Workshops

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
Microeconomics Workshop 2016

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2016年9月27日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

日時

2016年9月27日 (火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

マクロ経済学ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Joseph Zeira (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

A New Measure of Divergence (joint with Michele Battisti, Gianfranco di Vaio) [paper]

Abstract

This paper introduces a new measure of divergence or convergence of output across countries. It measures divergence for each country separately, by measuring how technology, or productivity, or output per worker in each country follows the global frontier. We use the US as the global frontier. We find that during the years 1970-2008 most countries did not follow the global frontier fully. This implies that these countries diverged from the countries at the frontier. We then examine how following the global frontier is related to various explanatory variables, in order to better understand long-run growth.

日時

2016年10月4日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

酒井真世 (Mayo Sakai) (The University of Tokyo)

Referral Hiring of Miners: Case from the Coal Industry in Early Twentieth Century Japan

Abstract

Referral hiring has been a practical solution to the problem of adverse selection in the labor market and, as a result, increasingly attracts interest from economic researchers. This study argues that firms use referral hiring when workers' skills are too specialized for employees in the human resources division to decide on a right candidate. In the 1900s, coal mining firms used referral hiring to screen workers. We focus on the recruitment of miners and study the experience of a coal mine in the 1900s, analyzing employment contracts. Our theoretical predictions argue that workers with traditional manual skills were hired with using referral hiring and unskilled workers and workers with modernized skills were hired directly by firms, not using referral hiring. Our empirical analysis is consistent with the predictions.

日時

2016年10月11日(火 Tuesday)12:10-13:25   ※時間に注意。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Stefano Lovo (HEC Paris)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月11日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Liran Einav (Stanford University)

Provider Incentives and Health Care Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals (joint with Amy Finkelstein and Neale Mahoney) [paper]

Abstract

We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting -- a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system -- by examining the impact of a sharp jump in payments to long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) that occurs when a patient's stay reaches a pre-specified number of days. The descriptive evidence indicates that discharge decisions from the LTCH respond strongly to approximately $13,000 payment increase for keeping a patient an additional day at the threshold. The marginal patient discharged after the threshold is a relatively healthy one. Despite the large incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population (90 day mortality is 30%), we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact of the incentives on patient mortality. To quantify the impact of the financial incentives and assess behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we specify and estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. We find that our least generous payment schedule could save about $12,000 per patient or $1.5 billion annually. Interestingly, we find that our most generous payment schedule, which provides weakly higher payments at every length of stay, also reduces government spending through its effect on discharge behavior. This result highlights how improved financial incentives can reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for patient health and perhaps even industry profits.

日時

2016年10月18日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

※CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』と共催  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Joel David (University of Southern California)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月21日(金 Friday)16:50-18:35
※曜日に注意。
   

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Clifford Winston (The Brookings Institution)

A New Approach to Measuring the Effects of Low-Cost Carrier (LCC) Competition in U.S. and Europe (joint with Jia Yan and Xinlong Tan)

Abstract

 

日時

2016年10月25日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35 

※CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』と共催  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Fernando Duarte (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年11月1日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

川口康平 (Kohei Kawaguchi) (Hitotsubashi University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年11月8日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

※授業日程上は予定されていませんが開催されます。

CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』、マクロ経済学ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Gadi Barlevy (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年11月22日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

佐野隆司 (Ryuji Sano) (Kyoto University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年11月29日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

中林純 (Jun Nakabayashi) (Kindai University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年12月6日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Alex Teytelboym (Oxford University)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年12月13日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (The University of Tokyo)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2016年12月20日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Ali Hortaçsu (University of Chicago)

TBA

Abstract

 

日時

2017年1月10日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Chengsi Wang (University of Mannheim)

TBA

Abstract

 


<本年度終了分>

日時

2016年4月5日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

伊藤秀史 (Hideshi Itoh) (Hitotsubashi University)

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations (joint with Kimiyuki Morita) [website]

Abstract

We study a decision process of a two-agent organization that consists of a decision-maker who selects a project and an implementer who implements and executes the selected project. Each of the decision-maker and the implementer has intrinsic and possibly divergent preferences over projects. Key features of the model are that (i) there is the separation of decision and implementation, and the implementer may choose to execute no project if the cost of implementation is high; and (ii) the implementer engages in both acquiring additional information and implementing the project. We show that the implementer's incentives to gather information and to implement the selected project interact with each other in a non- trivial way. We in particular show how this interaction affects the optimality of diversity of preferences in organizations as well as the implementer's strategic communication.

