Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2021

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2021年6月9日現在。近い予定から順に掲載しています。

Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について (Online Seminars Using Zoom) 

 

当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインで開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。

Microeconomics Workshop is held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.

  

※ 登録 (Registration)

事前登録が必須となります。 下記よりご登録頂けますと、 ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。 事前に、ご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。 (Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。)

Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email.  Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.)

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwtceGhrzMpHtZ8GucmpPdvrWzSi7Gf2sdT

参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website.

日本語 ・ English

※ 注意 (Note)

1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。 Please register your full name when you participate.

2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。

Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.

 

※ セミナー中 (During Seminars)

ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session.

音声OFFの手順 (Muting Participants in Zoom)

日本語 ・ English

 

日時

2021年6月22日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Chengsi Wang (Monash University)
Directed Search on a Platform: Meet Fewer to Match More? (Joint work with Makoto Watanabe)
Abstract

This paper studies a directed search equilibrium in a platform setting with homo- geneous buyers and sellers.We show that a meeting technology, typically controlled by intermediaries, (e.g., advertisement, interview scheduling, or online search pro- tocol) determines the matching outcome as follows. First, a meeting technology that provides full information to market participants is not necessarily ecient. Second, the seller- and buyer-optimal meeting technologies do not require full market transparency either; rather, the latter may be achieved even with the min- imum information. Finally, the ecient matching outcome can be decentralized by a pro t-maximizing platform who adopts a simple fee-setting policy for its intermediation service.

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara

 

日時

2021年6月29日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Antonio Rosato (University of Technology Sydney)
"Dutch vs. First-Price Auctions with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Bidders" (joint work with Benjamin Balzer and Jonas von Wangenheim) [paper]
Abstract

We study Dutch and ?first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders and show that the strategic equivalence between these formats no longer holds. Intuitively, as the Dutch auction unfolds, a bidder becomes more optimistic about her chances of winning; this stronger ?attachment?e¤ect pushes her to bid more aggressively than in the ?first-price auction. Thus, Dutch auctions raise more revenue than ?first-price ones. Indeed, the Dutch auction raises the most revenue among standard auction formats. Our results imply that dynamic mechanisms that make bidders more optimistic raise more revenue, thereby rationalizing the use of descending-price mechanisms by sellers in the ?field.

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年7月1日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard University)

Economics of Healthcare

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2021年7月6日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 森田穂高(Hodaka Morita) (Hitotsubashi University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara

 

日時

2021年7月13日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Patrick DeJarnette (Waseda University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年9月2日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Jesse Rothstein (UC-Berkeley)

Empirical Studies on Public Policy

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年9月30日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Benjamin Olken (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Economic Development and Political Economy

Moderator: Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年11月25日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

16 Brian Jacob ( University of Michigan)

Economics of K12

Moderator: TBA

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2021年12月7日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Gabriel Carroll (University of Toronto)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時

2021年12月21日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Chia-Hui Chen (Kyoto University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Eric Weese

 


<本年度終了分>

 

日時

2021年4月5日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※ 日時に注意

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Maria Martin Rodriguez (Nagoya University)
Stable Networks with Bargaining and Heterogeneous Linking Costs
Abstract

In a world where agents are of one of two possible types, we study the pairwise stability of stationary networks in which agents bargain in an infinite-horizon game à la Manea. The cost of forming and sustaining links depends on both the communication ease and complementarities, so that when the latter are strong enough, connections between individuals of different types are cheaper. In this case, several families of bipartite components such that no two players of the same type are connected become stable. These components are inequitable and so the surplus splits asymmetrically across linked individuals. This result differs from the case in which connections between individuals of the same type are cheaper, where the vast majority of stable components are equitable. Therefore, the result highlights how complementarities and the relative scarcity of certain types combined result in more or less unequal bargains.

Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2021年4月6日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Jin Li (The University of Hong Kong)
Promotion Opportunities and Production Dynamics i (joint with Ye Luo, Mike Powell, and Rongzhu Ke)
Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic production planning problem with promotion management. A principal optimally allocates promotion opportunities to agents arriving in different cohorts while ensuring that agents are willing to wait. An optimal dynamic assignment rule features a capped seniority rule: agents first joins a waitlist and get admitted to candidacy on a FIFO basis, at which point promotion opportunities are allocated randomly to candidates. The capped seniority rule enables the principal to combine the incentive constraints of the different cohorts into two aggregate constraints per period. These aggregated constraints determine the structure of the production, which consists of a sequence of waves and the firm size is downward rigid within each wave. Our analysis highlights a timing mismatch between when agents arrive and when promotion opportunities arrive. This asynchronicity gives rise to rich implications for how the timing of promotion opportunities influences the firm's size.

Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年4月15日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

930- Gordon Dahl (University of California, San Diego)

"Economics of the Family"

Moderator: Ayako Kondo (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

※本ワークショップは開催中止となりました。 The seminar has been cancelled.

2021年4月19日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

報告 Wojciech Kopczuk (Columbia University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Drew Griffen

 

日時

2021年4月20日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Daniel Keniston (Louisiana State University)
A Division of Laborers: Identity and Efficiency in India (joint with Guilhem Cassan and Tatjana Kleineberg) [paper]
Abstract

Workers' social identity affects their choice of occupation, and therefore the structure and prosperity of the aggregate economy. This paper studies this phenomenon in a setting where work and identity are particularly intertwined: the Indian caste system. Using a new dataset that combines information on caste, occupation, wages, and historical evidence of subcastes' traditional occupations, the paper shows that caste members are still greatly overrepresented in their traditional occupations. To quantify the effects of caste-level distortions on aggregate and distributional outcomes, the paper develops a general equilibrium Roy model of occupational choice. We structurally estimate the model and evaluate counterfactuals that remove castes' ties to their traditional occupations, through their direct preferences, and via their parental occupations and social networks. The findings show that the share of workers employed in their traditional occupation decreases substantially. However, the effects on aggregate output and productivity are very small–and in some counterfactuals even negative–because gains from a more efficient human capital allocation are offset by productivity losses from weaker caste networks and reduced learning across generations. The findings emphasize the importance of caste identity in coordinating workers into occupational networks that enable productivity spillovers.

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時

2021年4月27日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Patrick Francois (The University of British Columbia)
A theory of elite-initiated democratization, illustrated with the case of Myanmar (joint work with James Fearon)
Abstract

 

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時

2021年5月11日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Anastassios (Tasos) Kalandrakis (University of Rochester)
A priori bounds on legislative bargaining agreements [paper]

Abstract

In a workhorse model of legislative bargaining with spatial preferences, I establish easy to compute bounds on all equilibrium acceptable agreements, proposals, and out comes. The approach constitutes a feasible method to incorporate equilibrium restric tions from the model in correlational and structural empirical studies of legislatures, avoiding the computation of actual equilibria. It also yields a number of theoretical insights on the centrality of equilibrium legislative decisions, the relation of such equi librium outcomes with social choice solution sets, and the effect of changes on voting and proposal-making rights. These theoretical results highlight the broad conclusion that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is highly contingent on other institutional features besides the assignment of voting rights.

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年5月13日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Mark Duggan (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR))

Health Economics

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2021年5月18日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Alexis Akira Toda (University of California San Diego)
Optimal Epidemic Control in Equilibrium with Imperfect Testing and Enforcement (joint work with Thomas Phelan) [paper]
Abstract

We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informational constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect current risk of infection) and dynamic (individual actions affect future disease prevalence), and study how they are affected by limitations on testing and enforcement. We prove that a planner with imperfect enforcement will always wish to curtail activity, but that its incentives vanish as testing becomes perfect. When a vaccine arrives far into the future, the planner with perfect enforcement may encourage activity before herd immunity. We find that lockdown policies have modest welfare gains, whereas quarantine policies are effective even with imperfect testing.

Organizer Eric Weese

 

日時

2021年6月1日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 山下拓朗(Takuro Yamashita) (Toulouse School of Economics)
Excessive collusion: Information design in repeated interaction (joint work with Joao Correia da Silva)
Abstract

Consider a repeated interaction between a collusion coordinator (principal) and a participating firm (agent). There are three kinds of states: those where both prefer a collusive action (in terms of their instantaneous payoffs), those where only the coordinator prefers a collusive action (but the firm prefers a non-collusive action), and those where both prefer a non-collusive action. The coordinator can fully control the agent's information about the state, which is partially persistent over time. Under certain conditions, we show that the optimal policy for the coordinator is to recommend a collusive action in every state, in particular, even when both parties prefer a non-collusive action. This suggests that a collusion may not only harm those outside the collusion, but also those inside the collusion, at least in some states.

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara

 

日時

2021年6月8日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 定兼 仁 (Hitoshi Sadakane) (Kyoto University)
Cheap Talk and Fact-checking [paper]
Abstract

We study a model of cheap talk in which (i) the sender's preference is state independent, (ii) each message has a literal meaning, and (iii) the receiver can conduct costly fact-checking. By fact-checking, the receiver can verify whether the sender is conveying the truth. We characterize partially informative equilibria in which the sender conveys pieces of information about the state. In equilibrium, the sender's type space (the state space) is partitioned into two sets: truth-telling types and lying types. The truth-telling types send a non-fictional message, and the lying types randomly send fictional messages and mimic the truth-telling types. We also show that under the uniform-quadratic assumption, if the cost of fact-checking is not too high, the receiver's optimal equilibrium lies in a class of equilibria: high types truth-telling equilibria.

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara