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ミクロ経済学ワークショップ 2023
Microeconomics Workshop
- ※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます（Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH）。
Hybrid SeminarThe seminars are held in-person and online basically. (from October 2022) Seminar Venue (Please note that the seminar venue might be changed for irregular seminars.) : Please use the following link for online registration. See the bottom of the page for details.
Organizers: Yichuan Lou, Shunya Noda, Masahiro Shoji, Suk Joon Son
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RegistrationPlease use the following link for registration. Please read the bottom of the page for participation details. https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwtceGhrzMpHtZ8GucmpPdvrWzSi7Gf2sdT
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Companion WorkshopApplied Economics Workshop (AEW) |
Applied Economics Workshop（AEW) is our companion workshop, jointly held by the University of Tokyo, National Taiwan University, National University of Singapore, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong University, Academia Sinica, Hitotsubashi University, and Nanyang Technological University.
The seminars are held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation. Applied Economics Workshopは、Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制）となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 Applied Economics Workshop Website |
| 日時 | March 5, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Leon Musolff (The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania) "Entry Into Two-Sided Markets Shaped By Platform-Guided Search" with Kwok Hao Lee (National University of Singapore Business School) [Paper] |
| Abstract | Consider firms that operate platforms matching buyers and sellers while selling goods themselves. By guiding consumers towards their own products through algorithmic recommendations, these firms could influence market outcomes – a regulatory concern. To investigate, we combine novel data about sales and recommendations on Amazon with a structural model that captures seller entry. Recommendations are highly price-elastic (-20), and many consumers (34%) only consider recommended offers. Hence, algorithmic recommendations raise the demand elasticity (from -8 to -11), intensify price competition, and increase the purchase rate. However, increased competition reduces entry (but the missing merchants are the least efficient). Focusing on self-preferencing: recommendations favor Amazon (equivalent to a 6% price discount), but this skew does not act as a barrier to entry or otherwise harm consumers. Indeed, since consumers prefer Amazon’s offers, “self-preferencing” slightly raises consumer surplus by $9 per product per month (assuming Amazon’s prices remain constant.) |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Kei Kawai, Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | [Irregular Seminar] |
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上の説明をご確認ください。 ■ 対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール1階第1セミナー室 This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction above for details. |
| 報告 | Mitsuru Igami (伊神 満) (Yale University, Yale Department of Economics) "Welfare Gains from LCD Innovations, 2001–2011" with Shoki Kusaka, Jeff Qiu, Tuyetanh L. Tran |
| Abstract | We assess the welfare impact of new technologies by using detailed data from theglobal industry of liquid crystal display (LCD) panels. We focus on measuring bothproductivity growth via process innovation and consumer benefits from new products.We find process innovation accounted for most of the welfare gains in the computersegment, whereas product innovation played a major role in the TV segment. Wefurther decompose process innovation into vintage capital and learning by doing, andproduct innovation into larger products and other new varieties. We then conduct aseries of benefit-cost analyses to quantify the social and private returns on technologicalinvestments. Results suggest social returns were large, but most firms’ private returnswere small or negative; competitive pressure forced them to invest nevertheless. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Empirical Micro Research Seminar |
| Organizer | Kei Kawai, Suk Joon Son, Andrew Griffen |
以下次年度予定。次年度より「ミクロ理論ワークショップ Microeconomic Theory Workshop」となります。
| 日時 | [Irregular Seminar]
April 2, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10 |
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Yuichi Yamamoto (Hitotsubashi University) |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Daisuke Oyama (Shunya Noda)
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| 日時 | April 9, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Mamoru Kaneko (Waseda University) "A Resolution of the Centipede Paradox" (with Ryuichiro Ishikawa) [Paper] |
| Abstract | This paper starts to identify what the centipede paradox is. It is the antagonism between the outcome from the BI (backward induction) theory in a centipede game and people's responses. We weaken the underlying postulates of the BI theory so that payoffs are possibly incomparable for a player depending upon his bounded cognitive ability. In this case, he follows inertial behavior when decision nodes have some distance from the start. In the CIB (conscious choice/inertial behavior) theory which we develop, when both players have high cognitive abilities, the CIB theory exhibits the same outcome as the BI theory. However, when at least one has a low ability, it induces quite opposite outcomes to go to the ending area of the game. The degree of reversed causality manifests these results from a different point of view; it shows the maximum value for the BI outcome but takes values close to the minimum value for the CIB outcome in the ending area. These considerations form a resolution of the centipede paradox. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Akihiko Matsui (Shunya Noda)
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| 日時 | April 16, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Kenzo Imamura (University of Tokyo) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda
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| 日時 | April 23, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Zhaohong Sun (Kyushu University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda
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| 日時 | April 30, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Takeshi Murooka (Osaka University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda
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| 日時 | May 14, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Donghao Zhu (Institute of Statistical Mathematics) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Kenzo Imamura
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| 日時 | May 21, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Shota Ichihashi (Queen's University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda
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| 日時 | June 4, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | June 11, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | June 18, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | June 25, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Parag Pathak (The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima
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| 日時 | July 2, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | July 9, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | July 16, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Daisuke Hirata (Hitotsubashi University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima, (Shunya Noda) |
| 日時 | October 1, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | October 8, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Michihiro Kandori, Satoru Takahashi |
| 日時 | October 15, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Jaeok Park (Yonsei University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | October 22, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Takuo Sugaya (Stanford University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) |
| Organizer | Michihiro Kandori
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以下本年度終了分
| 日時 | April 4, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Brian A. Jacob (University of Michigan) "Racial Differences in Parent Response to COVID Schooling Policies" |
| Abstract | In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between COVID schooling policies and student enrollment, with a particular focus on differential responses by race and ethnicity. Using data on over 9,000 districts that serve 90% of public school students in the U.S., we first calculate deviations from pre-pandemic enrollment trends separately by district-subgroup. We then estimate differential responses to school policies across race within districts, controlling for a range of observable characteristics that may be correlated with school policies and enrollment changes, including local COVID severity and COVID prevention measures as well as a host of social, economic and political characteristics. We find enrollment responses to COVID policies differed notably by race. While White enrollments declined more in districts that started the 2020-21 school year virtually, Black enrollments declined more in districts that started the 2021 school year in-person. Moreover, in counties with higher COVID-19 death rates in the months preceding the start of the 2021 school year, both Black and Hispanic enrollments declined at a faster rate than White students in the same districts. In districts with mask requirements, White, Black, and Hispanic enrollment declines in 2021-22 were relatively similar. In contrast, when districts did not require masks at the start of the school year, Black enrollments remained nearly twice as far below-trend as White enrollments, particularly in districts that had previously been in-person or hybrid. |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Ryuichi Tanaka |
| 日時 | April 11, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Nikhil Agarwal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) "Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology" |
| Abstract | Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms have matched or surpassed the performance of
human experts in a number of predictive tasks, although human experts have access to
contextual information that may not be available for machine predictions. We investi-
gate how best to combine machine predictions with human input in the presence of such
contextual information and potential biases in how humans use machine predictions in
forming their assessments. Our experiment varies the availability of AI support and
contextual information. We find that that contextual information improves diagnostic
accuracy on average, but providing AI predictions does not always increase accuracy
although there are large potential gains from having radiologists make decisions using
AI support. These gains are not realized because radiologists partially neglect the AI’s
information and do not account for the redunancy between their own information and
the AI’s information. An implication of our results is that, unless these mistakes can be
corrected, the design of an optimal collaborative system has radiologists work alongside
as opposed to with AI. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | April 12, 2023（水 Wednesday）13:00-14:45 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University) "Robust Implementation with Costly Information" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We design mechanisms that robustly implement any desired social choice function when
(i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ pref-
erences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the social planner, and (iii) the
planner does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences.
The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation, and are robust to trembles in agents’
reporting strategies, to the introduction of a small amount of noise affecting agents’ signals about
the state, and to uncertainty concerning the state distribution and agents’ prior beliefs about the
state. We also establish impossibility results for stronger notions of robust implementation.
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| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori
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| 日時 |
April 17, 2023 (Monday) 10:30-12:00
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上の説明をご確認ください。 通常とURLが異なりますのでお気を付けください。 ■ 対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール1階第1セミナー室 This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction above for details. Registration <-- Please click here for online participation. |
| 報告 | Enrico Pennings (Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University of Rotterdam) "Incumbent Capacity Responses to Entry: Evidence of Predation in the U.S. Airline Industry?" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We empirically examine the post-entry price and capacity response of incumbent monopolists in 256 incumbent-entrant fights with a winner in the U.S. airline industry and find evidence of behaviour that is consistent with predation. The novelty of this paper is to use incumbent capacity to identify predatory behaviour, which helps overcome the hurdles of standard predation tests comparing price to cost. We exploit the fact that it is unprofitable to increase available capacity after entry since quantities are strategic substitutes for competitors. We show that incumbents who increase capacity after entry are more likely to eliminate competition, restore their monopoly position and exploit market power by raising prices after the exit of their rival. |
| Co-Host | 主催：Empirical Micro Research Seminar |
| Organizer | Hiroshi Ohashi, Andrew Griffen |
| 日時 | April 18, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Daniele Condorelli (University of Warwick) "Buyer-Optimal Platform Design"[Paper] |
| Abstract | A platform matches a unit-mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to
a unit-mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching, sellers make take-
it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the
platform, but sellers make inferences from the matching algorithm. The efficient matching is positive-
assortative, but buyer-optimal matchings are, often, stochastically negative-assortative (i.e., compared
to lower-quality sellers, high-quality ones are matched to buyers with lower expected valuation). Al-
beit everyone trades when the platform has full-information, generating rents for the side lacking
bargaining power results in inefficient matching.
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| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima |
| 日時 | |
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| 報告 | Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) “Coordination in Supply Chains” (joint with Robert Akerlof) |
| 日時 | April 25, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Pavel Kireyev (INSEAD) "NFT Marketplace Design and Market Intelligence" [Paper] |
| Abstract | Nonfungible tokens (NFTs) have exploded in popularity in 2021, generating billions of dollars in transaction volume. In tandem, market intelligence platforms have emerged to track summary statistics about pricing and sales activity across different NFT collections. We demonstrate that marketplace design can significantly influence market intelligence, focusing specifically on the costs of bidding which can differ across marketplaces depending on transaction fees, the prevalence of bidding bots, or the user interface for placing bids. We use data from the CryptoPunks marketplace and build an empirical model of the strategic interaction between sellers and bidders. Counterfactual simulations show that a reduction in bidding costs does not change the quantity of sales, but increases the share of sales that result from bids. Listing prices increase as sellers expect to accept more bids, making assets appear more valuable. The listing and realized sale price ratios between rare and common assets shrink, making the market appear more homogeneous. Collections that are offered by two different marketplaces can exhibit significantly different market statistics because of differences in bidding costs rather than differences in inherent value. The results have implications for the interpretation of NFT market intelligence. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son (Fuhito Kojima) |
| 日時 | May 2, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Yanjun Li(Hitotsubashi University) "Road to Crime: Expressway Connections and Child Trafficking" [Paper] |
| Abstract | Child trafficking is a long-lasting social issue in China. We argue that abducted children increase as an indirect and unintended consequence of improved urban infrastructure, such as the construction of expressways that facilitate the expedient transfer of victims between cities. To identify the causal relationship, we combine family-reported incidents of child abduction with geo-referenced data of China’s highway routes to explore the impact of expressways on connected cities in comparison to unconnected cities using a difference-in-differences approach and city-pair matching strategy. The results support our assumptions and are robust after addressing the concerns regarding the endogeneity of route placement and staggered treatment timing. The expanded demand side of the trafficking market and enhanced rural-urban migration, which increases the public safety risks, could account for the mechanism behind the phenomena. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | May 9, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Norio Takeoka(Hitotsubashi University) "Coarse Information Acquisition" [Paper] |
| Abstract | If agents are not given sufficient information when making decisions, they will attempt to obtain more accurate information through information acquisition. The literature of rational inattention hypothesizes that a rational agent optimally chooses an experiment or information structure to obtain an additional piece of information. In reality, however, it is difficult to conduct accurate experiments due to lack of knowledge about the experiment itself and/or ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state space. This paper studies the choice behavior of decision makers who are aware that their information acquisition is not always accurate and that they can only choose coarse experiments. By adopting the choice theoretic model of information acquisition, provided in de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, and Ozbek [12], we argue that one of their axioms, which is interpreted as preference for early resolution of risk and takes a form of quasi-convexity of preference, excludes the possibility of coarse experiments. By relaxing their quasi-convexity axiom, we axiomatically characterize models of information acquisition with coarse experiments. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | May 16, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University of Economics) "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences that accommodate income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium notions in such settings. Nevertheless, none of the well-known mechanisms that find the MPEs in the quasi-linear environment can identify or even approximate the MPEs for general preferences. We establish novel structural characterizations of MPEs and design the "Serial Vickrey (SV) mechanism" based on the characterizations. The SV mechanism finds an MPE for general preferences in a finite number of steps. Moreover, the SV mechanism only requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times, and also has nice dynamic incentive properties. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori |
| 日時 | May 23, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10 ※オンライン開催に変更されました
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、Zoomを利用してのオンライン開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Izumi Yokoyama (Hitotsubashi University) "The Unexpected Side Effects of Lockdowns on Those “Barely” Inside and Outside of Lockdown Areas" |
| Abstract | This study estimates the impact of Japan's anti-COVID-19 policy called “the state of emergency” (SOE) by employing a geographical regression discontinuity design (RDD). This policy can be considered a weaker alternative to a lockdown, where people are permitted to move outside certain targeted areas; in this sense, the areas are “unlocked” with several restrictions in place. In February 2021, an SOE was declared for 11 out of the 47 prefectures in Japan. This enabled us to utilize the geographical RDD for the study. We utilized the fact that the risk of infection and other factors were geographically continuous at the borders between targeted areas and non-targeted areas, while the SOE was completely discontinuous at each border. We obtained the following results. Those who lived “barely” outside the emergency areas were more alarmed by COVID-19 than those who lived “barely” inside the targeted areas. This contributed to behaviors such as refraining from going to bars or restaurants and to becoming more careful in practicing COVID-19 countermeasures. Our study is the first of its kind to find negative effects for targeted areas and positive effects for untargeted areas simultaneously, which was made possible by using the geographical RDD. Thus, the results of this paper suggest the importance of reconsidering the necessity of disease control that utilizes the borders between administrative divisions, such as states or prefectures, in implementing lockdowns. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | June 6, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Dean Hyslop (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research) "Training, Productivity and Wages: Direct evidence from a Temporary Help Agency" (joint with Xinwei Dong and Daiji Kawaguchi) [Paper] |
| Abstract | Firms frequently provide general skill training to workers at the firm’s cost. Theories proposed that labor market frictions entail wage compression, larger productivity gain than wage growth to skill acquisition, and motivates a firm to offer general skill training, but few studies directly test them. We use unusually rich data from a temporary help service firm that records both workers' wages and their productivity as measured by the fees charged to client firms. We find evidence that skill acquired through training and learning-by-doing increases productivity more than wages, which is consistent with wage compression. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Daiji Kawaguchi (Suk Joon Son) |
