ミクロ経済学ワークショップ 2022
Microeconomics Workshop

  • ※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

 

 

 

Hybrid Seminar

The seminars are held in-person and online basically. (from October 2022)

Seminar Venue (Please note that the seminar venue might be changed for irregular seminars.) :
 Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室 [Map]

Please use the following link for online registration. See the bottom of the page for details.

 

 

 

 

Registration

Please use the following link for registration. Please read the bottom of the page for participation details.

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJwtceGhrzMpHtZ8GucmpPdvrWzSi7Gf2sdT

 

Companion Workshop

Applied Economics Workshop (AEW)

  Applied Economics Workshop(AEW) is our companion workshop, jointly held by the University of Tokyo, National Taiwan University, National University of Singapore, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong University, and Academia Sinica.

The seminars are held online using Zoom Webinar (registration is required). Please register at the following website for participation.

Applied Economics Workshopは、Zoom Webinar を使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。参加をご希望の方は、下記ウェブサイトよりご登録下さい。

Applied Economics Workshop Website
https://sites.google.com/view/economicseminar/home

※ Instructions for Attendees

 

 

 

日時
October 4, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告

Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)
"Robust Monopoly Regulation"
Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya [Paper]

Abstract
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a non-Bayesian approach. We derive the policy that minimizes the regulator’s worst-case regret, where regret is the difference between the regulator’s complete-information payoff and his realized payoff. When the regulator’s payoff is consumers’ surplus, he imposes a price cap. When his payoff is the total surplus of both consumers and the firm, he offers a capped piece-rate subsidy. For intermediate cases, the regulator uses both a price cap and a capped piece-rate subsidy. The optimal policy balances three goals: giving more surplus to consumers, mitigating underproduction, and mitigating overproduction.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Yichuan Lou
日時
October 11, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告

Daniel Quint (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
"“Bid Shopping” in Procurement Auctions with Subcontracting"
 Raymond Deneckere, Daniel Quint [Paper]

Abstract
We analyze the equilibrium effects of “bid shopping” – a contractor soliciting a subcontractor bid for part of a project prior to a procurement auction, then showing that bid to a competing subcontractor in an attempt to secure a lower price.
Such conduct is widely criticized as un-ethical by professional organizations, and has been the target of legislation at both the federal and state level, but is widespread in procurement auctions in many places.
Our baseline model suggests that bid shopping that brings in new subcontractors after the auction – rather than diverting some existing subcontractors to post-auction competition – always increases social surplus, benefitting the procurer at the expense of the existing subcontractors.
Bid shopping that causes some subcontractors to wait to bid until after the auction tends to decease total surplus when subcontractors’bid preparation costs are low, but may increase total surplus when bid preparation costs are high.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Fuhito Kojima (Shunya Noda)
日時
October 18, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Aniko Öry (Yale School of Management)
Dynamic Price Competition: "Theory and Empirical Evidence" From Airline Markets [Paper]
Abstract
We introduce a model of oligopoly dynamic pricing where firms with limited capacity face a sales deadline. We establish conditions under which the equilibrium is unique and converges to a system of differential quations. Using unique and comprehensive pricing and bookings data for competing U.S. airlines, we estimate our model and find that dynamic pricing results in higher output but lower welfare than under uniform pricing. Our theoretical and empirical findings run counter to standard results in single-firm settings due to the strategic role of competitor scarcity. Pricing heuristics commonly used by airlines increase welfare relative to estimated equilibrium predictions.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Michihiro Kandori (Shunya Noda)
日時
October 25, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)
TBA
Abstract
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Fuhito Kojima (Shunya Noda)
日時
November 8, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Susumu Sato (Hitotsubashi University)
"TBA"
Abstract
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Shunya Noda
日時
November 15, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。  This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Charles Noussair (The University of Arizona)
"TBA"
Abstract
Co-Host
Organizer
Hidehiko Ichimura
日時
November 29, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.
報告
Yu Bai (The University of Tokyo)
"TBA"
Abstract
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時
December 6, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.
報告
Tong Wang (The University of Tokyo)
"TBA"
Abstract
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時
December 13, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
William Fuchs (The University of Texas at Austin McCombs School of Business and Universidad Carlos III)
"TBA"
Abstract
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Yichuan Lou



