財政・公共経済ワークショップ
Public Economics Workshop
2015年3月23日現在
※ 発表は原則として日本語で行われます。Presentations are basically in Japanese.
※ 経済学研究科教員・学生の方はご自由にご参加頂けます。
予定
今年度終了分
| 日時 | 2014年4月14日（月）10:30-12:10※ミクロワークショップと共催 Presentation in English |
| 場所 |
東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール） ※会場が第１セミナー室へ変更いたしましたのでご注意ください。 |
| 発表者・報告 | 小川光(Hikaru Ogawa) (Nagoya University) Municipal Merger and Tax Competition |
| 要旨 | This paper integrates the models of municipal consolidation and fiscal competition to examine governments' incentives for merging municipalities when countries engage in global tax competition. The result shows that the prospective tax competition leads to excessive municipal mergers. |
| 日時 | 2014年4月15日（火）16:40-18:20※ミクロワークショップと共催 |
| 場所 |
東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール） ※会場は1階となりますのでご注意ください。 |
| 発表者・報告 | 安藤道人(Michihito Ando) (Uppsala University) Identifying the Effects of Grants on Local Policies in the Presence of Grant Endogeneity and Grant Effect Heterogeneity [PDF]
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| 要旨 | Although recent empirical studies on the effects of intergovernmental grants on local policies and other outcomes have increasingly taken into account grant endogeneity, most of them rely on a linear estimation framework with a constant treatment effect or do not explicitly consider treatment effect heterogeneity in their theoretical and empirical models. In this paper, assuming a two-stage grant allocation process and relying on the potential outcome framework, I explicitly consider the case where heterogeneous propensities of local governments for public services induce endogenous grant allocation and heterogeneous grant effects on local policies. Then I discuss how a Regression Kink (RK) design with a kinked grant allocation rule can be utilized to solve the problem of grant endogeneity under the assumption of grant effect heterogeneity. Finally, using Japanese municipality panel data, I examine the causal effects of fiscal equalization grants on local policies with the RK design. Results imply that, for a specific subgroup of relatively affluent municipalities, expenditures for non-personnel education costs are arguably most significantly affected by the grants. Effects on other various expenditure categories and policy indicators are also estimated and interpreted. |
| 日時 | 2014年5月22日（木）14:50-16:30 ※時間にご注意ください。※マクロワークショップと共催 Presentation in English |
| 場所 |
東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール） ※会場は1階となりますのでご注意ください。 |
| 発表者・報告 | 小野哲生 (Testuo Ono) (Osaka University) Intergenerational politics, government debt and economic growth
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| 要旨 | This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model featuring endogenous growth and intergenerational conflict over fiscal policy. In particular, the paper characterizes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game between generations, and shows the following results. First, in an unbalanced budget case, the government borrows or lends in the capital market depending on the share of capital in production. Second, when the government borrows in the capital market, an introduction of a balanced budget rule results in a higher growth rate. Third, to obtain a normative implication of the political equilibrium, the paper considers a benevolent planner with a commitment technology, and shows that the planner always chooses to lend in the capital market to save more for future generations and thus attains a higher growth rate than the government in a political equilibrium. |