Workshops

2011年4月19日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Nicolas Schutz (University of Mannheim)

Anticompetitive Vertical Merger Waves (joint with Johan Hombert and Jerome Pouyet) [PDF]

This paper develops an equilibrium model of vertical mergers. We show that competition on an upstream market between integrated rms only is less intense than in the presence of unintegrated upstream rms. Indeed, when an integrated rm supplies the upstream market, it becomes a soft downstream competitor to preserve its upstream prots. This benets other integrated rms, which may therefore choose not to cut prices on the upstream market. This mechanism generates waves of vertical mergers in which every upstream rm integrates with a downstream rm, and the remaining unintegrated downstream rms obtain the input at a high upstream price.

2011年5月10日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

楡井 誠 (Makoto Nirei) (Hitotsubashi University)

Information aggregation and fat tails in financial markets [PDF]

This paper demonstrates that fat-tailed distributions of trading volume and stock price emerge in a model of information aggregation. I consider a simultaneous-move model of traders who infer other traders' private information on the value of assets by observing aggregate actions. Without parametric assumptions on the private information, I show that the traders' aggregate actions follow a power-law distribution with exponential truncation. By combining the power law with the composition uncertainty that a market maker faces, the model is able to mimic the non-normal distribution of the stock returns.

2011年5月17日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

高橋 悟 (Satoru Takahashi) (Princeton University)

Robust Equilibria in Sequential Games under Almost Common Belief (joint with Olivier Tercieux)

2011年5月24日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

藤嶋 翔太 (Shota Fujishima) (Washington University)

Evolutionary Implementation of Optimal Number and Size of Cities [PDF]

With a model of system of cities and one rural area, we consider evolutionary implementation (due to Sandholm [Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing, Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002), 667-689]) of optimal number and size of cities in which the planner leads the economy to a social optimum in the long-run without forcing lumpy migrations and without the knowledge of preferences. We show that the planner can achieve evolutionary implementation of a social optimum by internalizing the externalities evaluated at current prices and population distribution in each period. Unlike the original concept of Sandholm, we consider a migration dynamic with forward looking expectations to deal with multiplicity of local optima.

2011年5月31日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 　※日程が変更いたしました。

神事直人 (Naoto Jinji) (Kyoto University)

Does the Structure of Multinational Enterprises' Activity Affect Technology Spillovers? (joint with Xingyuan Zhang and Shoji Haruna) [paper]

We examine how the structure of multinational enterprises' (MNEs') activity affects technology spillovers between MNEs and their host economies by using firm-level data of Japanese MNEs and patent citations data. We construct new measures of foreign direct investment (FDI) by exploiting information on sales and purchases of foreign affiliates of MNEs. Pure horizontal (vertical) FDI is defined as FDI with a high share of transactions (i.e., both purchases of inputs and sales of outputs) in the local market (with the home country). Partially horizontal and vertical FDI are also defined. We then estimate the effects of these types of FDI on technology spillovers captured by patent citations. Our findings reveal that when developed economies host Japanese MNEs, pure vertical FDI has significantly positive effects on technology spillovers in both directions. When developing economies host Japanese MNEs, by contrast, no form of FDI significantly facilitates technology spillovers in either direction

2011年6月7日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

平野 智裕 (Tomohiro Hirano) (University of Tokyo)

Asset Bubbles, Endogenous Growth, and Financial Frictions (joint with Noriyuki Yanagawa) [PDF]

This paper analyzes the existence and the effects of bubbles in an endogenous growth model with financial frictions and heterogeneous investments. Bubbles are likely to emerge when the degree of pledgeability is in the middle range. This suggests that improving the financial market might enhance the possibility of bubbles. We also find that when the degree of pledgeability is relatively low, bubbles boost long-run growth. When it is relatively high, bubbles lower growth. Moreover, we examine the effects of bubbles bursting, and show that the effects depend on the degree of pledgeability, i.e., the quality of the financial system.

