Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2019

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2019年5月21日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

日時 2019年5月28日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 加藤隼人(Hayato Kato) (Osaka University)
Economic integration and agglomeration of multinational production with transfer pricing (joint with Hirofumi Okoshi) [paper]
Abstract Do low corporate taxes always favor multinational production in the course of economic integration? We build a two-country spatial model with di erent corporate tax rates in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) can manipulate transfer prices in intra- rm trade. Using transfer pricing, MNEs can shift pro ts between domestic production plants and foreign distribution aliates. In the initial stage of integration, more MNEs locate their production plants in the low-tax country, and then in the later stage, this location pattern reverses. Contrary to conventional wisdom, high taxes may favor multinational production, which does not yet necessarily bring greater tax revenues. The results have implications for empirical studies and tax competition between unequal-sized countries.
Organizer Yasuhiro Sato

 

日時 2019年5月28日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Mira Frick (Yale University)
Boolean Expected Utility

 

Ryota Iijima (Yale University)

Stability and Robustness in Misspecified Learning Models

Abstract  
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時 2019年5月29日(水 Wednesday)10:25-12:10

主催:Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

共催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

※日時・場所に注意

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 松山公紀 (Kiminori Matsuyama) (Northwestern University)
"Reconsidering the Market Size Effect in Innovation and Growth"
Abstract In the standard R&D-based endogenous growth model, a larger country innovates more and grows faster. Because of the homotheticity of preferences, however, it does not matter whether the large market size is due to a large population size or a high per-capita expenditure. In this paper, we develop a balanced growth model of innovation with nonhomothetic preferences, containing the standard model as a limit case. We show, among others, that, holding the aggregate market size fixed, a country with higher per capita expenditure and a smaller population size innovates more and grows faster under the empirically relevant cases.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年6月4日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Hiroshi Ohashi

 

日時 2019年6月13日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時

2019年6月14日(金 Friday)17:00-18:30 ※日時と場所に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ 共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Kagel (The Ohio State University) 

Infinitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games: Comparing Teams with Individuals* with David Cooper(Florida State University)

Abstract Teams are less cooperative than individuals in infinitely repeated PD games to begin with, but are more cooperative with experience. Strategies from team discussions are similar to maximum likelihood estimates at an aggregate level. However, discussions identify strategies that are substantially more complicated than standard strategies. Around 65% of teams use Always Defect to begin with, primarily out of safety concerns as well as a failure even consider the benefits of cooperating. Stage 1 cooperation rates are the same, or higher, in a comparable set of finitely repeated games, for both super-game 1 and the last common super-game.  
Organizer Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時 2019年6月11日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Konrad Grabiszwski (Keio University and Mohammad bin Salman College (MBSC))
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2019年6月18日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 小島武仁 (Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University and CREPE)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2019年6月24日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Michela Tincani (University College London )
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer ShintaroYamaguchi

 

日時 2019年6月25日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Philip Bond (University of Washington)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Kenichi Ueda

 

日時 2019年7月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 鎌田雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada)(Universityof California, Berkeley)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2019年7月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 高木悠貴(Yuki Takagi) (Stanford University and CREPE)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時 Master's Thesis presentations

2019年7月16日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 TBA
Abstract  

 

日時 2019年7月16日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 小西秀男(Hideo Konishi) (Boston College)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 Master's Thesis presentations

2019年7月23日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 TBA
Abstract  

 

日時 2019年7月23日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 郡山 幸雄 (Yukio Koriyama) (Ecole Polytechnique, CREST)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時 2019年7月30日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Hülya Eraslan (Rice University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時 2019年9月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 David Card (University of California, Berkeley)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年10月7日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Eric Zou (University of Oregon)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時 2019年11月4日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Shaoda Wang (University of Chicago)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時 2019年11月5日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Daniel S. Hamermesh (Barnard College, IZA)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2019年11月11日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 David Neumark (University of California, Irvine)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2019年11月18日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Dean Hyslop (Motu)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 


<本年度終了分>

日時 2019年4月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Thibault Fally (University of California-Berkeley)
"A New Engel on Price Index and Welfare Estimation" (joint with David Atkin, Ben Faber and Marco Gonzalez-Navarro) [paper]
Abstract Measuring changes in welfare, and particularly the price index, is challenging. Recent em-pirical contributions have addressed this challenge by drawing on rich and newly availablesources of microdata to measure changes in household nominal incomes and price indices.While such data have become available for some components of household welfare, andfor some locations and periods, they are typically not available for the entire consumptionbasket. In this paper, we propose and implement an alternative approach that uses rich,but widely available, expenditure survey microdata to estimate theory-consistent changesin income-group specific price indices and welfare. Our approach builds on existing workthat uses linear Engel curves and changes in expenditure on income-elastic goods to inferunobserved real incomes. A major shortcoming of this approach is that while based on non-homothetic preferences, the price indices it recovers are homothetic and hence are neithertheory consistent nor suitable for distributional analysis when relative prices are changing.To make progress, we show that we can recover changes in income-specific price indicesand welfare from horizontal shifts in Engel curves if preferences are quasi-separable (Gor-man, 1970; 1976) and we focus on what we term “relative Engel curves”. Our approach isflexible enough to allow for the highly non-linear Engel curves we document in the data,and for non-parametric estimation at each point of the income distribution. We first imple-ment this approach to estimate changes in cost of living and household welfare using Indianmicrodata. We then revisit the impacts of India’s trade reforms across regions.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年4月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Akifumi Ishihara (The University of Tokyo)
Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Abstract We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive effect to establish a productive working practice. An optimal relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which outperforms working environments operated by a multitasking single agent. Our result also suggests an implication on how privately observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal.
Organizer Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2019年4月15日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Giulio Zanella (University of Adelaide and University of Bologna)

"Prison Work and Recidivism" [Slides]

Abstract  
Organizer Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時 2019年4月16日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Andrea Weber (Central European University)
Female Leadership and Gender Gap within Firms: Evidence from an Italian Board Reform (joint with Agata Maida) [paper]
Abstract Over the last decade, several countries have followed the Norwegian example and introduced laws mandating gender quota for corporate board membership. The main aim of these laws is breaking the “glass ceiling” which prevents women from advancing into top corporate positions. In this paper, we evaluate the Italian law of 2011, which installed a step-wise increase in gender quota that remain effective for three consecutive board renewals of listed limited liability firms. We link firm-level information on board membership and board election dates with detailed employment and earnings records from the Social Security registers. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the gender quota regulation and variation in board renewals across firms, we evaluate the effect of the board gender composition on measures of gender diversity in top positions over a period of 4 years. While the reform substantially raised the female membership on corporate boards, we find no evidence of spillover effects on the representation of women in top executive or top earnings positions. Our results confirm the findings by Bertrand et al. (2019) who study the introduction of a gender quota for board members in Norway. Given that Italy is a much less egalitarian society than Norway, with a larger scope of establishing gender equality, our results confirm that board quota policies alone are ineffective in raising female representation in top corporate positions, at least in the short run
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年4月16日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Yuval Heller (Bar Ilan University)
Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (joint with Christoph Kuzmics) [paper]
Abstract We study coordination games with pre-play communication in which agents have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. We present a novel intuitive equilibrium strategy with the following properties: (1) each agent reports his preferred outcome (and nothing else), (2) agents never miscoordinate, (3) if the agents have the same preferred outcome, then they coordinate on this outcome, and (4) otherwise, there is a “fallback norm” that determines the coordinated outcome. We show that this behavior is essentially the unique renegotiation-proof strategy, and that it satisfies appealing properties: independence of the distribution of private preferences, Pareto optimality, high ex-ante expected payoff, and evolutionary stability.
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時 2019年4月23日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Galina Zudenkova (University of Mannheim)
"Information and Communication Technologies, Protests, and Censorship" joint with Maxim Ananyev, Maria Petrova and Dimitrios Xefteris.
Abstract We develop a theory of information flows and political regime change, when citizens use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for both information acquisition and protest coordination. Governments can respond by obfuscation of citizen´s signal or by restricting access to ICTs used for coordination. We find that introduction of communication technologies lowers the probability of regime survival, but this effect is weaker in economies that don´t use ICTs for production. We also expect less competent governments to use coordination censorship, though this effect is weaker in economies that use ICTs extensively. Some high-frequency empirical evidence is consistent with our predictions. 
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時 2019年5月7日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Johann Caro Burnett (Hiroshima University)
Are We Ready for A.I. Ethical Decision Making? A Study on Autonomous Cars (joint with Shinji Kaneko)
Abstract This paper studies how humans react to the ethical decision making of Artificial Intelligence; and it has contributions in two levels: methodological and applied. (i) From an applied point of view, we study whether there is an unjustifiable fear towards technology. To answer this question, we use a standard RCT/questionnaire. Moreover, (ii) we contrast two methodologies to estimate preferences: an indirect method (revealed preferences) and a direct method (stated preferences). We find that a direct method shows that such unjustifiable fear towards technology exists. In contrast, an indirect method shows that humans are not really against the implementation of new technologies. Then we discuss the cause of this discrepancy. We propose that the responses to a direct method largely weight the respondents' believes about the social preferences rather than their own preferences.
Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2019年5月13日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Ayumu Ken Kikkawa(University of British Columbia)
"The Impact of NAFTA on Prices and Competition: Evidence from Mexican Manufacturing Plants" [paper]
Abstract This paper assesses the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Mexican manufacturing plants' prices and markups. We distinguish between Mexican goods that are exported and those sold domestically, and decompose their prices sepa- rately into markups and marginal costs. We then analyze how these components were aected by reductions in Mexican output taris, intermediate input taris, and U.S. taris. We nd that declines in these taris led to signicant reductions in the marginal costs of Mexican products. However, prices of exported goods slightly increased as ex- porters increased their markups in response to declines in U.S. taris.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年5月14日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Martin Adler (VU University Amsterdam)
The congestion relief benefit of public transit: evidence from Rome (joint with Federica Liberini, Antonio Russo, and Jos N. van Ommeren) [paper]
Abstract We estimate the effect of public transport supply on travel times of motor-vehicle and bus users in Rome, Italy. We apply a quasi-experimental methodology exploiting hourly information on public transport service reductions during strikes. We find that a 10 percent reduction in public transit supply increases the travel time of motor-vehicles users by 1.6 percent in the morning peak. The effect of this reduction on travel time of bus users is similar. The congestion-relief benefit of public transport is sizeable and bus travel time gains account for an important share of this benefit. We also estimate the effects of dedicated bus lane provision on travel times of bus and motor-vehicle users. It appears that for specific roads dedicated bus lanes reduce overall travel time, despite the lane loss, and are undersupplied from a welfare perspective.
Organizer Yasuhiro Sato

