Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2020

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2020年10月15日現在。近い予定から順に掲載しています。

Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について (Online Seminars Using Zoom) 

 

当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインで開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。

Microeconomics Workshop is held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.

  

※ 登録 (Registration)

事前登録が必須となります。 下記よりご登録頂けますと、 ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。 事前に、ご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。 (Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。)

Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email.  Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.)

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwtceGhrzMpHtZ8GucmpPdvrWzSi7Gf2sdT

参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website.

日本語 ・ English

※ 注意 (Note)

1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。 Please register your full name when you participate.

2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。

Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.

 

※ セミナー中 (During Seminars)

ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session.

音声OFFの手順 (Muting Participants in Zoom)

日本語 ・ English

 

日時

2020年10月19日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意
※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細はミクロ実証分析ワークショップページ上部の説明をご確認ください。⇒ http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/emf/emf.html

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of Empirical Micro Research Seminar's page for details.  ⇒ http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/emf/emf.html

報告 Kiichi Tokuoka (International Monetary Fund)
Does Memory of Earthquakes Affect Risk Tolerance? [paper]
Abstract Using data on earthquakes that have affected Japan over the past 100 years and self-reported risk tolerance, this paper finds a positive impact of "life-long'' earthquake memory on risk tolerance. The results are robust with several alternative specifications. The paper also finds that earthquake memory is positively related to the share of risky financial assets in household financial assets.
Organizer Drew Griffen

 

日時

2020年10月20日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
Gender, Childhood Poverty, and Educational Attainment in China (joint with Emily Hannum and Weiwei Hu)
Abstract

How childhood poverty influences future life opportunities is fundamental to understanding intergenerational mobility. We examine gender differences in the effect of deprivations experienced in childhood on years of schooling utilizing a unique longitudinal study of children in rural China that began when they were 9-12 years old and followed them into adulthood. The surveys included village and school questionnaires, enabling us to assess the relative importance of family versus community deprivations. Data on siblings allows us to compare how poverty affects boys and girls differently within the same family. We find that in contrast to well-known findings for the US, in rural China girls’ educational attainment is much more sensitive to poverty than boys. Both family and community deprivations play an important role in explaining this difference; while differences in educational investments by parents and differences in gender attitudes do not. The difference in gender sensitivity to poverty is mainly explained by the lower educational attainment of older sisters with younger brothers when children grow up in poverty.

Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2020年10月22日(木 Thursday)10:25-12:10

※日時に注意

※主催: マクロ経済学ワークショップ

場所

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/macro/macro.html

報告 山田 憲(Ken Yamada) (Kyoto University)
The Race between Technological Progressand Female Advancement: Changes inGender and Skill Premia in OECD Countries (joint with Hiroya Taniguchi) [paper]
Abstract In recent decades, the male–female wage gap has fallen, while the skilled–unskilledwage gap has risen in advanced countries. The rate of decline in the gender wage gaphas tended to be greater for unskilled than skilled workers, while the rate of increase inthe skill wage gap has tended to be greater for male than female workers. To account forthese trends, we develop an aggregate production function extended to allow for gender-specific capital–skill complementarity, and estimate it using shift–share instruments andcross-country panel data from OECD countries. We confirm that information and com-munication technology (ICT) equipment is not only more complementary to skilled thanunskilled workers but also more complementary to female than male workers. Our resultsshow that changes in gender and skill premia are the outcome of the race between progressin ICT and advances in female educational attainment and employment.
Organizer Sagiri Kitao

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年10月27日(火 Thuesday)9:30 - 12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

9:30- David Deming (Harvard University)

Team Players: How Social Skills Improve Team Performance [paper]

Moderator: Jie Gong (National University of Singapore)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract Most jobs require teamwork. Are some people good team players? In this paper we design and test a new method for identifying individual contributions to team production. We randomly assign people to multiple teams and predict team performance based on previously assessed individualskills. Some people consistently cause their team to exceed its predicted performance. We call these individuals “team players”. Team players score significantly higher on a well-established measure of social intelligence, but do not differ across a variety of other dimensions, including IQ, personality, education and gender. Social skills – defined as a single latent factor that combines social intelligence scores with the team player effect – improve team performance about as much as IQ. We find suggestive evidence that team players increase effort among teammates.
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2020年10月30日(金 Friday)9:00-10:30

※日時に注意
※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細はミクロ実証分析ワークショップページ上部の説明をご確認ください。⇒ http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/emf/emf.html

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of Empirical Micro Research Seminar's page for details.  ⇒ http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/workshops/emf/emf.html

報告 Daniel Hamermesh (Barnard College)
Adjusting to Loss: Widow Time [paper]
Abstract By age 77 a plurality of American women are widows. Comparing older (ages 70+) married women to widows in the American Time Use Survey 2003-18 and linking the data to the Current Population Survey allow inferring the short- and longer-term effects of an arguably exogenous shock?husband's death?and measuring the paths of adjustment to it. Widows differ from otherwise similar married women, and especially from married women with working husbands, by cutting back on home production, especially food preparation and housework, mostly by engaging in less of it each day, not doing it less frequently. British, French, Italian, German and Dutch widows behave similarly. Widows are alone during most of the time they had spent with their spouses, with only a small increase in time with friends and relatives (except shortly after becoming widowed). They feel less time pressure than married women but are less satisfied with their lives. Following European women before and after a husband's death shows the exact same changes in their feelings of time pressure and life satisfaction. Most of the adjustment of time use in response to widowhood occurs within one year of the husband's death; but reduced life satisfaction and feelings of depression persist much longer.  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2020年11月6日(金 Friday)13:00-14:45 ※日時に注意

※共催:マーケットデザインセンター

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Utku Unver (Boston College)
A Market Design Solution to Unfair Distribution of Teachers in Schools (joint with Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Tercieux and Camille Terrier)
Abstract

In most countries, public schools at disadvantaged districts have relatively fewer experienced teachers than those at more privileged districts. As teacher experience is an important indicator of good educa- tion outcomes, this presents itself as an important shortcoming of public education. Moreover, many of such countries use centralized matching mechanisms for assigning new teachers to their first jobs at schools and reassigning tenured teachers who would like to move. We address the unfair teacher distri- bution problem through a market design approach by introducing two new centralized (re)assignment mechanisms. The defining property of these mechanisms is that the final allocation improves not only teachers' welfare with respect the status quo but also makes the schools better off by creating a more even teacher distribution. While both mechanisms are strategy-proof for teachers, one achieves two- sided Pareto efficiency and in particular teacher optimality and the other one achieves an appropriately defined stability property, targeted for countries that already use stability-based assignment schemes. We empirically estimate teacher preferences using data from the existing assignment system in France and test our proposals' performance using several empirical metrics.

Organizer Fuhito Kojima

 

日時

2020年11月10日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

石田潤一郎 (Junichiro Ishida) (Osaka University)
TBA

Abstract

 

Organizer Ryuichi Tanaka

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年11月17日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

9:30- Joel Waldfogel (University of Minnesota)

Digitization and Pre-Purchase Information: The Causal and Welfare Impacts of Reviews and Crowd Ratings [paper]

Moderator: Tiffany Tsai (National University of Singapore)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract Digitization has led to product proliferation, straining traditional institutions for product discovery; but digitization has also spawned crowd-based rating systems. We compare the relative impacts of professional critics and crowd-based Amazon star ratings on consumer welfare in book publishing. We assemble data on daily Amazon sales ranks, star ratings, and prices for thousands of books in 2018, along with information on their professional reviews in several major outlets. Using various fixed effects and discontinuity-based empirical strategies, we estimate that a New York Times review raises estimated sales by 78 percent during the first five days following a review; and the elasticity of sales with respect to an Amazon star is about 0.75. We use these causal estimates to calibrate structural models of demand for measuring the welfare impact of pre-purchase information in a way that respects the distinction between ex ante and ex post utility. The aggregate effect of star ratings on consumer surplus is roughly 15 times the effect of traditional review outlets. Crowd-based information now accounts for the vast majority of pre-purchase information, but the absolute effects of professional reviews have not declined over time.
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2020年11月24日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Yi Lu (Tsinghua University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2020年12月1日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 今井晋(Susumu Imai) (Hokkaido University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Ryuichi Tanaka

 

日時

2020年12月4日(金 Friday)13:00-14:45 ※日時に注意

※共催:マーケットデザインセンター


場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Tayfun Sonmez (Boston College)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Fuhito Kojima

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年12月8日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

9:30- Martha Bailey (University of Michigan)

Prep School for Poor Kids': The Long-Run Impact of Head Start on Human Capital and Productivity [paper]

Moderator: Jessica Pan (National University of Singapore)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract This paper evaluates the long-run effects of Head Start using large-scale, restricted 2000-2013 Census-ACS data linked to date and place of birth in the SSA’s Numident file. Using the county-level rollout of Head Start between 1965 and 1980 and state age-eligibility cutoffs for school entry, we find that participation in Head Start is associated with increases in adult human capital and economic self-sufficiency, including a 0.29-year increase in schooling, a 2.1-percent increase in high-school completion, an 8.7-percent increase in college enrollment, and a 19-percent increase in college completion. These estimates imply sizable, long-term returns to investing in large-scale preschool programs.
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2020年12月8日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

宇井貴志 (Takashi Ui) (Hitotsubashi University)
Incomplete Information Robustness (joint with Stephen Morris) [paper]

Abstract

Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation in terms of an incomplete information game and makes a prediction about players’ behavior. The analyst’s model approximatelydescribes each player’s hierarchies of beliefs over payoff-relevant states, but the true incomplete information game may have correlated duplicated belief hierarchies, and the analyst hasno information about the correlation. Under these circumstances, a natural candidate for theanalyst’s prediction is the set of belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria (BIBCE) of theanalyst’s incomplete information game. We introduce the concept of robustness for BIBCE:a subset of BIBCE is robust if every nearby incomplete information game has a BIBCE thatis close to some BIBCE in this set. Our main result provides a sufficient condition for robustness by introducing a generalized potential function of an incomplete information game. Ageneralized potential function is a function on the Cartesian product of the set of states and acovering of the action space which incorporates some information about players’ preferences.It is associated with a belief-invariant correlating device such that a signal sent to a player is asubset of the player’s actions, which can be interpreted as a vague prescription to choose someaction from this subset. We show that, for every belief-invariant correlating device that maximizes the expected value of a generalized potential function, there exists a BIBCE in whichevery player chooses an action from a subset of actions prescribed by the device, and that theset of such BIBCE is robust, which can differ from the set of potential maximizing BNE.

Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2020年12月15日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Isaias N. Chaves (Northwestern University)
TBA

Abstract

Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時

2020年12月22日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Kamhon Kan (Academia Sinica)
TBA

Abstract

 

Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年2月25日(木 Thursday)16:00-18:30

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

16:00- Yves Zenou (Monash University)

TBA

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Yasutora Watanabe (The University of Tokyo)

 

17:30- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年3月9日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

9:30- Amy Finkelstein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT))

TBA

Moderator: Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))

 

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年4月13日(火 Tuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

930- Gordon Dahl (University of California, San Diego)

TBA

Moderator: Ayako Kondo(The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2021年4月6日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 Jin Li (The University of Hong Kong)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時

2021年4月19日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00

※日時に注意

※主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Wojciech Kopczuk (Columbia University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Drew Griffen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年5月11日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Mark Duggan (Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR))

TBA

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年8月31日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Jesse Rothstein (UC-Berkeley)

TBA

Moderator: Joseph Tao-yi Wang (National Taiwan University) and Stacey Chen (The University of Tokyo)

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2021年9月28日(火 Thuesday)9:30-12:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Benjamin Olken (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

TBA

Moderator: Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))

 

11:00- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 


<本年度終了分>

日時

2020年6月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please see the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility [paper]

Abstract We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subject to retaliation risk and idiosyncratic taste shocks. We compare several ways of handling multiple accusations discussed in legal scholarship. (i) When accusations are aggregated to determine the probability that the defendant committed at least one unspecified offense and conviction entails severe punishment, witness reports are arbitrarily uninformative and offenses are frequent in equilibrium. Offenders induce negative correlation in witnesses’ private information, which causes information aggregation to fail. (ii) When accusations are treated separately to adjudicate guilt and conviction entails severe punishment, witness reports are highly informative and offenses infrequent in equilibrium.
Organizer Akihiko Matsui

 

日時

2020年6月9日(火 Tuesday) 10:25-12:10  
※主催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

場所

本セミナーはZoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。

注意:6/9セミナー(マクロ経済学ワークショップ主催)の参加登録は下記URLよりお願いいたします (通常と異なりますのでお気を付けください)。

This seminar is held online using Zoom (registration is required).

Attention: Please register at the website below for the seminar on June 9, organized by Macroeconomics Workshop. (Please note that the URL is different than usual.)

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJMrfu6oqjwrG9SZKHg-CnZC0Al6xhP__TZw

報告

齊藤 有希子 (Yukiko Saito) (Waseda University)
資料1. Indirect Trade and Direct Trade:Evidence from Japanese firm transaction data [paper]

資料2. Indirect Exports and Wholesalers:Evidence from interfirm transaction network data [paper]

(Japan and the World Economy, Volume 44, December 2017, pp. 35-47)

Abstract  
Organizer Sagiri Kitao

 

日時

2020年6月12日(金 Friday)15:30 ~ 17:00

※ 主催:東京労働経済学研究会、日時に注意

Presentation in Japanese

場所

本セミナーはZoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は下記をご参照ください。

https://sites.google.com/site/tokyolaborwkshp/home

報告

報告者1:川田恵介 ( Keisuke Kawata) (The University of Tokyo)

 

報告者2:大竹文雄(Fumio Ohtake) (Oska University)

Abstract  
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2020年6月16日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (The University of Tokyo)

Mechanism Design with Blockchain Enforcement (joint with Shunya Noda) [paper]

Abstract We study the design of self-enforcing mechanisms that rely on neither a trustedthird party (e.g., court, trusted mechanism designer) nor a long-term relationship.Instead, we use a smart contract written on blockchains as a commitment device.We design thedigital court, a smart contract that identifies and punishes agents whoreneged on the agreement. The digital court substitutes the role of legal enforcementin the traditional mechanism design paradigm. We show that, any agreement thatis implementable with legal enforcement can also be implemented with enforcementby the digital court. To pursue a desirable design of the digital court, we study away to leverage truthful reports made by a small fraction of behavioral agents. Ourdigital court has a unique equilibrium as long as there is a positive fraction of behavioralagents, and it gives correct judgment in the equilibrium if honest agents are more likelyto exist than dishonest agents. The platform for smart contracts is already ready in2020; thus, self-enforcing mechanisms proposed in this paper can be used practically,even now. As our digital court can be used for implementing general agreements, itdoes not leak the detailed information about the agreement even if it is deployed on apublic blockchain (e.g., Ethereum) as a smart contract.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2020年6月23日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Wen-Tai Hsu (Singapore Management University)

Innovation, Firm Size Distribution, and Gains from Trade (joint with Yi-Fan Chen and Shin-Kun Peng) [paper]

Abstract Unlike most trade models with firm heterogeneity which assume power-law distri-butions, we derive power laws in a rather general environment in a general-equilibriumtrade model. We do so by allowing firms to determine their productivities in an inno-vation stage in an otherwise standard Melitz (2003) model. We show that equilibriumproductivity and firm-size distributions exhibit power-law tails under general condi-tions on demand and innovating technology. Moreover, the emergence of the powerlaws is consistent with general underlying primitive heterogeneity among firms. Weinvestigate the model’s welfare implications and conduct a quantitative analysis ofwelfare gains from trade. We find that conditional on the same trade elasticity andvalues of the common parameters, our model yields 40% higher welfare gains fromtrade than a standard model with exogenously given productivity distribution.
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年6月30日(火 Tuesday)8:30-11:00

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

8:30 am (Tokyo Time)

AEW Working Paper Discussion

1) Nina Guyon (National University of Singapore)

New Peers From The Ghetto: Trickle-Down Effects of Public Housing Demolitions On Receiving Schools

 

2) Yu Qin (National University of Singapore)

Migration Restrictions and the Labor Market Outcomes of Migrants: Evidence from the 2014 Hukou Reform in China (joint with Lei An, Jing Wu and Wei You)

 

9:30- Keynote Seminar

Sandra E. Black (Columbia University)

Recent Evidence on Intergenerational Mobility: Health, Wealth, and More

Chief Moderator: Jessica Pan (National University of Singapore)

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2020年6月30日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

諸岡千裕 (Chihiro Morooka) (The University of Tokyo)

A New Folk Theorem in OLG Games [paper]

Abstract In this study, we analyze the model of general n-person overlapping generations games. It is assumed that players strictly discount the future at a common rate and that the dimension of feasible one-shot payoffs with individual rationality is equal to n. In contrast to previous researches, this study shows that players can obtain payoffs outside the feasible set of one-shot games.
Organizer Akihiko Matsui

 

日時

2020年7月7日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Syngjoo Choi(Seoul National University)

Large Scale Experiments on Networks: A New Platform with Applications[paper]

Abstract We present a new platform for large scale networks experiments in continuous time and conduct three experiments on it: groups range from 8 all the way to 100 subjects. These experiments involve pure linking games as well as games with linking and public goods provision.