2011年6月14日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Marcus Asplund (Royal Institute of Technology)

Did the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly Set Monopoly Prices? [PDF]

Do firms set profit maximizing prices? An affirmative answer implies that firms both aims at, and are able to, set prices to maximize profits. Despite the question's importance it is difficult to devise an empirical test since it requires not only knowledge about firms' costs and demand conditions but also the nature of the strategic interaction in markets. This paper sidesteps the problem of strategic interaction by providing a detailed case study of a monopolist's pricing decisions. The idea is to examine pricing behaviour of a monopolist facing a dynamic demand where current sales influence future demand. Empirically, I estimate an Euler equation implied by profit maximization on data from the Swedish Tobacco Monopoly's sales of moist snuff (an addictive tobacco product) over the period 1917-1959. It is found that the monopolist's prices are well below those that would maximize the expected net present value of profits. I discuss the extent to which the evidence from STM is consistent with implications from the maximization of some alternative objective functions.

2011年6月15日 （水　Wednesday） 16:50-18:30 ※曜日にご注意下さい

1) 横尾 真 (Makoto Yokoo) (Kyushu University)

Generalizing Envy-Freeness Toward Group of Agents [PDF]

1)

Traditionally, designing a mechanism for group decision making is done by hand. Recently, an approach called Automated Mechanism Design (AMD) has been developed. In this approach, a mechanism design problem is formalized as a problem of designing a function that maps possible inputs (e.g., type profiles of bidders) to desirable outputs (e.g., an allocation and payments). This problem is formalized as a mixed integer programming problem (MIP) and solved by an off-the-shelf MIP solver. Although the AMD approach sounds very attractive, one serious limitation is that it can solve only very small-scale problems. In this talk, I describe an idea of using AMD as a tool for discovering new mechanisms, and show an example of applying this idea for designing a new false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanism.

2)

Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which are refinements of traditional envy-freeness, is meaningful and brings up a new interesting research direction in mechanism design. In this paper, we introduce two new concepts of fairness called envy-freeness of an individual toward a group, and envy-freeness of a group toward a group. They are natural extensions of traditional envy-freeness. We discuss combinatorial auction mechanisms that satisfy these concepts. First, we characterize such mechanisms by focusing on their allocation rules. Then we clarify the connections between these concepts and three other properties: the core, strategy-proofness, and false-nameproofness.

2011年6月21日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

清水 崇 (Takashi Shimizu) (Kansai University)

Can More Information Facilitate Communication? (joint with Junichiro Ishida)

In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed in cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus on the "dual role" of the sender's message in this context: when the receiver has imperfect private information of her own, the sender's message provides information about the true state as well as about the reliability of the receiver's private information. This feature gives rise to the asymmetric response of the receiver's action, where the receiver reacts less to the truthful message and more to the misrepresented one, which is essential in disciplining the sender to be more truthful.

2011年7月5日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

鎌田 雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada) (Harvard University)

Multi-Agent Search with Deadline (joint with Nozomu Muto) [PDF]

This paper studies a finite-horizon search problem in which two or more players are involved. Players can agree upon a proposed object by a unanimous decision. Otherwise, search continues until the deadline is reached, at which players receive predetermined fixed payoffs. If players can benefit from the object of search only at the deadline, the limit payoffs as the realizations of objects become frequent are efficient but sensitive to the distribution of possible payoff profiles. In this case the limit expected duration of search relative to the length of time before the deadline is more than a half, and approximates one in the limit as the number of involved players goes to infinity. If the benefits are received as soon as they agree, the payoff approximates the Nash bargaining solution in the limit, and an agreement is reached almost immediately.

2011年7月8日 （金　Friday） 16:50-18:30 ※曜日にご注意下さい

竹内 憲司 (Kenji Takeuchi)(Kobe University)

Does Free Trade Promote Environmental Technology Transfer? (joint with Takeshi Iida) [PDF]

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.

2011年7月12日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

小島 武仁 (Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University)

Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach (joint with John William Hatfield and Yusuke Narita)

2011年7月19日 （火　Tuesday） （火　Tuesday)　12:00-13:30　　 ※時間にご注意下さい

高木 悠貴 (Yuki Takagi) (Harvard University)　

Local Gossip and Inter-generational Family Transfers: Comparative Political Economy of Insurance Provision [PDF]

Why are generous transfers from the younger to the older generations generous in some societies and not in others? For example, people in the northeast Japan tend to provide better nursing care to their aged parents and invest more in their children's education than those in the southwest. Communities in the northeast tend to be small and isolated compared to those in the southwest. This paper argues that differences in intergenerational dependence are due to demographic variation in community networks. This analysis of sustainability of intergenerational transfers posits game theoretical models of overlapping generations in which breadwinners make transfers to their parents and children. A novel feature of the models is that there is a local community that may supply information about its members' past behaviors. I demonstrate that an efficient level of intergenerational transfers can be sustained if neighbors "gossip" about each other. As an implication, my theory suggests that individuals in a close-knit community prefer lower levels of social protection. Empirical results from Japan support this argument: Individuals who interact with their neighbors tend to provide better nursing care to their aged parents, spend more on their childrens' education, and demand less from the government than those who do not interact with their neighbors.