| 日時 | June 12, 2023 （月 Monday）13:00-14:45 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Wooyoung Lim (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) “Lying and Deception in Repeated Communication:An Experimental Analysys” joint with Syngjoo Choi (SNU) and Chanjoo Lee (SNU) |
| Abstract | Lying and deception are common in economic interactions and have important strategic implications. While related, they are distinct phenomena that may have different effects on communication outcomes. In this paper, we study repeated communication with a reputation concern in a two-dimensional belief domain, and identify two environments where lying and deception are completely separated. In one environment, the sender must tell the truth to conceal a bad intention, while in the other, the sender must lie to reveal a good intention. Our experimental data show that the proportion of senders who successfully build reputations is lower than predicted in both environments. Furthermore, the deviation from theory is greater when reputation-building requires lying rather than deception. Finally, we observe that receivers punish senders for lying, even when the intention behind it is good. Our findings suggest that different communication mechanisms may perform differently depending on their reliance on lying or deception, highlighting the need to distinguish between these two concepts investigating organizational and political phenomena. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yasutora Watanabe, Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | June 13, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Makiko Nakamuro (Keio University) "The effect of the quality of early childhood education on children's subsequent outcomes" [Paper] |
| Abstract | This study presents the first quantitative evaluation of the quality of early childhood education and care (ECEC) in Japan to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge accumulated on ECEC in countries where research has been limited. We observed 30 classes comprising 3-year-olds, 28 classes comprising 5-year-olds, and 30 classes comprising mixed-ages from publicly provided nursery centers under the jurisdiction of the Kanto metropolitan area, Japan. An internationally-recognized quality rating scale for ECEC called the Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale, 3rd edition, which consists of six subscales, was used for this study. In contrast to previous studies conducted in the US, the results of this study showed that the Japanese ECEC is characterized as showing higher scores in the two subscales, “Personal Care Routines” and “Interaction,” and showing lower score in the subscale, “Learning Activities.” In addition, this study showed that the quality of ECEC varied across nursery centers. Furthermore, with regard to the two subscales, “Interaction” and “Language and Literacy,” the degree of variation within centers differed across nursery centers. This study analyzed how these characteristics of Japanese ECEC can be partly produced by the existence of national guideline for nursery centers authorized by the Japanese government. In addition, mechanisms producing differences in the quality of ECEC among and within centers were also discussed. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | June 19, 2023（月 Monday）10:25-12:10 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Allen Vong (University of Macau) "Effort smoothing" |
| Abstract | This paper highlights a new role of mediation in addressing dynamic moral hazard. I study a mediated market in which a worker repeatedly supplies costly effort. Equilibrium social welfare is maximized if and only if the mediator facilitates the worker's occasional and secret shirking at the expense of her employers. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | June 20, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania) "Caution and reference effects" |
| Abstract | We introduce Cautious Utility, a new model based on the idea that individuals are unsure of trade-offs between goods and apply caution. The model yields an endowment effect, even when gains and losses are treated symmetrically. Moreover, it implies either loss aversion or loss neutrality for risk, but in a way unrelated to the endowment effect, and it captures the certainty effect, providing a novel unified explanation of all three phenomena. Finally, Cautious Utility can help organize empirical evidence, including some that directly contradict leading alternatives. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | June 27, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Ming Li (Concordia University) "Mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest: Good news or bad news?" Coauthor: LIU, Ting (Stony Brook University) |
| Abstract | We investigate the welfare effect of disclosure of conflict of interest when an expert advises a decision maker. In a model with verifiable information and uncertainty about the expert's conflict of interest and the informedness of the expert, we show that disclosure of the expert's bias is counterproductive when the magnitude of the expert's bias is small and the likelihood of the expert being informed is low. The welfare loss is due to the distortion of the decision maker's action when the expert proclaims no information. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | June 28, 2023（水 Wednesday）13:15-14:45 ＊Irregular Seminar, 日時と場所にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Megumi Murakami (Northwestern University) DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE MARKET |
| Abstract | This research aims to investigate what factors contributed to the slower development of medicine in comparison to other sciences, and, what were the conditions for a new medical scientific theory to gain acceptance in society. Medical science differs from other natural sciences in that non-experts play a crucial role in the adoption of new theories. To illustrate this point, three historical cases are presented: scurvy in the British Navy, the 1982 cholera outbreak in Hamburg, and the anti-smallpox vaccination movements. We construct a signaling game with multiple senders and receivers, taking into account the medical market and the role of non-experts. We use Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE), focusing on two pure strategies : the truth-telling strategy and the conforming strategy. The cause of hindering the spread of correct knowledge varies depending on the equilibrium. In the truth-telling PBNE, the spread of correct knowledge is delayed because experts may propose incorrect theories due to receiving wrong information. In the partial conforming PBNE, the main cause is that pseudo-experts who express opposing opinions are more favored than experts who express correct scientific opinions. The modified model examines the scenario where experts can discuss new theories without persuading the general public, which is observed in natural sciences. We show that the condition for the existence of the truth-telling PBNE in medical science is more stringent than in natural science. |
| Co-Host | 経済史研究会 The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Akihiko Matsui, Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | July 4, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Midori Wakabayashi (Tohoku University) "Stuck in a Marriage: The Impact of Income Shocks on Divorce and Intra-Household Allocation" Wataru Kureishi Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hannah Paule-Paludkiewicz Deutsche Bundesbank, Hitoshi Tsujiyama University of Surrey, Midori Wakabayashi Tohoku University |
| Abstract | We exploit a natural-experimental earthquake shock to study the effects of adverse economic conditions on marital dissolution and intra-household reallocation. Using large-scale long-term panel data, we document that couples more affected by the adverse shock are less likely to divorce in both the short and long run. This bundling effect is particularly strong for dual-earner couples with a young child whose wives tend to experience a drop in their earnings due to the disaster, compared to singleearner couples with a young child or couples with no child or a grown-up child. Building on the collective household model with limited commitment, we argue that these results can be theoretically explained by a significant decrease in the value of the outside option (divorce) for women with income loss, implying that they are stuck in the marriage for economic reasons. The model also predicts an intra-household reallocation of resources from wives to husbands within these otherwise divorced families. We then provide novel empirical evidence for this reallocation: husbands make up for the income loss by moving into higher-paying jobs, compensated by longer leisure time, shorter time for home production, and higher private consumption. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | July 11, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Dong Wei (University of California, Santa Cruz) "Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents" |
| Abstract | We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and a lack of commitment. A principal who can only commit to one-period contracts would like to screen efficient (i.e., low-cost) workers over time and assign harder tasks to them. After efficiency is revealed, the principal becomes tempted to change the terms of trade. Breaches in contracts are observable and, hence, whenever past promises are not honored future information revelation stops. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which the principal is able to foster information revelation. Optimal contracts entail high-powered incentives after information is initially revealed, and rewards for information revelation disappear in the long run. Information revelation becomes easier when workers are stochastically replaced by new ones. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | July 18, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Chihiro Morooka (Tokyo Denki University) "Characterizing the Feasible Payoff Set of OLG Repeated Games" with Daehyun Kim (Pohang University of Science and Technology, South Korea) [Paper] |
| Abstract | We study the set of feasible payoffs of OLG repeated games. We first provide a complete characterization of the feasible payoffs. Second, we provide a novel comparative statics of the feasible payoff set with respect to players' discount factor and the length of interaction. Perhaps surprisingly, the feasible payoff set becomes smaller as the players' discount factor approaches to one. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori |
| 日時 | July 25, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-11:55
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Yusuke Tsugawa (UCLA David Geffen School of Medicine) "Physician-level determinants of healthcare quality, cost, and disparity" |
| Abstract | For decades, rapid growth in healthcare spending, suboptimal quality of care, and healthcare disparities based on patients' race, ethnicity, and gender have been fundamental challenges of the US healthcare system. Historically, studies on variations in healthcare quality and costs have focused on regions as primary determinants of such variations. My research advanced the field by showing, for the first time, that the variation in healthcare spending between individual physicians is larger than the variation between hospitals, shedding light on individual physicians as the key driver of healthcare variations (Tsugawa et al., JAMA Intern Med, 2017). By linking the comprehensive physician database with Medicare claims data, my research has also uncovered several significant physician factors—such as age, gender, and medical education and training—that impact the quality of care provided to patients. Currently, I am examining the effects of (1) racial, ethnic, and gender concordance between patients and physicians, and (2) physician training environments (e.g., racial, ethnic, and gender diversity of medical school and residency programs; the presence of cultural competency programs in residency programs). |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Toshiaki Iizuka (Suk Joon Son) |
| 日時 | October 3, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Naomi Feldman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) "The Impact of Opportunity Zones on Commercial Investment and Economic Activity" with Kevin Corinth |
| Abstract | A provision of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 offered tax incentives for investing in certain low-income areas in the United States called Opportunity Zones. The goal of this provision was to spur private investment in OZs in order to improve the economic well-being of their residents. Using a regression discontinuity design and data on the universe of all significant commercial investments in the United States, we find that OZ eligibility led to no statistically significant increase in investment in OZs. We can rule out at the 95 percent confidence level an increase in the probability of investment of more than 1.3 percentage points per OZ (4.9%), an increase in the number of annualized investments of more than 0.01 per OZ (6.7%), and an increase in annualized dollars of investment of more than $0.16 million per census tract (8.2%). These findings are supported by data from Mastercard that show no evidence of increased business activity nor consumer spending. Overall, our findings suggest that the impact of the OZ place-based investment incentives on economic improvement has thus far been limited. |
| Co-Host | Empirical Micro Research Seminar |
| Organizer | Andrew Griffen, (Masahiro Shoji) |
| 日時 | October 10, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Sam Jindani (National University of Singapore) "The dynamics of costly social norms" [Paper] |
| Abstract | Social norms that are costly for individuals can remain in place for a long time because of social pressure to conform. Examples include duelling, footbinding, female genital cutting, and norms of conspicuous consumption. These and other costly norms are rarely “all-or-nothing”; instead, they take on many alternative forms. We develop a theory of norm dynamics that allows for such intermediate forms. The theory predicts rich dynamics that are consistent with cases where norm shifts have been documented. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | October 17, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Takuro Yamashita(Osaka University) "A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment" with Niccol`o Lomys |
| Abstract | We study mechanism design with limited commitment. In each period, a principal offers a “spot” contract to a privately informed agent without committing to future contracts. In contrast to the classical model with a fixed information structure, we allow for all admissible information structures. We represent the information structure as a fictitious mediator and re-interpret the model as a mechanism design problem for the committed mediator. We construct examples to explain why new equilibrium outcomes can arise when considering general information structures. Next, we apply our approach to durable-good monopoly. In the seller-optimal mechanism, trade dynamics and welfare substantially differ from those in the classical model: the seller offers a discount to the high-valuation buyer in the initial period, followed by the high surplus-extracting price until an endogenous deadline, when the buyer’s information is revealed without noise. The Coase conjecture fails. We also discuss unmediated implementation of the seller-optimal outcome. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | October 24, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Philip Haile(Yale University) "Voting in Two-Party Elections: An Exploration Using Multi-Level Data" |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | October 31, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Corey White (Monash University) "Disentangling Sources of Variation in C-Section Rates" (with Stefanie Fischer, Shuhei Kaneko, Heather Royer) |
| Abstract | Prior literature documents large disparities in health care practices, utilization, and outcomes across geographies within the United States. Variation in the use of C-sections is a prominent example, however it is unknown the extent of this variation that is due to demand-side factors (e.g., patient risk factors or preferences) versus supply-side factors or "place effects" (e.g., physician practice style or incentives). In this paper, we estimate the share of variation in C-section rates that is attributable to the county of birth. Most of the literature identifying causal effects of place in health care does so by tracking individuals who move across locations. We develop a new approach leveraging closures of obstetric units across the United States between 1989 and 2019, which reallocate mothers to counties with different C-section rates. We implement this approach using the instrumental variables framework of Abaluck et al. (2021). Our results suggest strong supply-side effects: 90% of the variation in first-birth C-sections is due to the county of birth. |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Hitoshi Shigeoka (Masahiro Shoji) |
| 日時 | November 1, 2023（水 Wednesday）10:25-12:10 ※日時に注意
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Mirabelle Muûls (Imperial College London) "Does Pricing Carbon Mitigate Climate Change? Firm-Level Evidence from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme" with Jonathan Colmer, Ralf Martin, Ulrich J. Wagner [Paper] |
| Abstract | In theory, market-based regulatory instruments correct market failures at least cost. However, evidence on their efficacy remains scarce. Using administrative data, we estimate that, on average, the EU ETS – the world's first and largest market-based climate policy – induced regulated manufacturing firms to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 14-16% with no detectable contractions in economic activity. We find no evidence of outsourcing to unregulated firms or markets; instead firms made targeted investments, reducing the emissions intensity of production. These results indicate that the EU ETS induced global emissions reductions, a necessary and sufficient condition for mitigating climate change. We show that the absence of any negative economic effects can be rationalized in a model where pricing the externality induces firms to make fixed-cost investments in energy-saving capital that reduce marginal variable costs. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | November 7, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | David Neumark (University of California, Irvine) "Help Really Wanted? The Impact of Age Stereotypes in Job Ads on Applications from Older Workers" with Ian Burn, Daniel Firoozi, Daniel Ladd [Paper] |
| Abstract | Correspondence studies have found evidence of age discrimination in callback rates for older workers, but less is known about whether job advertisements can themselves shape the age composition of the applicant pool. We construct job ads for administrative assistant, retail, and security guard jobs, using language from real job ads collected in a prior large-scale correspondence study (Neumark et al., 2019a). We modify the job-ad language to randomly vary whether the job ad includes ageist language regarding age-related stereotypes. Our main analysis relies on computational linguistics/machine learning methods to design job ads based on the semantic similarity between phrases in job ads and age-related stereotypes. In contrast to a correspondence study in which job searchers are artificial and researchers study the responses of real employers, in our research the job ads are artificial and we study the responses of real job searchers. We find that job-ad language related to ageist stereotypes, even when the language is not blatantly or specifically age-related, deters older workers from applying for jobs. The change in the age distribution of applicants is large, with significant declines in the average and median age, the 75 th percentile of the age distribution, and the share of applicants over 40. Based on these estimates and those from the correspondence study, and the fact that we use real-world ageist job-ad language, we conclude that job-ad language that deters older workers from applying for jobs can have roughly as large an impact on hiring of older workers as direct age discrimination in hiring. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son, (Daiji Kawaguchi) |
| 日時 | November 14, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Stefano Lovo (HEC Paris) "Algorithmic Pricing and Liquidity in Securities Markets" (With J.E. Colliard and T. Foucault) |
| Abstract | We let "Algorithmic Market-Makers" (AMs), using Q-learning algorithms, choose prices for a risky asset when their clients are privately informed about the asset payoff. We find that AMs learn to cope with adverse selection and to update their prices after observing trades, as predicted by economic theory. However, in contrast to theory, AMs charge a mark-up over the competitive price, which declines with the number of AMs. Interestingly, markups tend to decrease with AMs' exposure to adverse selection. Accordingly, the sensitivity of quotes to trades is stronger than that predicted by theory and AMs' quotes become less competitive over time as asymmetric information declines. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Daisuke Oyama, (Shunya Noda) |
| 日時 | November 21, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Ashutosh Thakur (National University of Singapore) "Evolution of Institutional Designs: Theory and Empirics" |
| Abstract | In many organizations, members need to be assigned to certain positions, whether these are legislators to committees, executives to roles, or workers to teams. In such settings, the design of the assignment procedure becomes an institutional choice that is influenced and agreed upon by the very members being assigned. Will these agents seek to reform the assignment procedures by voting in favor of some alternative allocation over their current allocation? I explore this question of institutional stability by bringing together matching theory and social choice. I introduce majority stability---i.e., institutional stability under majority rule---and juxtapose it with other voting rules an organization might use to resolve internal conflict. Institutional stability is undermined by correlation across agents' preferences over positions, as the resulting envy enables a decisive coalition to arise endogenously to change the institution. For extremely correlated preferences, I establish a Chaos Theorem wherein there exists a majority-approved agenda from any matching allocation to any other allocation. Nevertheless, I show that institutions are robust to intermediate correlation across preferences under majority rule, in sharp contrast to plurality rule (i.e., popular matching, studied in computer science). Given the prevalence of (super-)majority rules in practice, this suggests why we observe institutional stability.