以下本年度終了分

日時
April 5, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Giovanni Compiani (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
A Method to Estimate Discrete Choice Models that is Robust to Consumer Search [Paper]
Abstract
We state suffcient conditions under which choice data suffices to identify preferences when consumers are not fully informed about attributes of goods. Standard estimators undervalue hidden attributes, as consumers will be unresponsive to some variation in those attributes. If consumers search goods in order of the component of utility observable to them without search, an alternative method of recovering preferences using cross derivatives of choice probabilities succeeds under both full information and a range of search models and is thus robust to what consumers know when they choose. Our approach can be used to recover preferences from choices made by imperfectly informed consumers, to test for full information, and to forecast how consumers will respond to information. We verify in a lab experiment that our approach succeeds in forecasting the response to new information and assessing the value of that information when consumers engage in costly search. In data from Expedia, our method identifies which attribute was not immediately visible to consumers in search results, and we then use the model to compute the value of information about the hidden attribute.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Suk Joon Son
日時
April 12, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Inga Deimen (The University of Arizona)
Communication in the Shadow of Catastrophe (joint work with Dezsö Szalay)[paper]
Abstract
We study the role of risk in strategic information transmission. We show that an increased likelihood of extreme states – heavier tails – decreases the amount of information transmission and makes it optimal to alter the mode of decision-making from communication to simple delegation. Moreover, the worst-case losses under communication increase relative to the worst-case losses under delegation when the tails get heavier.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Yichuan Lou
日時
April 19, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Tomoki Fujii (Singapore Management University)
Do Natural Disasters Cause Domestic Violence?: A study of the 2015 Nepal earthquake (joint work with Arpita Khanna) [Paper]
Abstract
This study estimates the impact of exposure to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake on intimate partner violence with two rounds of Demographic and Health Surveys data. Using differences-in-differences estimation, we find that exposure to the earthquake lead to a statistically and economically significant increase in intimate partner violence in the urban areas but not in the rural areas. This is possibly due to an increase in the stress felt by the victims. We also offer some evidence that the impact heterogeneity between the urban and rural areas is attributable to the differences in the reconstruction processes and assistance provided.
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時
April 26, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Youjin Hahn (Yonsei University)
Can STEM Learning Opportunities Reshape Gender Attitudes for Girls?: Field Evidence from Tanzania (joint work with So Yoon Ahn and Semee Yoon) [Paper]
Abstract
We study how educational opportunities change adolescents’ gender attitudes in Tanzania, using an experiential education program focused on STEM subjects. After the intervention, girls’ gender attitudes became more progressive by 0.29 standard deviations, but boys’ gender attitudes did not change. Perceived improvement in the labor market opportunities appears to be an important channel to explain the result. The intervention also increased girls’ weekly study hours and boosted their interests in STEM-related subjects and occupations. Our results show that providing STEM-related educational opportunities to girls in developing countries can be an effective way of improving their gender attitudes.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Suk Joon Son
日時
April 27, 2022(水 Wednesday)8:30-10:15 ※日時に注意 
場所

Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。以下ウェブサイトよりご登録ください(通常とURLが異なります)。
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please register on the website below. (Zoom URL is different than usual.)