2011年7月19日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

城所 幸弘 (Yukihiro Kidokoro) (GRIPS)

Revenue recycling within transport networks [paper]

In this paper, we analyse second-best pricing and investment policy for transport networks with a revenue recycling mechanism in which the toll revenue is used for transport investments or subsidies, as in London's congestion-charging scheme. The results of this paper demonstrate that the way toll revenue is used modifies the usual results significantly, which are typically based on assuming a lump-sum transfer. First, recycling revenue as investment increases the second-best toll when the benefits from the investment exceed the costs and when demand is inelastic with respect to the toll. Recycling revenue as a subsidy has no such effect. Second, ''partial" cost-benefit analysis that focuses only on the targeted transport mode would usually lead to erroneous conclusions about whether toll revenues should be used for transport investment, subsidies, or general tax revenues. Thus, ''full" cost-benefit analysis, which accounts for changes in consumer and producer surpluses in all transport modes, is necessary.

2011年7月20日 （水　Wednesday)　16:00-17:30　　 ※日時にご注意下さい

中田 啓之 (Hiroyuki Nakata) (University of Essex)

Self-Production, Friction, and Risk Sharing against Disasters: Evidence from a Developing Country

This paper uses a unique household data set collected in Vietnam to empirically test the necessary conditions for an extended version of the consumption risk-sharing hypothesis. The test explicitly incorporates self-production and uses natural disasters such as avian influenza, droughts, and floods to identify the effectiveness of market and non-market risk-sharing mechanisms. With these additional treatments, full risk sharing cannot be rejected, which suggests the presence of omitted variable bias in existing studies that reject full risk sharing. We also find that credit constraints have a significant impact, although limited commitment is not necessarily serious.

2011年7月25日 （月　Monday） 16:50-18:30　 ※曜日と会場にご注意下さい。

* Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30　と共催

Itzhak Gilboa (Tel-Aviv University)

The Dynamics of Induction in a Unified Model (joint with Larry Samuelson and David Schmeidler) [paper] [slides]

本セミナーの前（7/25 15:00-16:30）に、Itzhak Gilboa氏によるCIRJE特別セミナーが開催されます。詳細はこちらをご参照下さい。

CIRJE Special Seminar will be held from 3:00pm to 4:30pm on July 25. For details, please visit here.

2011年7月26日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

無藤 望 (Nozomu Muto) (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona)

Strategic Complexity and the Core in Bargaining Games [paper]

The aim of this paper is to make a non-cooperative foundation of the core through complexity considerations in general bargaining games. We consider a coalitional bargaining with a set of deterministic protocols (order of proposers) which generally depend on histories in the entire bargaining. The set of protocols contains those discussed in much of the previous literature. Following Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000), we first show that when players have preferences that incorporate complexity of their strategies, every Nash equilibrium is stationary for general protocols. Second, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that the core coincides with the set of allocations supported by pure-strategy stationary subgame perfect equilibria with threshold responses. The condition requires the protocols to include rich patterns in the order of proposers.

2011年9月15日 （木　Thursday） 16:50-18:30　 ※曜日にご注意下さい。

Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University)

Gain, loss, and the Shapley-Shubik power index [PDF]

We show that the Shapley-Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player implies a loss for someone else (the axiom does not specify the extent of the loss). The rest of our axioms are standard: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, and dummy.

2011年10月4日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Ron Harstad (University of Missouri)

Political Economy Field Experiments Become Possible

Laboratory experiments employing an induced-values methodology report on allocative efficiencies observed. This methodology requires experimenters know subjects' motivations, impossible in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be inactive. An allocation mechanism's outcome is defined to be behaviorally efficient if an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the mechanism and at most a negligible size of mutually beneficial gains identified. Methodological requirements for behavioral efficiency observation are provided. A simple field demonstration indicates when an increase in public good output can mutually beneficially cover marginal cost, without knowing valuations. Several empirical issues that arise are noted.