日時

2016年4月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Andrea Prat (Columbia University)

CEO Behavior and Firm Performance(joint with Oriana Bandiera, Stephen Hansen and Ra aella Sadun) [paper]

Abstract

We measure the behavior of over 1,100 CEOs in six countries (Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and US) using a new methodology that combines (i) a survey measuring each activity undertaken in a random work-week by the executives and (ii) a machine learning algorithm that projects these high dimensional data onto one CEO behavior index. A simple firm-CEO matching model yields the null hypothesis that, in absence of matching frictions, CEO behavior is uncorrelated with firm performance. Combining the CEO behavior index with firm level accounting data we reject this null. We find a large and significant correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance, which appears only gradually over time after the CEO is appointed and is stronger in emerging economies. Our results suggest that CEO-firm matching frictions may account for a sizable fraction of the cross country productivity differential observed in the data.

日時

2016年4月18日(月 Monday)15:00-16:30   ※日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Veikko Thiele (Queen's University)

Fostering Entrepreneurship: Backing Founders or Investors? (joint with Thomas Hellmann)

Abstract

Governments across the globe want to foster entrepreneurial ecosystems, but there is no consensus on what policies are most effective. This paper considers an entrepreneurial ecosystem where entrepreneurs get funded by angel investors who themselves are experienced entrepreneurs. It develops a dynamic model with overlapping generations, where successful entrepreneurs become investors. The theory finds an intergenerational linkage between current valuations of start-ups and future funding supply. Government policies that back founders by helping them start companies reduce valuations. In contrast, policies that back investors by making investments more attractive drive up valuations, and thereby increase funding for future entrepreneurs.

日時

2016年4月19日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

宮川大介 (Daisuke Miyakawa) (Hitotsubashi University)

Geography and Realty Prices:Evidence from International Transaction-Level Data (joint with Chihiro Shimizu and Iichiro Uesugi) [paper] [slides]

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the role of the international flow of capital in real estate prices by quantifying the relation between investors' geographical locations and the prices they pay for their realty investments. Our data set contains more than 30,000 realty investment transactions in Australia, Canada, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. First, we find that foreign investors pay significantly higher prices than domestic investors do even after taking a wide variety of controls into account. Second, this overpricing becomes smaller as the buyers’ exposure to realty investments in the host countries becomes higher. Third, in support of these results, the investment returns of foreign investors are systematically lower than that of domestic investors. This negative excess return becomes smaller as the buyer’s exposure to the host countries becomes higher. These results indicate that the overpricing of foreign investors occurs when investors are less informed about the local property market and lessens with the accumulation of investment experience.

日時

2016年4月26日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小倉義明 (Yoshiaki Ogura) (Waseda University)

Network-Motivated Lending Decisions [PDF]

Abstract

We theoretically and empirically demonstrate that monopolistic or collusive banks will keep lending to a loss-making firm at an interest rate lower than the prime rate if the firm is located in an influential position in an inter-firm supply network. An influential firm generates a positive externality, and its exit damages the sales in the supply network. To internalize this externality, the profit-maximizing banks undertake such forbearance lending for an influential firm when the cost to support the loss-making influential firm can be recouped by imposing high interest on less influential firms. Our empirical study with a unique dataset containing information about inter-firm transactions and main banks provides evidence for such network-motivated lending decisions. This effect is more clearly observed at less credit-worthy firms whose main bank is a regional bank. Notably, we observe that such banks are often dominant lenders in the local loan market, and most of their clientele do not have direct access to the stock and bond market.

日時

2016年5月10日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

片桐満 (Mitsuru Katagiri) (Bank of Japan)

Inflation Determinacy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Global Game Approach

Abstract

How inflation is determined at the zero lower bound of nominal interest rate (ZLB) is a controversial topic in the monetary economics. In this paper, I construct a two period general equilibrium model with strategic complementarities in price competitions, and investigate how inflation is determined in equilibrium. Although the model has multiple equilibria with different levels of inflation when the expected productivity growth is common knowledge, I demonstrate that a tiny noise to it leads to inflation determinacy even with the ZLB. This equilibrium selection implies that low expected productivity growth leads to low inflation in the unique equilibrium, but I show that some policy measures including an increase in the target inflation rate work for realizing equilibrium with positive inflation rates.

