Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2019

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2019年9月20日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

 

日時 2019年9月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

高橋秀典 (Hidenori Takahashi) (Hitotsubashi University)

Bidding for Contracts under Uncertain Demand: Skewed Bidding and Risk Sharing (joint with Yao Luo) [paper]

Abstract Procurement contracts often involve substantial uncertainty in project outcomes at the time of bid- ding. Whether the procurer of a contract bears such project risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. Using data from the Florida Department of Transportation, we document evidence that i) the procurer’s choice over the type of contract depends on unobserved project heterogeneity, and ii) potential contractors behave opportunistically via skewed bidding for contracts wherein the contractor bears the project risk. We develop and estimate a model of bidding for contracts that captures the bidder’s tradeoff between skewed bidding and risk exposure. Both efficient and inefficient bidders bid aggressively via skewed bidding. Counterfactual experiments suggest that the onus of bearing project risk should fall on the procurer (contractor) when project risk is large (small).
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時

Empirical Microeconomics Workshop

(The 4th CREPE Conference on Program Evaluation)

September 26, 2019 (Thursday) 9:30-17:20 ※日時と場所に注意

※主催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)
 共催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

 
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Program

For the latest program, please look at the Conference Website.

 

Program


9:30 am Welcome and registration

10:00 am
Yukiko Asai/Dmitri Koustas, University of Chicago
"Temporary Work Contracts and Female Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Japanese Airline Industry"

10:50 am Break

11:00 am
Yuko Mori, Tsuda University
"Impacts of Minimum-Wage Hikes on Wages and Employment in Japan," coauthored with Daiji Kawaguchi (The University of Tokyo)

11:50 am Lunch (only available for registered paritcipants)

1:00 pm
Takanao Tanaka, Hong KongUniversity of Science and Technology
"Energy Saving Can Kill: Evidence from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident," coauthored with Guojun He (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

1:50 pm Break

2:00 pm
Hitoshi Shigeoka, Simon Fraser University and University of Tokyo
"Free for Children? Patient Cost Sharing and Healthcare Utilization," coauthored with Toshiaki Iizuka (The University of Tokyo)

2:50 pm Break

3:00 pm
Raphael E. Ayibor/Stacey Chen, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
"Estimating the Effect of Maternal Education on Child Health Using Microdata from 22 African Countries"

3:50 pm Break

4:30 pm
David Card, University of California, Berkeley
(Keynote Speaker of UTokyo-GRIPS Workshop)
"Assortative Matching or Exclusionary Hiring? The Impact of Firm Policies on Racial Wage Differences in Brazil," coauthored with François Gerard (Columbia University), Lorenzo Lagos (Columbia University), and Edson Severnini (Carnegie Mellon University)

 

Registration Registration has already been closed.
Organizers Stacey H. Chen (GRIPS), Daiji Kawaguchi (The University of Tokyo), Ryuichi Tanaka (The University of Tokyo), Shintaro Yamaguchi (The University of Tokyo)
Sponsors Grant-in-Aid in Scientific Research (Service Sector Productivity in Japan: Determinants and Policies, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University) CREPE (The University of Tokyo)

 

日時

2019年10月1日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※ 共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップTokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

山内 太 (Futoshi Yamauchi) (International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI))

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Yoshito Takasaki

 

日時 2019年10月7日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Eric Zou (University of Oregon)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2019年10月8日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※ 共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップTokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

内藤久裕 (Hisahiro Naito) (University of Tsukuba)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Yoshito Takasaki

 

日時

2019年10月15日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※ 共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップTokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Alistair Munro (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Yoshito Takasaki

 

日時 2019年10月29日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

1. Takeshi Kawahara (The University of Tokyo)

The Chip Strategies Approximately Achieve Efficiency at the Optimal Rate [paper]

 

2. Kyohei Okumura (The University of Tokyo)

TBA

 

Abstract

1.For a two-player repeated favor-exchange game with private information, I compare the rates at which the chip-strategy equilibrium and the optimal perfect public equilibrium achieve the efficient payoff as the discount factor δ tends to 1. I show that (i) the convergence rate for the optimal perfect public equilibrium is no smaller than (1−δ)1/2; and (ii) that for the optimal chip-strategy equilibrium is no greater than (1 − δ)1/2, where the number of total chips grows at rate (1 − δ)−1/2. In this sense, the chip-strategy equilibrium approximately achieves efficiency at the optimal rate (1 − δ)1/2.

 

2.

