Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2018

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2018年5月25日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

※2018年度より、授業時間が2限(10:25-12:10)へ変更いたします。

日時

2018年5月25日(金 Friday)16:50-18:35 ※日時 ・場所に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Michela Giorcelli (University of California, Los Angeles)

"Reconstruction Aid, Public Infrastructure, and Economic Growth" (joint with Nicola Bianchi) [paper]

Abstract This paper studies the effects of international reconstruction aid on long-term economic development. It exploits plausibly exogenous differences between Italian provinces in the amount of grants disbursed through the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of public infrastructure. Provinces that received more reconstruction grants experienced a larger increase in the number of industrial firms and workers. Individuals and firms in these areas also started developing more patents. The same provinces experienced a faster mechanization of the agricultural sector. Motorized machines, such as tractors, replaced workers and significantly boosted agricultural production. Finally, we show how reconstruction grants induced economic growth by allowing Italian provinces to modernize their transportation and communication networks damaged during WWII.
Organizer

Tetsuji Okazaki

 

日時

2018年5月29日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Hillas (University of Auckland)

"Backward Induction in games without perfect recall" (joint with Dmitriy Kvasov) [paper]

Abstract The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall. In spite of this the concepts are well defined even in games without perfect recall. There is now a small literature examining the behaviour of these concepts in games without perfect recall. We argue that in games without perfect recall the original definitions are inappropriate. Our reading of the original papers is that the authors were aware that their definitions did not require the assumption of perfect recall but they were also aware that without the assumption of perfect recall the definitions they gave were not the "correct" ones. We give definitions of two of these concepts, sequential equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium, that identify the same equilibria in games with perfect recall and behave well in games without perfect recall.
Organizer

Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2018年6月5日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

杉田洋一 (Yoichi Sugita) (Hitotsubashi University)

"Wage Markdowns and FDI Liberalization" (joint with Yi Lu and Lianming Zhu)

Abstract This paper examines how the entry of foreign firms through foreign direct investment (FDI) affects incumbent firm’s monopsonic power in the labor market. We estimate firm-level “wage markdown,” the gap between the wage and the marginal revenue of labor, from firm-level production data of China. We identify the causal effect of inward FDI liberalization on wage markdowns, using variations in China’s regulation on FDI inflow upon its accession to the WTO in 2001. In contrast to textbook monopsony theories, markdowns are narrower at large and high productive employers and FDI liberalization widens the average wage markdown of incumbent firms. We show that these findings are consistent with modern theories of labor monopsony based on search friction.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月12日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Yusuke Tsugawa (Harvard University)

Association between physician medical school ranking and patient outcomes (joint with Daniel M. Blumenthal, Ashish K. Jha, E. John Orav and Anupam B. Jena)

Abstract Importance: Patients perceive the medical school from which a physician graduated as a signal of care quality. However, the relationship between the ranking of the medical school a physician attended and subsequent patient outcomes and spending is largely unknown. Objective: To investigate whether the ranking of the medical school a physician attended is associated with patient outcomes and healthcare spending. Design, setting, and participants: We analyzed a 20% random sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries aged ≥65 years, who were emergently hospitalized with a medical condition and treated by general internists from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2015. We examined the association between the ranking of the medical school a physician attended (determined by U.S. News & World Report rankings) and outcomes and spending of patients treated by these physicians, adjusted for patient and physician characteristics and hospital fixed effects (comparing physicians within the same hospital). As a sensitivity analysis, we focused on patients treated by hospitalists (because patients are plausibly quasi-randomly assigned to hospitalists based on their specific work schedules). Main outcomes and measures: 30-day mortality and readmission rates and Medicare Part B spending per hospitalization. Results: A total of 949,774 patients treated by 29,147 physicians were analyzed. When using primary care rankings, physicians who graduated from higher-ranked schools exhibited lower 30-day readmission rates (adjusted 30-day readmission rate, 15.7% for top-10 schools vs. 16.1% for schools ranked ≥50; adjusted risk difference, +0.4%; 95%CI, +0.1% to +0.8%; p-for-trend=0.005) and slightly lower spending (adjusted Part B spending, $1029 vs. $1066; adjusted difference, +$36; 95%CI, +$20 to +$52; p-for-trend<0.001) compared with graduates of lower-ranked schools but no difference in patient mortality. When using research rankings, physicians graduating from higher-ranked schools had slightly lower healthcare spending but no differences in mortality or readmissions. A sensitivity analysis restricted to patients treated by hospitalists yielded similar findings. Conclusion and relevance: Physicians who graduated from highly-ranked primary care medical schools exhibited slightly lower patient readmission rates and spending compared with physicians who attended lower ranked schools but had no difference in patient 30-day mortality. Physicians who graduated from highly-ranked research medical schools had slightly lower spending but no difference in patient mortality or readmission rates.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月18日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Dean Hyslop (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月19日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

花園誠 (Makoto Hanazono) (Nagoya University)

Market Structure and Price Dispersion: Asymmetric Oligopoly with Sequential Consumer Search (joint with Noritaka Kudoh)

Abstract This paper presents a new theory of price dispersion based on firm size and dynamic reasoning. We build a model of oligopolistic price competition among n firms with sequential consumer search, in which each firm consists of a mass of sellers. Since search is random, consumers are more likely to meet sellers from a larger firm. This reduces the consumer's outside option of rejecting a trade with a seller from a larger firm, generating a greater market power for a larger firm. We show that price dispersion disappears as search frictions disappear. Interestingly, there is a non-monotonic relationship between search frictions and price dispersion.
Organizer

Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年7月2日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Yangguang (Sunny) Huang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

A Model of Sales on Online Platforms

Abstract Online platforms, in many stylized models, intensify seller-side competition as they induce more entry, reduce search costs, and alleviate asymmetric information. However, platforms can also entail anti-competitive impact to the market because they can deeply influence consumers' consideration sets by search tools. For instance, most search algorithms and recommender systems are based on popularity, so sellers with established brands are further reinforced by appearing on the top of search results. We construct a model that provides an anatomy of how platforms influence consumers' consideration sets, which further determine the market structure and welfare. We study the data from food-delivery platforms and provide empirical evidence of the model.
Organizer

Naoki Wakamori

 

日時

2018年7月3日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

原田 勝孝 (Masataka Harada) (Fukuoka University)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2018年7月16日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Kai Liu (University of Cambridge)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Shitaro Yamaguchi

 

 

※Master's Thesis Presentations ※

We can print your thesis paper to be distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):

January 10 (Tuesday)…by 3:00pm, July 9 (Monday)

January 17 (Tuesday)…by8:45am, July 17 (Tuesday)


Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number along with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.
  • Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.

 

 

日時

2018年7月10日(火 Tuesday)10:00-12:30 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

10:00-10:30 Pan Yen Long (Readers: 川口、山口、(川田))

Term Effect of Graduating in Recession on Income and Consumption

 

10:30-11:00 QIAN Xunan (Readers: 川口、山口、(川田))

To work or to Have a Second Child-The Effect of Selective Two-Child Policy on Labor Market in China

 

11:00-11:30 LIU Zhang (Readers: 中林、田中、(川田))

Monetary Policy and House Price- If Monetary Policy should target at house price in China

 

11:30-12:00 ZHAO Rui (Readers: 岡崎、小島、(中村))

Competition in the railway industry in Manchuria after the World War I

 

12:00-12:30 LIU Silin (Readers: 岡崎、谷本、(川口))

The effect of export on regional usage: evidence from the bilateral trade between China and Japan

 

 

日時

2018年7月17日(火 Tuesday)10:00-12:30 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

10:30-11:00 LIN Jung-Hsuan (Readers: Griffen、川口、(若森))

Relative income distribution and the division of domestic work within Taiwanese household

 

11:00-11:30 LI Yishin (Readers: 若森、Griffen、(Marszalec))

Productivity and Foreign Direct Investment-A Study of Chinese Firms

 

11:30-12:00 SHI Zejin (Readers: 市村、山口、(Griffen))

Do single mothers have difficulty to remarry?

 

12:00-12:30 LIU Zaiwei (Readers: 市村、飯塚、(Griffen))

Physician Peer Effects in Patient-Sharing Networks

 

 

 

日時

2018年7月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Shunya Noda (Stanford University)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2018年7月31日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)

Market Segmentation and Managerial Effort (joint with Kevin Williams)

Abstract  
Organizer

Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2018年10月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

廣田正義 (Masayoshi Hirota) (情報社会科学研究所 (Information and Social Science Research ) )

動学的一般均衡体系の実験 (Experiments with dynamic General Equilibrium systems)

Abstract  
Organizer

Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2018年10月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Emanuel Ornelas (Sao Paulo School of Economics)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2019年1月21日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Guido Friebel (Goethe University)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Shintaro Yamaguchi

 


<本年度終了分>

日時

2018年4月2日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Hannes Mueller (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)

The Hard Problem of Prediction for Prevention: Reading Between the Lines (joint with Christopher Rauh)