The theoretical insights are used empirically to explain the historical evolution of assignment procedures of elite civil servants to states in India. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima, Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | November 28, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management University) "Undominated Mechanisms" with Tilman Börgers, Kexin Wang |
| Abstract | A mechanism is dominated by another mechanism if the latter mechanism
generates a weakly higher ex post revenue for all valuation profiles and a strictly
higher ex post revenue for at least one valuation profile. A mechanism is
undominated if there is no mechanism that dominates it. We study the class of
undominated mechanisms in various environments. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi (Yichuan Lou) |
| 日時 | December 5, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Kota Saito (California Institute of Technology) "Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives" with Haruki Kono, Alec Sandroni [Paper] |
| Abstract | The random utility model is one of the most fundamental models in economics. Falmagne (1978) provides an axiomatization but his axioms can be applied only when choice frequencies of all alternatives from all subsets are observable. In reality, however, it is often the case that we do not observe choice frequencies of some alternatives. For such a dataset, we obtain a finite system of linear inequalities that is necessary and sufficient for the dataset to be rationalized by a random utility model. Moreover, the necessary and sufficient condition is tight in the sense that none of the inequalities is implied by the other inequalities, and dropping any one of the inequalities makes the condition not sufficient. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | December 12, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Teresa Molina (University of Hawaii at Manoa) "An Examination of Intergenerational Mobility in the Philippines" (Teresa Molina and Cara Tan) |
| Abstract | Anti-poverty programs, including conditional cash transfers (CCTs), are widely viewed as effective tools for increasing intergenerational mobility. However, direct empirical tests of this hypothesis are hard to find, and little attention has been paid to the magnitude of any potential effects. In this paper, we calculate various measures of intergenerational education mobility in the Philippines at the municipality level. This allows us to estimate the effects of a national CCT program on both absolute upward mobility and relative mobility. We find that the program increased educational attainment and absolute upward mobility, but had no effect on relative mobility. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | December 19, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Sangyoon Park (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, HKUST) "Education and Wartime Mobilization: Evidence from Colonial Korea during WWII" |
| Abstract | We empirically examine the effect of colonial education on the mobilization of Koreans during World War II. In the early 1920s, the Japanese colonial government implemented an education expansion policy that doubled the number of public primary schools for Koreans. We employ a difference-in-differences strategy which exploits cross-regional variation in the number of schools built under this policy and cross-cohort variation in the exposure to school expansion. Our estimate suggests that the expansion of public primary education significantly increased military mobilization. The results are robust to a number of controls that account for potential confounders. By exploiting the design of the expansion policy, we use an instrumental variable approach and show that the results are qualitatively unchanged. We examine several potential mechanisms that explain our finding. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | December 26, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、 2023 CREPE Day との共催で対面での開催です。 |
| 報告 | Daisuke Adachi
(Aarhus University) "When Work is Threatened: Lifelong Education and Occupation Choice" |
| Abstract | We study the role of adult apprenticeship in occupational switch and labor market dynamics using matched Danish adult and continuing education register and employer-employee data. A dynamic difference-in-difference analysis reveals that workers enrolled in apprenticeships related to business service (BS) occupations exhibit a 1-3 percentage point higher likelihood of transitioning to BS roles within 1-10 years, compared to non-participants. We propose a life-cycle model of employment and education choices that yields a logit conditional choice probability with flexible elasticities of substitution between occupations and education programs. The estimated education take-up elasticity is lower than that of job switching, suggesting a relative insensitivity of individuals to the program attractiveness. Counterfactual analysis indicates that enhancing the attractiveness of BS programs could modestly substitute the take-up of other programs with BS programs, along with striking churning effects on switches from traditional industrial jobs to BS occupations. These findings underscore the potential benefits of adult education initiatives that effectively address the recent changes in labor markets, such as automation and globalization. |
| Co-Host | Center for Research and Education in Program Evaluation (CREPE) |
| Organizer | Yasuyuki Sawada, (Shunya Noda) |
| 日時 |
※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※
January 9, 2024（火 Tuesday）9am - 5pm |
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面のみで開催されます。詳細は本ウェブサイトの説明をご確認ください。 The presentations are held in-person only. Please gather at the seminar venue by the starting time of your presentation. ■ 対面会場: 東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階第3セミナー室 |
| Notice | Presentation Materials: Your thesis paper can be printed by CIRJE and distributed at the seminar venue. Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can print it. The submission deadline is (please be punctual): Thursday, January 4 by 9:00am Please make sure that: * Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason. * The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version. * You need to send your emergency contact information (such as your cell phone number) along with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken. * Those who missed the deadline or those who wish to revise the thesis paper after the submission are required to make 5 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on your presentation day. * You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation: for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis. * Presenters need to make sure that the computer and pointer in the seminar room should be back into a locker after use. |
