Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2018

 

 

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2018年9月20日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

※2018年度より、授業時間が2限(10:25-12:10)へ変更いたします。

日時

2018年10月1日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

共催: 政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Vivek Bhattacharya (Northwestern University)
Bidding and Drilling Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Payment Auctions (joint with Andrey Ordin and James W. Roberts) [paper]
Abstract

 

Auctions are often used to sell assets whose future cash flows require the winner to make post-auction investments. When a winner’s payment is contingent on the asset’s cash flows, auction design can influence both bidding and incentives to exert effort after the auction. This paper proposes a model of contingent payment auctions that explicitly links auction design to post-auction economic activity, in the context of Permian Basin oil auctions. The estimated model is used to demonstrate that auction design can materially impact both revenue and post-auction drilling activity, as well as mitigate or amplify the effects of oil price shocks.
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時

2018年10月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 廣田正義 (Masayoshi Hirota) (情報社会科学研究所 (Information and Social Science Research ) )
動学的一般均衡体系の実験 (Experiments with dynamic General Equilibrium systems)

[paper]
Abstract Previous experimental work demonstrates the power of classical theories of economic dynamics to accurately predict major features of price dynamics in multiple market systems. Building on this literature, this study implements experimental markets designed after extreme environments identified by Scarf (1960) and Hirota (1981). These environments provide insight into two important economic questions: (a) do markets necessarily converge to a unique interior equilibrium? and (b) which model, among a set of classical specifications, most accurately characterizes observed price dynamics? Our first result demonstrates that the dynamic property of "expanding price orbits" exists, with prices spiraling outwardly around the equilibrium prices in the directions predicted by the theory of disequilibrium price dynamics. Our second result establishes properties of partial equilibrium theory in an unstable general equilibrium environment. Price changes in a market reflect the magnitude of excess demand of that market, with excess demand in other markets making second-order contributions to predicted price changes. These results support the fundamental principle, advanced by Walras and others, that the direction of price change in a given market depends only on the sign of its own excess demand. This excess demand may depend on many prices, but unless disequilibrium is severe the sign of the price change does not depend on the magnitude of excess demand in other markets.
Organizer Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2018年10月9日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Emanuel Ornelas (Sao Paulo School of Economics)
Preferential Trade Agreements and Global Sourcing
Abstract  
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 

日時

2018年10月16日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 吉田雄一郎 (Yuichiro Yoshida) (Hiroshima University)


TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2018年10月23日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 藤原グレーヴァ香子 (Takako Fujiwara-Greve) (Keio University)


TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2018年10月30日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 椋寛 (Hiroshi Mukunoki) (Gakushuin University)
TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年11月6日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Chia-Hui Chen (Kyoto University)
TBA

Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年11月20日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Lianming Zhu (Osaka University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年11月26日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Eeshani Kandpal (World Bank - DEC)


TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2018年11月27日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

共催: 財政・公共経済ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

長谷川誠 (Makoto Hasegawa) (Kyoto University)

TBA

Abstract

 

Organizer

Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年12月3日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Suphanit Piyapromdee (University College London)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2018年12月4日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 関 絵里香(Erika Seki) (Osaka University)
TBA
Abstract
 
Organizer Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年12月10日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Ami Ko (Georgetown University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2018年12月11日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 成田悠輔(Yusuke Narita) (Yale University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年12月18日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2018年12月25日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 渡辺誠 (Makoto Watanabe) (VU University Amsterdam)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2019年1月7日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Pauline Grosjean (University of New South Wales)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2019年1月21日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Guido Friebel (Goethe University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2019年1月28日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Isis Durrmeyer (Toulouse University)
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Naoki Wakamori

 

日時 2019年2月18日 (月 Monday) 10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Shiko Maruyama (University of Technology Sydney)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年3月25日 (月 Monday) 10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Victor Lavy (University of Warwick)
TBA
Abstract

 

Organizer Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時 2019年4月2日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告 Thibault Fall (University of California-Berkeley )
TBA
Abstract  
Organizer Taiji Furusawa

 


<本年度終了分>

日時

2018年4月2日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Hannes Mueller (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)

The Hard Problem of Prediction for Prevention: Reading Between the Lines (joint with Christopher Rauh)

Abstract This article provides a new methodology to predict armed conflict by using newspaper text. Through machine learning, vast quantities of newspaper text are reduced to interpretable topics. These topics are then used in panel regressions to predict the onset of conflict. We propose the use of the within- country variation of these topics to predict the timing of conflict. This allows us to avoid the tendency of predicting conflict only in countries where it occurred before. We show that the within-country variation of topics is a good predictor of conflict and becomes particularly useful when risk in previously peaceful countries arises. Two aspects seem to be responsible for these features. Topics provide depth because they consist of changing, long lists of terms which makes them able to capture the changing context of conflict. At the same time topics provide width because they are summaries of the full text, including stabilizing factors.[paper]
Organizer

Andrew Griffen

 

日時

2018年4月9日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Carlos Carrilo-Tudela (University of Essex)

The Cost of Job Loss (joint with Kenneth Burdett, and Melvyn Coles) [paper]

Abstract This paper identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and quit turnover in a labour market where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning-by- doing while employed, there is skill loss while unemployed and there is on-the-job search. Firms set optimal company wage policies which, in equilibrium, have the property that the wage paid increases with experience and tenure. Using indirect inference, our quantitative analysis shows the model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages following job loss as found in UK data, it also explains why those wage losses differ so markedly across skill groups.
Organizer

Shintaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2018年4月10日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Daniel Marszalec (The University of Tokyo)

Bounded rationality, expectations and risk aversion in auctions for complements. (joint with Alexander Levkun and Alex Teytelboym)

Abstract We evaluate four auctions for complements in an experimental setting with one global and two local bidders. Using between-subject design, we also vary the degree of correlation between local bidders' values. The experiment covers two standard auctions (Vickrey and fist-price), and two sealed-bid core-selecting designs (Nearest-Bid and Reference Rule). At the auction level, we find the first-price auction revenue-dominant, and most efficient, across for all correlation parameters. At the bidder level, Bayesian-Nash predictions are rejected, and bidders do not account for the effects of correlation. Furthermore, under full correlation, bidders are also not best-responding to their expectations of their rivals' play. Though a small degree of free-riding is observed between local bidders in the first-price auction, we reject level-K type bounded rationality as likely explanation of bidder behaviour. Using numerically calculated best-response functions, we propose risk aversion as the best fit to the data, which can also explain the strong performance of the first-price auction.
Organizer

 

 

!--開始部分-->

日時

2018年4月16日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

共催: 政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Christopher Flinn (New York University)

Firm's Choices of Wage-Setting Protocols in the Presence of Minimum Wages [paper]

Abstract We study the formation of wages in a frictional search market where firms can choose either to bargain with workers or post non-negotiable wage offers. Workers can secure wage increases for themselves by engaging in on-the-job search and either moving to firms that offer higher wages or, when possible, leveraging an outside offer into a higher wage at the current firm. We characterize the optimal wage posting strategy of non-negotiating firms and how this decision is influenced by the presence of renegotiating firms. We quantitatively examine the model's unique implications for efficiency, wage dispersion, and worker welfare by estimating it using data on the wages and employment spells of low-skill workers in the United States. In the estimated steady state of the model, we find that more than 10% of job acceptance decisions made while on the job are socially sub-optimal. We also find that, relative to a benchmark case without renegotiation, the presence of even a small number of these firms increases the wage dispersion attributable to search frictions, deflates wages, and reduces worker welfare. Moving to a general equilibrium setting, we use the estimated model to study the impact of a minimum wage increase on firm bargaining strategies and worker outcomes. Our key nding is that binding minimum wages lead to an increase in the equilibrium fraction of renegotiating firms which, relative to a counterfactual in which this fraction is fixed, significantly dampens the reduction in wage dispersion and gains in worker
Organizer

Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時

2018年4月17日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Eunhee Kim (City University of Hong Kong)

TBA

Abstract  
Organizer

Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2018年4月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

室岡 健志 (Takeshi Murooka) (Osaka University)

Market Competition and Informal Incentives

Abstract We develop a model where firms compete on a product market and employ workers whose effort increases revenue, but where no formal contracts can be used to provide incentives for the workers. Firms and workers are matched in a labor market and wages are determined by a bargaining process. Replacing a worker is costly, and the replacement costs incurred by firms are lower in a more competitive labor market (i.e., how many workers are available in the labor market). We show that lowering the replacement costs may decrease workers' wages, industry-wide production efficiency, and consumer surplus. It also makes collusion between firms easier to sustain because the incentive to deviate from a collusive agreement are lower. By contrast, helping potential workers in the labor market typically increases workers' wages, production efficiency, and consumer surplus --- highlighting that there is a sharp asymmetry of reducing costs in the labor market between firms and workers. We also discuss other implications for labor market policies.
Organizer

Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2018年5月7日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Jesper Bagger (Royal Holloway, University of London)

Income Taxation and Equilibrium Labor Allocation

Abstract We study the role of labor income taxation on job search and frictional labor market matching in the presence of worker and firm heterogeneity. Our analysis is strictly positive and is based on a rich equilibrium on-the-job search model of the labor market with endogenous search effort. We estimate the structural model on Danish administrative data and evaluate how three income tax reforms in Denmark in the 1990s and 2000s affected equilibrium labor allocation, wages, and output. The reforms resulted in labor income increasing by 1.8 percent, while unemployment decreased by 4.8 percent. The model allows us to identify Pareto optimal tax reforms that increases government revenue while improving everyone's welfare. In the case of risk-averse workers, Pareto optimal tax system calls for a slightly higher degree of progressivity and produces a modest increase in government revenue by around 0.1 percent, while increasing lifetime utility of the different worker types by between 0.01 percent and 0.1 percent.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年5月8日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Christopher Taber (University of Wisconsin-Madison)

Estimation of a Life-Cycle Model with Human Capital, Labor Supply and Retirement (joint with Xiaodong Fan, and Ananth Seshadri) [paper]

Abstract We develop and estimate a life-cycle model in which individuals make decisions about consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply. Retirement arises endogenously as part of the labor supply decision. The model allows for both an endogenous wage process through human capital investment (which is typically assumed exogenous in the retirement literature) and an endogenous retirement decision (which is typically assumed exogenous in the human capital literature). We estimate the model using Indirect Inference to match the life-cycle profiles of wages and hours from the SIPP data. The model replicates the main features of the data—in particular the large increase in wages and small increase in labor supply at the beginning of the life-cycle as well as the small decrease in wages but large decrease in labor supply at the end of the life cycle. We also estimate versions of the model in which human capital is completely exogenous and in which human capital is exogenous conditional on work (learning-by-doing). The endogenous human capital model fits the data the best; the learning-by-doing model is able to fit the overall life-cycle pattern; the exogenous model does not. We find that endogenous labor supply is essential for understanding life-cycle human capital investment and life-cycle human capital investment is essential for understanding life-cycle labor supply.
Organizer

Hidehiko Ichimura

 

日時

2018年5月14日(月 Monday)  10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

主催:ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Yusuke Narita (Yale University)

Toward an Ethical Experiment [paper]

Abstract Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.
Organizer

Hitoshi Matsushima

 

日時

2018年5月15日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10

共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Xing Xia (Yale-NUS College)

Selective mortality and the long-term effects of early-life exposure to natural disasters [paper]

Abstract We analyze the effects of early-life shocks with varying degrees of severity on mortality and human capital outcomes in the Philippines. We exploit variations in typhoon exposure and the introduction of a short-term post-disaster relief policy. Before the policy, mortality from in-utero exposure to severe typhoons was 10 percent, but survivors exhibited similar levels of human capital as the unaffected. The policy change mitigated the mortality effect of severe typhoons, but survivors have lower human capital in the long-term. The observed changes in adverse long-term effects are due to the policy’s effectiveness in increasing survival probability.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年5月22日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小西祥文 (Yoshifumi Konishi) (University of Tsukuba)

Distorted Technical Change? Evidence from New Vehicle Launches in the Japanese Automobile Industry [paper]

Abstract We empirically examine the distortionary impact of an attribute-based regulation on technical change, in the context of new product launches in the Japanese automobile industry. Under the Japanese regulation, fuel economy standards are a step function of curb weight, and their stringency levels vary substantially over time across weight bins of different sizes. We explicitly exploit these quasi-experimental variations in the difference-in-difference-in-differences framework to control for confounders that may be correlated with regulatory assignment. We find strong evidence in support of our theoretical prediction: An attribute-based regulation distorts technical change when it creates trade-offs between the targeted and secondary attributes that differ from technically feasible trade-offs. We also demonstrate that bunching behavior reported elsewhere was evident only in reporting to the government, but not in product offerings in the market.
Organizer

Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年5月24日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意

主催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

共催:ミクロ実証ワークショップ

場所 東京大学国際学術総合研究棟地下1階・第1教室 [地図]
Lecture Hall No. 1, International Academic Research Building, University of Tokyo [MAP]
報告

Joshua Angrist (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

"Uber vs. Taxi: A Driver’s Eye View" (joint with Sydnee Caldwell, and Jonathan V. Hall) [paper]

Abstract Ride-hailing drivers pay a proportion of their fares to the ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many internet-mediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a ?xed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. We assess these compensation models from a driver’s point of view using an experiment that o?ered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were o?ered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our o?ers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2. At the same time, our virtual lease program was under-subscribed: many drivers who would have bene?tted from buying an inexpensive lease chose to opt out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indi?erent between ride-hailing and a traditional taxi compensation contract. The results suggest that ride-hailing drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing.
Organizer

 

 

日時

2018年5月25日(金 Friday)16:50-18:35 ※日時 ・場所に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Michela Giorcelli (University of California, Los Angeles)

"Reconstruction Aid, Public Infrastructure, and Economic Growth" (joint with Nicola Bianchi) [paper]

Abstract This paper studies the effects of international reconstruction aid on long-term economic development. It exploits plausibly exogenous differences between Italian provinces in the amount of grants disbursed through the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of public infrastructure. Provinces that received more reconstruction grants experienced a larger increase in the number of industrial firms and workers. Individuals and firms in these areas also started developing more patents. The same provinces experienced a faster mechanization of the agricultural sector. Motorized machines, such as tractors, replaced workers and significantly boosted agricultural production. Finally, we show how reconstruction grants induced economic growth by allowing Italian provinces to modernize their transportation and communication networks damaged during WWII.
Organizer

Tetsuji Okazaki

 

日時

2018年5月29日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Hillas (University of Auckland)

"Backward Induction in games without perfect recall" (joint with Dmitriy Kvasov) [paper]

Abstract The equilibrium concepts that we now think of as various forms of backwards induction, namely subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1965), perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975), sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (van Damme, 1984), are explicitly restricted to games with perfect recall. In spite of this the concepts are well defined even in games without perfect recall. There is now a small literature examining the behaviour of these concepts in games without perfect recall. We argue that in games without perfect recall the original definitions are inappropriate. Our reading of the original papers is that the authors were aware that their definitions did not require the assumption of perfect recall but they were also aware that without the assumption of perfect recall the definitions they gave were not the "correct" ones. We give definitions of two of these concepts, sequential equilibrium and quasi-perfect equilibrium, that identify the same equilibria in games with perfect recall and behave well in games without perfect recall.
Organizer

Michihiro Kandori

 

日時

2018年6月5日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

杉田洋一 (Yoichi Sugita) (Hitotsubashi University)

"Wage Markdowns and FDI Liberalization" (joint with Yi Lu and Lianming Zhu)

Abstract This paper examines the impact of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) liberalization on domestic firm’s monopsonic power over wage. We estimate firm-level “wage markdown,” the gap between the wage and the marginal cost of labor (MCL), from firm-level production data of China. Our estimation framework is general about reasons for firm’s monopsony power, assumes no functional form about labor supply curves to firms, and simultaneously estimate firm’s monopoly power in the output market. During 1998-2007, 82% of manufacturing firms exercised monopsony power and workers at a median firm receives only 35% of MCL.We estimate the causal effect of FDI liberalization on wage markdowns, using variations in China’s regulation on FDI inflow upon its accession to the WTO in 2001. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, markdowns are narrower at large employers and FDI liberalization widens wage markdown for an average worker by around 8.7%. We show that these apparently counter-intuitive findings are consistent with monopsony theory based on search friction.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月12日(火 Tuesday)11:00-12:30 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Yusuke Tsugawa (University of California Los Angeles)

