ミクロ経済学ワークショップ 2021
Microeconomics Workshop

  • ※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

2021年度予定

Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について (Online Seminars Using Zoom) 

当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインで開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。

Microeconomics Workshop is held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.

※ 登録 (Registration)

事前登録が必須となります。 下記よりご登録頂けますと、 ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。 事前に、ご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。 (Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。)

Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email.  Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.)

 

Please click here for registration :

参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website.

日本語 ・ English

 

※ 注意 (Note)

1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。 Please register your full name when you participate.

2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。

Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.

 

※ セミナー中 (During Seminars)

ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session.

音声OFFの手順 (Muting Participants in Zoom)

日本語 ・ English

日時
Special lectures at University of Tokyo
Towards a general theory of markets with indivisible goods


1) September 21, 2021(火 Tuesday)4:00-5:30PM
2) September 22, 2021(水 Wednesday)4:00-5:30PM
3) September 23, 2021(木 Thursday)4:00-5:30PM

4) September 24, 2021(金 Friday)9:30-11:00AM

※日時に注意
*Each lecture will be followed by 30 minutes Q&A session.
*All time shown are Japan time.

場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
1)  Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford), Introduction to Markets for Indivisible Goods

2)  Elizabeth Baldwin (University of Oxford),
The geometry of preferences: demand types, equilibrium with Indivisibilities, and bidding languages

3)  Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford), The Equilibrium Existence Duality

4)  Ravi Jagadeesan (Stanford University) , Matching and Prices

 

– Recorded lecture will be posted on UTMD’s YouTube channel within 6 hours.

– The name and faces of the participants may be displayed in the recording. Pictures may be used for the purpose of posting on our report/website.

Abstract
1) Introduction to Markets for Indivisible Goods (Alexander Teytelboym)

In many settings, such as auctions, the indivisibility of goods is a key market feature. But in markets with indivisible goods, competitive equilibria might not exist. We explore conditions, such as substitutability of goods, that ensure existence of competitive equilibria. We also discuss connections between conditions for existence, tâtonnement, and cooperative properties of equilibria.


2) The geometry of preferences: demand types, equilibrium with Indivisibilities, and bidding languages (Elizabeth Baldwin)

An equivalence theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into "Demand Types", incorporates existing definitions regarding the comparative statics of demand (substitutes, complements, "strong substitutes", etc.) and permits new ones. Our Unimodularity Theorem generalises previous results about when competitive equilibrium exists for any set of agents whose valuations are all of a "demand type". Contrary to popular belief, equilibrium is guaranteed for more classes of purely-complements, than of purely-substitutes, preferences. Our Intersection Count Theorem checks equilibrium existence for combinations of agents with specific valuations by counting the intersection points of geometric objects. Applications include the "Product-Mix Auction" introduced by the Bank of England in response to the financial crisis. In that context, we show that all substitutes preferences can be represented, and no other preferences can be represented, by appropriate sets of permitted bids in the Substitutes Product-Mix Auction language; an analogous result holds for strong substitutes, when we refine the characteristics of the language. These languages thus also provide new characterizations of (all) substitutes, and of strong substitutes, respectively.


3) The Equilibrium Existence Duality (Alexander Teytelboym)

We show that, with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents' substitution effects, not their income effects. Our Equilibrium Existence Duality allows us to transport results on the existence of competitive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability---which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability---is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibrium. Further applications give new existence results beyond the case of (net) substitutes. Our results have implications for auction design.


4) Matching and Prices (Ravi Jagadeesan) 

Indivisibilities and budget constraints are pervasive features of many matching markets.  But gross substitutability -- a standard condition on preferences in matching models -- typically fails in such markets.  To accommodate budget constraints and other income effects, we instead assume that agents' preferences satisfy net substitutability.  Although competitive equilibria do not generally exist in our setting, we show that stable outcomes always exist and are efficient.  We illustrate how the flexibility of prices is critical for our results.  We also discuss how budget constraints and other income effects affect the properties of standard auction and matching procedures, as well as of the set of stable outcomes.

