Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2016

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2016年5月31日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

日時

※Schedule Cancelled   下記のセミナーは中止となりました。

2016年5月31日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (The University of Tokyo)

日時 産業組織コンファレンス (IO Conference)

2016年6月4日 (土 Saturday)10:00-12:00  

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

報告

1) 10:00-11:00

Partick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics, GREMAQ, IDEI and CEPR)

TBA

 

2) 11:00-12:00

Michael Riordan (Economics Department, Columbia University)

Privacy Protection (joint with Bruno Jullien and Yassine Lefouili) [paper]

 

Abstract

1)

 

2) We study the incentives of a website to sell its customers’ personal information. Third parties buying that information can bring either benefits or harm to consumers, who learn their vulnerability to malicious third parties through experience. The cost of selling information is the risk that bad experience leads consumers to end their relationship with the website. The privacy policy is not contractible but the website may decide to be cautious by not selling personal information or may spend resources to screen harmful third parties from access to customer information. We characterize the equilibrium and its welfare properties. We then discuss implications for policy rules.

日時

2016年6月7日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

中島大輔 (Daisuke Nakajima) (Otaru University of Commerce)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月14日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

大西健 (Ken Onishi) (Singapore Management University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月16日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35

※ 曜日・会場に注意  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Kennan (University of Wisconsin at Madison)

Spatial Variation in Higher Education Financing and the Supply of College Graduates

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月21日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

安田洋祐 (Yosuke Yasuda) (Osaka University)

Competitive Market Achieves the Greatest Happiness of the Minimum Number

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月28日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

内田浩史 (Hirofumi Uchida) (Kobe University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年7月5日(火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10 ※時間に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

野田 俊也 (Shunya Noda) (Stanford University)

Full Surplus Extraction and within-period Ex Post Implementation in Dynamic Environments [website]

Abstract

We study the properties of the information structure that guarantee full surplus extraction in dynamic environments. Exploiting the intertemporal correlation of agents' types, we propose a condition for the existence of a within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanism that leaves no information rent. The concepts of strong- and weak-detectability suggested in this paper turn out to be crucial for achieving this goal. Our results suggest that the assumptions needed for private information to confer a positive rent might be stronger when we consider dynamic environments.

日時

2016年7月5日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

楡井誠(Makoto Nirei) (Ministry of Finance Japan)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年7月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

共催:CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Florin Bidian (Georgia State University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年7月19日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

山本竜市 (Ryuichi Yamamoto) (Waseda University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年7月26日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Zaifu Yang (University of York)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年9月20日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:20
※授業日程上は予定されていませんが開催されます

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Quah (Oxford University and National University of Singapore)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年9月27日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

マクロ経済学ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Joseph Zeira (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月11日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Liran Einav (Stanford University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月18日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Joel David (University of Southern California)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月21日(金 Friday)16:50-18:35
※曜日に注意。
   

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Clifford Winston (The Brookings Institution)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月25日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Fernando Duarte (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年11月8日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

※授業日程上は予定されていませんが開催されます・会場に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 第3セミナー室
in Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Gadi Barlevy (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

TBA

Abstract

 


<本年度終了分>

日時

2016年4月5日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

伊藤秀史 (Hideshi Itoh) (Hitotsubashi University)

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita) [website]

Abstract

We study a decision process of a two-agent organization that consists of a decision-maker who selects a project and an implementer who implements and executes the selected project. Each of the decision-maker and the implementer has intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. Key features of the model are that (i) there is the separation of decision and implementation, and the implementer may choose to execute no project if the cost of implementation is high; and (ii) the implementer engages in both acquiring additional information and implementing the project. We show that the implementer's incentives to gather information and to implement the selected project interact with each other in a non- trivial way. We in particular show how this interaction affects the optimality of diversity of preferences in organizations as well as the implementer's strategic communication.

日時

2016年4月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Andrea Prat (Columbia University)

CEO Behavior and Firm Performance(joint with Oriana Bandiera, Stephen Hansen and Ra aella Sadun) [paper]

Abstract

We measure the behavior of over 1,100 CEOs in six countries (Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and US) using a new methodology that combines (i) a survey measuring each activity undertaken in a random work-week by the executives and (ii) a machine learning algorithm that projects these high dimensional data onto one CEO behavior index. A simple firm-CEO matching model yields the null hypothesis that, in absence of matching frictions, CEO behavior is uncorrelated with firm performance. Combining the CEO behavior index with firm level accounting data we reject this null. We find a large and significant correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance, which appears only gradually over time after the CEO is appointed and is stronger in emerging economies. Our results suggest that CEO-firm matching frictions may account for a sizable fraction of the cross country productivity differential observed in the data.