The major finding is that subjects create sparse networks that are almost always highly efficient. In some cases networks have a very unequal distribution of connections and exhibit small average distances, while in others subjects create equal and dispersed large distance networks. In some cases highly connected nodes earn vastly more while in other cases they earn significantly less than their less connected cohort. Informational overload helps in explaining why highly connected nodes make excessive investments but earn less than the spokes.  

Organizer Ryuichi Tanaka

 

日時

2020年7月10日(金 Friday)14:00 ~ 17:00

※ 主催:東京労働経済学研究会、日時に注意

Presentation in Japanese

場所

本セミナーはZoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は下記をご参照ください。

https://sites.google.com/site/tokyolaborwkshp/home

報告

報告者1:明日山陽子(Yoko Asuyama) (Waseda University)

なぜ日本には「面白い仕事」が少ないのか?


報告者 2:湯川志保(Shiho Yukawa) (Teikyo University)

性別役割意識の固着化,子どもの性別は親の政策支持と性別役割意識にどのような影響を与えるか

Abstract  
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2020年7月14日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Xiaojian Zhao (Monash University)

Economics of Motivated Cognition and Emotion: Shame, Guilt and Self-Confidence (joint with Roberta Dessi and Junjie Ren)

Abstract The available evidence from anthropology, psychology and economics shows that sensitivity to the emotion of shame and guilt varies across cultures. So does the tendency to exhibit a different psychological incentive mechanism: overconfidence. Shame and guilt have been portrayed as motivational mechanisms to enforce cooperation. This paper investigates how reliance on guilt versus shame interacts with overconfidence. We find that overconfidence and guilt are typically complementary, whereas shame can be a substitute for overconfidence. The paper also studies the model's predictions using data on differences in self-confidence and in shame and guilt sensitivity across countries, as well as individual-level data on migrants.
Organizer Yasutora Watanabe

 

日時

2020年7月21日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Hyelim Son (University of Seoul)

The Long-Term Effects of Labor Market Entry in a Recession: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis [paper]

Abstract This study investigates the long-term effects of initial labor market conditions by comparing cohorts who graduated from college before, during, and after the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis in South Korea. We measure the overall welfare effect by examining their labor market activities, family formation, and household finances. Using data from 20 waves of the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study, we find a substantial and persistent reduction in employment, earnings, marriage, fertility, and asset building among men who graduated during the recession. For women, limited job opportunities at graduation resulted in an increase in childbearing. We also find evidence that family provides a risk-sharing mechanism for recession graduates. Our results suggest that labor market entry in a large-scale recession has prolonged effects on a young worker's life course even after the penalties in the labor market have disappeared.
Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

2020年7月28日(火 Tuesday)10:00-13:00

2020年8月4日(火 Tuesday)10:00-12:00

Registration

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

※ すべての発表は同じZoomミーティング内で行われます。  All presentations are held using same Meeting ID. 

報告 7月28日

10:00-10:30 Ying Ye (Readers: 中林, 田中, 川田)

 

10:30-11:00 Yang Huang (Readers: 中林, 田中, 川田)

 

11:00-11:30 Yuchen He (Readers: 中林, 田中, 近藤)

 

11:30-12:00 Yiwen Fan (Readers: 川田, 近藤, 中林)

 

12:00-12:30 Lianqing Li (Readers: 高崎, 川口, 川田)

 

12:00-12:30 Yuanyuan Zhou (Readers: 近藤, 中林, 川口)

 

 

 

8月4日

10:00-10:30 Qianmao Zhu (Readers: 松井, 尾山, 神取)

 

10:30-11:00 Yining Song (Readers: 近藤, 川田, 田中)

 

11:00-11:30 Xinyu Wang (Readers: 近藤, 田中, 川田)

 

11:30-12:00 Xuancheng Peng (Readers: 佐々木, 大橋, 若森)

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年7月30日(木 Thursday)

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan University と共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

Keynote Seminar

Simon Loertscher (University of Melbourne)

Recent Evidence on Intergenerational Mobility: Health, Wealth, and More

Moderator: Kohei Kawaguchi (HKUST)

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時 Applied Economics Workshop

2020年9月24日(木 Thursday)16:00-

※ Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, National University of Singapore, and National Taiwan Universityと共催

Registration

Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 

This seminar is held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

報告

16:00- Keynote Seminar

Dávid Krisztián Nagy (CREI)

All aboard: The aggregate effects of port development (joint with Cesar Ducruet, Reka Juhasz, and Claudia Steinwender)

Moderator: Kohei Kawaguchi (HKUST)

 

17:30- AEW Working Paper Discussion

Abstract  
Organizer Stacey Chen

 

日時

2020年9月29日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 室岡健志 (Takeshi Murooka) (大阪大学)
Fragile Self-Esteem (joint with Bosond Koszegi and George Loewenstein) [paper]
Abstract

We develop a model of fragile self-esteem —self-esteem that is vulnerable to objectively unjustigied swings— and study its implications for choices that depend on, or are aimed to protect, one's self-view. We assume that a person's self-esteem is determined by sampling from his store of ego-relevant memories in a fashion that in turn depends on his self-esteem. This feedback mechanism can create multiple "self-esteem personal equilibria," making self-esteem fragile. Self-esteem is especially likely to be fragile, as well as unrealistic in either the positive or the negative direction, if it is an important ingredient of overall utility. A person with fragile self-esteem who has a low self-view might respond to an increase in incentives by decreasing effort. An individual with a high self-view, in contrast, might distort their choices to avoid a collapse in self-esteem. We discuss the implications of our results for education, job search, workaholism, and aggression.

Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2020年10月6日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10 ※日程変更いたしました。

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告 成田悠輔 (Takeshi Murooka) (Yale University)
Algorithm is Experiment: Machine Learning, Market Design, and Policy Eligibility Rules
自然実験としてのアルゴリズム:日本企業への理論投入 (joint with Kohei Yata, Yuta Saito, Shunsuke Aihara, Megumi Matsutani, ZOZO Technologies, 半熟仮想株式会社)
Abstract

Machine learning, market design, and other algorithms produce a growing portion of decisions and recommendations. Such algorithmic decisions are natural experiments (conditionally quasi-randomly assigned instruments) since the algorithms make decisions based only on observable input variables. We use this observation to characterize the sources of causal-effect identification for a class of stochastic and deterministic algorithms. Data from almost every algorithm is shown to identify some causal effect. This identification result translates into a treatment-effect estimator. We prove that our estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal for well-defined causal effects. The estimator is easily implemented even with high-dimensional data and complex algorithms. Our estimator also induces a high-dimensional regression discontinuity design as a key special case. We deploy our method at fashion e-commerce platform ZOZOTOWN and other Japanese companies.

Organizer Ayako Kondo

 

日時

2020年10月13日(火 Thuesday)10:25-12:10  ※日程変更いたしました。

場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 

This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the top of this website for details.

報告

Eric Weese (University of Tokyo)
Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan (joint with Masayoshi Hayashi and Masashi Nishikawa)[paper]

Abstract

We consider a model in which the arrangement of political boundaries involves a tradeoff between efficiencies of scale and heterogeneity, and develop a maximum score estimation technique to determine the parameters of a central planner's payoff function given the way they partitioned a territory into jurisdictions. We apply this technique to historical data on a set of centralized boundary changes in Japan: walking distance appears to determine jurisdiction boundaries, rather than historical, religious, or economic differences. We assume that local villages shared these preference parameters emphasizing walking distance, and use binary integer programming to calculate core partitions for a decentralized coalition formation game based on this model. Core partitions exist with very high probability. In a counterfactual world in which there are no between-village income differences, these core partitions are extremely close to the partition that would be chosen by a utilitarian central planner. When actual cross-village income differences are used, however, sorting on income results in mergers that are both smaller and geographically bizarre. 

Organizer Ryuichi Tanaka