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 鈴木崇文(愛知淑徳大学) TBA |
要旨 |
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■ 以下、本年度終了分 ■
日時 |
2023年4月28日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 髙橋 済 (Wataru Takahashi)(高崎経済大学) Interactions among Local Governments over the Provision of Nursery Facilities: A Quasi-Experimental Approach [Paper] |
要旨 | The development policy for nursery facilities has become an important issue in Japan in recent years. We thus examine the existence of a strategic interaction among local governments over the provisioning policies for nursery facilities by estimating their reaction function. To this end, we employ a quasi-experimental framework to validate the strategic |
日時 |
2023年5月12日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 持田信樹 (Nobuki Mochida) (中央大学) Macroeconomic Impact of Tax Shocks: Evidence from Japan Using a Narrative Approach [Paper] |
要旨 | This paper analyzes the effects of tax shocks on the economic activity. Following David and Christina Romer's narrative approach, we identify, from scratch, 486 tax changes enacted in Japan into endogenous tax changes motivated by the state of the economy and more exogenous tax changes . These provide new datasets following those for the US and UK. We found that exogenous tax changes have a large and long- term impact on the economic activity in Japan as well. Exogenous tax shocks negatively impact the GDP trajectory, with consumption as the main transmission channels. In other words, tax cuts motivated by a desire to raise long-term growth have a positive effect on consumption, thereby increasing GDP. Deficit- driven tax changes have a negative effect on residential investment but has a positive effect on corporate investment, thereby increasing GDP. |
日時 |
2023年6月9日(金)16:50-18:30
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場所 | Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 後藤剛志(千葉大学) Tax-Price Elasticities of Charitable Giving and Selection of Declaration: Panel Study of South Korea [Paper] |
要旨 | This study estimates the tax-price elasticity of donations, addressing the bias caused by the existence of nondeclared giving and presenting the estimation method based on the intention-to-treat analysis to eliminate the bias. Using the method and the exogenous variation of tax incentives in the 2014 South Korean tax reform, we estimate that the giving price elasticity is -1.6, more elastic than the standard results. The control function approach confirms similar results and shows that less declaration of those with large amounts of donations without tax incentives causes the elasticity to be incorrectly estimated to be inelastic. |
日時 |
2023年7月28日(金)16:50-18:30 *会場が変更いたしました。
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場所 | Seminar Room 1on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration. |
報告 | 小林克也 (法政大学) Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests [Paper] |
要旨 | This study characterizes role assignments in maximizing a group’s winning probability under the influence of the complementarity of group members’ efforts in a group contest, in contrast to prize and multiple resource allocations. We use a CES effort aggregator function to parameterize the complementarity. While the prize and resource allocation rules depend on the complementarity, the assignment rule does not when multiple roles are assignable to a single group member: All roles are assigned only to the most productive group member. However, when only a single role per group member is assignable, the assignment rule depends on the complementarity: Roles from greater to less importance are assigned to group members in descending order of their productivity under strong complementarity; only the most important role is assigned to the most productive group member and the others have no effect under weak complementarity.
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