 

Organizer Shunichiro Bessho

 

日時 2019年11月4日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Shaoda Wang (University of Chicago)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2019年11月5日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 関 絵里香 (Erika Seki) (Osaka Univeresity)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Yoshito Takasaki

 

日時

2019年11月11日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 David Neumark (University of California, Irvine)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2019年11月18日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Dean Hyslop (Motu)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2019年11月19日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Tong Wang (Waseda University)
Purchasing Seats for High School Admission in China
Abstract Many Chinese cities once gave students the option of paying higher tuition to attend their preferred schools. This seat-purchasing mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor stable. Our paper combines administrative and survey data to estimate students' preferences and conduct welfare analysis. We find that changing from a deferred acceptance mechanism to the so-called cadet-optimal stable mechanism reduces students' welfare but that adopting the observed seat-purchasing mechanism alleviates this welfare loss. Under the latter approach, upper-tier schools collect significantly more tuition with a minimal change in student quality whereas collecting more tuition results in middle-tier schools facing substantial uncertainty about student quality.
Organizer Yoshito Takasaki

 

日時 2019年12月3日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Wooyoung Lim (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時 2019年12月10日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

粟屋祐 (Yu Awaya) (University of Rochester)

Startups and Upstarts (joint with Vijay Krishna) [paper]

Abstract

We study a continuous-time R&D race between an established firm and a startup under asymmetric information. R&D investment brings success stochastically but only if the innovation is feasible. The only asymmetry between the firms is that the established firm has better information about the feasibility of the innovation. We show that there is an equilibrium in which the poorly-informed startup wins more often, and has higher expected profits, than the better-informed incumbent.  When the informational asymmetry is large, this is the unique equilibrium outcome. Even though better information is a competitive disadvantage, the value of information is positive.

Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 


<本年度終了分>

日時 2019年4月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Thibault Fally (University of California-Berkeley)
"A New Engel on Price Index and Welfare Estimation" (joint with David Atkin, Ben Faber and Marco Gonzalez-Navarro) [paper]
Abstract Measuring changes in welfare, and particularly the price index, is challenging. Recent em-pirical contributions have addressed this challenge by drawing on rich and newly availablesources of microdata to measure changes in household nominal incomes and price indices.While such data have become available for some components of household welfare, andfor some locations and periods, they are typically not available for the entire consumptionbasket. In this paper, we propose and implement an alternative approach that uses rich,but widely available, expenditure survey microdata to estimate theory-consistent changesin income-group specific price indices and welfare. Our approach builds on existing workthat uses linear Engel curves and changes in expenditure on income-elastic goods to inferunobserved real incomes. A major shortcoming of this approach is that while based on non-homothetic preferences, the price indices it recovers are homothetic and hence are neithertheory consistent nor suitable for distributional analysis when relative prices are changing.To make progress, we show that we can recover changes in income-specific price indicesand welfare from horizontal shifts in Engel curves if preferences are quasi-separable (Gor-man, 1970; 1976) and we focus on what we term “relative Engel curves”. Our approach isflexible enough to allow for the highly non-linear Engel curves we document in the data,and for non-parametric estimation at each point of the income distribution. We first imple-ment this approach to estimate changes in cost of living and household welfare using Indianmicrodata. We then revisit the impacts of India’s trade reforms across regions.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年4月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Akifumi Ishihara (The University of Tokyo)
Cooperation or Collusion? Rents in Relational Contracts for Teams
Abstract We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive effect to establish a productive working practice. An optimal relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which outperforms working environments operated by a multitasking single agent. Our result also suggests an implication on how privately observed individual signals should be aggregated to a commonly observed team signal.
Organizer Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2019年4月15日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Giulio Zanella (University of Adelaide and University of Bologna)

"Prison Work and Recidivism" [Slides]