 

日時

2019年5月20日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※共催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Matilde Bombardini(University of British Columbia)
Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy (joint with Marianne Bertrand, Raymond Fisman, Brad Hackinen, and Francesco Trebbi) [paper]
Abstract Politicians and regulators rely on feedback from the public when setting policies. For-profit corporations and non-profit entities are active in this process and are arguably expectedto provide independent viewpoints. Policymakers (and the public at large), however, maybe unaware of the financial ties between some firms and non-profits – ties that are legaland tax-exempt, but difficult to trace. We identify these ties using IRS forms submitted bythe charitable arms of large U.S. corporations, which list all grants awarded to non-profits.We document three patterns in a comprehensive sample of public commentary made byfirms and non-profits within U.S. federal rulemaking between 2003 and 2015. First, we showthat, shortly after a firm donates to a non-profit, the grantee is more likely to comment onrules for which the firm has also provided a comment. Second, when a firm comments on arule, the comments by non-profits that recently received grants from the firm’s foundationare systematically closer in content similarity to the firm’s own comments than to thosesubmitted by other non-profits commenting on that rule. Comments by non-profits thatrecently received grants are also not opposing in terms of sentiment of their content. Third,when a firm comments on a new rule, the discussion of the final rule is more similar to thefirm’s comments when the firm’s recent grantees also comment on that rule. These patterns,taken together, suggest that corporations strategically deploy charitable grants to inducenon-profit grantees to make comments that favor their benefactors, and that this translatesinto regulatory discussion that is closer to the firm’s own comments.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年5月21日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Francesco Trebbi (University of British Columbia)
Unbundling Polarization (joint with Nathan Canen and Chad Kendall) [paper]
Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of political polarization, a phenomenon ofincreasing relevance in Western democracies. How much of polarization is driven by divergencein the ideologies of politicians? How much is instead the result of changes in the capacity ofparties to control their members? We use detailed internal information on party discipline inthe context of the U.S. Congress – whip count data for 1977-1986 – to identify and structurallyestimate an economic model of legislative activity where agenda selection, party discipline, andmember votes are endogenous. The model delivers estimates of the ideological preferences ofpoliticians, the extent of party control, and allows us to assess the effects of polarization throughagenda setting (i.e. which alternatives to a status quo are strategically pursued). We find thatparties account for approximately 40 percent of the political polarization in legislative votingover this time period, a critical inflection point in U.S. polarization. We also show that, absentparty control, historically significant economic policies, including Debt Limit bills, the SocialSecurity Amendments of 1983, and the two Reagan Tax Cuts of 1981 and 1984 would havenot passed or lost substantial support. Counterfactual exercises establish that party control ishighly relevant for the probability of success of a given bill and that polarization in ideologicalpreferences is instead more consequential for policy selection, resulting in different bills beingpursued.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa