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ミクロ経済学ワークショップ 2023
Microeconomics Workshop
- ※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます（Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH）。
Hybrid SeminarThe seminars are held in-person and online basically. (from October 2022) Seminar Venue (Please note that the seminar venue might be changed for irregular seminars.) : Please use the following link for online registration. See the bottom of the page for details.
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RegistrationPlease use the following link for registration. Please read the bottom of the page for participation details. https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwtceGhrzMpHtZ8GucmpPdvrWzSi7Gf2sdT
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Companion WorkshopApplied Economics Workshop (AEW) |
Applied Economics Workshop（AEW) is our companion workshop, jointly held by the University of Tokyo, National Taiwan University, National University of Singapore, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong University, Academia Sinica, Hitotsubashi University, and Nanyang Technological University.
The seminars are held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation. Applied Economics Workshopは、Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制）となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。 Applied Economics Workshop Website |
| 日時 | June 6, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Dean Hyslop (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research) "Training, Productivity and Wages: Direct evidence from a Temporary Help Agency" (joint with Xinwei Dong and Daiji Kawaguchi) [Paper] |
| Abstract | Firms frequently provide general skill training to workers at the firm’s cost. Theories proposed that labor market frictions entail wage compression, larger productivity gain than wage growth to skill acquisition, and motivates a firm to offer general skill training, but few studies directly test them. We use unusually rich data from a temporary help service firm that records both workers' wages and their productivity as measured by the fees charged to client firms. We find evidence that skill acquired through training and learning-by-doing increases productivity more than wages, which is consistent with wage compression. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Daiji Kawaguchi (Suk Joon Son) |
| 日時 | June 12, 2023 （月 Monday）13:00-14:45 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Wooyoung Lim (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) “Lying and Deception in Repeated Communication” joint with Syngjoo Choi (SNU) and Chanjoo Lee (SNU) |
| Abstract | Lying and deception are common in economic interactions and have important strategic implications. While related, they are distinct phenomena that may have different effects on communication outcomes. In this paper, we study repeated communication with a reputation concern in a two-dimensional belief domain, and identify two environments where lying and deception are completely separated. In one environment, the sender must tell the truth to conceal a bad intention, while in the other, the sender must lie to reveal a good intention. Our experimental data show that the proportion of senders who successfully build reputations is lower than predicted in both environments. Furthermore, the deviation from theory is greater when reputation-building requires lying rather than deception. Finally, we observe that receivers punish senders for lying, even when the intention behind it is good. Our findings suggest that different communication mechanisms may perform differently depending on their reliance on lying or deception, highlighting the need to distinguish between these two concepts investigating organizational and political phenomena. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yasutora Watanabe, Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | June 13, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Makiko Nakamuro (Keio University) "The effect of the quality of early childhood education on children's subsequent outcomes" [Paper] |
| Abstract | This study presents the first quantitative evaluation of the quality of early childhood education and care (ECEC) in Japan to make a significant contribution to the body of knowledge accumulated on ECEC in countries where research has been limited. We observed 30 classes comprising 3-year-olds, 28 classes comprising 5-year-olds, and 30 classes comprising mixed-ages from publicly provided nursery centers under the jurisdiction of the Kanto metropolitan area, Japan. An internationally-recognized quality rating scale for ECEC called the Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale, 3rd edition, which consists of six subscales, was used for this study. In contrast to previous studies conducted in the US, the results of this study showed that the Japanese ECEC is characterized as showing higher scores in the two subscales, “Personal Care Routines” and “Interaction,” and showing lower score in the subscale, “Learning Activities.” In addition, this study showed that the quality of ECEC varied across nursery centers. Furthermore, with regard to the two subscales, “Interaction” and “Language and Literacy,” the degree of variation within centers differed across nursery centers. This study analyzed how these characteristics of Japanese ECEC can be partly produced by the existence of national guideline for nursery centers authorized by the Japanese government. In addition, mechanisms producing differences in the quality of ECEC among and within centers were also discussed. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | June 19, 2023（月 Monday）10:25-12:10 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Allen Vong (University of Macau) "Effort smoothing" |
| Abstract | This paper highlights a new role of mediation in addressing dynamic moral hazard. I study a mediated market in which a worker repeatedly supplies costly effort. Equilibrium social welfare is maximized if and only if the mediator facilitates the worker's occasional and secret shirking at the expense of her employers. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | June 20, 2023（火 Tueday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | June 27, 2023（火 Tueday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Ming Li (Concordia University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | June 28, 2023（水 Wednesday）13:15-14:45 ＊Irregular Seminar, 日時に注意
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Megumi Murakami (Northwestern University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | 経済史研究会 The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Akihiko Matui, Shunya Noda |
| 日時 | July 4, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Midori Wakabayashi (Tohoku University) "Stuck in a Marriage: The Bundling Effect of Adverse Shocks and Family Insurance" Wataru Kureishi Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hannah Paule-Paludkiewicz Deutsche Bundesbank, Hitoshi Tsujiyama University of Surrey, Midori Wakabayashi Tohoku University |
| Abstract | We exploit a natural-experimental earthquake shock to study the effects of adverse economic conditions on marital dissolution and intra-household reallocation. Using large-scale long-term panel data, we document that couples more affected by the adverse shock are less likely to divorce in both the short and long run. This bundling effect is particularly strong for dual-earner couples with a young child whose wives tend to experience a drop in their earnings due to the disaster, compared to singleearner couples with a young child or couples with no child or a grown-up child. Building on the collective household model with limited commitment, we argue that these results can be theoretically explained by a significant decrease in the value of the outside option (divorce) for women with income loss, implying that they are stuck in the marriage for economic reasons. The model also predicts an intra-household reallocation of resources from wives to husbands within these otherwise divorced families. We then provide novel empirical evidence for this reallocation: husbands make up for the income loss by moving into higher-paying jobs, compensated by longer leisure time, shorter time for home production, and higher private consumption. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | July 11, 2023（火 Tueday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Dong Wei (University of California, Santa Cruz) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | July 18, 2023（火 Tueday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Chihiro Morooka (Tokyo Denki University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori |
| 日時 | July 25, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer |
| 日時 | October 3, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Naomi Feldman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Andrew Griffen, (Masahiro Shoji) |
| 日時 | October 10, 2023（火 Tueday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Sam Jindani (National University of Singapore) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Satoru Takahashi, (Syunya Noda) |
| 日時 | October 17, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer |
| 日時 | October 24, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Philip Haile(Yale University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | November 7, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | （予定）本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | David Neumark (University of California, Irvine) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son, (Daiji Kawaguchi) |
| 日時 | November 14, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Stefano Lovo (HEC Paris) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Daisuke Oyama, (Shunya Noda) |
| 日時 | November 21, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer |
| 日時 | November 28, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
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| Organizer |
| 日時 | December 5, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Ken Miura(Kyoto University) TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International Economics Development (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | December 12, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
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| Organizer |
| 日時 | December 19, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
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| 日時 | December 26, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer |
| 日時 | January 9, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer |
| 日時 | January 16, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
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| Organizer |
| 日時 | January 23, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
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| Organizer |
| 日時 | January 30, 2024（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | TBA TBA |
| Abstract | |
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| Organizer |
以下本年度終了分
| 日時 | March 14, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。
■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details. |
| 報告 | Joel Rodrigue (Vanderbilt University) Exporting and Investment under Credit Constraints" [Paper] |
| Abstract | |
| Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Taiji Furusawa, Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | March 28, 2022（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Bobak Pakzad-Hurson (Brown University) "Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence" joint with Natalie Cox, Ricardo Fonseca, and Matthew Pecenco |
| Abstract | Can a school-choice clearinghouse generate a stable matching if it does not allow students to express preferences over peers? Theoretically, we show stable matchings exist with peer preferences under mild conditions but finding one via canonical mechanisms is unlikely. Increasing transparency about the previous cohort's matching induces a tâtonnement process wherein prior matchings function as prices. We develop a test for stability and implement it empirically in the college admissions market in New South Wales, Australia. We find evidence of preferences over relative peer ability, but no convergence to stability. We propose a mechanism improving upon the current assignment process. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima |
| 日時 | April 4, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Brian A. Jacob (University of Michigan) "Racial Differences in Parent Response to COVID Schooling Policies" |
| Abstract | In this paper, we re-examine the relationship between COVID schooling policies and student enrollment, with a particular focus on differential responses by race and ethnicity. Using data on over 9,000 districts that serve 90% of public school students in the U.S., we first calculate deviations from pre-pandemic enrollment trends separately by district-subgroup. We then estimate differential responses to school policies across race within districts, controlling for a range of observable characteristics that may be correlated with school policies and enrollment changes, including local COVID severity and COVID prevention measures as well as a host of social, economic and political characteristics. We find enrollment responses to COVID policies differed notably by race. While White enrollments declined more in districts that started the 2020-21 school year virtually, Black enrollments declined more in districts that started the 2021 school year in-person. Moreover, in counties with higher COVID-19 death rates in the months preceding the start of the 2021 school year, both Black and Hispanic enrollments declined at a faster rate than White students in the same districts. In districts with mask requirements, White, Black, and Hispanic enrollment declines in 2021-22 were relatively similar. In contrast, when districts did not require masks at the start of the school year, Black enrollments remained nearly twice as far below-trend as White enrollments, particularly in districts that had previously been in-person or hybrid. |
| Co-Host | |
| Organizer | Ryuichi Tanaka |
| 日時 | April 11, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Nikhil Agarwal (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) "Combining Human Expertise with Artificial Intelligence: Experimental Evidence from Radiology" |
| Abstract | Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms have matched or surpassed the performance of
human experts in a number of predictive tasks, although human experts have access to
contextual information that may not be available for machine predictions. We investi-
gate how best to combine machine predictions with human input in the presence of such
contextual information and potential biases in how humans use machine predictions in
forming their assessments. Our experiment varies the availability of AI support and
contextual information. We find that that contextual information improves diagnostic
accuracy on average, but providing AI predictions does not always increase accuracy
although there are large potential gains from having radiologists make decisions using
AI support. These gains are not realized because radiologists partially neglect the AI’s
information and do not account for the redunancy between their own information and
the AI’s information. An implication of our results is that, unless these mistakes can be
corrected, the design of an optimal collaborative system has radiologists work alongside
as opposed to with AI. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son |
| 日時 | April 12, 2023（水 Wednesday）13:00-14:45 *日時にご注意ください
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University) "Robust Implementation with Costly Information" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We design mechanisms that robustly implement any desired social choice function when
(i) agents must incur a cost to learn the state of the world, (ii) with small probability, agents’ pref-
erences can be arbitrarily different from some baseline known to the social planner, and (iii) the
planner does not know agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs about one another’s preferences.
The mechanisms we propose have a natural interpretation, and are robust to trembles in agents’
reporting strategies, to the introduction of a small amount of noise affecting agents’ signals about
the state, and to uncertainty concerning the state distribution and agents’ prior beliefs about the
state. We also establish impossibility results for stronger notions of robust implementation.
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| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori
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| 日時 |
April 17, 2023 (Monday) 10:30-12:00
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上の説明をご確認ください。 通常とURLが異なりますのでお気を付けください。 ■ 対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール1階第1セミナー室 This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction above for details. Registration <-- Please click here for online participation. |
| 報告 | Enrico Pennings (Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University of Rotterdam) "Incumbent Capacity Responses to Entry: Evidence of Predation in the U.S. Airline Industry?" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We empirically examine the post-entry price and capacity response of incumbent monopolists in 256 incumbent-entrant fights with a winner in the U.S. airline industry and find evidence of behaviour that is consistent with predation. The novelty of this paper is to use incumbent capacity to identify predatory behaviour, which helps overcome the hurdles of standard predation tests comparing price to cost. We exploit the fact that it is unprofitable to increase available capacity after entry since quantities are strategic substitutes for competitors. We show that incumbents who increase capacity after entry are more likely to eliminate competition, restore their monopoly position and exploit market power by raising prices after the exit of their rival. |
| Co-Host | 主催：Empirical Micro Research Seminar |
| Organizer | Hiroshi Ohashi, Andrew Griffen |
| 日時 | April 18, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Daniele Condorelli (University of Warwick) "Buyer-Optimal Platform Design"[Paper] |
| Abstract | A platform matches a unit-mass of sellers, each owning a single product of heterogeneous quality, to
a unit-mass of buyers with differing valuations for unit-quality. After matching, sellers make take-
it-or-leave-it price-offers to buyers. Initially, valuations of buyers are only known to them and the
platform, but sellers make inferences from the matching algorithm. The efficient matching is positive-
assortative, but buyer-optimal matchings are, often, stochastically negative-assortative (i.e., compared
to lower-quality sellers, high-quality ones are matched to buyers with lower expected valuation). Al-
beit everyone trades when the platform has full-information, generating rents for the side lacking
bargaining power results in inefficient matching.