Abstract  
Organizer Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時 2019年4月16日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Andrea Weber (Central European University)
Female Leadership and Gender Gap within Firms: Evidence from an Italian Board Reform (joint with Agata Maida) [paper]
Abstract Over the last decade, several countries have followed the Norwegian example and introduced laws mandating gender quota for corporate board membership. The main aim of these laws is breaking the “glass ceiling” which prevents women from advancing into top corporate positions. In this paper, we evaluate the Italian law of 2011, which installed a step-wise increase in gender quota that remain effective for three consecutive board renewals of listed limited liability firms. We link firm-level information on board membership and board election dates with detailed employment and earnings records from the Social Security registers. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the gender quota regulation and variation in board renewals across firms, we evaluate the effect of the board gender composition on measures of gender diversity in top positions over a period of 4 years. While the reform substantially raised the female membership on corporate boards, we find no evidence of spillover effects on the representation of women in top executive or top earnings positions. Our results confirm the findings by Bertrand et al. (2019) who study the introduction of a gender quota for board members in Norway. Given that Italy is a much less egalitarian society than Norway, with a larger scope of establishing gender equality, our results confirm that board quota policies alone are ineffective in raising female representation in top corporate positions, at least in the short run
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年4月16日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Yuval Heller (Bar Ilan University)
Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (joint with Christoph Kuzmics) [paper]
Abstract We study coordination games with pre-play communication in which agents have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. We present a novel intuitive equilibrium strategy with the following properties: (1) each agent reports his preferred outcome (and nothing else), (2) agents never miscoordinate, (3) if the agents have the same preferred outcome, then they coordinate on this outcome, and (4) otherwise, there is a “fallback norm” that determines the coordinated outcome. We show that this behavior is essentially the unique renegotiation-proof strategy, and that it satisfies appealing properties: independence of the distribution of private preferences, Pareto optimality, high ex-ante expected payoff, and evolutionary stability.
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時 2019年4月23日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Galina Zudenkova (University of Mannheim)
"Information and Communication Technologies, Protests, and Censorship" joint with Maxim Ananyev, Maria Petrova and Dimitrios Xefteris.
Abstract We develop a theory of information flows and political regime change, when citizens use information and communication technologies (ICTs) for both information acquisition and protest coordination. Governments can respond by obfuscation of citizen´s signal or by restricting access to ICTs used for coordination. We find that introduction of communication technologies lowers the probability of regime survival, but this effect is weaker in economies that don´t use ICTs for production. We also expect less competent governments to use coordination censorship, though this effect is weaker in economies that use ICTs extensively. Some high-frequency empirical evidence is consistent with our predictions. 
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時 2019年5月7日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Johann Caro Burnett (Hiroshima University)
Are We Ready for A.I. Ethical Decision Making? A Study on Autonomous Cars (joint with Shinji Kaneko)
Abstract This paper studies how humans react to the ethical decision making of Artificial Intelligence; and it has contributions in two levels: methodological and applied. (i) From an applied point of view, we study whether there is an unjustifiable fear towards technology. To answer this question, we use a standard RCT/questionnaire. Moreover, (ii) we contrast two methodologies to estimate preferences: an indirect method (revealed preferences) and a direct method (stated preferences). We find that a direct method shows that such unjustifiable fear towards technology exists. In contrast, an indirect method shows that humans are not really against the implementation of new technologies. Then we discuss the cause of this discrepancy. We propose that the responses to a direct method largely weight the respondents' believes about the social preferences rather than their own preferences.
Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2019年5月13日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Ayumu Ken Kikkawa(University of British Columbia)
"The Impact of NAFTA on Prices and Competition: Evidence from Mexican Manufacturing Plants" [paper]
Abstract This paper assesses the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Mexican manufacturing plants' prices and markups. We distinguish between Mexican goods that are exported and those sold domestically, and decompose their prices sepa- rately into markups and marginal costs. We then analyze how these components were aected by reductions in Mexican output taris, intermediate input taris, and U.S. taris. We nd that declines in these taris led to signicant reductions in the marginal costs of Mexican products. However, prices of exported goods slightly increased as ex- porters increased their markups in response to declines in U.S. taris.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年5月14日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Martin Adler (VU University Amsterdam)
The congestion relief benefit of public transit: evidence from Rome (joint with Federica Liberini, Antonio Russo, and Jos N. van Ommeren) [paper]
Abstract We estimate the effect of public transport supply on travel times of motor-vehicle and bus users in Rome, Italy. We apply a quasi-experimental methodology exploiting hourly information on public transport service reductions during strikes. We find that a 10 percent reduction in public transit supply increases the travel time of motor-vehicles users by 1.6 percent in the morning peak. The effect of this reduction on travel time of bus users is similar. The congestion-relief benefit of public transport is sizeable and bus travel time gains account for an important share of this benefit. We also estimate the effects of dedicated bus lane provision on travel times of bus and motor-vehicle users. It appears that for specific roads dedicated bus lanes reduce overall travel time, despite the lane loss, and are undersupplied from a welfare perspective.
Organizer Yasuhiro Sato

 