2011年10月11日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Ayako Kondo (近藤絢子) (Hosei Universtiy)

Effects of Universal Health Insurance on Health Care Utilization, Supply-Side Responses and Mortality Rates: Evidence from Japan (joint with Hitoshi Shigeoka) [PDF]

 We investigate the effects of a massive expansion in health insurance coverage on health care utilization and health by examining the introduction of universal health insurance in Japan in 1961. There are three major findings. First, health care utilization increases more than would be expected from previous estimates of the elasticities of individual-level changes in health insurance status. Second, increases in the supply of health care services tend to be smaller than increases in the demand for these services. The size of the supply response differs across types of services: while the number of bed increases, effects on the numbers of medical institutions, physicians and nurses are negligible or inconclusive. Third, we do not find evidence of reduced mortality rates at least in the short run. Our results suggest two lessons for countries planning a large expansion in health insurance coverage: first, it requires financial resources for the surge in health care expenditures, which is likely to be much larger than predicted from individual-level changes in insurance status; second, the slow supply- side response may constrain the ability of the health care system to meet increased demand.

2011年10月18日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

神取道宏 (Michihiro Kandori) (University of Tokyo)

Towards a Belief-Based Theory of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: An Application of POMDP (joint with Ichiro Obara) [paper]

 An equilibrium in a repeated game with imperfect private moitoring is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite number of states. We provide a tractable general method to check the equilibrium conditions in this class. Our method is based on the belief-based approach and employs the theory of POMDP (Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes). This encompasses the majority of existing works.

2011年11月1日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

※　Speaker Changed/発表者が変更いたしました　※

澤田康幸 (Yasuyuki Sawada) (University of Tokyo)

"Incentives and Social Preferences in a Traditional Labor Contract: Evidence from Rice Planting Experiments in the Philippines?"(joint with Jun Goto, Takeshi Aida and Keitaro Aoyagi)

This paper investigates the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in formulating rice planting contracts of the Philippines. Intriguingly, in our study area, despite the potential of infestation of opportunistic behaviors by workers, a fixed wage (FW) contract has been dominant for rice planting since the 1960s. To account for such a seemingly-inefficient contractual arrangement, we conduct field experiments by randomly assigning three distinct labor contracts, i.e., FW, individual piece rate (IPR), and group piece rate (GPR) contracts. Individual workers' performance data from field experiments are then combined with data on social preferences elicited by laboratory experiments. Five main empirical findings emerge. First, our basic results show the positive incentive effects in IPR, moral hazard problems in FW, and free-riding behavior in GPR, which are consistent with standard theoretical implications. Second, while, under FW, social preferences such as altruism and guilt aversion play an important role in stimulating incentives, introducing monetary incentives crowds out such intrinsic motivations. Third, other non-monetary factors such as self-selection of team members and social connections significantly change incentives under FW contract. Fourth, as alternative hypotheses, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis of intertemporal incentives arising from performance based contract renewal probabilities. Our results are also supportive to implications of the interlinked contract of labor and credit transactions in mitigating moral hazard problems. Yet, we reject the optimality of FW contract due to large effort measurement errors.

2011年11月15日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

渡辺安虎 (Yasutora Watanabe) (Northwestern University)

Entry by Acquisition: Estimates from a Two-sided Matching Model with Externality

As banks often acquire incumbents to enter a new market, presence of desirable acquisition targets affects not only merger decisions but also entry decisions at the same time. We study banks' entry and merger decisions jointly by considering a two-sided matching model with externality to account for "with whom" decision of merger and to incorporate negative externality of post-entry competition. Using this model and the data of commercial banks, we investigate the effect of deregulation on market entry by Riegle-Neal Act. We first propose a deferred acceptance algorithm applicable to the environment with externality to show existence of stable allocation. Our algorithm extends the algorithm of Hatfield and Milgrom(2005). Then, using the characterization of the lattice structure of the stable allocations, we construct moment inequalities that partially identify banks' payoff function including (dis)synergies from mergers. Our identification strategy adopts Milgrom and Shannon's (1994) monotone comparative statics results, and we run our deferred acceptance algorithm in our simulated estimator. We find that synergies tend to be larger between larger and healthier potential entrants and smaller and less healthy incumbent banks. We also study the effect of FDIC's assistance in bank mergers.