共催
Organizer
Fuhito Kojima, Michihiro Kandori, and Yuichiro Kamada
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
September 30, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告
9:30- Keynote Seminar

 

10:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion Benjamin Olken (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
TBA
Chief Moderator: Chief Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (Nat Taiwan)
Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
October 5, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
青柳潤(Jun Aoyagi) (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
TBA
Abstract
Organizer
若森直樹 (Naoki Wakamori)
日時
October 12, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Benjamin Bernard (National Taiwan University)
Continuous-time stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
Abstract
This paper characterizes the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs, the set of Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs, and a simple class of semi-stationary equilibrium payoffs in continuous-time stochastic games with finitely many states and a publicly observable Brownian signal about past actions. Contrary to many discrete-time methods, the characterization does not rely on a convergence to the stationary distribution of the underlying state process. As a consequence, the correspondence of initial state to equilibrium payoffs is preserved, the characterization is possible for any level of discounting, and the characterization is applicable to games, in which the state process is not irreducible.
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
October 19, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Ricardo Dahis (PUC-Rio)
Development via Administrative Redistricting Evidence from Brazil (joint work with Christiane Szerman)[paper]
Abstract
We exploit a large redistricting episode in Brazil to examine if, and how, adminis- trative unit splits impact local development. Using a rich panel of administrative and spatial data, we first document that requests to split are more likely to be initiated by poor and rural districts. Employing a difference-in-differences strategy with areas whose requests to split were never approved serving as a control group, we find that splitting leads to improvements in economic activity and public service delivery, to- gether with an expansion of the public sector. Meanwhile, outcomes are unaffected in parent municipalities. Results are consistent with new municipalities adapting policy to local preferences. Our findings inform the equity-efficiency trade-off embedded in decentralization reforms worldwide.
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
October 28, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 9:30-12:00
場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

 Rema Hanna (Harvard Kennedy School)
TBA

10:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion
Chief Moderator: TBA


TBA

Abstract
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
November 2, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Ilwoo Hwang (Seoul National University)
Competitive Advertising and Pricing" (joint work with Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim and Ralph Boleslavsky)
Abstract
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
November 9, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Nicola Fontana (Trinity College, Dublin)
TBA
Abstract
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
November 16, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Edwin Muñoz-Rodriguez (El Colegio de Mexico A.C.)
TBA
Abstract
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
November 25, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告
9:30- Keynote Seminar
Brian Jacob ( University of Michigan)
Economics of K12
Chief Moderator: Ryuichi Tanaka (The University of Tokyo)

 

10:45- AEW Working Paper Discussion
Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
December 7, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Gabriel Carroll (University of Toronto)
TBA
Abstract
Organizer
Eric Weese
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
December 9, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告
9:30- Keynote Seminar
Kevin Milligan (The University of British Columbia)
TBA
Chief Moderator: TBA

 

10:45- AEW Working Paper Discussion
Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
December 14, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Xi Weng (Peking University)
Minimum Performance Targets, Multitasking, and Incentives: Theory and Evidence from China's Air Quality Controls (joint work with Guangyu Cao, Mingwei Xu, Li-An Zhou)
Abstract
This paper examines how local Chinese ocials respond strategically to minimum air quality control targets when they care more about pursuing regional economic development, which is closely linked to their career prospects. Using a novel prefecture-day level dataset on air quality and applying a regression discontinuity design, we nd strong evidence that air quality tends to improve when the air quality target is doomed to fail, but deteriorates signi cantly after the early ful llment of the target is guaranteed. These \asymmetric" strategic responses are mainly driven by \outsiders" { local ocials with no previous exposure to the regions to which they are assigned. Greater pressure to promote local economic development reinforces outsiders' asymmetric responses. For \non-outsiders" who have been promoted from the local area and who are more likely to intrinsically value the local environment, air quality performance is stable in both cases of target ful llment. We build a simple theoretical model to rationalize these key ndings. Our study sheds light on how minimum air quality targets have functioned in China's context and highlights the role of intrinsic motivations in mitigating strategic responses to minimum performance targets in a multitasking environment.
Organizer
Andrew Griffen
日時
December 21, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Chia-Hui Chen (Kyoto University)
TBA
Abstract
Organizer
Eric Weese

以下本年度終了分

日時
April 5, 2021(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※ 日時に注意
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Maria Martin Rodriguez (Nagoya University)
Stable Networks with Bargaining and Heterogeneous Linking Costs
Abstract
In a world where agents are of one of two possible types, we study the pairwise stability of stationary networks in which agents bargain in an infinite-horizon game à la Manea. The cost of forming and sustaining links depends on both the communication ease and complementarities, so that when the latter are strong enough, connections between individuals of different types are cheaper. In this case, several families of bipartite components such that no two players of the same type are connected become stable. These components are inequitable and so the surplus splits asymmetrically across linked individuals. This result differs from the case in which connections between individuals of the same type are cheaper, where the vast majority of stable components are equitable. Therefore, the result highlights how complementarities and the relative scarcity of certain types combined result in more or less unequal bargains.
Organizer
Daniel Marszalec
日時
April 6, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Jin Li (The University of Hong Kong)
Promotion Opportunities and Production Dynamics i (joint with Ye Luo, Mike Powell, and Rongzhu Ke)
Abstract
This paper studies a dynamic production planning problem with promotion management. A principal optimally allocates promotion opportunities to agents arriving in different cohorts while ensuring that agents are willing to wait. An optimal dynamic assignment rule features a capped seniority rule: agents first joins a waitlist and get admitted to candidacy on a FIFO basis, at which point promotion opportunities are allocated randomly to candidates. The capped seniority rule enables the principal to combine the incentive constraints of the different cohorts into two aggregate constraints per period. These aggregated constraints determine the structure of the production, which consists of a sequence of waves and the firm size is downward rigid within each wave. Our analysis highlights a timing mismatch between when agents arrive and when promotion opportunities arrive. This asynchronicity gives rise to rich implications for how the timing of promotion opportunities influences the firm's size.
Organizer
Yasutora Watanabe
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
April 15, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

930- Keynote Seminar
Gordon Dahl (University of California, San Diego)
"Economics of the Family"
Moderator: Ayako Kondo(The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Ayako Kondo
日時
※本ワークショップは開催中止となりました。 The seminar has been cancelled.

April 19, 2021(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

報告
Wojciech Kopczuk (Columbia University)
共催
Organizer
Drew Griffen
日時
April 20, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Daniel Keniston (Louisiana State University)
A Division of Laborers: Identity and Efficiency in India (joint with Guilhem Cassan and Tatjana Kleineberg) [paper]
Abstract
Workers' social identity affects their choice of occupation, and therefore the structure and prosperity of the aggregate economy. This paper studies this phenomenon in a setting where work and identity are particularly intertwined: the Indian caste system. Using a new dataset that combines information on caste, occupation, wages, and historical evidence of subcastes' traditional occupations, the paper shows that caste members are still greatly overrepresented in their traditional occupations. To quantify the effects of caste-level distortions on aggregate and distributional outcomes, the paper develops a general equilibrium Roy model of occupational choice. We structurally estimate the model and evaluate counterfactuals that remove castes' ties to their traditional occupations, through their direct preferences, and via their parental occupations and social networks. The findings show that the share of workers employed in their traditional occupation decreases substantially. However, the effects on aggregate output and productivity are very small–and in some counterfactuals even negative–because gains from a more efficient human capital allocation are offset by productivity losses from weaker caste networks and reduced learning across generations. The findings emphasize the importance of caste identity in coordinating workers into occupational networks that enable productivity spillovers.
Organizer
Eric Weese
日時
April 27, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Patrick Francois (The University of British Columbia)
A theory of elite-initiated democratization, illustrated with the case of Myanmar (joint work with James Fearon)
Abstract  
Organizer
Eric Weese
日時
May 11, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Anastassios (Tasos) Kalandrakis (University of Rochester)
A priori bounds on legislative bargaining agreements [paper]
Abstract
In a workhorse model of legislative bargaining with spatial preferences, I establish easy to compute bounds on all equilibrium acceptable agreements, proposals, and out comes. The approach constitutes a feasible method to incorporate equilibrium restric tions from the model in correlational and structural empirical studies of legislatures, avoiding the computation of actual equilibria. It also yields a number of theoretical insights on the centrality of equilibrium legislative decisions, the relation of such equi librium outcomes with social choice solution sets, and the effect of changes on voting and proposal-making rights. These theoretical results highlight the broad conclusion that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is highly contingent on other institutional features besides the assignment of voting rights.
Organizer
Eric Weese
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
May 13, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告
930- Keynote Seminar
Mark Duggan (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR))
Health Economics
Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
May 18, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Alexis Akira Toda (University of California San Diego)
Optimal Epidemic Control in Equilibrium with Imperfect Testing and Enforcement (joint work with Thomas Phelan) [paper]
Abstract
We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informational constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect current risk of infection) and dynamic (individual actions affect future disease prevalence), and study how they are affected by limitations on testing and enforcement. We prove that a planner with imperfect enforcement will always wish to curtail activity, but that its incentives vanish as testing becomes perfect. When a vaccine arrives far into the future, the planner with perfect enforcement may encourage activity before herd immunity. We find that lockdown policies have modest welfare gains, whereas quarantine policies are effective even with imperfect testing.
Organizer
Eric Weese
日時
June 1, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
山下拓朗(Takuro Yamashita) (Toulouse School of Economics)
Excessive collusion: Information design in repeated interaction (joint work with Joao Correia da Silva)
Abstract
Consider a repeated interaction between a collusion coordinator (principal) and a participating firm (agent). There are three kinds of states: those where both prefer a collusive action (in terms of their instantaneous payoffs), those where only the coordinator prefers a collusive action (but the firm prefers a non-collusive action), and those where both prefer a non-collusive action. The coordinator can fully control the agent's information about the state, which is partially persistent over time. Under certain conditions, we show that the optimal policy for the coordinator is to recommend a collusive action in every state, in particular, even when both parties prefer a non-collusive action. This suggests that a collusion may not only harm those outside the collusion, but also those inside the collusion, at least in some states.
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara
日時
June 8, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
定兼 仁 (Hitoshi Sadakane) (Kyoto University)
Cheap Talk and Fact-checking [paper]
Abstract
We study a model of cheap talk in which (i) the sender's preference is state independent, (ii) each message has a literal meaning, and (iii) the receiver can conduct costly fact-checking. By fact-checking, the receiver can verify whether the sender is conveying the truth. We characterize partially informative equilibria in which the sender conveys pieces of information about the state. In equilibrium, the sender's type space (the state space) is partitioned into two sets: truth-telling types and lying types. The truth-telling types send a non-fictional message, and the lying types randomly send fictional messages and mimic the truth-telling types. We also show that under the uniform-quadratic assumption, if the cost of fact-checking is not too high, the receiver's optimal equilibrium lies in a class of equilibria: high types truth-telling equilibria.
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara
日時
June 22, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Chengsi Wang (Monash University)
"Dutch vs. First-Price Auctions with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Bidders" (joint work with Benjamin Balzer and Jonas von Wangenheim)
Abstract
This paper studies a directed search equilibrium in a platform setting with homo- geneous buyers and sellers.We show that a meeting technology, typically controlled by intermediaries, (e.g., advertisement, interview scheduling, or online search pro- tocol) determines the matching outcome as follows. First, a meeting technology that provides full information to market participants is not necessarily ecient. Second, the seller- and buyer-optimal meeting technologies do not require full market transparency either; rather, the latter may be achieved even with the min- imum information. Finally, the ecient matching outcome can be decentralized by a pro t-maximizing platform who adopts a simple fee-setting policy for its intermediation service.
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara
日時
June 29, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Antonio Rosato (University of Technology Sydney)
"Dutch vs. First-Price Auctions with Expectations-Based Loss-Averse Bidders" (joint work with Benjamin Balzer and Jonas von Wangenheim)

[paper]
Abstract
We study Dutch and ?first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders and show that the strategic equivalence between these formats no longer holds. Intuitively, as the Dutch auction unfolds, a bidder becomes more optimistic about her chances of winning; this stronger ?attachment?e¤ect pushes her to bid more aggressively than in the ?first-price auction. Thus, Dutch auctions raise more revenue than ?first-price ones. Indeed, the Dutch auction raises the most revenue among standard auction formats. Our results imply that dynamic mechanisms that make bidders more optimistic raise more revenue, thereby rationalizing the use of descending-price mechanisms by sellers in the field.
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara
日時
July 6, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
森田穂高(Hodaka Morita) (Hitotsubashi University)
Production, Labor Turnover, and Training: New Implications of Competition and Market Power (Joint with Arghya Ghosh and Susumu Sato)
Abstract

Firms compete against each other to employ and train workers, and let them supply goods and services to consumers. We analyze the link between firms' product and labor market competition and explore its welfare consequences and policy implications. In our model, firms engage in imperfect labor market competition for workers who have heterogenous preferences to employers, and, at the same time, they engage in imperfect product market competition for consumers who have heterogenous tastes to horizontally differentiated products. Each firm provides a certain level of training to its own workers and then engages in wage competition with other firms to retain and poach workers. Each firm's production cost for competition is determined by the number of workers it employs and the level of training they have received.

How would firms' market power affect consumers, workers, and firms themselves? To address this question, we study effects of worker's cost to switch employers, and effects of the level of overlapping ownership arrangements among firms, on equilibrium outcomes. The prediction of our model is consistent with the standard intuition that an increase in the market power benefits firms and hurts consumers and workers, provided that the level of training is fixed. An increase in the market power, however, does change the fraction of workers each firm ends up retaining as a result of wage competition, which in turn affects firms' incentives to train workers. Consequently, our model yields richer and previously unnoticed welfare implications that an increase in the market power may benefit workers and/or consumers, and hurt firms. Firms tend to underinvest in training in the presence of labor market competition, but they may overinvest in it due to product market competition in our model. The interaction between competition in both markets leads our model to yield novel predictions. We discuss policy implications of our findings.

