Workshops

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます（Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH）。

※ 2015年3月28日現在　近い予定から順に掲載しています。

＜2015度より授業時間が変更いたしましたのでお気を付け下さい。＞

＜本年度終了分＞

日時	2015年4月1日（水　Wednesday）16:50-18:35　※日時に注意。
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Xavier Vives (University of Navarra) Endogenous Public Information and Welfare in Market Games [PDF]
Abstract	This paper performs a welfare analysis of markets with private information in which agents condition on prices in the rational expectations tradition. Price-contingent strategies introduce two externalities in the use of private information: a pecuniary externality induces agents to put too much weight on private information and in the normal case, where the allocation role of the price prevails over its informational role, overwhelms the learning externality which impinges in the opposite way. The price may be very informative but at the cost of an excessive dispersion of the actions of agents. The welfare loss at the market solution may be increasing in the precision of private information. The analysis provides insights into optimal business cycle policy and a rationale for a Tobin-like tax for financial transactions.

日時	2015年4月7日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	重岡 仁 (Hitoshi Sigeoka) (Simon Fraser University) Can We Steer Income Comparison Attitudes by Information Provision?: Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments in the US and the UK (joint with Katsunori Yamada) [PDF]
Abstract	Economists have long been concerned that negative attitudes about relative income reduce social welfare. This paper investigates whether such attitudes can be mitigated by a simple information treatment. Toward this end, we conducted an original randomized online survey experiment in the US and the UK. As a baseline result, we find that UK respondents compare their incomes with others’ at a much higher rate than US subjects do. Additionally, we find that our information treatment—suggesting that comparing income with others may diminish their welfare even when income levels are actually increasing—made respondents compare incomes more, rather than less. Interestingly, we find such effects only among UK respondents. The mechanism for this among UK respondents seems to be driven by those who are initially less comparison-conscious becoming more comparison-conscious, indicating that our information treatment gives moral “license” to make comparisons by informing that others actually do.

日時	Workshop: "Incentives, Preferences, and Management in Developing and Developed Countries" 2015年4月9日（木　Thursday) ※場所にご注意下さい。 ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、Tokyo Workshop on International Developmentと共催
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟６階 大会議室 Meeting Room on the 6th floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]
Program	9:55-10:00 Opening Remark by Yasuyuki Sawada Session 1: Management Performance (Chaired by Yasuyuki Sawada) 10:00-11:00 Oriana Bandiera (London School of Economics)                    "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work" (joint with Andrea                     Prat and Raffaella Sadun) 11:00-11:50 Tsutomu Miyagawa (Gakusyuin University)                    "Is Productivity Growth Correlated with Improvements in Management Quality?                    An empirical study using interview surveys in Korea and Japan (joint with                     Keun Lee, Kazuma Edamura, Young Gak Kim, Hosung Jung) 11:50-12:50 Lunch Session 2: Incentives and Preferences (Chair Hideshi Itoh) 12:50-13:40 Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)                    "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools"                    (Joint with Naureen Karachiwalla) 10 min. break 13:50-14:40 Yasuyuki Sawada (University of Tokyo)                    "Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a                    Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract" (joint with Jun Goto,                    Takeshi Aida, and Keitaro Aoyagi) 14:40-15:30 Hideo Owan (University of Tokyo)                    "Monetary Incentives for Corporate Inventors: Intrinsic Motivation,                     Project Selection and Inventive Performance (joint with Sadao Nagaoka                     and Koichiro Onishi) 30 min. Break Session 3: Public service delivery (Chaired by Hideo Owan) 16:00-16:50 Andrew Griffen (University of Tokyo)                     "Election, Implementation, and Social Capital in School-Based                     Management: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of COGES                     Project in Burkina Faso" (joint with Yasuyuki Sawada, Takeshi Aida, Eiji                     Kozuka, Haruko Noguchi, and Yasuyuki Todo) 16:50-17:50  Imran Rasul (University College London)                    "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery:                    Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service" (joint with Daniel Rogger)

日時	2015年4月14日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Naijia Guo (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) The Impact of an Early Career Recession on Schooling and Lifetime Welfare [PDF]
Abstract	This paper evaluates the long-term welfare consequences from ex- periencing a recession as youths, considering the impact on schooling, wages and labor supply. The paper also explores the mechanisms that account for lifetime wage changes, including changes from schooling, from work experience, and from job mobility. I develop and estimate a directed search equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and aggre- gate shocks. Experiencing the 1981-1982 recession at age 16-22 causes a 2.2% to 3.0% lifetime welfare loss. Endogenizing schooling decision avoids overestimation of the welfare loss. The loss in experience and tenure explains the persistent wage loss after the recession.