日時

2019年5月20日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※共催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Matilde Bombardini(University of British Columbia)
Hall of Mirrors: Corporate Philanthropy and Strategic Advocacy (joint with Marianne Bertrand, Raymond Fisman, Brad Hackinen, and Francesco Trebbi) [paper]
Abstract Politicians and regulators rely on feedback from the public when setting policies. For-profit corporations and non-profit entities are active in this process and are arguably expectedto provide independent viewpoints. Policymakers (and the public at large), however, maybe unaware of the financial ties between some firms and non-profits – ties that are legaland tax-exempt, but difficult to trace. We identify these ties using IRS forms submitted bythe charitable arms of large U.S. corporations, which list all grants awarded to non-profits.We document three patterns in a comprehensive sample of public commentary made byfirms and non-profits within U.S. federal rulemaking between 2003 and 2015. First, we showthat, shortly after a firm donates to a non-profit, the grantee is more likely to comment onrules for which the firm has also provided a comment. Second, when a firm comments on arule, the comments by non-profits that recently received grants from the firm’s foundationare systematically closer in content similarity to the firm’s own comments than to thosesubmitted by other non-profits commenting on that rule. Comments by non-profits thatrecently received grants are also not opposing in terms of sentiment of their content. Third,when a firm comments on a new rule, the discussion of the final rule is more similar to thefirm’s comments when the firm’s recent grantees also comment on that rule. These patterns,taken together, suggest that corporations strategically deploy charitable grants to inducenon-profit grantees to make comments that favor their benefactors, and that this translatesinto regulatory discussion that is closer to the firm’s own comments.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年5月21日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Francesco Trebbi (University of British Columbia)
Unbundling Polarization (joint with Nathan Canen and Chad Kendall) [paper]
Abstract This paper investigates the determinants of political polarization, a phenomenon ofincreasing relevance in Western democracies. How much of polarization is driven by divergencein the ideologies of politicians? How much is instead the result of changes in the capacity ofparties to control their members? We use detailed internal information on party discipline inthe context of the U.S. Congress – whip count data for 1977-1986 – to identify and structurallyestimate an economic model of legislative activity where agenda selection, party discipline, andmember votes are endogenous. The model delivers estimates of the ideological preferences ofpoliticians, the extent of party control, and allows us to assess the effects of polarization throughagenda setting (i.e. which alternatives to a status quo are strategically pursued). We find thatparties account for approximately 40 percent of the political polarization in legislative votingover this time period, a critical inflection point in U.S. polarization. We also show that, absentparty control, historically significant economic policies, including Debt Limit bills, the SocialSecurity Amendments of 1983, and the two Reagan Tax Cuts of 1981 and 1984 would havenot passed or lost substantial support. Counterfactual exercises establish that party control ishighly relevant for the probability of success of a given bill and that polarization in ideologicalpreferences is instead more consequential for policy selection, resulting in different bills beingpursued.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年5月28日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 加藤隼人(Hayato Kato) (Osaka University)
Economic integration and agglomeration of multinational production with transfer pricing (joint with Hirofumi Okoshi) [paper]
Abstract Do low corporate taxes always favor multinational production in the course of economic integration? We build a two-country spatial model with di erent corporate tax rates in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) can manipulate transfer prices in intra- rm trade. Using transfer pricing, MNEs can shift pro ts between domestic production plants and foreign distribution aliates. In the initial stage of integration, more MNEs locate their production plants in the low-tax country, and then in the later stage, this location pattern reverses. Contrary to conventional wisdom, high taxes may favor multinational production, which does not yet necessarily bring greater tax revenues. The results have implications for empirical studies and tax competition between unequal-sized countries.
Organizer Yasuhiro Sato

 

日時 2019年5月28日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:50  ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Mira Frick (Yale University)
Boolean Expected Utility

 

Ryota Iijima (Yale University)

Stability and Robustness in Misspecified Learning Models

Abstract  
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時 2019年5月29日(水 Wednesday)10:25-12:10

主催:Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

共催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

※日時・場所に注意

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 松山公紀 (Kiminori Matsuyama) (Northwestern University)
"Reconsidering the Market Size Effect in Innovation and Growth"
Abstract In the standard R&D-based endogenous growth model, a larger country innovates more and grows faster. Because of the homotheticity of preferences, however, it does not matter whether the large market size is due to a large population size or a high per-capita expenditure. In this paper, we develop a balanced growth model of innovation with nonhomothetic preferences, containing the standard model as a limit case. We show, among others, that, holding the aggregate market size fixed, a country with higher per capita expenditure and a smaller population size innovates more and grows faster under the empirically relevant cases.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 2019年6月4日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)
Designing Context-based Marketing: Product Recommendations under Time Pressure (joint with Kohei Kawaguchi and Yasutora Watanabe)[paper]
Abstract We study howto design product recommendationswhenconsumers’ attention and utility are influenced by time pressure—a prominent example of the context effect—and menu characteristics, such as the number of recommended products in the assortment. Using unique data on consumer purchases fromvending machines on train platformsin Tokyo,we develop and estimate a structural consideration set model in which time pressure and the recommendationmenuinfluence attention and utility. We find that time pressure reduces consumer attention but increases utility in general. Time pressure moderates the effect of recommendations for attention of both recommended and non-recommended products, and utility for recommended products. Moreover, the number of total recommendations increases consumer attention in general, but in a diminishing way. In our counterfactual simulation, we find that the revenue-maximizing number of recommendations decreases with time pressure. Optimizing the number of recommendations for each vending machine and for each time of day increases the total sales volume by 4.5% relative to the actual policy, 1.9% points more than traditional consumer-segment-based targeting.
Organizer Hiroshi Ohashi