日時

2016年5月17日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Debasis Mishra (Indian Statistical Institute)

Balanced Ranking Mechanisms (joint with Tridib Sharma) [paper]

Abstract

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent with at least 99% probability provided there are at least 14 agents. It is also ex-post individually rational. We also show that this mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of satisfactory ranking mechanisms. Our mechanism coincides with the well-known mechanism of Green and Laont when there are no more than 8 agents, and modifies it for higher number of agents.

日時

2016年5月24日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

梶井厚志 (Atsushi Kajii) (Kyoto University)

Strategic Ambiguity and Information

Abstract

 

日時

2016年5月26日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35  

※曜日に注意。

主催:マクロ経済学ワークショップ

共催:CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Heng Chen (University of Hong Kong)

The Great Famine and Household Saving in China [paper]

Abstract

The Great Famine in China (1959-1961) is one of the most dramatic tragedies in history, which may have long term consequences for economic behaviors of Chinese population. In particular, we explore whether it continues to have impacts on household saving choices. Employing a dataset across 122 Chinese counties, we find that the saving rate of rural households in 2002 tend to be higher in counties where the famine was severer; and the impact of the famine is even larger, once its severity is instrumented. Evidence from individual preference data shows that people are more willing to cultivate thrift in children in counties more severely affected. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the Great Famine altered the thrifty attitude of survivors and subsequent generations.

日時

※Schedule Cancelled   下記のセミナーは中止となりました。

2016年5月31日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (The University of Tokyo)

日時 産業組織コンファレンス (IO Conference)

2016年6月4日 (土 Saturday)10:00-12:00  

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

報告

1) 10:00-11:00

Partick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics, GREMAQ, IDEI and CEPR)

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation (joint withYeon-Koo Che and Elisabetta Iossa) [paper]

 

2) 11:00-12:00

Michael Riordan (Economics Department, Columbia University)

Privacy Protection (joint with Bruno Jullien and Yassine Lefouili) [paper]

 

Abstract

1) The procurement of an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the tradeoff via two instruments: a monetary prize and a contract to implement the project. The optimal mechanism favors the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is above a certain threshold, and handicaps the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is below that threshold. A monetary prize is employed as an additional incentive but only when the value of innovation is sufficiently high.

 

2) We study the incentives of a website to sell its customers’ personal information. Third parties buying that information can bring either benefits or harm to consumers, who learn their vulnerability to malicious third parties through experience. The cost of selling information is the risk that bad experience leads consumers to end their relationship with the website. The privacy policy is not contractible but the website may decide to be cautious by not selling personal information or may spend resources to screen harmful third parties from access to customer information. We characterize the equilibrium and its welfare properties. We then discuss implications for policy rules.

日時

2016年6月7日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

中島大輔 (Daisuke Nakajima) (Otaru University of Commerce)

Limited Attention and Revealed Preference

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月14日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

大西健 (Ken Onishi) (Singapore Management University)

Quantity Discounts and Capital Misallocation in Vertical Relationships [paper]

Abstract

I study transactions between aircraft manufacturers and airlines as well as airlines' utilization of their eet. Aircraft production is characterized by economies of scale via learning-by-doing, which creates a trade-off between current pro t and future competitive advantage in the aircraft market. The latter consideration makes large buyers more attractive than small buyers and induces quantity discounts. The resulting nonlinear pricing strategy may distort both production and allocation in favor of large buyers. In the data, there is a negative cor- relation between the size of aircraft orders and the per-unit price, and a positive correlation between the price paid and the utilization rate of the aircraft model. The pattern in the data suggests that the manufacturers' price discrimination leads to misallocation of aircraft. To assess whether there is an inefficient allocation, I construct and estimate a dynamic model of the aircraft market that includes a model of utilization. Using the estimated model, I conduct counterfactual simulations where I nd that uniform pricing increases aircraft production by 10% and total welfare by 1.6%.

日時

2016年6月16日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:35

※ 曜日・会場に注意  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Kennan (University of Wisconsin at Madison)

Spatial Variation in Higher Education Financing and the Supply of College Graduates

Abstract

 

日時

2016年6月21日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

安田洋祐 (Yosuke Yasuda) (Osaka University)

Competitive Market Achieves the Greatest Happiness of the Minimum Number [website]

Abstract

This note studies homogenous good markets, assuming that each buyer/seller has a unit demand/supply and that side payments beyond buyer-seller pairs are prohibited. We show that the quantity of good traded under the competitive market equilibrium is minimum among all Pareto efficient and individually rational allocations, provided that the definition of Pareto efficiency incorporates the presumption of no side payment. Our finding may suggest that the competitive market results in the most unequal allocation, since the number of buyers or sellers left-behind from profitable trades is maximized. Conversely, unless a demand or supply curve is completely flat, there always exists a Pareto efficient allocation that entails strictly larger number of profitable trades than the equilibrium quantity. Implications to positive analysis are also discussed.

日時

2016年6月28日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35  

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

内田浩史 (Hirofumi Uchida) (Kobe University)

Moral hazard versus adverse selection in financial contracting (with Iichiro Uesugi and Hiromichi Iwaki)

Abstract

Using detailed loan-level data before and after the introduction of unsecured lending by a large public bank in Japan, this paper tests the theory of asymmetric information in financial contracting. We find that borrowers of unsecured loans tend to perform worse than those of secured loans, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction. However, this test of asymmetric information cannot distinguish moral hazard and adverse selection. We thus devise tests to identify these two theories, and report preliminary results.

日時

2016年7月5日(火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10 ※時間に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

野田 俊也 (Shunya Noda) (Stanford University)

Full Surplus Extraction and within-period Ex Post Implementation in Dynamic Environments [website]

Abstract

We study the properties of the information structure that guarantee full surplus extraction in dynamic environments. Exploiting the intertemporal correlation of agents' types, we propose a condition for the existence of a within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanism that leaves no information rent. The concepts of strong- and weak-detectability suggested in this paper turn out to be crucial for achieving this goal. Our results suggest that the assumptions needed for private information to confer a positive rent might be stronger when we consider dynamic environments.

日時

2016年7月5日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

楡井誠(Makoto Nirei) (Ministry of Finance Japan)

Inflation level and volatility revisited

Abstract

Abstract: I present a state-dependent pricing model that generates inflation fluctuations from idiosyncratic shocks on firms. In the model, the fluctuations are caused by complementary repricing behavior of incompletely competing firms. I show that inflation volatility depends on the density of firms at repricing threshold. When the long-term inflation level is high, the stationary density at threshold is high, which causes high volatility in short-term inflation rates. Numerical analysis shows that the model with reasonably calibrated parameters can explain the positive relationship between inflation level and volatility that has been observed empirically. The model points to a possible source of welfare loss caused by high inflation levels.

日時

2016年7月7日(木 Thursday)12:10-13:10

※日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

杉田洋一 (Yoichi Sugita) (Hitotsubashi University)

Assortative Matching of Exporters and Importers (joint with Kensuke Teshima and Enrique Seira) [paper]

Abstract

This paper studies the mechanism behind matching between exporters and importers in Mexican textile/apparel exports to the US. A surge in Chinese exports to the US after the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in 2005 caused re-matching of incumbent US importers and Mexican exporters according to their pre-liberalization trade volume. We show that the re-matching pattern is consistent with a model combining Becker-type positive assortative matching of exporters and importers by their capability with the standard Melitztype model. The combined model suggests the observed re-matching brings new gains from trade: trade liberalization improves buyer-supplier matching within industries.

日時

2016年7月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

共催:CARF 『バブル、金融危機と政策対応研究会』

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Florin Bidian (Georgia State University)

Bubbles and trading volume

Abstract

Rational bubbles in dividend-paying assets can cause increases in trading volume, even after accounting for their expansionary effect on output and other macroeconomic aggregates. Dividend-bearing assets used to transfer resources intertemporally reduce the need for portfolio adjustment after a bad shock. Bubbles, on the contrary, do not produce dividends and require more rebalancing after a bad shock. Thus \rational exuberance", without speculation driven by differences in beliefs, can cause increased trading, in addition to macroeconomic expansions and asset price run-ups.

日時

2016年7月19日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

山本竜市 (Ryuichi Yamamoto) (Waseda University)

Hidden order strategies and market quality in a dynamic limit order market

Abstract

 

日時

2016年7月22日(金 Friday)12:10-13:10

※日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

大久保敏弘 (Toshihiro Okubo) (Keio University)

Industrial cluster policy and transaction networks: Evidence from firm-level data in Japan (joint with Toshihiro Okubo, Tetsuji Okazaki, and Eiichi Tomiura) [paper]

Abstract

Cluster policy is designed to facilitate inter-firm networking. We examine industrial clusters in Japan based on firm-level transaction data. Firms in clusters expand transaction networks at a higher speed, but significantly only with firms in the agglomerated core Tokyo, not with local firms within the same region. We confirm the robustness by regional historical background as instruments. By disaggregating firms by their main bank types, we find that cluster firms expanding networks are mainly financed by regional banks, not by banks with nation-wide operations. This suggests the importance of intensive relationship with the main banks for inter-firm network formation.