Organizer Akifumi Ishihara
日時
July 13, 2021 (火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告
Patrick DeJarnette (Waseda University)
Failure of Bayesian Updating and the Echo Chamber Effect (Joint work with Joseph Tao-yi Wang and Chun-hou Cheng)
Abstract We conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate individual ability to process contradicting information that could be potentially irrelevant, in which each subject independently draws a ball from one of two digital urns and receives information reported by another subject who may or may not have drawn from the same urn. We find that 71% of subjects who receive new information misattribute the source of the information compared to Bayesian updating. Conflicting information is overly assumed as irrelevant, and confirming information is overly assumed as relevant. This effect is robust even if subjects perceive others as reporting randomly. Attributing conflicting information as irrelevant may form the foundation of stable echo chambers or equilibria where additional information has no effect on beliefs.
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara
日時

※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

2020年7月16日(金 Friday)**17:30**-18:30 Schedule Changed

2020年7月20日(火 Tuesday)10:00-18:30

2020年7月28日(水 Wednesday)12:30-13:00

場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

2020年7月16日(金 Friday)**17:30**-18:30 Schedule Changed

2020年7月20日(火 Tuesday)10:00-18:30

2020年7月28日(水 Wednesday)12:30-13:00

Registration

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

* The same Meeting ID is used for all presentations. 

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

※ すべての発表は同じZoomミーティング内で行われます。  

報告

 

July 16 (Friday)

 

17:30-18:00 Xie Mianzun (Readers: Kawaguchi (main), Yamaguchi, Y. Watanabe)

 

18:00-18:30 Chen Tsung Jen (Readers: Wakamori (main), Griffen, Y. Watanabe)

 

 

July 16 (Friday)

10:00-10:40 Jiahao Li (Readers: Matsui (main), Kojima, Kandori)

10:40-11:10 Puhong Yu (Readers: Kandori (main), Matsui, Oyama)

12:30-13:00 Xinyu Wang (Readers: Kondo (main), Kawata, Tanaka)

13:00-13:30 Jiayu Deng (Readers: Tanaka (main), Kawata, Kondo)

13:30-14:00 Qiaozhe Tian (Readers: Kondo (main), Kawata, Tanaka)

14:00-14:30 Chuqiao Gao (Readers: Kondo (main), Nakabayashi, Shoji)

14:30-15:00 Yeling Jiao (Readers: Nakabayashi (main), Kondo, Shoji)

18:00-18:30 Xinyue Ren (Okazaki (main), Fukuda, Hoshi)

 

July 20 (Tuesday)

10:00-10:40 Jiahao Li (Readers: Matsui (main), Kojima, Kandori)

 10:40-11:10 Puhong Yu (Readers: Kandori (main), Matsui, Oyama)

 12:30-13:00 Xinyu Wang (Readers: Kondo (main), Kawata, Tanaka)

 13:00-13:30 Jiayu Deng (Readers: Tanaka (main), Kawata, Kondo)

 13:30-14:00 Qiaozhe Tian (Readers: Kondo (main), Kawata, Tanaka)

 14:00-14:30 Chuqiao Gao (Readers: Kondo (main), Nakabayashi, Shoji)

 14:30-15:00 Yeling Jiao (Readers: Nakabayashi (main), Kondo, Shoji)

 18:00-18:30 Xinyue Ren (Okazaki (main), Fukuda, Hoshi)

 

July 28 (Wednesday)

12:30-13:00 Youmei Xie (Readers: Y. Watanabe (main), Kawaguchi, Wakamori)

日時

Applied Economics Workshop
August 5, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 
※Rescheduled

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar
Josh Lerner (Harvard Business School)
Public Entrepreneurial Finance around the Globe (joint work with Jessica Bai, Shai Bernstein, Abhishek Dev)
Chief Moderator: Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))

 

10:45 am- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
Applied Economics Workshop

** Reschedueld **
2021年8月19日(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00

※ This seminar has been rescheduled.

 

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar
Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard University)
Public Entrepreneurial Finance around the Globe
Chief Moderator: Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))

 

10:45- AEW Working Paper Discussion
Abstract  
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen
日時
Applied Economics Workshop
September 2, 2021(木 Thursday)9:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

場所
Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 
This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.


https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar
Jesse Rothstein (UC-Berkeley)
TBA
Chief Moderator: Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract
共催
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University
Organizer
Stacey Chen