 

日時 2019年6月11日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Konrad Grabiszwski (Keio University and Mohammad bin Salman College (MBSC))
Profiling Players in Dynamic Games: A Mobile Experiment
Abstract This article has two distinct objectives. The first objective is to explore what mobile technology has to offer for experimental research. To that end, a team of app developers was recruited to create Blues and Reds, a mobile app (Android/iOS) that operates as an experiment designed to study behavior in dynamic games. In less than six months, the app generated a database consisting of 35,826 observations from 6,463 subjects located in 141 countries. The second objective is to design and test a novel method of profiling players in dynamic games using data from Blues and Reds that satisfies both descriptive and predictive requirements. To describe the reasoning process in dynamic games, a profile consists of two dimensions. The first dimension depicts the quality of the subject's reasoning (savvy vs naive); the second dimension captures the speed of that reasoning (fast vs slow). Predictive power requires that the subject's profile indicates her likelihood to behave consistently with backward induction. The proposed hypothesis is that this probability is the highest for savvy-fast profile, followed by savvy-slow, then naive-fast, and naive-slow at the end. This hypothesis is successfully confirmed and replicated in 22 various dynamic games.
Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時 2019年6月13日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management University)
Robustly Optimal Reserve Price (joint withWei He) [paper]
Abstract We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. Theauctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of ageneric bidder’s valuation, but does not have reliable information about thejoint distribution. In this setting, we analyze the performance of second-price auctions with reserve prices in terms of revenue guarantee, that is,the greatest lower bound of revenue across all joint distributions that areconsistent with the marginals. For any finite number of bidders, we solvefor the robustly optimal reserve price that generates the highest revenueguarantee. Our analysis has interesting implications in large markets. For anymarginal distribution, the robustly optimal reserve price converges to zeroas the number of bidders gets large. Furthermore, the second-price auctionwith no reserve price is asymptotically optimal among all mechanisms.
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時

2019年6月14日(金 Friday)17:00-18:30 ※日時と場所に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ 共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Kagel (The Ohio State University) 

Infinitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games: Comparing Teams with Individuals (joint with David Cooper) [paper]

Abstract Teams are less cooperative than individuals in infinitely repeated PD games to begin with, but are more cooperative with experience. Strategies from team discussions are similar to maximum likelihood estimates at an aggregate level. However, discussions identify strategies that are substantially more complicated than standard strategies. Around 65% of teams use Always Defect to begin with, primarily out of safety concerns as well as a failure even consider the benefits of cooperating. Stage 1 cooperation rates are the same, or higher, in a comparable set of finitely repeated games, for both super-game 1 and the last common super-game.  
Organizer Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時

2019年6月17日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意
※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Joshua Goodman (Harvard Kennedy School) 

"Heat and Learning" [paper]

Abstract We demonstrate that heat inhibits learning and that school air-conditioning may mitigate this effect. Student fixed effects models using 10 million PSAT-retakers show hotter school days in years before the test reduce scores, with extreme heat being particularly damaging. Weekend and summer temperature has little impact, suggesting heat directly disrupts learning time. New nationwide, school-level measures of air-conditioning penetration suggest patterns consistent with such infrastructure largely offsetting heat’s effects. Without air-conditioning, a 1°F hotter school year reduces that year’s learning by one percent. Hot school days disproportionately impact minority students, accounting for roughly five percent of the racial achievement gap.
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2019年6月18日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 小島武仁 (Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University and CREPE)
Job Matching under Constraints (joint with Ning Sun and Ning Neil Yu) [paper]
Abstract In a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, we consider arbitrary con-straints imposed on sets of doctors that hospitals can hire. Constraints pre-serve the substitutes condition if and only if they are “generalized intervalconstraints,” slightly generalizing “interval constraints” that specify minimumand maximum numbers of doctors allowed. Given the substitutes condition, amild assumption ensures existence of competitive equilibria; equilibrium salariesform a lattice; a rural hospital theorem holds. We study comparative staticsabout changing interval constraints, and also show that instead of compellinghospitals to obey interval constraints, the government can entice them throughsubsidy and taxation.
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2019年6月24日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Michela Tincani (University College London )
"Rank Incentives, Misperceptions and the Design of Education Policy"
Abstract In this paper, we combine merged administrative and novel survey data that we collected in the context of a randomized national policy with structural econometric modelling to study how agents respond to rank incentives, and to analyze the design of such incentives. By combining a randomized experiment with structural modelling we are able to cleanly identify policy impacts and key model parameters, and use model simulations to provide evidence on the mechanisms driving policy impacts. 
Organizer ShintaroYamaguchi