日時	2015年4月21日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	花園誠 (Makoto Hanazono) (Nagoya University) Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation (joint with Jun Nakabayashi and Masanori Tsuruoka)
Abstract	We offer a theory of procurement auctions in which multi-dimensional bidding is ranked by a scoring rule. Our analysis allows a broad class of practically used scoring rules such as one in which price and non-price attributes are evaluated nonlinearly in score. We find that first-score (FS) and second-score (SS) auctions can be transformed into equivalent, single-dimensional score-bid auctions where the bidder's utility is non-linear in the score-bid. Our analysis demonstrates that the expected scores of FS and SS auctions generally differ unless scoring rule is quasilinear.

日時	2015年4月28日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Youngwoo Koh(Hanyang University) Decentralized College Admissions (joint with Yeon-Koo Che) [PDF]
Abstract	We study decentralized colleges admissions in the face of uncertain student preferences. Enrollment uncertainty causes colleges to strategically target their admissions to students overlooked by others. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or suffer from a higher chance of coming up empty--"falling through the cracks"--than those ranked below. When students' attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weights on school-specific measures such as essays. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alleviates enrollment uncertainty, but the outcomes are inefficient and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm attains efficiency and fairness, but some college may be worse offrelative to decentralized matching.

日時	2015年5月12日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	石原章史 (Akifumi Ishihara) (The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)) On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts
Abstract	We investigate the optimal job design in relational contract with　multiple tasks where the performance measurement is distorted,　 aggregated, and nonverifiable. We compare task bundling where all the tasks are assigned to a single agent with task separation where the tasks are split and assigned to two agents. Compared to task bundling, task separation mitigates misallocation of efforts among the tasks but requires more commitment due to dispersion of informal bonuses to multiple agents. As a result, task separation is better than task bundling if and only if the discount factor of the parties is high. We furthermore show that the optimal job design may exhibit task exclusion, in which only a single agent is employed but the assigned tasks are limited.

日時	2015年5月19日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	笠原博幸 (Hiroyuki Kasahara) (University of British Columbia) Identification and Estimation of Production Function with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Abstract

日時	2015年5月26日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10 ※時間に注意
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Ruilin Zhou　(The Pennsylvania State University) A Crisis-Bailout Game (joint with Bruno Salcedo and Bruno Sultanum) [PDF]
Abstract	This paper studies the optimal design of a liability-sharing arrangement as an infinitely repeated game. We construct a non-cooperative, 2-player model. The active agent can take a costly, unobservable action to reduce the incidence of crisis. Crisis is costly for both agents. When a crisis occurs, each agent decides unilaterally how much to contribute mitigating it. For the one-shot game, when the avoidance cost is too high relative to the expected loss of crisis for the active agent, the first-best is not achievable, i.e., the active agent cannot be induced to put in effort to minimize the incidence of crisis at any static Nash equilibrium. We show that with the same stage-game environment, the first-best cannot be implemented as a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) of the infinitely repeated game either. Instead, at any constrained efficient PPE, the active agent “shirks” infinitely often, and when crisis happens, the active agent is “bailed out” infinitely often. The frequencies of crisis and bailout are endogenously determined at equilibrium. This result of the welfare optimal equilibrium being characterized by recurrent crises and bailouts is consistent with historical episodes of financial crises with varying frequency and varied external responses for troubled institutions and countries in the real world. We explore some comparative statics of the PPEs of the repeated game numerically.

日時	2015年5月26日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Tanjim Hossain (University of Toronto) What's a Signal Worth?
Abstract

日時	2015年6月2日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	栗野盛光 (Morimistu Kurino) (University of Tsukuba) College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized (joint with Isa E. Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov andDorothea Kübler) [paper]
Abstract	We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges, and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. The main predictions of the theory are supported by experiments, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to equilibrium benchmark.

日時	2015年6月9日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Ryota Iijima (Harvard University) Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility (joint with Drew Fudenberg and Tomasz Strzalecki) [PDF]
Abstract	Perturbed utility functions|the sum of expected utility and a non-linear perturbation function|provide a simple and tractable way to model various sorts of stochastic choice. We provide two easily understood conditions each of which characterizes this representa- tion: One condition generalizes the acyclicity condition used in revealed preference theory, and the other generalizes Luce's IIA condition. We relate the discrimination or selectivity of choice rules to properties of their associated perturbations, both across dierent agents and across decision problems. We also show that these representations correspond to a form of ambiguity-averse preferences for an agent who is uncertain about her true utility.