2011年11月22日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

In-Ho Lee (Seoul National University)

Moral Hazard and Forbearance in the Prudential Regulation

We construct a model of a self-interested financial regulation agency who incurs political cost when a bank defaults. The agency decides whether to regulate the bank conditional upon the signal observation, which contains information about the risk of the bank. The agency may choose not to regulate a bank even if its condition looks worse than another bank who is regulated, which we call forbearance. Since the optimal decision rule of the regulator depends on the variance of the signal, the banks choose projects with signals which will induce their preferred decision rule of the regulator. The bank's choice of the project with respect to the variance of the signal may be sub-optimal.

2011年11月29日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

林正義 (Masayoshi Hayashi) (University of Tokyo)

Do Central Grants Increase Welfare Caseloads? Evidence from Public Assistance in Japan [PDF]

In Japan, the central government has traditionally claimed that increases in central subsidies make local governments lenient in granting eligibility for social assistance. While the issue of whether or not central grants affect local welfare caseloads is an empirical question, it is often a difficult one to evaluate: the rates of matching subsidies are nationally uniform, and the amount of general-purpose grants is endogenous. This study circumvents these difficulties by taking advantage of institutional changes and the interplays of in the Japanese system of intergovernmental transfers. The results provide a support for the claim that more central grants lead to more welfare caseloads.

[特別連続セミナー]

2011年12月5日 （月　Monday） 16:50-18:30

2011年12月6日 （火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

※　曜日・場所が通常と異なりますのでにご注意下さい。　※

※UTIPE Special Lecture Series funded by Global 30 と共催

Robin Boadway (Queen's University and CESifo)

2011年12月5日 （月　Monday) 16:50-18:30

　　Optimal Taxation: Lessons for Tax Policy Part 1

2011年12月6日 （火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

　　Optimal Taxation: Lessons for Tax Policy Part 2

[outline] [slides1] [slides2] [slides3]

※　学生に対する教育的内容の高い講義となります。 (These lectures are educational and manily for students.) ※

2011年12月7日 （水　Wednesday） 16:50-18:30

※　曜日にご注意下さい。　※

※UTIPE Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30 と共催

Robin Boadway (Queen's University and CESifo)

Indirect Taxes for Redistribution: Should Necessity Goods be Favored? (joint with Pierre Pestieau) [PDF]

The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem shows that with weakly separable preferences, differential commodity taxes are not needed if an optimal nonlinear income tax is imposed. Redistributive objectives can be achieved with the income tax alone even if goods differ considerably in their income elasticities of demand. Deaton showed that if the government is restricted to a linear progressive income tax along with commodity taxes, the latter are superfluous if preferences are not only weakly separable but also yield linear Engel curves whose slopes are common to all households. These have potentially strong policy implications since they suggest that the common practice of giving preferential commodity tax treatment to necessities is not warranted. Using the linear progressive income tax as an example and assuming the Deaton conditions are satisfied, we derive two contradictory results. First, if the income tax is less progressive than optimal, necessities should be taxed preferentially relative to luxuries. Second, if low-income households are income-constrained so are unable to afford any luxury goods, it may be optimal to tax necessity goods at higher rates than luxuries, depending on whether labor supply varies along the intensive or extensive margin. The analysis is extended to allow for nonlinear taxes and endogenous demand for a public good.

2011年12月13日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (University of Tokyo)

Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges [PDF]

We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of combinatorial auctions and bilateral trades, where the multiple commodities to be traded are possessed by participants and a central planner as endowments. Private values, risk neutrality, and independent types are assumed. Efficiency, Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, and Interim Individual Rationality are required. We characterize the least upper bound of the central planner's expected revenue. We introduce a stability notion, namely, the marginal core, to the assumption that the central planner's endowment is unprotected. We show that the central planner has a deficit in expectation if and only if the marginal core is non-empty.