 

日時 2019年6月25日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Philip Bond (University of Washington)
Failing to forecast rare events [paper]
Abstract We analyze the allocation of trading talent across different types ofassets, taking intoaccount equilibrium considerations in both labor and financial markets. We identify a strongeconomic force that leads the highest-skill traders to focus on trading “common event” assetsthat pay off frequently. Less talented traders instead trade “rare event” assets that pay offonly rarely, so that short positions pay off with high probability, i.e., “nickels in front of asteamroller” strategies. This allocation of talent leads to higher bid-ask spreads in commonevent assets, and reduces the ability of financial markets to predict rare events.
Organizer Kenichi Ueda

 

日時

2019年6月26日 (水 Wednesday) 16:50-18:35  ※日時に注意

主催:Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)

共催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告 Samuel Kortum (Yale University)
"Firm-to-Firm Trade: Imports, Exports, and the Labor Market” (joint with Jonathan Eaton and Francis Kramarz)
Abstract

 

日時 2019年7月1日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意
※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Mitsukuni Nishida (Johns Hopkins University)
"Are Mergers Beneficial for Firms? Evaluating Intangible Factors behind a Slowdown after a Financial Integration"
Abstract Although the profitability of firms drives the desire to merge, nearly half of all mergers are considered failures. We analyze whether a past merger made merging firms more or less profitable, and through what channels did the merger affect profitability. We examine the effects of mergers on revenues, costs, and intangible assets (e.g., corporate culture, managerial talent, and organizational learning/forgetting) with limited data. The model relies on publicly available information on sales and store count of the convenience-store chains in 47 geographical markets in Japan, before and after an actual merger event. Our descriptive analysis documents that the merging firms experienced a slowdown in sales performance and the magnitude of the slowdown differs across geographic markets. To examine the effect of the merger on intangible, we estimate a dynamic model of retail expansion by modeling intangible assets as serially correlated unobservables in economic profits that evolve both endogenously and stochastically. The estimates reveal these intangible factors declined following the merger, and such decay is associated with the distance from the parent company's headquarters. 
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年7月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 鎌田雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada)(Universityof California, Berkeley)
Flash Pass (joint with Zihao Zhou)
Abstract

We consider a model in which an amusement park sells different priority passes to customers in a queue whose utilities depend on positions in the queue. A customer’s valuation of a priority pass depends on the number of customers buying a higher-or-equal priority pass and hence other customers’ purchase decisions have an externality on the customer’s valuation. This externality differentiates our model from the standard screening model and we discuss implementability of selling multiple passes for different utility patterns. In our model, the externality makes the implementation of multi-pass schemes difficult, an issue that persists even when there are multiple types of customer types.

Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時 2019年7月8日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ 共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 吉田二郎(Jiro Yoshida) (Pennsylvania State University and CREPE)
"The Inheritance Tax and Household Mobility: An Exploration of Empty Nest Problem"[paper]
Abstract The underutilized housing stock is a problem caused by the mismatch between housing stock and demand. Two forms of mismatch are vacant homes and empty nests. Vacant homes reflect a thin second-hand housing market whereas empty nests are associated with low mobility. This study sheds light on the cause of empty nests by focusing on bequest motives and the inheritance tax. By using Japanese household panel data, we first explore how the characteristics of household and housing are associated with empty nests, bequest motives, mobility, and renovation decisions. By the two-stage estimation of the bequest and mobility/renovation equations, we find that the inheritance tax exemption exacerbates the empty nest problem by decreasing household mobility and renovation through greater bequest motives. Bequest motives are also positively impacted by a coresident male child, financial wealth, and a self-employment status. Mobility decreases by age but increases by house size. In contrast, renovation decreases by retirement but increases by financial wealth, a self-employment status, and if a house is constructed under new earthquake-resistance standards.  
Organizer Tsutomu Watanabe

 