日時	2015年6月16日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Byung-Cheol Kim (Georgia Institute of Technology) The Economics of the Right to be Forgotten (joint with Jin Yeub Kim) [PDF]
Abstract	We study the underlying economics behind the burgeoning debate on the "right to be forgotten." One individual's right to privacy may collide with others' rights of free speech and access to information. We offer a model of the right to be forgotten as a legal dispute game between petitioner(s) and a search engine. Our equilibrium analysis implies that, as long as the claim fee is small enough, the petitioner with a certain level of harm from defamatory links will act aggressively to claim the removal and go to litigation if the claim is rejected. Surprisingly, we show that a higher loss from broken links decreases the expected number of broken links. In this sense, we argue that the global expansion of the European ruling is neither necessarily posing a threat to the freedom of speech, nor protect the privacy right of the European more effectively.

日時	2015年6月23日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	成田悠輔（Yusuke Narita） (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized School Assignment for Impact Evaluation (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Josh Angrist, Parag Pathak）
Abstract	A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to match students to schools in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. When schools are oversubscribed, these matching schemes use lotteries to ration seats. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi-experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery-generated variation integral to such designs from non-random preferences and priorities remains open. This paper develops easily-implementable empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in widely-used deferred acceptance mechanisms. We use these new methods to evaluate charter schools in Denver Public Schools, one of a growing number of districts that integrate charter and traditional public schools in a unified match. On the empirical side, our results show large test score gains from charter school attendance. Our approach also generates substantial econometric efficiency gains over ad hoc methods that fail to exploit the full richness of the embedded lotteries.

日時	2015年6月30日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	佐藤公敏（Kimitoshi Sato） (Tohoku University) The MDP Procedure for Public Goods and Local Strategy Proofness [PDF]
Abstract	This paper revisits the family of MDP Procedures and analyzes their properties. It also reviews the procedure developed by Sato (1983) which achieves Aggregate Correct Revelation in the sense that the sum of the Nash equilibrium strategies al- ways coincides with the aggregate value of the correct MRSs. The procedure named the Generalized MDP Procedure can possess other desirable properties shared by continuous-time locally strategy proof planning procedures, i.e., feasibility, monotonicity and Pareto efficiency. Under myopia assumption, each player’s dominant strategy in the local incentive game associated at any iteration of the procedure is proved to reveal his/her marginal rate of substitution for a public good. In connection with the Generalized MDP Procedure, this paper analyses the structure of the locally strategy proof procedures as algorithms and game forms. An alternative characterization theorem of locally strategy proof procedures is given by making use of the new Condition, Transfer Independence. A measure of incentives is proposed to show that the exponent attached to the decision function of public good is characterized. A Piecewise Nonlinearized MDP Procedure is presented, which is coalitionally locally strategy proof. Equivalence between price-guided and quntity-guided procedures are also discussed.

日時	2015年7月7日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	小島武仁 (Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University) Recent Developments in Matching Theory and their Practical Applications
Abstract	Many developments have happened in matching theory and its applications in recent years. In this talk, I will survey them and suggest possible research directions for the future. My main focus will be on the advances in matching theory that try to solve market design problems in practical markets where the classic theory has been inapplicable. Specifically, we discuss the recent theory of matching in large markets and approximate market design, as well as a new theory of "matching with constraints", as well as their applications.

日時	2015年7月14日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Joan Llull (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Internal Migration in Dual Labor Markets (joint with Robert A. Miller)
Abstract	This paper uses a large panel assembled from Spanish administrative data for over one million individuals assembled from tax, welfare and employment records over a period spanning 30 years to estimate a dynamic model of individual optimization that explains transitions and spell lengths between permanent positions, temporary positions, unemployment and exits from the workforce. We seek to explain the sequence of job spells in temporary contracts and unemployment transitions as new entrants in the workforce gradually acquire experience and, ultimately, transition into permanent contracts. The career mobility of young workers is jointly determined with geographical and occupational mobility. Thus we investigate how different types of labor market experience and welfare entitlements affect job search behavior, employment duration, and migration patterns over the life cycle.

日時	2015年7月21日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10　 ※時間に注意
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	野田俊也 (Shunya Noda)　(Stanford University) Incentives in Pre-Mechanism Activities with Externalities (joint with Hitoshi Matsushima)
Abstract	We study the incentives of pre-mechanism activities. When the agents can take pre-mechanism actions that influence not only their own types but also the types of the other agents, the classical VCG mechanism does not always achieve full efficiency (efficient action and efficient allocation together), because agents want to weaken the opponents to emphasize their marginal contributions. On the other hand, the pure Groves mechanism, which equalize each agent's incentive with welfare-maximization problem, always achieves full efficiency, while it typically results in a deficit. The pure Groves mechanism is the unique fully efficient mechanism when the agents can influence the other agents' types in a wide variety of ways. We also investigate when and how we can improve the revenue keeping full efficiency, and suggest a scheme to construct the revenue-maximizing fully efficient mechanism.

日時	2015年7月21日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Keiichi Kawai (the University of New South Wales) Optimality of Quota Contract [PDF]
Abstract	A quota contract – characterized by a target, and discrete and sizable reward for achieving it – is susceptible to gaming by the agent. For example, the agent can manipulate the timing of closing a deal and/or reporting earnings. Because of this obvious drawback, the widespread use of quota contracts for salespeople and executives has puzzled economists. In this paper, we show that using a quota contract can be optimal for the principal if she has a contract commitment problem. Moreover, the benefit of a quota contract arises precisely from inducing the agent to game the incentive system.

場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Master Thesis Defense Presentation Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall).  The submission deadline is (please be punctual) 9:00am, July 16.   Make sure that Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason. The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version. You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken. Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day. You MUST attend an official oral examination on August 18 in addition to this master thesis defence presentation. Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.
Schedule 1	2015年7月16日（木　Thursday）   9:30-10:10 Huo Liu (Readers：Tanaka, Nakabayashi, (Owan)) Bank-Enterprise Relationship and its Influence on SMEs’ Performance in China   10:15-10:55 Xington Liu (Readers：Sasaki, Nakabayashi, (Tanaka)) The Analysis on Main Influencing Factors of China’s House Price   11:00-11:40 Ge Song (Readers：Owan, Nakabayashi, (Sasaki)) TBA
Schedule 2	2015年7月28日（火　Tuesday）   　16:00-16:40 Xu Sun (Readers：Matsui, Oyama, (Kandori)) 　An Application of Game Theory in Life Insurance

日時	2015年7月28日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	鎌田雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada) (University of California, Berkeley) Simple and Detail-Free Reciprocity in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (joint with Philipp Strack)
Abstract	We consider repeated prisoner's dilemma games in which it is unknown how cooperation intensity translates to cooperation probability. We propose a class of strategies that are simple and detail-free: It keeps track of only the average cooperation frequency in the past, and it does not depend on the fine detail of the knowledge about the intensity-probability relationship. We show that such a strategy can be used in an epsilon-equilibrium for any environment near the deterministic intensity-probability relationship, and all such equilibria result in the payoff profiles close to the Pareto-frontier, except when players permanently defect.

日時	2015年9月8日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Atsuko Tanaka (University of Calgary ) College Loans and Post-schooling Skill Accumulation (joint with Chao Fu)
Abstract

日時	2015年9月15日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Takeshi Murooka (University of Munich (LMU)) Deception under Competitive Intermediation [PDF]
Abstract	This paper investigates the incentive of intermediaries|such as nancial advisors, mortgage brokers, or insurance salespeople|to educate consumers who misperceive the value of products. Two types of rms sell products through competing common-agent intermediaries and pay commissions for sales. One sells a transparent product, while the other sells a deceptive product that has a hidden fee, quality, or risk. Each intermediary chooses which product to oer and whether or not to educate consumers about the hidden attribute. I show that a non-educating equilibrium exists if and only if the degree of misperception is large. In the equilibrium, intermediaries earn high commissions despite competition. Furthermore, because consumers ultimately bear the cost of such commissions, consumer welfare is lower when intermediaries can educate consumers than when they cannot. Regulating commissions|analogous to recent policies in the Australian and UK mutual-fund industries|can lead intermediaries to reveal any hidden attribute. I also provide a condition to detect such welfare distortion under competition from market data.

日時	2015年9月29日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Danni Catambay (Hitotsubashi University) Violent Crime: A Symptom of Wage Inequality
Abstract	Violent crime plagues the poorest neighborhoods of the United States, often being concentrated amongst minority populations. Despite being closely linked to income, violent crime does not obey the typical rules of revealed rational preferences. This paper builds a theoretical model based on insights from demographic and psychological studies to link violence with wealth inequality through a self-esteem production function, essentially posing violence as an inferior substitute to esteem. The main ndings are that violence is more closely linked to relative than objective poverty and that punishment based deterrence may fail to reduce overall crime rates.