Association between physician medical school ranking and patient outcomes (joint with Daniel M. Blumenthal, Ashish K. Jha, E. John Orav and Anupam B. Jena)

Abstract Importance: Patients perceive the medical school from which a physician graduated as a signal of care quality. However, the relationship between the ranking of the medical school a physician attended and subsequent patient outcomes and spending is largely unknown. Objective: To investigate whether the ranking of the medical school a physician attended is associated with patient outcomes and healthcare spending. Design, setting, and participants: We analyzed a 20% random sample of Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries aged ≥65 years, who were emergently hospitalized with a medical condition and treated by general internists from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2015. We examined the association between the ranking of the medical school a physician attended (determined by U.S. News & World Report rankings) and outcomes and spending of patients treated by these physicians, adjusted for patient and physician characteristics and hospital fixed effects (comparing physicians within the same hospital). As a sensitivity analysis, we focused on patients treated by hospitalists (because patients are plausibly quasi-randomly assigned to hospitalists based on their specific work schedules). Main outcomes and measures: 30-day mortality and readmission rates and Medicare Part B spending per hospitalization. Results: A total of 949,774 patients treated by 29,147 physicians were analyzed. When using primary care rankings, physicians who graduated from higher-ranked schools exhibited lower 30-day readmission rates (adjusted 30-day readmission rate, 15.7% for top-10 schools vs. 16.1% for schools ranked ≥50; adjusted risk difference, +0.4%; 95%CI, +0.1% to +0.8%; p-for-trend=0.005) and slightly lower spending (adjusted Part B spending, $1029 vs. $1066; adjusted difference, +$36; 95%CI, +$20 to +$52; p-for-trend<0.001) compared with graduates of lower-ranked schools but no difference in patient mortality. When using research rankings, physicians graduating from higher-ranked schools had slightly lower healthcare spending but no differences in mortality or readmissions. A sensitivity analysis restricted to patients treated by hospitalists yielded similar findings. Conclusion and relevance: Physicians who graduated from highly-ranked primary care medical schools exhibited slightly lower patient readmission rates and spending compared with physicians who attended lower ranked schools but had no difference in patient 30-day mortality. Physicians who graduated from highly-ranked research medical schools had slightly lower spending but no difference in patient mortality or readmission rates.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月18日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

共催:政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Dean Hyslop (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research)

Earnings dynamics and measurement error in matched survey and administrative data (joint with Wilbur Townsendy) [paper]*paper updated on June 18

Abstract This paper analyzes earnings dynamics and measurement error using a matched longitudinal sample of individuals’ survey and administrative earnings. We reject that survey reports are measured with classical error and the administrative earnings are error free. The reported differences are negatively correlated with average administrative earnings, and with annual deviations, and characterized by both persistent and transitory factors. We formulate models for individuals’ true earnings and measurement errors in each report. Assuming no measurement error in the administrative reports, we estimate mean-reverting errors in the survey report, but this finding is not robust to relaxing this assumption. The results imply measurement errors dominate the observed changes in earnings.
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年6月19日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

花園誠 (Makoto Hanazono) (Nagoya University)

Market Structure and Price Dispersion: Asymmetric Oligopoly with Sequential Consumer Search (joint with Noritaka Kudoh)

Abstract This paper presents a new theory of price dispersion based on firm size and dynamic reasoning. We build a model of oligopolistic price competition among n firms with sequential consumer search, in which each firm consists of a mass of sellers. Since search is random, consumers are more likely to meet sellers from a larger firm. This reduces the consumer's outside option of rejecting a trade with a seller from a larger firm, generating a greater market power for a larger firm. We show that price dispersion disappears as search frictions disappear. Interestingly, there is a non-monotonic relationship between search frictions and price dispersion.
Organizer

Hikaru Ogawa

 

日時

2018年6月26日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

共催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Yusuke Narita (Yale University)

Match or Mismatch? Learning and Inertia in School Choice [paper]

Abstract Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well- informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To al- leviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms im- prove on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia).
Organizer

Daiji Kawaguchi

 

日時

2018年7月2日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Yangguang (Sunny) Huang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

A Model of Sales on Online Platforms [paper]

Abstract Online platforms, in many stylized models, intensify seller-side competition as they induce more entry, reduce search costs, and alleviate asymmetric information. However, platforms can also entail anti-competitive impact to the market because they can deeply influence consumers' consideration sets by search tools. For instance, most search algorithms and recommender systems are based on popularity, so sellers with established brands are further reinforced by appearing on the top of search results. We construct a model that provides an anatomy of how platforms influence consumers' consideration sets, which further determine the market structure and welfare. We study the data from food-delivery platforms and provide empirical evidence of the model.
Organizer

Naoki Wakamori

 

日時

2018年7月3日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

原田 勝孝 (Masataka Harada) (Fukuoka University)

Measuring Destruction from Above Long-Term Effects of the WWII Air Raid Damages on Contemporary Sociopolitical Activities in Japan (joint with Gaku Ito)

Abstract Do mass destructions due to wars change local communities thereafter? If they do, in which aspects, how much, and what are the mechanisms? Although several studies have examined the ramifications of wars, the results are mixed, and most of them focus on sparsely populated rural areas in developing countries. This study presents the novel causal evidence for these questions with a natural experimental setting. Specifically, we take advantage of the fact that the Great Tokyo Air Raids in 1945 left random damages to the communities due to the differences in the landscape and the microclimates on the bombing days. We have developed the new dataset by applying remote-sensing technique to the aerial photography of 1947-1948 Tokyo, which enables us to measure the level of destruction at Cho-chomoku (similar to the census block in the U.S.) level, a significantly smaller unit of analysis than past studies. The preliminary results show that the air raids increased the unemployment rates, and this effect remains after removing the mediation effect of move-in population.
Organizer

Keisuke Kawata

 

日時

2018年7月10日(火 Tuesday) 16:30-18:30 ※時間に注意

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

16:30-17:30
Ryota Iijima (Yale University)

Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies (joint with Mira Frick, and Yuhta Ishii) [paper]

17:30-18:30
Mira Frick (Yale University)

Misinterpreting Others and the Fragility of Social Learning (joint with Ryota Iijima and Yuhta Ishii)

Abstract

"Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies"

Motivated by the fact that people’s perceptions of their societies are routinely incorrect, we study the possibility and implications of misperception in social interactions. We focus on coordination games with assortative interactions, where agents with higher types (e.g., wealth, political attitudes) are more likely than lower types to interact with other high types. Assor- tativity creates scope for misperception, because what agents observe in their local interactions need not be representative of society as a whole. To model this, we define a tractable solution concept, “local perception equilibrium” (LPE), that describes possible behavior and perceptions when agents’ beliefs are derived only from their local interactions. We show that there is a unique form of misperception that can persist in any environment: This is assortativity neglect , where all agents believe the people they interact with to be a representative sample of society as a whole. Relative to the case with correct perceptions, assortativity neglect generates two mutually reinforcing departures: A “false consensus effect,” whereby agents’ perceptions of average characteristics in the population are increasing in their own type; and more “dispersed” behavior in society, which adversely affects welfare due to increased miscoordination. Finally, we propose a comparative notion of when one society is more assortative than another and show that more assortative societies are characterized precisely by greater action dispersion and a more severe false consensus effect, and as a result, greater assortativity has an ambiguous effect on welfare.

Organizer

Daisuke Oyama

 

日時

2018年7月17日(火 Tuesday) 16:30-18:30  ※時間・会場に注意

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Yuichiro Kamada (University of California, Berkeley)

Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns (joint with Takuo Sugaya) [paper]

Abstract We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We show that this simple friction leads to rich and subtle campaign dynamics. We first demonstrate these effects in a series of canonical static models of elections that we extend to dynamic settings, including models with valence, a multi-dimensional policy space, policy motivated candidates, campaign spending, and incomplete information. We then present general principles that underlie the results from those examples. In particular, we establish that candidates spend a long time using ambiguous language during the election campaign in equilibrium.
Organizer

Michihiro Kandori

 

※Master's Thesis Presentations ※

We can print your thesis paper to be distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):

January 10 (Tuesday)…by 3:00pm, July 9 (Monday)

January 17 (Tuesday)…by8:45am, July 17 (Tuesday)


Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number along with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.
  • Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.

 

 

日時

2018年7月10日(火 Tuesday)10:00-12:30 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

10:00-10:30 Pan Yen Long (Readers: 川口、山口、(川田))

Long-Term Effect of Graduating in Recession on Income and Consumption

 

10:30-11:00 QIAN Xunan (Readers: 川口、山口、(川田))

To work or to Have a Second Child-The Effect of Selective Two-Child Policy on Labor Market in China

 

11:00-11:30 LIU Zhang (Readers: 中林、田中、(川田))

Monetary Policy and House Price- If Monetary Policy should target at house price in China

 

11:30-12:00 ZHAO Rui (Readers: 岡崎、小島、(中村))

Competition in the railway industry in Manchuria after the World War I

 

12:00-12:30 LIU Silin (Readers: 岡崎、谷本、(川口))

The effect of export on regional usage: evidence from the bilateral trade between China and Japan

 

 

日時

2018年7月17日(火 Tuesday)10:30-12:30 

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

10:30-11:00 LIN Jung-Hsuan (Readers: Griffen、川口、(若森))

Relative income distribution and the division of domestic work within Taiwanese household

 

11:00-11:30 LI Yishin (Readers: 若森、Griffen、(Marszalec))

Productivity and Foreign Direct Investment-A Study of Chinese Firms

 

11:30-12:00 SHI Zejin (Readers: 市村、山口、(Griffen))

Do single mothers have difficulty to remarry?

 

12:00-12:30 LIU Zaiwei (Readers: 市村、飯塚、(Griffen))

Physician Peer Effects in Patient-Sharing Networks

 

 

 

日時

2018年7月24日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Shunya Noda (Stanford University)

Large Matching in Large Market with Flexible Supply [paper]

Abstract We study truthful mechanisms that achieve a large size of matching (expected number of agents matched to some objects) in an environment where the planner can decide which and how many objects to provide subject to linear upper bound constraints. Naïve extensions of the classical serial mechanisms may generate an arbitrarily small matching in such environments. Assuming the market to be large (in that the variety of objects is fixed but the capacity to be large), we establish several mechanisms that have a constant guarantee for the size achieved. As a main result, we propose the adaptive parallel polymatroid serial mechanism, which (i) is not too computationally difficult to implement, (ii) achieves 1-1/e ≈ 63.2% of the maximum feasible size even in the worst case, and (iii) keeps agents' choice sets as large as possible.
Organizer

Daniel Marszalec

 

日時

2018年7月30日(月 Monday)10:30-12:00  ※時間に注意

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Kai Liu (University of Cambridge)

Estimating the Dynamic Effects of a Job Training Program with Multiple Alternatives

Abstract This paper aims at estimating the causal effect of a job training program for disadvantaged youths on their subsequent earnings. Participants are randomized in treatment and control groups, but are allowed to choose when to leave the program and to participate (alternative) training when not enrolled in the program. We consider a multi-stage decision setting, where individuals sequentially select which training to obtain at every stage. The standard Wald estimator using initial random assignment as instrument identifies a weighted average of the effects of the treatment for the subgroups of individuals selecting different duration and different trainings outside the program. We develop a selection model which allows to separately estimate the effect of the treatment for the different subgroups. We use the estimated model to investigate dynamic complementarity/substitutability between different training programs. We show that considering the dynamic interaction between different trainings in this setting is relevant to study the heterogeneous effect of the program and to conduct a complete cost-benefit analysis.  
Organizer

Shitaro Yamaguchi

 

日時

2018年7月31日(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 

主催: ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)

Taxation and Market Power in Legal Marijuana Industry (with Brett Hollenbeck) 

Abstract  
Organizer

Shintaro Yamaguchi