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| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Fuhito Kojima |
| 日時 | |
|---|---|
| 報告 | Richard Holden (University of New South Wales) “Coordination in Supply Chains” (joint with Robert Akerlof) |
| 日時 | April 25, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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|---|---|
| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Pavel Kireyev (INSEAD) "NFT Marketplace Design and Market Intelligence" [Paper] |
| Abstract | Nonfungible tokens (NFTs) have exploded in popularity in 2021, generating billions of dollars in transaction volume. In tandem, market intelligence platforms have emerged to track summary statistics about pricing and sales activity across different NFT collections. We demonstrate that marketplace design can significantly influence market intelligence, focusing specifically on the costs of bidding which can differ across marketplaces depending on transaction fees, the prevalence of bidding bots, or the user interface for placing bids. We use data from the CryptoPunks marketplace and build an empirical model of the strategic interaction between sellers and bidders. Counterfactual simulations show that a reduction in bidding costs does not change the quantity of sales, but increases the share of sales that result from bids. Listing prices increase as sellers expect to accept more bids, making assets appear more valuable. The listing and realized sale price ratios between rare and common assets shrink, making the market appear more homogeneous. Collections that are offered by two different marketplaces can exhibit significantly different market statistics because of differences in bidding costs rather than differences in inherent value. The results have implications for the interpretation of NFT market intelligence. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Suk Joon Son (Fuhito Kojima) |
| 日時 | May 2, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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|---|---|
| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Yanjun Li(Hitotsubashi University) "Road to Crime: Expressway Connections and Child Trafficking" [Paper] |
| Abstract | Child trafficking is a long-lasting social issue in China. We argue that abducted children increase as an indirect and unintended consequence of improved urban infrastructure, such as the construction of expressways that facilitate the expedient transfer of victims between cities. To identify the causal relationship, we combine family-reported incidents of child abduction with geo-referenced data of China’s highway routes to explore the impact of expressways on connected cities in comparison to unconnected cities using a difference-in-differences approach and city-pair matching strategy. The results support our assumptions and are robust after addressing the concerns regarding the endogeneity of route placement and staggered treatment timing. The expanded demand side of the trafficking market and enhanced rural-urban migration, which increases the public safety risks, could account for the mechanism behind the phenomena. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
| 日時 | May 9, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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|---|---|
| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Norio Takeoka(Hitotsubashi University) "Coarse Information Acquisition" [Paper] |
| Abstract | If agents are not given sufficient information when making decisions, they will attempt to obtain more accurate information through information acquisition. The literature of rational inattention hypothesizes that a rational agent optimally chooses an experiment or information structure to obtain an additional piece of information. In reality, however, it is difficult to conduct accurate experiments due to lack of knowledge about the experiment itself and/or ambiguity about the payoff-relevant state space. This paper studies the choice behavior of decision makers who are aware that their information acquisition is not always accurate and that they can only choose coarse experiments. By adopting the choice theoretic model of information acquisition, provided in de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, and Ozbek [12], we argue that one of their axioms, which is interpreted as preference for early resolution of risk and takes a form of quasi-convexity of preference, excludes the possibility of coarse experiments. By relaxing their quasi-convexity axiom, we axiomatically characterize models of information acquisition with coarse experiments. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Yichuan Lou |
| 日時 | May 16, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10
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|---|---|
| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University of Economics) "Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism" [Paper] |
| Abstract | We study an assignment market where multiple heterogenous objects are sold to unit demand agents who have general preferences that accommodate income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium notions in such settings. Nevertheless, none of the well-known mechanisms that find the MPEs in the quasi-linear environment can identify or even approximate the MPEs for general preferences. We establish novel structural characterizations of MPEs and design the "Serial Vickrey (SV) mechanism" based on the characterizations. The SV mechanism finds an MPE for general preferences in a finite number of steps. Moreover, the SV mechanism only requires agents to report finite-dimensional prices in finitely many times, and also has nice dynamic incentive properties. |
| Co-Host | The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD) |
| Organizer | Shunya Noda, Michihiro Kandori |
| 日時 | May 23, 2023（火 Tuesday）10:25-12:10 ※オンライン開催に変更されました
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|---|---|
| 場所 | 本ワークショップは、Zoomを利用してのオンライン開催となります。オンラインでは（事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 |
| 報告 | Izumi Yokoyama (Hitotsubashi University) "The Unexpected Side Effects of Lockdowns on Those “Barely” Inside and Outside of Lockdown Areas" |
| Abstract | This study estimates the impact of Japan's anti-COVID-19 policy called “the state of emergency” (SOE) by employing a geographical regression discontinuity design (RDD). This policy can be considered a weaker alternative to a lockdown, where people are permitted to move outside certain targeted areas; in this sense, the areas are “unlocked” with several restrictions in place. In February 2021, an SOE was declared for 11 out of the 47 prefectures in Japan. This enabled us to utilize the geographical RDD for the study. We utilized the fact that the risk of infection and other factors were geographically continuous at the borders between targeted areas and non-targeted areas, while the SOE was completely discontinuous at each border. We obtained the following results. Those who lived “barely” outside the emergency areas were more alarmed by COVID-19 than those who lived “barely” inside the targeted areas. This contributed to behaviors such as refraining from going to bars or restaurants and to becoming more careful in practicing COVID-19 countermeasures. Our study is the first of its kind to find negative effects for targeted areas and positive effects for untargeted areas simultaneously, which was made possible by using the geographical RDD. Thus, the results of this paper suggest the importance of reconsidering the necessity of disease control that utilizes the borders between administrative divisions, such as states or prefectures, in implementing lockdowns. |
| Co-Host | Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID) |
| Organizer | Masahiro Shoji |
Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について （Online Seminars Using Zoom)
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当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインでも開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。 Microeconomics Workshop is also held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.
※ 登録 (Registration) 事前登録が必須となります。下記よりご登録頂けますと、ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。事前にご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。（Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。） Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information including meeting URL will be provided via email. Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application) on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.) Please click here for registration : |