日時	2015年10月6日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map] ※会場が変更いたしました / Venue Changed
報告	Hugo F. Sonnenschein (University of Chicago) A Theory of Efficient Negotiations
Abstract

日時	2015年10月13日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	川越敏司 (Toshiji Kawagoe) (Future University Hakodate) Truth-telling and Stability in School Choice Problems with Affirmative Action: Theory and Experiment
Abstract	The paper presents an experimental study of affirmative action policies in school choice problems with focus on two mechanisms hitherto proposed: Hafalir et al. (2012)’s minority reserve mechanism (H mechanism) and Kojima (2012) and Matsubae (2011)’s majority quota mechanism (KM mechanism). We examined their performance in two preference environments. Our findings are (1) while truth telling is a dominant strategy in both mechanism, its rate is less than 60%; (2) the average payoff was significantly higher under H mechanism than under KM mechanism as predicted by theory. (3) The proportion of students who have justified envy was higher under H than under KM mechanism. (4) We identified a stable pattern of subject’s behavior as a cause of the deviation from dominant strategy, and theoretically proved that it constituted a Nash equilibrium when KM mechanism was used in some environment, but not under H mechanism. This explains our finding on the instability of matching under H mechanism.

日時	2015年10月20日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Martin Peitz (University of Mannheim) Media See-saws: Winners and Losers on Media Platforms (joint with Simon P. Anderson) [PDF]
Abstract	We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but increases advertiser surplus if profits of each merged platform increase with the merger. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising, advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.

日時	2015年10月27日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Eugenio Miravete (University of Texas at Austin) One Markup to Rule them All: Redistribution Effects of Simple "Fair" Pricing
Abstract

日時	2015年11月10日（火　Tuesday）15:30-17:00　 ※時間に注意。
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Jonathan Newton (University of Sydney) Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration [PDF]
Abstract	The ability to share intentions and adjust one's choices in collaboration with others is a fundamental aspect of human nature. We discuss the forces that would have acted for and against the evolution of this ability for a large class of dilemmas and coordination problems that would have been faced by our hominin ancestors. In contrast to altruism and other non-fitness maximizing preferences, the ability to share intentions proliferates when rare without requiring repeated interaction or assortativity in matching.

日時	2015年11月10日（火　Tuesday） 17:10-18:40 　 ※時間に注意。
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology) Average choice (joint with David Ahn and Kota Saito) [PDF]
Abstract	This is an investigation of stochastic choice when only the average of the choices is observable. For example when one observes aggregate sales numbers from a store, but not the frequency with which each item was purchased. The focus of our work is on the Luce model, also known as the Logit model. We show that a simple path independence property of average choice uniquely character- izes the Luce model. We also characterize the linear Luce mode, using similar tools. A linear version of the Luce model is used most frequently in empirical work by applied economists. Our characterization is based on the property of path independence, which runs counter to early impossibility results on path independent choice. From an empirical perspective, our results provide a small-sample advantage over the tests of Luce's model that rely on estimating choice frequences.

日時	2015年11月24日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　　 ※財政・公共経済ワークショップと共催
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Eric Weese(Yale University) Inefficiency and Self - Determination: Simulation - Based Evidence From Meiji Japan (joint with Masayoshi Hayashi and Masashi Nishikawa) [paper]
Abstract	Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple individual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (post- merger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.

日時	2015年12月1日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	村田安寧 (Yasusada Murata) (Nihon University) New trade models, elusive welfare gains (joint with Kristian Behrens and Yoshitsugu Kanemoto)
Abstract	Extant studies take it for granted that there is a one-to-one mapping from a change in the equilibrium allocation to a change in welfare. We show, however, that such a premise does not apply to fairly standard models of monopolistic competition in various fields of economics, namely trade, growth, and economic geography. For any change in the equilibrium allocation, there exist an infinite number of possible welfare changes, provided that the number of varieties consumed differs between the two equilibria. Our result thus reveals a fundamental difficulty in measuring welfare changes when consumption diversity varies.

日時	2015年12月8日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	山本裕一 (Yuichi Yamamoto) (University of Pennsylvania) Stochastic Games with Hidden States and Hidden Actions
Abstract	This paper considers infinite-horizon stochastic games with hidden states and hidden actions. The state changes over time, players observe only a noisy public signal about the hidden state each period, and actions are private information. We show how to construct an approximately efficient equilibrium in a repeated Cournot game. Then we extend it to a general case and find a condition under which the folk theorem holds using ex-post equilibria. The result remains true even if players observe private signals rather than a public signal, provided that cheap-talk communication is allowed.

日時	2015年12月15日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	齊藤 紘多 (Kota Saito) (California Institute of Technology) Savage in the Market (joint with Federico Echenique) [PDF]
Abstract	We develop a behavioral axiomatic characterization of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) under risk aversion. Given is an individual agent's behavior in the market: assume a nite collection of asset purchases with corresponding prices. We show that such behavior satisfies a "revealed preference axiom" if and only if there exists a SEU model (a subjective probability over states and a concave utility function over money) that accounts for the given asset purchases.