Abstract This article provides a new methodology to predict armed conflict by using newspaper text. Through machine learning, vast quantities of newspaper text are reduced to interpretable topics. These topics are then used in panel regressions to predict the onset of conflict. We propose the use of the within- country variation of these topics to predict the timing of conflict. This allows us to avoid the tendency of predicting conflict only in countries where it occurred before. We show that the within-country variation of topics is a good predictor of conflict and becomes particularly useful when risk in previously peaceful countries arises. Two aspects seem to be responsible for these features. Topics provide depth because they consist of changing, long lists of terms which makes them able to capture the changing context of conflict. At the same time topics provide width because they are summaries of the full text, including stabilizing factors.[paper]
Organizer

Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2018年4月9日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Carlos Carrilo-Tudela (University of Essex)

The Cost of Job Loss (joint with Kenneth Burdett, and Melvyn Coles) [paper]

Abstract This paper identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and quit turnover in a labour market where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning-by- doing while employed, there is skill loss while unemployed and there is on-the-job search. Firms set optimal company wage policies which, in equilibrium, have the property that the wage paid increases with experience and tenure. Using indirect inference, our quantitative analysis shows the model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages following job loss as found in UK data, it also explains why those wage losses differ so markedly across skill groups.
Organizer

Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2018年4月10日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Daniel Marszalec (The University of Tokyo)

Bounded rationality, expectations and risk aversion in auctions for complements. (joint with Alexander Levkun and Alex Teytelboym)

Abstract We evaluate four auctions for complements in an experimental setting with one global and two local bidders. Using between-subject design, we also vary the degree of correlation between local bidders' values. The experiment covers two standard auctions (Vickrey and fist-price), and two sealed-bid core-selecting designs (Nearest-Bid and Reference Rule). At the auction level, we find the first-price auction revenue-dominant, and most efficient, across for all correlation parameters. At the bidder level, Bayesian-Nash predictions are rejected, and bidders do not account for the effects of correlation. Furthermore, under full correlation, bidders are also not best-responding to their expectations of their rivals' play. Though a small degree of free-riding is observed between local bidders in the first-price auction, we reject level-K type bounded rationality as likely explanation of bidder behaviour. Using numerically calculated best-response functions, we propose risk aversion as the best fit to the data, which can also explain the strong performance of the first-price auction.
Organizer

 

 

!--開始部分-->

日時

2018年4月16日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

共催: 政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Christopher Flinn (New York University)

Firm's Choices of Wage-Setting Protocols in the Presence of Minimum Wages [paper]

Abstract We study the formation of wages in a frictional search market where firms can choose either to bargain with workers or post non-negotiable wage offers. Workers can secure wage increases for themselves by engaging in on-the-job search and either moving to firms that offer higher wages or, when possible, leveraging an outside offer into a higher wage at the current firm. We characterize the optimal wage posting strategy of non-negotiating firms and how this decision is influenced by the presence of renegotiating firms. We quantitatively examine the model's unique implications for efficiency, wage dispersion, and worker welfare by estimating it using data on the wages and employment spells of low-skill workers in the United States. In the estimated steady state of the model, we find that more than 10% of job acceptance decisions made while on the job are socially sub-optimal. We also find that, relative to a benchmark case without renegotiation, the presence of even a small number of these firms increases the wage dispersion attributable to search frictions, deflates wages, and reduces worker welfare. Moving to a general equilibrium setting, we use the estimated model to study the impact of a minimum wage increase on firm bargaining strategies and worker outcomes. Our key nding is that binding minimum wages lead to an increase in the equilibrium fraction of renegotiating firms which, relative to a counterfactual in which this fraction is fixed, significantly dampens the reduction in wage dispersion and gains in worker
Organizer

Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時

2018年4月17日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Eunhee Kim (City University of Hong Kong)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2018年4月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

室岡 健志 (Takeshi Murooka) (Osaka University)

Market Competition and Informal Incentives

Abstract We develop a model where firms compete on a product market and employ workers whose effort increases revenue, but where no formal contracts can be used to provide incentives for the workers. Firms and workers are matched in a labor market and wages are determined by a bargaining process. Replacing a worker is costly, and the replacement costs incurred by firms are lower in a more competitive labor market (i.e., how many workers are available in the labor market). We show that lowering the replacement costs may decrease workers' wages, industry-wide production efficiency, and consumer surplus. It also makes collusion between firms easier to sustain because the incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement are lower. By contrast, helping potential workers in the labor market typically increases workers' wages, production efficiency, and consumer surplus --- highlighting that there is a sharp asymmetry of reducing costs in the labor market between firms and workers. We also discuss other implications for labor market policies.
Organizer

Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2018年5月7日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Jesper Bagger (Royal Holloway, University of London)