| 報告 | Tuesday, January 9 Seminar Room 3, 2nd Floor 9:00-9:30 OSAKI Yu (大崎 勇) (Readers: Shoji (main), Sawada, Takasaki) 9:30-10:00 TERAUCHI Hiroo (寺内 寛雄) (Readers: Matsumura (main), Cato, Ishihara) 10:00-10:30 HARADA Ko (原田 航) (Readers: Cato (main), Matsumura, Ishihara) 10:30-11:00 RACHLIN Kamran Joseph (Readers: Noda (main), Kojima, Matsushima) 11:00-11:30 TERANISHI Sora (寺西 空) (Readers: Kojima (main), Kandori, Noda) 11:30-12:00 YAGO Ayano (野吾 綾乃) (Readers: Kojima (main), Kandori, Noda) 12:00-12:30 HIRANO Asuka (平野 飛鳥) (Readers: Kandori (main), Kojima, Noda) 12:30-13:00 KONO Ayana (河野 彩奈) (Readers: Kojima (main), Kandori, Noda) 13:30-14:00 LYU You (Readers: Sawada (main), Takasaki, Griffen) 16:30-17:00 SASAKI Hideyuki (佐佐木 英之) (Readers: Takahashi Satoru (main), Oyama, Kojima) |
| 日時 | ※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※
January 16, 2024（火 Tuesday）11am - 2:30pm |
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面のみで開催されます。詳細は本ウェブサイトの説明をご確認ください。 The presentations are held in-person only. Please gather at the seminar venue by the starting time of your presentation. ■ 対面会場: 東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階第3セミナー室 |
| Notice | Presentation Materials: Your thesis paper can be printed by CIRJE and distributed at the seminar venue. Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can print it. The submission deadline is (please be punctual): Friday, January 12 by 9:00am Please make sure that: * Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason. * The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version. * You need to send your emergency contact information (such as your cell phone number) along with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken. * Those who missed the deadline or those who wish to revise the thesis paper after the submission are required to make 5 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on your presentation day. * You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation: for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis. * Presenters need to make sure that the computer and pointer in the seminar room should be back into a locker after use. |
| 報告 | Tuesday, January 16 Seminar Room 3, 2nd Floor 11:00-11:30 KOTANI Atsuki (小谷 厚起) (Readers: Sawada (main), Okazaki, Takasaki) 12:30-13:00 NITTA Rikuma (新田 陸磨) (Readers: Matsushima (main), Noda, Kojima) 13:00-13:30 KENT Nikita (Readers: Noda (main), Matsushima, Kojima) 13:30-14:00 ZHENG Haozhi (Readers: Noda (main), Matsushima, Kojima) 14:00-14:30 MINOWA Sota (箕輪 創太) (Readers: Watanabe Yasutora (main), Weese, Takasaki) |
| Date and Time | Six Lectures on Non-CES Demand Systems and Their Applications In-Person Seminar November 30（Thursday） 16.45-18.30 * Office Hours: 15.30-16.30 before the lectures. |
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| Venue | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟3階第４教室 * The seminar venues are different than usual Macroworkshop. |
| Speaker | Kiminori Matsuyama (Northwestern University) [Syllabus]
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| Co-Host | Organizer: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, Co-Host: Microeconomics Workshop |
| 日時 | January 23, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Taisuke Imai (Osaka Univerisy) "Experiments on misperceptions and attitudes toward CO2 emissions"[Paper_Part1][Paper_Part2] |
| Abstract | Addressing the urgent challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions necessitates innovative approaches, especially in the face of political contention surrounding carbon pricing. Policymakers often emphasize the role of providing information about CO2 emissions to both consumers and producers. In this presentation, we delve into a series of experiments aimed at understanding individuals' beliefs, attitudes toward CO2 emissions, and their support for carbon pricing. In the first part, we explore an empirical test centered on the argument that consumers are willing to mitigate emissions but lack information on how to do so. Through an extensive new dataset, we uncover substantial misperceptions regarding the carbon impact of various consumption behaviors, coupled with a clear preferences for mitigation. However, our findings reveal that correcting these beliefs has no discernible effect on consumption in large, representative samples. These robust null results challenge the efficacy of information-based policies in the fight against climate change. In the second part, we present a fully incentivized experiment involving a large representative sample of the German population. This study compares five distinct revenue recycling schemes. We discover that support for a carbon price is maximized by a "Climate Premium" that entails a fixed, uniform upfront payment to each individual. This recycling scheme outperforms tax and dividend schemes, utilizing revenues for the government's general budget, and earmarking revenues for environmental projects. Additionally, we demonstrate that both participants and experts underestimate public support for carbon pricing. |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Yasuyuki Sawada, (Shunya Noda) |
| 日時 | February 6, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Harry Pei (Northwestern University) "Community Enforcement with Endogenous Records"[Paper] |
| Abstract | I study repeated games with anonymous random matching and a continuum of players. By the end of each period, each player can erase the signal generated in that period from his record. I show that when players are sufficiently long-lived and have strictly dominant actions in the stage game, they will play their dominant actions with probability arbitrarily close to one in all equilibria. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, there exist purifiable equilibria with a positive level of cooperation in the submodular prisoner's dilemma but not in the supermodular prisoner's dilemma. My results suggest that when players can selectively include signals in their records, the maximal level of cooperation a community can sustain is not monotone with respect to the expected lifespans of its members and that the complementarity in players' actions can undermine their abilities to sustain cooperation. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Shunya Noda) |
Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について （Online Seminars Using Zoom)
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当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインでも開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。 Microeconomics Workshop is also held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.
※ 登録 (Registration) 事前登録が必須となります。下記よりご登録頂けますと、ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。事前にご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。（Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。） Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information including meeting URL will be provided via email. Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application) on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.) Please click here for registration : |