日時	2015年12月22日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	松山公紀 (Kiminori Matsuyama) (Northwestern University) The Home Market Effect and Patterns of Trade Between Rich and Poor Countries [PDF]
Abstract	This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for studying the patterns of trade between rich and poor countries by incorporating nonhomothetic preferences into the standard home market effect models of trade. It has a continuum of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competitive sectors with iceberg trade costs. There are two countries, which may differ in their per capita labor endowment and the population size. Preferences across sectors are such that, as per capita income goes up, the households shift their expenditure shares towards higher-indexed sectors. In equilibrium, the Rich country, whose households achieve higher standard-of-living, runs a trade surplus in higher-indexed sectors through the home market effect, and hence becomes a net-exporter of high income elastic goods. The framework is flexible enough to allow for a variety of comparative statics. For example, a uniform productivity improvement causes the Rich to switch from a net exporter to a net importer in some middle sectors. The Rich gains relatively more (less) from such changes than the Poor when the goods produced in different sectors are substitutes (complements). The effects of globalization, captured by a reduction in the trade cost, are similar to those of uniform productivity improvements, except that it has additional effects of the terms of trade change when the two countries are unequal in size.

日時	2016年1月15日（金 Friday）8:30-10:00 ※日時に注意　　 ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、Tokyo Workshop on International Developmentと共催
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Mari Tanaka (Stanford University) Exporting Sweatshops? Evidence from Myanmar [PDF]
Abstract	There is a long-standing debate over the impact of global trade on workers and firms in developing countries. In this paper I investigate the causal effect of exporting on working conditions and firm performance in Myanmar. This analysis draws on a new survey I conducted on Myanmar manufacturing firms from 2013 to 2015. I use the rapid opening of Myanmar to foreign trade after 2011 alongside firm product, geographic and industry variations to obtain causal estimates of the impact of trade. I find that exporting has large positive impacts on working conditions in terms of improved fire safety, health-care, union recognition, and wages. My results also indicate that exporting increases firm sales, employment, management practice scores, and the likelihood of receiving a labor audit.

日時	The 12th Joint conference of Seoul National University and University of Tokyo "Current Topics in Economic Theory" 2016年1月22日（金 Friday）10:15-16:45 ※日時・会場に注意
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
Program	For detalied information please see the program [download]

日時	2016年2月15日（月　Monday）16:50-18:35　　 ※場所にご注意下さい。 ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、マクロファイナンス・金融&国際金融ワークショップと共催
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	濱尾泰 (Yasushi Hamao) （Unversity of Southern California） Selectiive Disclosure: The Case of Nikkei Preview Articles (joint with William N. Goetzmann) [PDF]
Abstract	Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei for short) is a leading Japanese daily newspaper specializing in economy and business. During earnings announcement season, the Nikkei morning edition often publishes “preview” articles that are about companies’ sales and earnings. These predate the actual company announcements, and forecast more accurately the actual results than extant forecast, making the Nikkei forecasts value-relevant information. We identify 2,835 preview articles in the newspaper from 2000 to 2010. We find that share prices on average react to information before the preview articles are printed, suggesting some prior leakage of the date and content of preview information. The reaction is asymmetric: the stock price reacts positively to positive news but it does not react negatively to negative news. The costs and benefits (or incentives) for companies. Nikkei, and investors are investigated using changes in returns and information content around the events. We find a positive correlation between previewing and positive news sentiment.

日時	ゲーム理論ワークショップ2016 2016年3月6日（日　Sunday）13:50-3月8日（火　Tuesday） 15:45 主催：科学研究費基盤(A)「ゲーム理論の新展開：協力メカニズムの解明」
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
	Program

日時	2016年3月9日（水　Wednesday）12:00-13:15　　 ※日時に注意。　 共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Lorenzo Caliendo （Yale University） Trade and Labor Market Dynamics (joint with Maximiliano Dvorkin and Fernando Parro) [PDF]
Abstract	We develop a dynamic trade model where production and consumption take place in spatially distinct labor markets with varying exposure to domestic and international trade. The model recognizes the role of labor mobility frictions, goods mobility frictions, geographic factors, and input-output linkages in determining equilibrium allocations. We show how to solve the equilibrium of the model without estimating productivities, migration frictions, or trade costs, which are usually difficult to identify. We calibrate the model to 38 countries, 50 U.S. states, and 22 sectors and use the rise in China’s import competition to quantify the effects across more than a thousand U.S. labor markets. We find that China’s trade shock resulted in a loss of 0.8 million U.S. manufacturing jobs, about 50 percent of the change in the manufacturing employment share unexplained by a secular trend. We find aggregate welfare gains but, due to trade and migration frictions, the welfare and employment effects vary across U.S. labor markets. Estimated transition costs to the new long-run equilibrium are also heterogeneous and reflect the labor dynamics.