2011年12月20日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

※UTIPE　Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30と共催

竹内幹 (Kan Takeuchi) (Hitotsubashi University)

The future bias and the concavity of time discount function [PDF]

I discuss the experimental studies on time preference, particularly addressing the common confounding in the literature, and then it develops a new method to elicit time preference. In almost all experimental researches on time preference, it is assumed that time discounting is separable from future reward and that the instantaneous utility function is linear. These two assumptions cause serious biases in the estimation of time preference. My new elicitation method allows for nonlinear utility functions, non-separability between delay and reward, and time inconsistency including future bias in addition to present bias. In particular, the experiment (1) runs a non-parametric test of time consistency and (2) estimates the form of time discount function independently of instantaneous utility functions, and then (3) the result suggests that many subjects exhibiting future bias, indicating an inverse S-curve time discount function. I ran another pilot experiment to see if the time discounting function is concave for short delay and convex for long delay. The observation supports the hypothesis that the discounting is not just hyperbolic and convex but seems to be inverse S-shaped. This implies that the future does not really start right away. Rather, it starts after some time lag for human perception.

※ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Markets for Fake Products:Experimental Evidence from Local Markets for Antimalarial Medicine in Uganda (joint with Martina Björkman and Jakob Svensson)

This paper investigates the determinants of quality of health products in developing countries. We use experimental data from local markets for antimalarial medicines in Uganda to study this. To measure drug quality, we used covert shoppers that purchased antimalarials from private outlets and then tested for substandard drugs using Raman spectroscopy. Combining this with household survey data, we first establish some facts about product quality. We find that (i) 30 percent of the outlets sell fake antimalarials, (ii) price does not signal quality, (iii) consumer beliefs about prevalence of fake drugs are positively correlated with actual prevalence, (iv) fakes drugs are more prevalent when misconceptions about malaria are more common among consumers. In addition, we conduct a randomized experiment to investigate how competition affects the market equilibrium. We randomly assigned a new drug outlet selling authentic drugs below the prevailing market price. The results show that the intervention reduced prevalence of fake drugs by incumbent outlets by half, reduced the incumbent prices, and increased treatment of children reported sick in malaria. We also find evidence suggesting that the effects of competition on quality is larger when consumers are better able to correctly infer drug quality. Together, our results indicate that lack of competition and consumer ability to infer quality are key determinants of substandard drugs in developing countries.

2012年2月14日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Tai-wei Hu (Northwestern University)

Critical Comparisons between the Nash Noncooperative Theory and Rationalizability (jonit with Mamoru Kaneko) [PDF]

The theories of Nash noncooperative solutions and of rationalizability intend to describe the same target problem of ex ante individual decision making, but they are distinctively different. We consider what their essential difference is by giving parallel derivations of their resulting outcomes. The derivations pinpoint that the difference is only in the use of quantifiers for each player's prediction about the other's possible decisions; the universal quantifier for the former and the existential quantifier for the latter. Using this difference, we argue that the former is compatible with the free-will postulate for game theory that each player has free will for his decision making, and that for the latter, the interpretation in terms of determinism would be more natural. In the present approach, however, the distinction between decisions and predictions still remains interpretational. For an explicit distinction, we undertake, in the companion paper, a study of those theories in a framework of common knowledge logic.

2012年2月20日 （ 月　Monday） 16:00-17:10, 17:20-18:30　 ※日時にご注意下さい。

(1) 16:00-17:10　Olivier Tercieux (Paris School of Economics)

Subgame-Perfect Implementation under Value Perturbations (joint with Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden and Takashi Kunimoto) [paper]

(2) 17:20-18:30　Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore)

Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction (joint with Siyang Xiong) [paper]

(1) We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms when common knowledge of the state of Nature is relaxed to common p-beliefs about it. We show that with even an arbitrarily small amount of such uncertainty, the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and in addition there are sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we show that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then there are arbitrarily small common p-belief value perturbations under which an undesirable sequential equilibrium exists.

(2) We study whether priors that admit full surplus extraction (FSE) are generic, which becomes a gauge to evaluate the validity of the current mechanism design paradigm. We consider the space of priors on the universal type space, and thereby relax the assumption of a fixed finite number of types in Crémer and McLean (1988) along the direction of Wilson's Doctrine. We show that FSE priors are topologically generic, contrary to the result of Heifetz and Neeman (2006) that FSE is generically impossible, both geometrically and measure-theoretically. Instead of using the BDP approach or convex combination of priors adopted in Heifetz and Neeman (2006), we prove our genericity results by showing a robustness property of Crémer-McLean mechanisms.