Income Taxation and Equilibrium Labor Allocation

Abstract We study the role of labor income taxation on job search and frictional labor market matching in the presence of worker and firm heterogeneity. Our analysis is strictly positive and is based on a rich equilibrium on-the-job search model of the labor market with endogenous search effort. We estimate the structural model on Danish administrative data and evaluate how three income tax reforms in Denmark in the 1990s and 2000s affected equilibrium labor allocation, wages, and output. The reforms resulted in labor income increasing by 1.8 percent, while unemployment decreased by 4.8 percent. The model allows us to identify Pareto optimal tax reforms that increases government revenue while improving everyone's welfare. In the case of risk-averse workers, Pareto optimal tax system calls for a slightly higher degree of progressivity and produces a modest increase in government revenue by around 0.1 percent, while increasing lifetime utility of the different worker types by between 0.01 percent and 0.1 percent.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年5月8日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Christopher Taber (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Estimation of a Life-Cycle Model with Human Capital, Labor Supply and Retirement (joint with Xiaodong Fan, and Ananth Seshadri) [paper]

Abstract We develop and estimate a life-cycle model in which individuals make decisions about consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply. Retirement arises endogenously as part of the labor supply decision. The model allows for both an endogenous wage process through human capital investment (which is typically assumed exogenous in the retirement literature) and an endogenous retirement decision (which is typically assumed exogenous in the human capital literature). We estimate the model using Indirect Inference to match the life-cycle profiles of wages and hours from the SIPP data. The model replicates the main features of the data—in particular the large increase in wages and small increase in labor supply at the beginning of the life-cycle as well as the small decrease in wages but large decrease in labor supply at the end of the life cycle. We also estimate versions of the model in which human capital is completely exogenous and in which human capital is exogenous conditional on work (learning-by-doing). The endogenous human capital model fits the data the best; the learning-by-doing model is able to fit the overall life-cycle pattern; the exogenous model does not. We find that endogenous labor supply is essential for understanding life-cycle human capital investment and life-cycle human capital investment is essential for understanding life-cycle labor supply.
Organizer

Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時

2018年5月14日(月 Monday)  10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Yusuke Narita (Yale University)

Toward an Ethical Experiment [paper]

Abstract Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.
Organizer

Hitoshi Matsushima

 

日時

2018年5月15日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Xing Xia (Yale-NUS College)

Selective mortality and the long-term effects of early-life exposure to natural disasters [paper]

Abstract We analyze the effects of early-life shocks with varying degrees of severity on mortality and human capital outcomes in the Philippines. We exploit variations in typhoon exposure and the introduction of a short-term post-disaster relief policy. Before the policy, mortality from in-utero exposure to severe typhoons was 10 percent, but survivors exhibited similar levels of human capital as the unaffected. The policy change mitigated the mortality effect of severe typhoons, but survivors have lower human capital in the long-term. The observed changes in adverse long-term effects are due to the policy’s effectiveness in increasing survival probability.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年5月22日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小西祥文 (Yoshifumi Konishi) (University of Tsukuba)

Distorted Technical Change? Evidence from New Vehicle Launches in the Japanese Automobile Industry [paper]

Abstract We empirically examine the distortionary impact of an attribute-based regulation on technical change, in the context of new product launches in the Japanese automobile industry. Under the Japanese regulation, fuel economy standards are a step function of curb weight, and their stringency levels vary substantially over time across weight bins of different sizes. We explicitly exploit these quasi-experimental variations in the difference-in-difference-in-differences framework to control for confounders that may be correlated with regulatory assignment. We find strong evidence in support of our theoretical prediction: An attribute-based regulation distorts technical change when it creates trade-offs between the targeted and secondary attributes that differ from technically feasible trade-offs. We also demonstrate that bunching behavior reported elsewhere was evident only in reporting to the government, but not in product offerings in the market.
Organizer

Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年5月24日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意

主催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

共催:ミクロ実証ワークショップ

場所 東京大学国際学術総合研究棟地下1階・第1教室 [地図]
Lecture Hall No. 1, International Academic Research Building, University of Tokyo [MAP]
報告

Joshua Angrist (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

"Uber vs. Taxi: A Driver’s Eye View" (joint with Sydnee Caldwell, and Jonathan V. Hall) [paper]

Abstract Ride-hailing drivers pay a proportion of their fares to the ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many internet-mediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a ?xed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. We assess these compensation models from a driver’s point of view using an experiment that o?ered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were o?ered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our o?ers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2. At the same time, our virtual lease program was under-subscribed: many drivers who would have bene?tted from buying an inexpensive lease chose to opt out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indi?erent between ride-hailing and a traditional taxi compensation contract. The results suggest that ride-hailing drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing.
Organizer