日時

2016年7月26日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Zaifu Yang (University of York)

Decentralised Random Competitive Dynamic Market Processes [paper]

Abstract

We study a decentralised and uncoordinated market where heterogeneous self-interested firms and workers meet directly and randomly in pursuit of higher payoff over time. Each firm hires several workers and each worker has preferences over firms and salaries, taking at most one job. When employees work for a firm, they generate a joint revenue which will be split among the firm and its employees. Neither firms nor workers possess perfect knowledge of the market. We show that a natural random decentralised dynamic market process widely observed in the (free) labour market converges globally and almost surely to a competitive equilibrium, provided that an equilibrium exists and each possible coalition improvement with the status quo maintaining rule occurs with a positive probability. The proof relies on a mathematical theorem which establishes the existence of a finite sequence of successive coalition improvements with the status quo maintaining rule from an arbitrary market state to an equilibrium. Our findings also have meaningful policy implications.

日時

2016年7月27日(水 Wednesday)12:10-13:10

※日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

清田耕造 (Kozo Kiyota) (Keio University)

Understanding the Cross-country Productivity Gap of Exporters (with Toshiyuki Matsuura and Lionel Nesta)

Abstract

This paper examines the cross-country productivity gap of exporters and asks whether or not the average cross-country productivity gap of exporters can simply be attributable to the industry average productivity gap between countries. We show that the international productivity gap of exporters between two countries can be computed from the following three variables: 1) industry average productivity gap, 2) export participation rate, and 3) export premia in each country. One of the contributions of this paper is that our framework allows us to examine the cross-country productivity gap of exporters without accessing confidential firm-level data in each country directly. We apply our framework to cross-country comparisons between France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that the average productivity gap of exporters between two countries does not necessarily reflect the industry average productivity gap due to the differences in export participation rates and export premia between countries.

 

 

Master's Thesis Presentations

Please note that the schedule might be changed. Presentations in English.

Guideline

 

Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th (top) floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):

July 29 (Friday)… by 9:00am, Fuly 29 (Friday)

 

Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken
  • Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue during their presentations:  make sure they should be back into place after use.


日時

2016年7月29日(金 Friday)12:10-13:10

Master Thesis Presentation, 日時に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Joyce Lim (The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

 

日時

2016年8月18日(Friday)12:00-13:10 - 19日(Saturday) 10:00-17:05

The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations

The 100th meeting: Tokyo Conference [Program]

場所

東京大学社会科学研究所, 赤門総合研究棟5階549号室

Conference Room (Room 549), 5th floor, Akamon General Research Building

Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo.

※ 会場に注意。

※主催:The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations

Program

 

August 18 (Thursday)

12:25-12:30 Opening remarks, Masaki Nakabayashi (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)

 

12:30-16:15 Industrial Organization chaired by Noriaki Matsushima (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

12:30-13:30 Taiju Kitano (Graduate School of International Management, Aoyama Gakuin University)

Title “Measures to promote green cars: Evaluation at the car variant level.”

13:45-14:45 Junichi Haraguchi (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Title “Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly under uncertainty.”

15:00-16:00 Taku Masuda (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Title “CSR as a bribe to a government.” (co-authored with Kosuke Hirose)

 

16:15-18:30 Formal and Endogenous Institutions chaired by Takashi Shimizu (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University)

16:15-17:15 An My Le (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Title “The welfare analysis of higher education’s financial aid system.”Master Thesis Presentation, (Readers: Dan Sasaki, Masaki Nakabayashi, Toshihiro Matsumura)

17:30-18:30 Tadashi Sekiguchi (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University)

Title “Repeated multimarket contact with imperfect private monitoring: A belief-free approach.”

 

 

August 19 (Friday)

10:00-12:15 Mechanism Design chaired by Masaki Nakabayashi (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)

10:00-11:00 Naoki Watanabe (Graduate School of Business Administration, Keio University)

Title “The kernel of a patent licensing game: The optimal number of licensees.” (co-authored with Shin Kishimoto)

11:15-12:15 Daniel Marszalec (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

Title “Auctions for complements - An experimental analysis.”