2012年2月21日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

※社会科学研究所　産業組織研究会との共催

Ken Corts (University of Toronto)

Optimal (and Finite) Penalties for False Advertising [paper]

I show that information on product quality is sometimes (though not always) socially valuable and that when it is valuable there is generally a tradeoff between the acquisition and revelation of finer, but more costly information and the revelation of coarser, but less costly information. As a result, it can be optimal for firms to reveal only coarse private information. If the credibility of such information revelation is supported by penalties for misrepresentations of quality, then the regulator may optimally choose penalties that are not too strong, in order not to discourage firms from revealing their (optimally) coarse private information through what I term speculative claims. This is in stark contrast to the assumption of arbitrarily strong penalties for false advertising that is commonly made in the literature on information disclosure.

2012年3月27日 （火　Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

笠原博幸 (Hiroyuki Kasahara) (The University of British Columbia)

Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Programming Models (joint with Katsumi Shimotsu) [paper]

This paper develops a new computationally attractive procedure for estimating dynamic discrete choice models that is applicable to a wide range of dynamic programming models. The proposed procedure can accommodate unobserved state variables that (i) are neither additively separable nor follow generalized extreme value distribution, (ii) are serially correlated, and (iii) aect the choice set. Our estimation algorithm sequentially updates the parameter estimate and the value function estimate. It builds upon the idea of the iterative estimation algorithm proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) but conducts iteration using the value function mapping rather than the policy iteration mapping. Its implementation is straightforward in terms of computer programming; unlike the Hotz-Miller type estimators, there is no need to reformulate a xed point mapping in the value function space as that in the space of probability distributions. It is also applicable to estimate models with unobserved heterogeneity. We analyze the convergence property of our sequential algorithm and derive the conditions for its convergence. We develop an approximated procedure which reduces computational cost substantially without deteriorating the convergence rate. We further extend our sequential procedure for estimating dynamic programming models with an equilibrium constraint, which include dynamic game models and dynamic macroeconomic models.

※ 2012年1-2月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

配布資料の印刷をご希望の方は、下記の期日までにセンター研究支援室の田中(kimiko[at mark]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp)まで発表論文のファイルを送るか、ハードコピーをセンター研究支援室（経済学研究科 学術交流棟（小島ホール） ６階）までご持参下さい。提出されたファイルはすぐに印刷にまわしてしまいますので、その後の差し替えがないよう、最終稿を１度だけ提出してください。 期限内に届いたものについては当日配布用印刷物を用意いたしますが、間に合わない場合やその後の差し替えについては、当日ご自分で１５部ほどコピーをご持参下さい。期限内に提出されなかった場合は、印刷を受け付けられませんのでご注意ください。

※　印刷物は会場に届けられます。

※　パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。（プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。）

発表論文提出期限：

1月11日（水）発表者＝1月10日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月17日（火）発表者＝1月16日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月18日（水）発表者＝1月17日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月24日（火）発表者＝1月23日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月 25日（水）発表者＝1月24日（火）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月 31日（火）発表者＝1月30日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

2月 2日（木）発表者＝2月1日（水）朝9:00（必着）まで

2012年1月11日（水　Wednesday）16:50-17:30

エルデネバータル　バヤルマー （Readers：佐々木　松村　(大橋)）

Informed principal problem in quasi-linear environment

2012年1月11日（水　Wednesday）17:30-18:10

新田倫久 （Readers：佐々木　松村　(大橋)）

社会保障制度の収支均衡　保険料か消費税か

2012年1月11日（水　Wednesday）18:10-18:50

青江龍 （Readers：林　持田　(田渕)）

国勢調査パネルデータによる生活保護の決定要因分析

2012年1月11日（水　Wednesday）18:50-19:30

浅野北斗 （Readers：林　岩本　(澤田)）

等価尺度の推定による生活保護基準額の評価

2012年1月11日（水　Wednesday）19:30-20:10

長谷川望 （Readers：岩本　玄田　(林)）

公的保育施策に対する認可外保育所の反応の分析

2012年1月17日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

加藤隆太 （Readers：松井　松島　(神取)）

Generalization of "House allocation with existing tenants" multiple goods assignment

2012年1月17日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10

安達伸輝（Readers：松井　神取　(松島)）

ｸﾞﾛｰﾊﾞﾙ世界の中の少数言語ー２社会言語モデルによる分析

2012年1月17日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50

Shen, ChaoHai （Readers：神取　松井　(市村)）

Similarity in Reinforcement Learning

2012年1月17日（火　Tuesday）18:50-19:30

潮田佑 （Readers：神取　神谷　(市村)）

Media Capture and Reputation

2012年1月17日（火　Tuesday）19:30-20:10

角谷和彦 （Readers：神谷　神取　(市村)）

Education,Training and Policies under Labor Market Frictions

2012年1月18日（水　Wednesday）16:50-17:30

岩渕正人（Readers：柳川　松島　(三輪)）

産業要因を考慮したM&A実施後における企業財務パフォーマンス測定

2012年1月18日（水　Wednesday）17:30-18:10

永井淳（Readers：柳川　松島　(三輪)）

改正貸金業法下における貸出し行動の分析

2012年1月18日（水　Wednesday）18:10-18:50

上大谷起一（Readers：柳川　松島　(三輪)）

格付の保守性と手数料構造

2012年1月18日（水　Wednesday）18:50-19:30

竹村龍一（Readers：柳川　松島　(三輪)）

研究開発投資の決定要因ーIFRSと研究開発行動ー

2012年1月24日（火　Tuesday）13:00-13:40

尾又督隆 （Readers：大橋　佐々木　(松村)）

DVDレコーダー・BDレコーダー市場におけるネットワーク外部性の考察

2012年1月24日（火　Tuesday）13:40-14:20

福田真二 （Readers：大橋　佐々木　(松村)）

日本の新聞業界のマークアップから新聞社の戦略を考える

2012年1月24日（火　Tuesday）16:10-16:50

久光孔世留 （Readers：大橋　飯塚　(佐々木)）

品質調整の手法の変化による物価指数の変容

2012年1月24日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

遠山祐太 （Readers：大橋　市村　(三輪)）

Quantifying the Impacts of a Horizontal Merger on Both Domestic and Export Markets : The Case of the Hyundai-Kia Merger in the Korean Automobile Industry

2012年1月25日（水　Wednesday）17:30-18:10

梶哲也 （Readers：市村　松井　(神取)）

Structural Estimation of the Japanese Marriage Market as a Finite-horizon Dynamic Matching Model

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）16:10-16:50 * Schedule Changed *

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）

１階 第２セミナー室 　

in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)

※会場が第２セミナー室（セミナー室隣）となりますのでご注意下さい。

西村仁憲 （Readers：市村　鈴木　(岩本)）

THE EFFECTS OF JAPANESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM ON RETIREMENT BEHAVIOR

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）16:10-16:50

Charles-Alexis Couvreur （Readers：中林　澤田　(大橋)）

INSIGHTS ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: Banking Companies from 1870 to 1885

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

坂井容子 （Readers：澤田　市村　(大橋)）

The Analysis of Impact on Household Welfare from the typhoon Milenyo in the Philippines

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10

宮内悠平 （Readers：市村　澤田　(神取))

The Analysis of Impact on Household Welfare from the typhoon Milenyo in the Philippines

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50

山�ｱ公輔 （Readers：市村　澤田　(玄田))

社会関係資本と健康

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）18:50-19:30

ブドジャワ　ムンフバヤラ （Readers：澤田　市村　(鈴木))

Testing Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis in Mongolia : The Euler equation approach in micro data

2012年1月31日（火　Tuesday）19:30-20:10

小林潤 （Readers：玄田　市村　(中村（圭))

転職選択行動と転職による所得変化

2012年2月2日（木　Thursday）15:00-15:40

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）

２階 小島コンファレンスルーム 　※会場にご注意下さい。
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)

樋口一登Christopher （Readers：伊藤(元)　 柳川　(大橋))

Firm Heterogeneity and Location Destination Decision of Japanese Multinational Firms : Firm Productivity and Production Factor Ratio

2012年2月2日（木　Thursday）15:40-16:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）

２階 小島コンファレンスルーム 　※会場にご注意下さい。
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)

Zhang, RuiFeng （Readers：伊藤(元)　 柳川　(大橋))

The effects of mortality decline on savings and education in rural and urban China