日時

2019年7月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

※共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

※会場が変更されましたのでお気を付けください。

報告 高木悠貴(Yuki Takagi) (Stanford University and CREPE)
"Weighted Voting and Information Acquisition in Committees" [paper]
Abstract In a weighted voting system, votes are assigned based on predetermined criteria, such as population for the decision-making at the EU Council, shares at shareholder meetings, and financial contribution at the IMF and the World Bank. The criterion is typically unrelated to the voters’ ability to make a correct judgment. Do these unequal decision power distributions undermine the accuracy of group decisions? The goal of this paper is to analyze how the distribution of votes affects the accuracy of group decisions. I introduce an information aggregation model in which voters are identical except for voting shares. If the information is free, the accuracy of group decisions is always higher under unweighted majority rule than any weighted majority rules. When acquiring information is costly, by contrast, I show that the accuracy of group decisions may be higher under some weighted majority rules than under unweighted majority rule. This may justify giving someone greater decision power even if the person is no more capable than others. More generally, I characterize the equilibrium in which weighted voters invest in information and unweighted voters do not. The number of voters who invest in equilibrium is decreasing in the cost of improving their information.  
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時 2019年7月16日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 小西秀男(Hideo Konishi) (Boston College)
Incentivizing Team Production by Indivisible Prizes (joint with Benoit Crutzen, Sabine Flamand and Nicolas Sahuguet) [paper]
Abstract This paper formulates proportional representation in a parliamental election as a multi-prize contest among political parties. In particular, we analyze the performance of commonly-used list rule, and investigate what the optimal list rule is when candidates differ in their abilities to contribute. We show that, in order to maximize the aggregated effort exerted by the party candidates, each party should assign the highest ability candidates to the middle of the list, while the top priority ranks and low priority ranks should be assigned to lower ability candidates under the optimal list rule. Turning to the optimal mechanism, we can show that the optimal list rule is indeed the optimal monotonic rule when individual effort cost function is not too convex and the complementarities of individual efforts are not too strong. We also consider a situation in which some of the party members get extra benefits by the party’s winning the majority of the parliament seats, and show that the party leader may place the highest ability group at the top of the list so that the party leader may place the highest ability group at the top of the list so that both the highest and the middle-level ability party members to exert the maximum efforts as the whole.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

※Master's Thesis Presentations ※

We can print your thesis paper to be distributed at the seminar venue if needed.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):

July 23: 4:30pm. July 22 (Monday)


Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number along with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken
  • Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory.
Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.

 

日時 Master's Thesis presentations

2019年7月23日(火 Tuesday)10:30-11:30

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

10:30-11:00 CONG Tianxiang (神取、尾山、松井)

 

11:00-11:30 Kenneth S. Reyes (岡崎)

The Sweetness of Power:Human Capital Accumulation in America's Philippines"

   

 

日時

2019年7月23日(火 Tuesday)14:55-16:40, 16:50-18:35

※日時・場所に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

14:55-16:40 山本祐一 (Yuichi Yamamoto) (Hitotsubashi University)

"Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Model Misspecification" (joint with Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo)

 

16:50-18:35 郡山 幸雄 (Yukio Koriyama) (Ecole Polytechnique, CREST)
The Winner-Take-All Dilemma (joint with Kazuya Kikuchi) [paper]

Abstract This paper considers collective decision-making when individuals are partitioned into groups (e.g., states or parties) endowed with voting weights. We study a game in which each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members’ preferences. We show that under quite general conditions, the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma: while the winner-take-all rule is a dominant strategy, the equilibrium is Pareto dominated. We also show asymptotic Pareto dominance of the proportional rule. Our numerical computation for the US Electoral College verifies the sensibility of the asymptotic results.
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時 2019年7月26日(金 Friday)10:25-12:10 ※曜日に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University)
A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion
Abstract We consider a model in which a sender performs series of experiments to persuade a receiver to take a desired action. Constraints on information flow force the sender’s persuasion to take real time, and the receiver may walk away at any time without listening. In addition, persuasion is costly for both players. To incentivize the receiver to listen, the sender must leave rents that compensate his listening costs, but neither player can commit to her/his future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. But, for persuasion cost sufficiently small, there is a folk theorem: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s optimal persuasion and full revelation, as well as anything in between are obtained in MPE, as the persuasion cost vanishes.
Organizer Daisuke Oyama

 

日時

2019年7月29日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※日時に注意

 