日時

2016年4月18日(月 Monday)15:00-16:30   ※日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Veikko Thiele (Queen's University)

Fostering Entrepreneurship: Backing Founders or Investors? (joint with Thomas Hellmann)

Abstract

Governments across the globe want to foster entrepreneurial ecosystems, but there is no consensus on what policies are most effective. This paper considers an entrepreneurial ecosystem where entrepreneurs get funded by angel investors who themselves are experienced entrepreneurs. It develops a dynamic model with overlapping generations, where successful entrepreneurs become investors. The theory finds an intergenerational linkage between current valuations of start-ups and future funding supply. Government policies that back founders by helping them start companies reduce valuations. In contrast, policies that back investors by making investments more attractive drive up valuations, and thereby increase funding for future entrepreneurs.

日時

2016年4月19日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

宮川大介 (Daisuke Miyakawa) (Hitotsubashi University)

Geography and Realty Prices:Evidence from International Transaction-Level Data (joint with Chihiro Shimizu and Iichiro Uesugi) [paper] [slides]

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the role of the international flow of capital in real estate prices by quantifying the relation between investors' geographical locations and the prices they pay for their realty investments. Our data set contains more than 30,000 realty investment transactions in Australia, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. First, we find that foreign investors pay significantly higher prices than domestic investors do even after taking a wide variety of controls into account. Second, this overpricing becomes smaller as the buyers’ exposure to realty investments in the host countries becomes higher. Third, in support of these results, the investment returns of foreign investors are systematically lower than that of domestic investors. This negative excess return becomes smaller as the buyer’s exposure to the host countries becomes higher. These results indicate that the overpricing of foreign investors occurs when investors are less informed about the local property market and lessens with the accumulation of investment experience.

日時

2016年4月26日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小倉義明 (Yoshiaki Ogura) (Waseda University)

Network-Motivated Lending Decisions [PDF]

Abstract

We theoretically and empirically demonstrate that monopolistic or collusive banks will keep lending to a loss-making firm at an interest rate lower than the prime rate if the firm is located in an influential position in an inter-firm supply network. An influential firm generates a positive externality, and its exit damages the sales in the supply network. To internalize this externality, the profit-maximizing banks undertake such forbearance lending for an influential firm when the cost to support the loss-making influential firm can be recouped by imposing high interest on less influential firms. Our empirical study with a unique dataset containing information about inter-firm transactions and main banks provides evidence for such network-motivated lending decisions. This effect is more clearly observed at less credit-worthy firms whose main bank is a regional bank. Notably, we observe that such banks are often dominant lenders in the local loan market, and most of their clientele do not have direct access to the stock and bond market.

日時

2016年5月10日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

片桐満 (Mitsuru Katagiri) (Bank of Japan)

Inflation Determinacy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Global Game Approach

Abstract

How inflation is determined at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rate (ZLB) is a controversial topic in the monetary economics. In this paper, I construct a two period general equilibrium model with strategic complementarities in price competitions, and investigate how inflation is determined in equilibrium. Although the model has multiple equilibria with different levels of inflation when the expected productivity growth is common knowledge, I demonstrate that a tiny noise to it leads to inflation determinacy even with the ZLB. This equilibrium selection implies that low expected productivity growth leads to low inflation in the unique equilibrium, but I show that some policy measures including an increase in the target inflation rate work for realizing equilibrium with positive inflation rates.

日時

2016年5月17日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute)

Balanced Ranking Mechanisms (joint with Tridib Sharma) [paper]

Abstract

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent with at least 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We also show that this mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Our mechanism coincides with the well-known mechanism of Green and Laont when there are no more than 8 agents, and modifies it for higher number of agents.

日時

2016年5月24日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

梶井厚志 (Atsushi Kajii) (Kyoto University)

Strategic Ambiguity and Information

Abstract

 

日時

2016年5月26日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35  

※曜日に注意。

主催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

共催:CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Heng Chen (University of Hong Kong)

The Great Famine and Household Saving in China [paper]

Abstract

The Great Famine in China (1959-1961) is one of the most dramatic tragedies in history, which may have long term consequences for economic behaviors of Chinese population. In particular, we explore whether it continues to have impacts on household saving choices. Employing a dataset across 122 Chinese counties, we find that the saving rate of rural households in 2002 tend to be higher in counties where the famine was severer; and the impact of the famine is even larger, once its severity is instrumented. Evidence from individual preference data shows that people are more willing to cultivate thrift in children in counties more severely affected. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the Great Famine altered the thrifty attitude of survivors and subsequent generations.