 

13:30-17:00 Human Captial, Work Organization, and Labor Market chaired by Mayo Sakai (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo)

13:30-14:30 Ryo Nakajima (Department of Economics, Keio University)

Title “Evaluating professor value-added: Evidence from professor and student matching in physics.” download

14:45-15:45 Junichiro Ishida (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

Title “Rewarding mediocrity? Optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns.”

16:00-17:00 Keisuke Kawata (Graduate School fo International Development and Cooperation, Hiroshima University)

Title “Measuring surplus gain from hypothetical labor market policies in rural myanmar: Non-parametric conjoint and welfare analysis.”

 

17:00-17:05 Closing remarks, Masaki Nakabayashi (Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo)

 

日時

2016年8月31日(水 Wednesday)16:00-18:30 ※日時に注意。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

1) 16:00-17:10

Rajiv Sarin (University of Exeter)

A Model of Satisficing

 

2) 17:20-18:30

Brit Grosskopf (University of Exeter)

Do you mind me paying less? Measuring Other–Regarding Preferences in the Market for Taxis (joint with Graeme Pearce) [paper]

Abstract

1) We build a dynamic model of satisficing behavior. We explicitly introduce the payoff the decision maker "expects" from a strategy, where this expectation is adaptively formed. If the agent receives a payoff above her satisficing level she continues with the current action, updating what she expects from it. If she receives a payoff below her satisficing level and what she expects from the action falls below her satisficing level she updates both her satisficing level and what she expects from the strategy she has chosen. We show that in decision problem such satisficing behavior results in cautious choice. In games, we show that both risk dominant and payoff dominant choices may result. Both the cooperate only profile and defect only profile are equilibria in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

 

2) We present a natural eld experiment designed to measure other{regarding preferences in the market for taxis. We employed testers of varying ethnicity to take a number of predetermined taxi journeys. In each case we endowed them with only 80% of the expected fare. Testers revealed the amount they could a ord to pay to the driver mid-journey and asked for a portion of the journey for free. In a 2×2 between-subjects design we vary the length of the journey and whether drivers have reputational concerns or not. We nd that the majority of drivers give at least part of the journey for free and over 25% complete the journey. Giving is found to be proportional to the length of the journey, and the drivers' reputational concerns do not explain their behaviour. Evidence of strong out-group negativity against black testers by both white and South-Asian drivers is also reported. In order to link our empirical analysis to behavioural theory we estimate the parameters of a number of utility functions. The data and the structural analysis lend support to the quantitative predictions of experiments that measure other-regarding preferences, and shed further light on how discrimination can manifest itself within our preferences.

日時

2016年9月13日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

M. Utku Ünver (Boston College)

Multi-Donor Organ Exchange (joint with Haluk Ergin and Tayfun Sönmez) [website]

Abstract

Owing to the worldwide shortage of deceased donor organs for transplantation, tissue/organ donations from living donors have become a signi cant source for transplantation for various organs including kidneys, livers, and lungs. However, not all willing living donors can donate to their intended patients because of medical incompatibility between donor and patient. Such incompatibilities can be overcome by an exchange (of donors) between patients with incompatible donors. Such exchanges have become widespread in the last decade for kidneys with the introduction of optimization and market design techniques to kidney exchange. Following the success of kidney exchange, a small but growing number of liver exchanges has also been conducted. However, even though living-donor lung transplantation was introduced more than two decades ago, lung exchange is neither practiced nor introduced. From an organizational perspective, living donation is more involved for lungs than kidneys or livers because it often requires two donors. While this makes living donation more dicult for lungs, it also means that the role of exchange might be more prominent for living-donor lung transplantation. We introduce lung exchange as a novel transplantation modality, develop an analytical lung-exchange model, and introduce optimal lung-exchange mechanisms under various logistical constraints. Our simulations suggest that the number of living-donor lung transplants can be doubled by allowing 2-way and 3-way exchanges alone, and can be tripled in the absence of logistical constraints.

日時

2016年9月20日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:35
※授業日程上は予定されていませんが開催されます

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

John Quah (Johns Hopkins University and National University of Singapore)

A Comprehensive Approach to Revealed Preference Theory (joint with Hiroki Nishimura and Efe A. Ok) [paper]

Abstract

We develop a version of Afriat's Theorem that is applicable to a variety of choice environments, beyond the setting of classical consumer theory. This allows us to devise tests for rationalizability in the context of choice data on lotteries, contin- gent consumption, and intertemporal consumption. We also establish a version of Richter's Theorem that characterizes the strict rationalizability of choice data with a continuous utility function (rather than simply with a preference that may not be continuous).