日時	2016年3月14日（月　Monday）12:10-13:25　　 ※日時に注意。　 共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Munir Squires （London School of Economics and Political Science） Kinship Taxation as a Constraint on Microenterprise Growth: Experimental Evidence from Kenya [paper]
Abstract	Developing country entrepreneurs face family pressure to share income. This pressure, a kinship tax, can distort capital allocations. I combine evidence from a lab experiment -which allows me to estimate an individual- level sufficient statistic for the distortion- with data I collected on a sample of Kenyan entrepreneurs, to quantify the importance of the tax. My data reveal high kinship tax rates for a third of entrepreneurs in my sample. My quantitative analysis makes use of a simple structural model of input allocation fitted to my data, and implies that removing distortions from kinship taxation would increase total factor productivity by 26%, and increase the share of workers in firms with five or more employees from 9% to 56%. These effects are substantially larger than those coming from credit market distortions, which I estimate using a cash transfer RCT. My analysis also implies strong complementarities between kinship taxation and credit constraints.

 

日時

※ 2016年1月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※ １．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい （Please note that the following schedule might be changed)。 ２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます （Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

発表者の方へ

発表論文についてはCIRJEにて印刷し、当日会場にて配布いたします。つきましては、下記の期日までに最終稿のファイルまたはハードコピーをご提出ください。   発表論文提出期限（厳守）： 1月12日（火）発表者＝1月12日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで 1月19日（火）発表者＝1月19日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで 1月20日（水）発表者＝1月20日（水）朝9:00（必着）まで 1月 26日（火）発表者＝1月26日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで 1月 27日（水）発表者＝1月27日（水）朝9:00（必着）まで     提出先：学術交流棟（小島ホール）６階 CIRJE（cirje [at mark]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp） 上記提出期限の日時を過ぎたものについてはいかなる理由があっても受け付けられません。ご自身で15部のコピーをご用意の上、当日会場にご持参ください。 論文は必ず最終稿をご提出ください。提出後の差し替えは受け付けませんので、差し替えなければならない事態が発生した場合には、論文はご自身で印刷して（15部）当日持参して頂くことになります。 添付ファイルが破損している等、ファイルが開けない場合は連絡を差し上げるため、ファイルで提出される方はお申し込み時に携帯電話番号等、当日すぐに連絡のつく連絡先をお書き添え下さい。 別途、正式な修士論文口述試験が行なわれるので、修士論文提出時に大学院係 から配付される審査日程を参照のうえ、必ずご出席下さい。 パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。（プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。） 発表用のスライドファイルを入れるUSBには、（他のファイルを入れずに）スライドファイルのみを入れて会場へお持ち下さい。（スライド以外の情報がたくさん入ったUSBが認識されない、というトラブルが起きているためです。） Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall).    The submission deadline is (please be punctual): January 12 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 12 (Tuesday) January 19 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 19 (Tuesday) January 20 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 20 (Wednesday) January 26 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 26 (Tuesday) January 27 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 27 (Wednesday)   Make sure that Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason. The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version. You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken. Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory. Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day. You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis. Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.

 

日時	2016年1月12日（火　Tuesday）15:50-16:30
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	鈴木崇文 （Readers： 林 岩本 （小川）） 高齢化および一般財源化が自治体の歳出配分に与える 影響

日時	2016年1月12日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	田島遼一 （Readers： 林 岩本 （持田）） 主要国における法人実効税率の 計算と検討及び日本の位置

日時	2016年1月12日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	益田　拓 （Readers： 佐々木 松村 （大橋）） Collusive Incentive behind Frequent New Model Introduction

日時	2016年1月12日（火　Tuesday）18:20-19:00
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	槇本良平 （Readers： 佐々木 松村 （Marzalec）） Does R&D cooperation facilitate innovation?

日時	2016年1月19日（火　Tuesday）15:00-15:40
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	櫻井智祥 （Readers： 松島 尾山 （神取）） Moral Hazard with Hardworking Agents

日時	2016年1月19日（火　Tuesday）15:50-16:30
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	酒井勇介 （Readers： 松島 尾山 （神取）） Kidney exchange with individually rationality in hospitals and patients

日時	2016年1月19日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	笠松怜史 （Readers： 神取 松島 （神谷）） Game Theoritic Analysis of Positive and Negative Campaign for Policy

日時	2016年1月19日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	草野友弘 （Readers： 神取 松島 （神谷）） 2 期間学校選択モデルの分析

日時	2016年1月20日（水　Wednesday）15:00-15:40
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	松澤　哲 （Readers： 中林 松井 （松村）） Relative Evaluation Scheme for Groups

日時	2016年1月20日（水　Wednesday）15:50-16:30
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	LI Ren （Readers： 松井 尾山 （神取）） How to Set Promotions ―An Application of All-pay Auction Model―

日時	2016年1月20日（水　Wednesday）16:40-17:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	濱田高彰 （Readers：松井 尾山 （神取）） The Effect of College as a Signal on Students’ Activity

日時	2016年1月20日（水　Wednesday）17:30-18:10
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	三島大輝 （Readers： 松井 尾山 （神取）） 共通ポイントカード導入による企業行動への影響

日時	2016年1月20日（水　Wednesday）18:20-19:00
場所	東 京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	大録誠広 （Readers： 尾山 松井 （神取）） Academic-Industry Relationships: Analysis of Non-Patent Citations

日時	2016年1月26日（火　Tuesday）15:00-15:40
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	川窪　悦章 （Readers： 澤田 市村 （飯塚）） The Effect of Incentive Scheme on Health Care Service Market: Evidence from PNPM Generasi Program in Indonesia

日時	2016年1月26日（火　Tuesday）15:50-16:30
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economicc s Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	CAO Yuan （Readers： 澤田 福田 （青山）） On Aid Effectiveness-A Perspective From Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach-

日時	2016年1月26日（火　Tuesday）16:40-17:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	津田俊祐 （Readers： 澤田 市村 （植田(健)）） Wage Responses in Imperfect Labor Markets to a Huge-Scale Forced Migration In ow in African Agricultural Economies

日時	2016年1月26日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	西村早織 （Readers： 澤田 大湾 （田中）） The Lasting Effects of In Utero Health Shock: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh, India

日時	2016年1月26日（火　Tuesday）18:20-19:00
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	原　朋弘 （Readers： 澤田 市村 （大湾）） Information from Media and Social Preferences toward Minorities: Evidence from Laboratory Experiments Regarding Koreans in Japan

日時	2016年1月27日（水　Wednesday）15:00-15:40
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	岡本千草 （Readers： 田渕 小川 (林) ） 地理的集積パターンに関する産学間共同開発と企業間共同開発との比較

日時	2016年1月27日（水　Wednesday）15:50-16:30
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	新藤直人 （Readers： 田渕 林 （小川）） 市場ポテンシャルとメキシコ航空機産業の立地選択

日時	2016年1月27日（水　Wednesday）16:40-17:20
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	ZHANG Xiannong （Readers： 田渕 Fabinger （小川）） Hurt by Social Network: A Atudy on Rural-Urban Migration in China

日時	2016年1月27日（水　Wednesday）17:30-18:10
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	矢田紘平 （Readers： 飯塚 澤田 （大橋）） Schoolmate Peer Effects in Education and Delinquency

日時	2016年1月29日（金　Friday）14:00-14:40 *Schedule Changd
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	緒方良輔 （Readers： 市村 若森 （渡辺）） 消費行動のstate dependenceを鑑みた企業の最適なprice marketingについて

日時	2016年3月17日（木　Thursday）16:50-18:20　　 ※曜日に注意。　 共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Réka Juhász （Princeton University） Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade [PDF]
Abstract	This paper uses a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of temporary trade protection on long-term economic development. I find that regions in the French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) increased capacity in mechanized cotton spinning to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. In the long-run, regions with exogenously higher spinning capacity had: i.) higher activity in mechanized cotton spinning; ii.) higher labor-productivity for mechanized cotton-spinning firms, and; iii.) higher value-added per capita in industry.

日時	2016年3月25日（金　Friday）16:50-18:30　※日時に注意。　 　 主催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ
場所	東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室 in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告	Mitsuru Igami （Yale University） Privatization and Innovation: Productivity, New Products, and Patents in China (joint with Yuyu Chen and Mo Xiao) [paper]
Abstract	We study Chinese firms' innovative activities in the period of privatization. We use Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer’'s (forthcoming) method to estimate TFP, which suggests domestic private firms' average TFP converged with that of foreign firms, whereas that of state-owned enterprises lagged behind. We then investigate the relationships between our TFP estimates and other, observed measures of innovation, including the introduction of new products and patent applications. We find: (1) process and product innovations seem complementary to each other, (2) “invention” patents appear more reliable as an indicator of innovations than the other types of Chinese patents, and (3) patenting behaviors are highly heterogeneous across firms of different ownership types.

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