 

Registration: https://u-tokyo-ac-jp.zoom.us/j/83707575275?pwd=N3dCcUswV0VROUg2TEpYS1RLREFYdz09

報告
Kei Kawai (University of California, Berkeley)
Estimating Candidate Valence (joint work with Takeaki Sunada) [Paper]
Abstract
We estimate valence measures for candidates running in U.S. House elections from data on vote shares. Our estimates control for endogeneity of campaign spending and sample selection of candidates due to endogenous entry. Our identification and estimation strategy builds on ideas developed for estimating production functions. We find that incumbents have substantially higher valence measures than challengers running against them, resulting in about 9.2 percentage-point differences in the vote share, on average. We find that open-seat challengers have higher valence measures than those running against incumbents by about 5.3 percentage points. Our measure of candidate valence can be used to study various substantive questions of political economy. We illustrate its usefulness by studying the source of incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections.
Co-Host  
Organizer
Yasutora Watanabe
日時
April 28, 2022(木 Thursday)9:00-10:30 ※日時に注意 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Peng Shi (University of South California)
Optimal Matchmaking Strategy in Two-Sided Marketplaces [Paper]
Abstract
Online platforms that match customers with suitable service providers utilize a wide variety of matchmaking strategies: some create a searchable directory of one side of the market (i.e., Airbnb, Google Local Finder); some allow both sides of the market to search and initiate contact (i.e., Care.com, Upwork); others implement centralized matching (i.e., Amazon Home Services, TaskRabbit). This paper compares these strategies in terms of their efficiency of matchmaking, as proxied by the amount of communication needed to facilitate a good market outcome. The paper finds that the relative performance of the above matchmaking strategies is driven by whether the preferences of agents on each side of the market are easy to describe. Here, ``easy to describe'' means that the preferences can be inferred with sufficient accuracy based on responses to standardized questionnaires. For markets with suitable characteristics, each of the above matchmaking strategies can provide near-optimal performance guarantees according to an analysis based on information theory. The analysis provides prescriptive insights for online platforms.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Shunya Noda
日時
変更予定 May 10, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Xuan Li (The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST))
TBA
Abstract
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Ayako Kondo
日時
May 17, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University)
Union Leaders: Experimental Evidence From Myanmar (joint work with Laura Boudreau, Rocco Macchiavello and Virginia Minni)
Abstract
Economic theory suggests that leaders may play a key roles in enabling social movements to overcome collective action problems through a variety of distinct mechanisms. Empirical tests of these theories outside the lab are scarce due to both measurement and identification challenges. We conduct multiple field experiments to test theories of leadership in the context of Myanmar’s burgeoning labor union movement. We collaborate with a confederation of labor unions as it mobilizes garment workers in the run-up to a national minimum wage negotiation. We present three sets of results. First, we document that union leaders differ from union members and non-members along several traits that economists identify as relevant for political selection and that psychologists have associated with ability to influence collective outcomes, respectively. Second, we randomly embed leaders in group discussions on workers’ preferred and expected minimum wage levels. A leader’s presence in the group improves group engagement and increases workers’ consensus around the unions’ preferred minimum wage levels. Third, we conduct a mobilization experiment in which workers are invited to participate in an< unannounced activity that features strategic complementarity in turnout. Leaders influence
participation through both coordination and social pressure mechanisms rather than by simply motivating workers.
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時
May 19, 2022(木 Thursday)10:25-12:10 ※日時に注意
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Ryota Iijima & Mira Frick (Yale University)
Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures (joint work with Yuhta Ishii) [Paper]
Abstract
We study settings in which, prior to playing an incomplete information game, players observe many draws of private signals about the state from some information structure. Signals are i.i.d. across draws, but may display arbitrary correlation across players. For each information structure, we define a simple learning efficiency index, which only considers the statistical distance between the worst-informed player’s marginal signal distributions in different states. We show, first, that this index characterizes the speed of common learning (Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2008): In particular, the speed at which players achieve approximate common knowledge of the state coincides with the slowest player’s speed of individual learning, and does not depend on the correlation across players’ signals. Second, we build on this characterization to provide a ranking over information structures: We show that, with sufficiently many signal draws, information structures with a higher learning efficiency index lead to better equilibrium outcomes, robustly for a rich class of games and objective functions that are “aligned at certainty.” We discuss implications of ourresults for constrained information design in games and for the question when information structures are complements vs. substitutes.
Co-Host
Organizer
Akihiko Matsui
日時
May 24, 2022(火 Tuesday)9:00-10:00 ※日時に注意 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Eric Budish (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
The Economic Limits of Bitcoin and Anonymous, Decentralized Trust on the Blockchain
Abstract
Abstract Satoshi Nakamoto invented a new form of trust. This paper presents a three equation argument that Nakamoto's new form of trust, while undeniably ingenious, is extremely expensive: the recurring, “flow” payments to the anonymous, decentralized compute power that maintains the trust must be large relative to the one-off, “stock” benefits of attacking the trust. This result also implies that the cost of securing the trust grows linearly with the potential value of attack — e.g., securing against a $1bn attack is 1000 times more expensive than securing against a $1m attack. Thus, if Bitcoin is to become significantly more economically useful than it is today, then the cost of maintaining Bitcoin must grow commensurately as well for it to remain trustworthy. A way out of this flow-stock argument is if both (i) the compute power used to maintain the trust is non-repurposable (as has been true for Bitcoin since mid-2013), and (ii) a successful attack would cause the economic value of the trust to collapse. However, vulnerability to economic collapse is itself a serious problem, and the model points to specific collapse scenarios. The analysis thus suggests a “pick your poison” economic critique of Bitcoin and its novel form of trust.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Fuhito Kojima
日時
May 31, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Jacob Leshno (The University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Price Discovery in Waiting Lists: A Connection to Stochastic Gradient Descent (Joint with Itai Ashlagi, Pengyu Qian, and Amin Saberi)
Abstract
Waiting lists offer agents a choice among types of items and associated non-monetary prices given by required waiting times. These non-monetary prices are endogenously determined by a tâtonnement-like price discovery process: an item's price increases when an agent queues for it, and decreases when an item arrives and a queuing agent is assigned. By drawing a connection between price adjustments in waiting lists and the stochastic gradient descent optimization algorithm, we show that the waiting list mechanism achieves allocative efficiency minus a loss due to price fluctuations that is bounded by the granularity of price changes. We further consider a price discovery process inspired by the waiting list mechanism and show that this simple price discovery process performs well if the granularity of price changes is chosen to appropriately trade-off the speed of price adaptation and loss from price fluctuations.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Fuhito Kojima
日時
June 7, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Jonathan Libgober (University of Southern California)
"Learning Underspecified Models" joint with In-Koo Cho
Abstract
This paper considers optimal pricing with a seller who does not possess a complete description of how actions translate into payoffs. We refer to a problem with this property as underspecified. To save computational costs, she delegates the pricing decision to an algorithm, in every period over an infinite horizon. Not knowing the true demand curve, the algorithm is tasked with ensuring that the optimal price emerges with sufficiently high probability, at a rate that is uniform over the set of possible demand curves. The monopolist views the complexity-profit tradeoff lexicographically, seeking an algorithm with a minimum number of parameters subject to achieving the same long run average payoff. For a large class of feasible demand curves, the optimum is achieved by an algorithms that assumes demand is linear even if it is not. Though misspecified, this saves on computational cost, and still achieves an attractive worst-case learning rate.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Yichuan Lou
日時

June 8, 2022(水 Wednesday)10:25-12:10 

** Online and In-Person Seminar

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟(小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
Seminar Room 1, on the 1st Floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)

Registration

Please register at the website above because Zoom information is different than usual.

Zoom情報が通常と異なるため、上記「Registration」よりご登録をお願いいたします。

報告
Cheng Chen (Clemson University)
Uncertainty, Imperfect Information, and Expectation Formation over the Firm's Life Cycle

Abstract
Using a long-panel data set of Japanese firms that contains firm-level sales forecasts, we provide evidence on firm-level uncertainty and imperfect information over their life cycles. We find that firms make nonnegligible and positively correlated forecast errors. However, they make more precise forecasts and less correlated forecast errors when they become more experienced. We then build a model of heterogeneous firms with endogenous entry and exit where firms gradually learn about their demand by using a noisy signal. We present our novel approach to cleanly isolate the learning mechanism from other mechanisms by using expectations data over time. We combine the model with our data to perform a nonparametric decomposition of the age-declining forecast errors and find that learning accounts for between 20% to 40% of the overall decline in forecast errors observed in our data. Our model shows that, within the context of our cross-regional data, productivity gains from removing information frictions range from 6% to 12%.
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Taiji Furusawa
日時
June 14, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Hongyao Ma (Columbia Business School)
"Randomized FIFO Mechanisms" Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh and Chiwei Yan [Paper]
Abstract
We study the matching of jobs to workers in a queue, e.g. a ridesharing platform dispatching
drivers to pick up riders at an airport. Under FIFO dispatching, the heterogeneity in trip
earnings incentivizes drivers to cherry-pick, increasing riders’ waiting time for a match and
resulting in a loss of efficiency and reliability. We first present the direct FIFO mechanism,
which offers lower-earning trips to drivers further down the queue. The option to skip the rest
of the line incentivizes drivers to accept all dispatches, but the mechanism would be considered
unfair since drivers closer to the head of the queue may have lower priority for trips to certain
destinations. To avoid the use of unfair dispatch rules, we introduce a family of randomized FIFO
mechanisms, which send declined trips gradually down the queue in a randomized manner. We
prove that a randomized FIFO mechanism achieves the first best throughput and the second best
revenue in equilibrium. Extensive counterfactual simulations using data from the City of Chicago
demonstrate substantial improvements of revenue and throughput, highlighting the effectiveness
of using waiting times to align incentives and reduce the variability in driver earnings.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Shunya Noda
日時
June 21, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
YingHua He (Rice University)
"Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice" Yeon-Koo Che, Dong Woo Hahm, and YingHua He
Abstract
Recent evidence suggests that market participants make mistakes even in a strategically straightforward environment but seldom with significant payoff consequences. We explore the implications of such payoff-insignificant mistakes for inferring students' preferences from school-choice data. Uncertainties arise from the use of lotteries or other sources in a typical school choice setting; they make certain mistakes more costly than others, thus making some preferences---those whose misrepresentation would be more costly and would thus be avoided by students---more reliably inferable than others. We propose a novel method of exploiting the structure of the uncertainties present in a matching environment to robustly infer student preferences under the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism. We then apply our methods to estimate student preferences through a Monte Carlo analysis capturing canonical school choice environments with single tie-breaking lotteries, and also to New York City's high school assignment data. We then evaluate the effects of an affirmative action policy on disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Suk Joon Son
日時
June 28, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
■対面会場:東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告

Michihiro Kandori (The University of Tokyo)
"Using Big Data and Machine Learning to Uncover How Players Choose Mixed Strategies" (joint with T. Hirasawa and A. Matsushita) [Paper]

※ Downloading may take some time because of the file size.

Abstract
How do humans behave in a situation where (i) one needs to make one’s own behavior unpredictable and (ii) one needs to predict the opponent’s behavior? Such a situation can be formulated as a game with a mixed strategy equilibrium. If humans are put in such a situation, it should be obvious that, rather than calculating and following the mixed equilibrium, they use their intuition, hunch, and some heuristics to achieve the above-mentioned goals (i) and (ii). Exactly what kind of mechanisms are employed has not been fully understood. By using a unique big experimental data set we have collected about a game with mixed strategy equilibrium, which has more than 75,000 observations, we compare conventional behavior economics models and some leading machine learning models to uncover how human behavior is determined in such a situation. Our big data enabled us to obtain a reliable comparison of the prediction powers of those models, and we found that machine learning models, most notably a version of the deep learning model LSTM, substantially outperform the leading behavioral model (EWA). Finally, we try to improve the EWA model by incorporating the insights gained by the machine learning models.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Shunya Noda
日時
June 29, 2022(水 Wednesday)13:00-14:30 *(6/28)Time has been changed.
場所
本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
■対面会場:東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Kota Murayama (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"The social value of information in networked beauty contest model"
Abstract
This paper studies the social value of information in the beauty contest model that allows for heterogeneous coordination motives.
First, we relate the structure of agents’ coordination motives to their equilibrium use of information. In particular, the relative sensitivity of the equilibrium actions to private and public information is proportional to their Katz-Bonacich centralities. Our main result provides a taxonomy of how the social value of public information depends on the network structure: more precise public information necessarily improves welfare if and only if the weighted sum of agents’ Katz-Bonacich centralities is sufficiently small.
Finally, we study the optimal degree of public information dissemination and the endogenous acquisition of private information.
Co-Host
Organizer
Shunya Noda
日時
July 5, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所

本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインでの、ハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場: 東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Michael Zierhut (Humboldt University)
"Dynamic Inconsistency and Inefficiency of Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty" [Paper]
Abstract
This paper extends the theory of general equilibrium with Knightian uncertainty to economies with more than two dates. Agents have incomplete preferences with multiple priors `a la Bewley. These priors are updated in light of new information. Contrary to the two-date model, the market outcomes varies with choice of updating rule.
We document two phenomena: First, unless agents apply the full Bayesian rule, consumption decisions may be dynamically inconsistent.
Second, unless they apply the maximum-likelihood rule, ambiguous probability mass may dilate, which causes price fluctuations.
Either phenomenon results in Pareto inefficient allocations. We ask whether it is possible to design one updating rule that prevent both phenomena. The answer is negative: No such rule exists. Efficiency can be restored by restricting priors: Full Bayesian and maximum-likelihood updates agree when priors are rectangular, and when ambiguity is sufficiently large, all equilibria are Pareto efficient, even if prices and allocations change over time.
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Akifumi Ishihara / Shunya Noda
日時
July 12, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Tatyana Avilova (Columbia University/ The University of Tokyo)
“Patient Cost Sharing and Prescription Drug Trends: Evidence from Japan”[Paper]
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of a change in patient cost sharing on total prescription drug spending. I exploit a feature of the Japanese health care system, where an individual’s coinsurance rate is determined primarily by their age. I contribute to the existing literature by investigating heterogeneous effects by patient sex and drug therapeutic class (focusing on cardiovascular drugs, antibiotics, vitamins, antihistamines, and psychotropic drugs). I find that for the whole sample, price elasticity for spending ranges from —0.12 to —0.23. This is comparable to previous estimates of price elasticity of spending for general medical services (—0.2). I find no evidence of heterogeneous effects by sex over the whole sample of prescriptions, but I do find statistically significant differences between women and men within therapeutic drug classes. I also conduct exploratory analysis on the effect of changes in patient cost sharing on the volume of prescriptions. I estimate a price elasticity of demand between —0.33 and —0.69, which is larger than previous estimates of demand elasticity for general medical services (—0.16 to —0.2). I also find evidence that physicians do not respond on the intensive margin by prescribing more expensive medications. Although Japanese patients are more likely to be prescribed brand-name drugs, patients on generics may be more price sensitive to changes in patient cost sharing. Overall, the findings suggest that physicians respond by prescribing a greater quantity of medications, either on the extensive or the intensive margin.
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時
July 19, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10 
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Kentaro Nakajima (Hitotsubashi University)
"On the Use of Satellite-Based Vehicle Flows Data to Assess Local Economic Activity: The Case of Philippine Cities" (with Eugenia C. Go, Yasuyuki Sawada, and Kiyoshi Taniguchi)
Abstract
Spatially granular data of local economic activities are widely demanded in economic analysis; however, their availability is limited, especially in developing countries. This study proposes vehicle traffic volume data, obtained from daytime satellite images, as a new measure of local economic activities for policy evaluation. Vehicles observed at a given location are considered to represent human traffic in the area, and are, therefore, appropriate proxy variables for local economic activities. We construct vehicle density data in each 500 m times 500 m tile from high-resolution satellite images, using a machine learning algorithm. Validation exercises using administrative, nightlight luminosity, and cell phone based human flow data, confirm vehicle density proxies well for local economic activities, especially in the service sector. As a case for application of the data for policy evaluation, the opening of the new international airport terminal in Cebu, Philippines is used to estimate the impact of the new infrastructure on the local economy. Results of the difference-in-differences analysis show that the new terminal significantly increased vehicle density in Cebu. However, it lessens as the distance from the airport increases, is stronger in areas where hotels are located, and is most pronounced during the peak months of international tourists in Cebu. These findings imply that the opening of the new international terminal has enhanced Cebu's local economy through international tourism, and our proposed new measure works well for policy evaluations.
Co-Host Tokyo Workshop on International and Development Economics (TWID)
Organizer
Masahiro Shoji
日時

※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※
July 25, 2022(月 Monday)10:00-10:30

場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告

10:00-10:30 Ichio Aoki (Readers: Masaki Nakabayashi(main),Keisuke Kawata, Masahiro Shoji)

日時
July 26, 2022(火 Tuesday)10:25-12:10
場所
Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 
This seminar is held online (registration is required). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Nina Bobkova (Rice University)
Information Choice in Auctions
Abstract
Co-Host The University of Tokyo Market Design Center (UTMD)
Organizer
Yichuan Lou
日時

August 5(金 Friday)14:55-16:40

*Seminar Postponed from July 29

場所
本ワークショップは、対面とZoomを利用してのオンラインとのハイブリッド開催となります。オンラインでは(事前登録制)となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト下部の説明をご確認ください。 

■対面会場:東京大学本郷キャンパス 小島ホール1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Kojima Hall

This seminar is held in-person and online (registration is required for online participation). Please read the instruction at the bottom of this website for details.

報告
Kohei Kawaguchi (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
Miners' Reward Elasticity and Stability of Competing Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencie
Abstract
Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies consume vast energy to rule out potential attacks. Therefore, evaluating and improving the security-cost efficiency, the cost of attacking the system per unit of operating cost, is important. In this paper, we demonstrate that the stability of miners' supply of work over time is essential for the security-cost efficiency, and it is determined by the Difficulty Adjustment Algorithm (DAA) of the currency and the reward elasticity of the miner's supply of work. To this end, we model the supply side of the multicurrency mining market and estimate the own- and cross-elasticity of the hash supply to the reward by exploiting the reward shock event, called halving. We use the estimated model to simulate the mining market and evaluate the security-cost efficiency. We find that Bitcoin is stable because of the inelastic miners, regardless of the DAA, whereas other smaller coins face highly elastic miners and can be stable only with efficient DAAs. Upgrading all relevant currencies' DAAs to the state-of-art one substantially improves the security-cost efficiency and saves the energy-consumption rate by 0.21 GW or 3.2% while maintaining the security level.
Organizer
Shunya Noda


Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について (Online Seminars Using Zoom) 

当面の間、本ワークショップはZoom を利用してオンラインで開催されます。 以下の注意事項を必ずご確認のうえご準備をお願いいたします。

Microeconomics Workshop is held online using Zoom for the time being. Please read the following instruction for participation.

※ 登録 (Registration)

事前登録が必須となります。 下記よりご登録頂けますと、 ミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。 事前に、ご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。 (Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID, パスワードを使ってサインインして頂くことも可能です。)

Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email.  Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.)

 

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参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website.

日本語 ・ English

 

※ 注意 (Note)

1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。 Please register your full name when you participate.

2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。

Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.

 

※ セミナー中 (During Seminars)

ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session.

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日本語 ・ English