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Yoshito Takasaki (The University of Tokyo)
"Disability, vocational training, and psychological externalities: Experimental evidence from Cambodia" [paper]
Abstract This paper reports a randomized control trial on vocational training for persons with disabilities (PWDs). The program seeks to promote skilled work in mechanics and service for persons with limb amputation or paralysis in heavily mined areas of rural Cambodia. The program is small scale but intensive, involving long stay at the training center, up to one year. Eligible PWDs were randomly recruited and only recruited PWDs could participate in the program, if they wished (one-sided noncompliance). I examine economic, psychological, and social impacts of the training. On one hand, the training greatly increased employment (salary employment, not family enterprise) and earnings. Moreover, this led to employment among nondisabled household members (i.e., positive economic intrahousehold spillover). On the other hand, the training rather increased people’s discrimination against disabilities, which led to an increase in PWDs’ stigma of disability (i.e., negative psychological intergroup spillover). This unintended consequence was not caused by PWDs’ economic inclusion (e.g., envy), but by their negative interactions with nondisabled people who were not familiarity with disabilities in the community. I address potential threats to identification of these psychological externalities: perception bias in discrimination experienced by PWDs and psychological intragroup spillover among PWDs.  
Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時 2019年7月30日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Hülya Eraslan (Rice University)
Efficiency with Political Power Dynamics and Costly Policy Change (joint with Adriana Piazza)
Abstract We consider a dynamic model in which two parties decide on a unidimensional policy in each period over an infinite horizon. The policy implemented in any period becomes the next status quo. Given the status quo, adjusting the policy upwards involves a cost that may differ between the party in power and the party out of power due to favoritism. A second source of tension is ideological: the two parties may be polarized in their ideal policies. We show that efficiency requires no policy reversals in the long run and efficient policies are bounded above. After fully characterizing equilibrium, we analyze its efficiency properties. When polarization is high, equilibrium is inefficient due to perpetual policy reversals. When polarization is not high but favoritism is, equilibrium is inefficient due to an "overshooting" effect. When neither polarization nor favoritism is high, equilibrium is efficient in the long run.
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時

2019年7月30日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意

 

※共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

齊藤紘多(Kota Saito) (California Institute of Technology and CREPE)
Repeated Choice: A Theory of Stochastic Intertemporal Preferences [paper]

Abstract We provide a repeated-choice foundation for stochastic choice. We obtain necessary and sufficient conditions under which observed stochastic choice of an agent can be represented as a limit frequency of the agent's repeated choice over time. In the representation, the agent repeatedly chooses today’s consumption and tomorrow’s continuation menu, aware that future preferences will evolve according to a subjective ergodic utility process. Using our model, we demonstrate how not taking into account the agent’s preference for early (late) resolution of uncertainty would lead an analyst to underestimate (resp., overestimate) the agent’s risk aversion. Estimation of preferences can be performed by the analyst without explicitly modeling continuation problems (i.e. stochastic choice is independent of continuation menus) if and only if the utility process takes on the standard additive and separable form. Applications include estimation under dynamic discrete choice.
Organizer Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時 2019年7月31日(水 Wednesday)10:25-12:10 ※曜日・場所に注意
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 第3セミナー室
in Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 野田俊也 (Shunya Noda) (University of British Columbia)
A Lucas Critique to the Difficulty Adjustment Algorithm of the Bitcoin System (joint with Kyohei Okumura and Yoshinori Hashimoto) [paper]
Abstract The design of the difficulty adjustment algorithm (DAA) of the Bitcoin system is vulnerable as it dismisses miners' response to the difficulty adjustment. We develop an economic model of the Proof-of-Work based blockchain system. Our model allows miners to pause operation when the expected reward is below the shutdown point. Hence, the supply of aggregate hash power can be elastic in the cryptocurrency price and the difficulty target of the mining puzzle. We prove that, when the hash supply is elastic, the Bitcoin DAA fails to generate a new block at a constant rate. In contrast, the DAA of another blockchain system, Bitcoin Cash, is shown to be stable even when the cryptocurrency price is volatile and the supply of hash power is highly elastic. We also provide empirical evidence and simulation results supporting the model's prediction. Our results indicate that the current Bitcoin system might collapse once a sharp price fall lowers the reward for mining denominated in fiat money. However, such a crisis can be prevented through upgrading.
Organizer Hitoshi Matsushima

 

日時 September 4, 2019 (水 Wednesday) 19:00-21:00 ※日時・場所に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告 赤石 れい (Rei Akaishi) (RIKEN Center for Brain Science )
Decision (Neuro)Science in Society
Abstract Data and its analysis create value by assisting humans in the decision making process. The mergence of decision science and data science opens new perspectives and opportunities for research and industry. In this talk Rei Akaishi gives an introduction to decision neuroscience and behavioral economics and discusses the synthesis of decision science and data science with the audience.
Organizer

Yoshito Takasaki, Michal Fabinger

日時 2019年9月9日(月 Monday)16:30-18:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Jessica Pan (National University of Singapore)
"The Effects of Sexism on American Women: The Role of Norms vs. Discrimination"[paper]
Abstract We examine the extent and channels through which reported sexism affects American women. Using a sample of internal migrants and an IV approach, we show that higher prevailing sexism where a woman currently lives (residential sexism) as well as where she was born (background sexism) adversely affect her labor market outcomes relative to men, increases marriage, and reduces childbearing age. The pattern of whose sexism (men vs. women, and specifc percentiles) matters for which set of outcomes suggest that residential sexism primarily a ects labor market outcomes through prejudice-based discrimination, and non-labor market outcomes through the in uence of current norms.? 
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi