April 2, 2018 (Monday)10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Hannes Mueller (Barcelona Graduate School of Economics)

"The Hard Problem of Prediction for Prevention: Reading Between the Lines" (joint with Christopher Rauh) [paper]

This article provides a new methodology to predict armed conflict by using newspaper text. Through machine learning, vast quantities of newspaper text are reduced to interpretable topics. These topics are then used in panel regressions to predict the onset of conflict. We propose the use of the within- country variation of these topics to predict the timing of conflict. This allows us to avoid the tendency of predicting conflict only in countries where it occurred before. We show that the within-country variation of topics is a good predictor of conflict and becomes particularly useful when risk in previously peaceful countries arises. Two aspects seem to be responsible for these features. Topics provide depth because they consist of changing, long lists of terms which makes them able to capture the changing context of conflict. At the same time topics provide width because they are summaries of the full text, including stabilizing factors.

Andrew Griffen

April 9, 2018 (Monday)10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Carlos Carrilo-Tudela (University of Essex)

"The Cost of Job Loss" (joint with Kenneth Burdett, and Melvyn Coles) [paper]

This paper identifies an equilibrium theory of wage formation and quit turnover in a labour market where risk averse workers accumulate human capital through learning-by- doing while employed, there is skill loss while unemployed and there is on-the-job search. Firms set optimal company wage policies which, in equilibrium, have the property that the wage paid increases with experience and tenure. Using indirect inference, our quantitative analysis shows the model not only reproduces the large and persistent fall in wages following job loss as found in UK data, it also explains why those wage losses differ so markedly across skill groups.

Shintaro Yamaguchi

April 16, 2018 (Monday)10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Christopher Flinn (New York University)

"Firm's Choices of Wage-Setting Protocols in the Presence of Minimum Wages" [paper]

We study the formation of wages in a frictional search market where firms can choose either to bargain with workers or post non-negotiable wage offers. Workers can secure wage increases for themselves by engaging in on-the-job search and either moving to firms that offer higher wages or, when possible, leveraging an outside offer into a higher wage at the current firm. We characterize the optimal wage posting strategy of non-negotiating firms and how this decision is influenced by the presence of renegotiating firms. We quantitatively examine the model's unique implications for efficiency, wage dispersion, and worker welfare by estimating it using data on the wages and employment spells of low-skill workers in the United States. In the estimated steady state of the model, we find that more than 10% of job acceptance decisions made while on the job are socially sub-optimal. We also find that, relative to a benchmark case without renegotiation, the presence of even a small number of these firms increases the wage dispersion attributable to search frictions, deflates wages, and reduces worker welfare. Moving to a general equilibrium setting, we use the estimated model to study the impact of a minimum wage increase on firm bargaining strategies and worker outcomes. Our key nding is that binding minimum wages lead to an increase in the equilibrium fraction of renegotiating firms which, relative to a counterfactual in which this fraction is fixed, significantly dampens the reduction in wage dispersion and gains in worker welfare that can typically be achieved with moderate minimum wage increases. Indeed, the presence of endogenous bargaining strategies reverses the sign of the average welfare effect of a $15 minimum wage from positive to negative.

Hidehiko Ichimura

May 7, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jesper Bagger (Royal Holloway, University of London)

"Income Taxation and Equilibrium Labor Allocation"

We study the role of labor income taxation on job search and frictional labor market matching in the presence of worker and firm heterogeneity. Our analysis is strictly positive and is based on a rich equilibrium on-the-job search model of the labor market with endogenous search effort. We estimate the structural model on Danish administrative data and evaluate how three income tax reforms in Denmark in the 1990s and 2000s affected equilibrium labor allocation, wages, and output. The reforms resulted in labor income increasing by 1.8 percent, while unemployment decreased by 4.8 percent. The model allows us to identify Pareto optimal tax reforms that increases government revenue while improving everyone's welfare. In the case of risk-averse workers, Pareto optimal tax system calls for a slightly higher degree of progressivity and produces a modest increase in government revenue by around 0.1 percent, while increasing lifetime utility of the different worker types by between 0.01 percent and 0.1 percent.

Daiji Kawaguchi

May 8, 2018 （Tuesday）10:25-12:10 ※日時に注意

主催： ミクロ経済学ワークショップ
共催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Christopher Taber （University of Wisconsin-Madison)

"Estimation of a Life-Cycle Model with Human Capital, Labor Supply and Retirement" (joint with Xiaodong Fan, and Ananth Seshadri) [paper]

• We develop and estimate a life-cycle model in which individuals make decisions about consumption, human capital investment, and labor supply. Retirement arises endogenously as part of the labor supply decision. The model allows for both an endogenous wage process through human capital investment (which is typically assumed exogenous in the retirement literature) and an endogenous retirement decision (which is typically assumed exogenous in the human capital literature). We estimate the model using Indirect Inference to match the life-cycle profiles of wages and hours from the SIPP data. The model replicates the main features of the data—in particular the large increase in wages and small increase in labor supply at the beginning of the life-cycle as well as the small decrease in wages but large decrease in labor supply at the end of the life cycle. We also estimate versions of the model in which human capital is completely exogenous and in which human capital is exogenous conditional on work (learning-by-doing). The endogenous human capital model fits the data the best; the learning-by-doing model is able to fit the overall life-cycle pattern; the exogenous model does not. We find that endogenous labor supply is essential for understanding life-cycle human capital investment and life-cycle human capital investment is essential for understanding life-cycle labor supply.

Hidehiko Ichimura

May 14, 2018 （Monday）10:30-12:00

共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yusuke Narita (Yale University)

"Toward an Ethical Experiment" [paper]

Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) enroll hundreds of millions of subjects and involve many human lives. To improve subjects’ welfare, I propose an alternative design of RCTs that I call Experiment-as-Market (EXAM). EXAM Pareto optimally randomly assigns each treatment to subjects predicted to experience better treatment effects or to subjects with stronger preferences for the treatment. EXAM is also asymptotically incentive compatible for preference elicitation. Finally, EXAM unbiasedly estimates any causal effect estimable with standard RCTs. I quantify the welfare, incentive, and information properties by applying EXAM to a water cleaning experiment in Kenya (Kremer et al., 2011). Compared to standard RCTs, EXAM substantially improves subjects’ predicted well-being while reaching similar treatment effect estimates with similar precision.

Hitoshi Matsushima

May 15, 2018 （Tuesday）10:25-12:10
※日時に注意

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Xing Xia (Yale-NUS College)

"Selective mortality and the long-term effects of early-life exposure to natural disasters"[paper]

We analyze the effects of early-life shocks with varying degrees of severity on mortality and human capital outcomes in the Philippines. We exploit variations in typhoon exposure and the introduction of a short-term post-disaster relief policy. Before the policy, mortality from in-utero exposure to severe typhoons was 10 percent, but survivors exhibited similar levels of human capital as the unaffected. The policy change mitigated the mortality effect of severe typhoons, but survivors have lower human capital in the long-term. The observed changes in adverse long-term effects are due to the policy’s effectiveness in increasing survival probability.

Daiji Kawaguchi

May 21, 2018 (Monday) 10:25-12:15
※時間に注意

共催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE), 法学政治学研究科比較法政センター
支援：東大友の会、イェール大学マクミランセンター
第12回山川健次郎レクチャーシリーズ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Fredrik Sävje (Yale University)

Average treatment effects in the presence of unknown interference [paper]

We investigate large-sample properties of treatment effect estimators under unknown interference in randomized experiments. The inferential target is a generalization of the average treatment effect estimand that marginalizes over potential spillover effects. We show that estimators commonly used to estimate treatment effects under no-interference are consistent for the generalized estimand for most experimental designs under limited but otherwise arbitrary and unknown interference. The rates of convergence depend on the rate at which the amount of interference grows and the degree to which it aligns with dependencies in treatment assignment. Importantly for practitioners, the results imply that if one erroneously assumes that units do not interfere in a setting with limited, or even moderate, interference, standard estimators are nevertheless likely to be close to an average treatment effect if the sample is sufficiently large.

Hidehiko Ichimura

May 22, 2018 （Tuesday）10:25-12:10
※日時に注意

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

小西祥文 (Yoshifumi Konishi) (University of Tsukuba)

"Distorted Technical Change? Evidence from New Vehicle Launches in the Japanese Automobile Industry"

We empirically examine the distortionary impact of an attribute-based regulation on technical change, in the context of new product launches in the Japanese automobile industry. Under the Japanese regulation, fuel economy standards are a step function of curb weight, and their stringency levels vary substantially over time across weight bins of different sizes. We explicitly exploit these quasi-experimental variations in the difference-in-difference-in-differences framework to control for confounders that may be correlated with regulatory assignment. We find strong evidence in support of our theoretical prediction: An attribute-based regulation distorts technical change when it creates trade-offs between the targeted and secondary attributes that differ from technically feasible trade-offs. We also demonstrate that bunching behavior reported elsewhere was evident only in reporting to the government, but not in product offerings in the market.

Hikaru Ogawa

May 24, 2018 （Thursday） 16:50-18:35
※日時・場所に注意

主催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)
共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学国際学術総合研究棟地下１階・第１教室 [地図]
Lecture Hall No. 1, International Academic Research Building, University of Tokyo [Map]

Joshua Angrist (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

"Uber vs. Taxi: A Driver’s Eye View" (joint with Sydnee Caldwell, and Jonathan V. Hall) [paper]

Ride-hailing drivers pay a proportion of their fares to the ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many internet-mediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a ?xed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. We assess these compensation models from a driver’s point of view using an experiment that o?ered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were o?ered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our o?ers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2. At the same time, our virtual lease program was under-subscribed: many drivers who would have bene?tted from buying an inexpensive lease chose to opt out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indi?erent between ride-hailing and a traditional taxi compensation contract. The results suggest that ride-hailing drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing.

May 25, 2018 (Friday) 16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Michela Giorcelli (University of California, Los Angeles)

"Reconstruction Aid, Public Infrastructure, and Economic Growth" (joint with Nicola Bianchi) [paper]

This paper studies the effects of international reconstruction aid on long-term economic development. It exploits plausibly exogenous differences between Italian provinces in the amount of grants disbursed through the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of public infrastructure. Provinces that received more reconstruction grants experienced a larger increase in the number of industrial firms and workers. Individuals and firms in these areas also started developing more patents. The same provinces experienced a faster mechanization of the agricultural sector. Motorized machines, such as tractors, replaced workers and significantly boosted agricultural production. Finally, we show how reconstruction grants induced economic growth by allowing Italian provinces to modernize their transportation and communication networks damaged during WWII.

Tetsuji Okazaki

June 11, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※主催：応用統計ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Marc Henry (The Pennsylvania State University)

"Sharp bounds and testability of a Roy model of STEM major choices" (joint with Ismael Mourifie and Romuald Meango)

We analyze the empirical content of the Roy model, stripped down to its essential features, namely sector specific unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection on the basis of potential outcomes. We characterize sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and testable implications of the Roy self-selection model under an instrumental constraint on the joint distribution of potential outcomes we call stochastically monotone instrumental variable (SMIV). We show that testing the Roy model selection is equivalent to testing stochastic monotonicity of observed outcomes relative to the instrument. Special emphasis is put on the case of binary outcomes, which has received little attention in the literature to date. For richer sets of outcomes, we emphasize the distinction between pointwise sharp bounds and functional sharp bounds, and its importance, when constructing sharp bounds on functional features, such as inequality measures. We analyze a Roy model of college major choice in Canada and Germany within this framework, and we take a new look at the under-representation of women in STEM.

Katsumi Shimotsu

June 18, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Dean Hyslop (Motu Economic and Public Policy Research)

Earnings dynamics and measurement error in matched survey and administrative data (joint with Wilbur Townsendy) [paper] *paper updated on June 18

This paper analyzes earnings dynamics and measurement error using a matched longitudinal sample of individuals’ survey and administrative earnings. We reject that survey reports are measured with classical error and the administrative earnings are error free. The reported differences are negatively correlated with average administrative earnings, and with annual deviations, and characterized by both persistent and transitory factors. We formulate models for individuals’ true earnings and measurement errors in each report. Assuming no measurement error in the administrative reports, we estimate mean-reverting errors in the survey report, but this finding is not robust to relaxing this assumption. The results imply measurement errors dominate the observed changes in earnings.

Daiji Kawaguchi

June 26, 2018 (Tuesday) 10:25-12:10

※日時に注意

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yusuke Narita (Yale University)

Match or Mismatch? Learning and Inertia in School Choice [paper]

Centralized matching markets are designed assuming that participants make well- informed choices upfront. However, this paper uses data from NYC’s school choice system to show that families’ choices change after the initial match as they learn about schools. I develop an empirical model of evolving demand for schools under learning, endowment effects in response to prior assignments, and switching costs. These model components are identified by using admissions lotteries and other institutional features. The estimates suggest that there are even more changes in underlying demand than in observed choices, undermining the welfare performance of the initial match. To al- leviate the welfare cost of demand changes, I theoretically and empirically investigate dynamic mechanisms that best accommodate choice changes. These mechanisms im- prove on the existing discretionary reapplication process. In addition, the gains from the mechanisms drastically change depending on the extent of demand-side inertia caused by switching costs. Thus, the gains from a centralized market depend not only on its design but also on demand-side frictions (such as demand changes and inertia).

Daiji Kawaguchi

July 2, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yangguang (Sunny) Huang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

"A Model of Sales on Online Platforms"

One prominent feature of online sales is that consumers rely on search tools offered by platforms to process the tremendous amount of information in searching for products. These search tools, such as search engines and recommender systems, can have anti-competitive impacts on the market by affecting the consideration sets of consumers. We develop a model that demonstrates how a search algorithm affects the market structure and welfare. Our model also captures two other effects generated by online platforms: reducing search costs and increasing market participation. Using data from food delivery platforms, we provide empirical evidence of the model.?

Naoki Wakamori

July 23, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

吉田二郎（Jiro Yoshida) (The Pennsylvania State University and CREPE)

Cash to Spend: Credit Constraints, IPO Lockups, and House Prices (joint with Barney Hartman-Glaser, Mark Thibodeau)

This study empirically demonstrates the positive impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on local housing values in California from 1993 through 2017. In the spirit of the difference-in-difference approach, we test whether hedonic price indexes (HPIs) increase after IPO events more for the areas around IPO firm headquarters. We use the IPO events of public filing, issuing, and lockup expiration to distinguish changes in the shareholders' expected wealth, assessed wealth, and immediately available wealth, respectively. HPIs increase more within 5 miles of IPO headquarters than in the surrounding area by 0.8 to 3.3 percentage points after all types of IPO events. There is significant variation, by distance, by property market segment, by firm/IPO characteristics and performance. For example, firms with the highest stock returns or volatility are associated with a larger change in house prices around the lockup expiration date. The result is consistent with risk-averse shareholders diversifying into housing and being liquidity-constrained due to an inability to borrow against book wealth. This study sheds light on the effect of successful entrepreneurs on the local economy.

Shintaro Yamaguchi

July 30, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kai Liu (University of Cambridge)

Estimating the Dynamic Effects of a Job Training Program with Multiple Alternatives

This paper aims at estimating the causal effect of a job training program for disadvantaged youths on their subsequent earnings. Participants are randomized in treatment and control groups, but are allowed to choose when to leave the program and to participate (alternative) training when not enrolled in the program. We consider a multi-stage decision setting, where individuals sequentially select which training to obtain at every stage. The standard Wald estimator using initial random assignment as instrument identifies a weighted average of the effects of the treatment for the subgroups of individuals selecting different duration and different trainings outside the program. We develop a selection model which allows to separately estimate the effect of the treatment for the different subgroups. We use the estimated model to investigate dynamic complementarity/substitutability between different training programs. We show that considering the dynamic interaction between different trainings in this setting is relevant to study the heterogeneous effect of the program and to conduct a complete cost-benefit analysis.

Shintaro Yamaguchi

July 31, 2018 (Tuesday) 10:25-12:10 ※日時に注意

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)

Taxation and Market Power in Legal Marijuana Industry (with Brett Hollenbeck)  

Shintaro Yamaguchi

October 1, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Vivek Bhattacharya (Northwestern University)

"Bidding and Drilling Under Uncertainty: An Empirical Analysis of Contingent Payment Auctions (joint with Andrey Ordin and James W. Roberts)" [paper]

 

Auctions are often used to sell assets whose future cash flows require the winner to make post-auction investments. When a winner’s payment is contingent on the asset’s cash flows, auction design can influence both bidding and incentives to exert effort after the auction. This paper proposes a model of contingent payment auctions that explicitly links auction design to post-auction economic activity, in the context of Permian Basin oil auctions. The estimated model is used to demonstrate that auction design can materially impact both revenue and post-auction drilling activity, as well as mitigate or amplify the effects of oil price shocks.

Naoki Wakamori

October 15, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Joshua B. Miller (University of Alicante)

"The Hot Hand Fallacy Fallacy" [paper]

The hot hand fallacy has long been considered a massive and widespread cognitive illusion with important implications for decision making. We uncover a subtle, but critical, statistical bias that invalidates previous evidence supporting the hot hand fallacy in its canonical domain, basketball shooting. We re-assess and re-analyze basketball shooting and betting data. We find that the hot hand exists, and that players can bet on it successfully.

Andrew Griffen

October 29, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Andrew Griffen (The University of Tokyo)

"School Based Management and Prosocial Preferences: Experimental Evidence from Burkina Faso"

Shintaro Yamaguchi

November 12, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yuta Toyama (Waseda University)

"Dynamic Incentives and Equilibrium in Cap-and-Trade Regulation"

Regulatory design of cap-and-trade program involves dynamic considerations: A regulator set up a schedule of permit allocation, which often decreases over time, and decides whether it allows for saving/borrowing of emissions permits across periods. Given such dynamic policy design, regulated firms make abatement and compliance decisions in a forward-looking way. This paper studies dynamic incentives of those firms and equilibrium outcomes under cap-and-trade regulation. I first develop a dynamic equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms that characterizes abatement investment and permit trading subject to transactions costs. I estimate the model using the data from the US Acid Rain Program and evaluate the performance of cap-and-trade through counterfactual simulations. I found that, given a fixed level of aggregate emissions, the costs of reducing emissions under cap-and-trade are 16.6% lower than a uniform standard. Although environmental damages from SO2 emissions increase due to the change in the geographic distribution of emissions, the net-benefit of the cap-and-trade is positive. I also examine the potential gains from trade in the absence of transaction costs. I find more dispersed patterns of investment and less banking of permits, both of which result in cost savings.  

Shintaro Yamaguchi

November 26, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Eeshani Kandpal (World Bank - DEC)

"General Equilibrium Effects of Targeted Cash Transfers Nutrition Impacts on Non-Beneficiary Children"[paper]

Cash transfer programs may generate significant general equilibrium effects that can detract from the anti-poverty goals of the program. Data from a randomized evaluation of a Philippine cash transfer program targeted to poor households show that a 9 percent increase in village income significantly raised the prices of perishable protein-rich foods while leaving other food prices unaffected. The price changes are largest in areas with the highest program saturation, where the shock to village income is on the order of 15 percent and persists more than 2.5 years after program introduction. Although significantly improving nutrition related outcomes among beneficiary children, the cash transfer worsened those same indicators among non-beneficiary children. The stunting rate of young non-beneficiary children increased by eleven percentage points, with even greater increases in the most saturated areas. Another potentially related spillover arises in local health markets: formal health care utilization by mothers and children also declined among non-beneficiary households. Failing to consider such local general equilibrium effects can over - state the net benefit of targeted cash transfers. In areas where individual targeting of social programs covers the majority of households, offering the program on a universal basis should avoid such negative impacts at little additional cost. 

Andrew Griffen

December 3, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Suphanit Piyapromdee (University College London)

"On Worker and Firm Heterogeneity in Wages and Employment Mobility: Evidence from Danish Data" with Rasmus Lentz and Jean-Marc Robin [paper]

In this paper, we develop a model of wage dynamics and employment mobility with unrestricted interactions between worker and firm unobserved characteristics in both wages and employment mobility. We adopt the finite mixture approach of Bonhomme et al. (2017). The model is estimated on Danish matched employer-employee data for the period 1985-2013. The estimation includes gender, education, age, tenure and time controls. We find significant sorting on wages and it is stable over the period. Sorting is established early in careers, increasing during the first decade after which it declines steadily. Job-to-job mobility displays a “mean-reverting” pattern that maintains correlations between worker and firm types to a stationary level. Counterfactuals demonstrate that sorting is primarily driven by two channels: First, a “preference” channel whereby higher wage workers are more likely to accept jobs in higher wage firms. Second, a job finding channel where the job destination distribution out of non-employment is stochastically increasing in the wage type of the worker. 

Shintaro Yamaguchi

December 10, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Ami Ko (Georgetown University)

"An equilibrium analysis of the long-term care insurance market"[paper]

A life-cycle model of intergenerational long-term care decisions is developed to analyze how family interactions affect the equilibrium coverage and welfare in the U.S. long-term care insurance market. In the model, consistent with empirical facts, help provided by adult children substitutes formal long-term care services, and parents’ purchase of long-term care insurance discourages children’s informal care provision. The model is structurally estimated using data from the Health and Retirement Study by the conditional choice probability (CCP) estimation method. I find that wealthy parents have a disincentive to purchase insurance as it reduces their children’s strategic incentive to provide informal care. I also find that the failure to account for heterogeneity in informal care options results in adverse selection where the long-term care insurance market attracts a disproportionate number of individuals with worse informal care options and hence higher expected formal care spending. I demonstrate that using family demographics in pricing long-term care insurance contracts reduces adverse selection and improves the average welfare of the elderly.

Andrew Griffen

CREPE Conference on Program Evaluation

December 22, 2018 (Saturday)9:25-18:00 ※日時・場所に注意

*Registration is Required

※主催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学国際学術総合研究棟２階・第６教室[地図]
Lecture Hall No. 6, International Academic Research Building [MAP]

※12/3 会場が変更になりました (venue has been changed)

 

9:25 am to 9:30 am: Opening Remarks

9:30 am to 11:00 am
"Labor Market Screening and Social Insurance Program Designs for Disabled"
Naoki Aizawa (Wisconsin)
"How elastic is capacity choice of welfare facilities? Evidence from notches in child care subsidy scheme"
Taiyo Fukai (UTokyo)

11:00 am to 11:20 am: Break

11:20am to 12:05 pm
"Publication Bias under Imperfect Aggregation: Theory, Evidence, and a New Correction Method"
Chishio Furukawa (UTokyo / MIT)

12:05 pm to 1:30 pm: Lunch (on your own)

1:30 pm to 3:00 pm
"Using Rotation and Incumbency Patterns to Detect Collusion"
Kei Kawai (UC Berkeley)
"Ratcheting, Competition, and the Diffusion of Technological Change: The Case of Televisions under an Energy Efficiency Program"
Tomomichi Amano (Columbia)

3:00 pm to 3:20 pm: Break

3:20 pm to 4:50 pm
"Spring Forward and Fall Back on Health: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Acute Myocardial Infarction"
Shinsuke Tanaka (Tufts)
"Proximity to Delhi Metro and Female Work Participation"
Mai Seki (Ritsumeikan)

4:50 pm to 5:10 pm: Break

5:10 pm to 5:55 pm
"Mixture Models"
Hiroyuki Kasahara (UBC)

5:55 pm to 6:00 pm: Closing Remarks CREPE Conference on Program Evaluation

　　　　Please click here for details of registration

 

January 7, 2019 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Stephan Litschig (The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))

"Measuring corruption when punishments are asymmetric in practice" with Aamer Shahid (National Accountability Bureau of Pakistan)

We provide a proof of concept for measuring corruption from the inside when de jure punishments are symmetric but enforcement is asymmetric in practice. We approached 48 water supply project contractors for the Public Health Engineering Department (PHED) of the provincial government of Punjab in Pakistan. 28 contractors agreed to be interviewed and give us access to 237 project-level internal records on the condition of anonymity. We also conducted qualitative interviews with PHED engineers and end-users of the construction projects. Both quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest that the level of bribes depends heavily on whether the contract was awarded competitively or through collusion between the contractors and the engineer in charge of the project. Only about one-third of contracts in the sample were awarded competitively. Under collusion, PHED contractors on average pay about 15% of the project budget in bribes. About 12% is paid to the engineering department and about 3% is paid to the politicians who sponsored the project. When there is competition for the contract, the average total bribe percentage is about 10%, with 8.5% going to the department and 1.5% going to politicians on average. Contractors’ profit margins are about 13% on average, irrespective of competition. These numbers provide a lower bound on bribery if those who pay higher bribes refused to participate in the study.

Shintaro Yamaguchi

January 21, 2019 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Guido Friebel (Goethe University)

"A pay change and its long-term consequences"　[Paper]

We investigate the consequences of an unexpected pay change in a consulting firm. After a
reduction in the slope of the bonus function, consultants’ output in the affected divisions
decreased by around 30%, and attrition increased. Based on the firm’s management
information system, we document that consultants’ efforts decreased by the same order of
magnitude as output. We present evidence that these effects cannot be interpreted as a spot
reaction to the flatter slope of the bonus function. Rather, they support the views of the fair
wage hypothesis and of relational contracting. The drop of performance triggered by the pay
change, however, was only temporary, because the consultants who enter after the pay change
are equally productive as the ones who were in the firm when the pay change occurred.

Shintaro Yamaguchi

※ 2019年1月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the following schedule might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

 

発表論文についてはCIRJEにて印刷し、当日会場にて配布いたします。つきましては、下記の期日までに最終稿のファイルまたはハードコピーをご提出ください。

 

発表論文提出期限（厳守）：

1月21日（月）発表者＝1月18日（金）昼12:00（必着）まで

 

提出先：学術交流棟（小島ホール）６階 CIRJE　（cirje[at mark]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp）

1. 上記提出期限の日時を過ぎたものについてはいかなる理由があっても受け付けられません。ご自身で15部のコピーをご用意の上、当日会場にご持参ください。
2. 論文は必ず最終稿をご提出ください。提出後の差し替えは受け付けませんので、差し替えなければならない事態が発生した場合には、論文はご自身で印刷して（15部）当日持参して頂くことになります。
3. 添付ファイルが破損している等、ファイルが開けない場合は連絡を差し上げるため、ファイルで提出される方はお申し込み時に携帯電話番号等、当日すぐに連絡のつく連絡先をお書き添え下さい。
4. 別途、正式な修士論文口述試験が行なわれるので、修士論文提出時に大学院係から配付される審査日程を参照のうえ、必ずご出席下さい。
5. パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。（プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。）
6. 発表用のスライドファイルを入れるUSBには、（他のファイルを入れずに）スライドファイルのみを入れて会場へお持ち下さい。（スライド以外の情報がたくさん入ったUSBが認識されない、というトラブルが起きているためです。）

Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to CIRJE at cirje [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):
January 21 (Monday)…by 12:00pm., January 18 (Friday)

 

Make sure that

• Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
• The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
• You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.
• Please put a file of your presentation slides only in your USB memory when you come to the seminar venue since it is sometimes not recognized when other files are inculded in the USB memory.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on presentation day:  make sure they should be back into the position after use.

January 21, 2019 (Monday) 13:30-16:30

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

修士論文報告会（Master's Thesis Presentations）

13:30-14:00 　小林健太郎　（Readers： 高崎、川口 （田中 ））

“Do Parents Reinforce or Compensate Their Children's Endowment? Empirical Evidence from South Africa”

14:00-14:30　 LUO Xianwei 　（Readers： 川口、田中（川田 ））

“Estimating the experience effect on student outcome: An empirical study on middle school student in China”

14:30-15:00 　井上ちひろ （Readers： 山口、川口 （田中 ））

“Education Choice in Anticipation of Future Spouse"

15:00-15:30 　河原崎耀　（Readers： 市村、川口 （山口））

“Does Early Childhood Education and Care Matter for Older Adulthood Outcomes?”

15:30-16:00 　HONG Sungwan　（Readers： 市村、Griffen （近藤 ））

“The effect of private and public kindergartens on child development: analyzing a market failure”

16:00-16:30 　柴田真宏　（Readers： 市村、 川田 （Griffen ））　

“Distinguishing consideration from preference in Sequential Search Discrete Choice”

Shintaro Yamaguchi

January 28, 2019 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Isis Durrmeyer (Toulouse University)

"Winners and losers: the distributional effects of the French feebate on the automobile market"[Paper]

I quantify the monetary and environmental gains and losses of an environmental purchase tax/subsidy (feebate) for new cars using a structural model of demand and supply that features a high level of heterogeneity in consumers' preferences. I simulate the market equilibrium without the feebate to quantify its causal effects. The regulation favors middle-income individuals but has redistributive effects when combined with a proportional to income tax. It reduces average carbon emissions at the cost of extra emissions of local air pollutants. The emissions, however, increase the least where they are the highest, implying another type of redistribution.

Naoki Wakamori

February 18, 2019 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Shiko Maruyama (University of Technology Sydney)

Impacts of Unexpected Birth Outcomes on the Life of Children and Parents: Why Dynamic Complementarities?

1) Another Look at Returns to Birthweight (joint with Eskil Heinesen)

We revisit the causal effect of birthweight. Because variation in birthweight in developed countries primarily stems from variation in gestational age rather than intrauterine growth restriction, we depart from the widely-used twin fixed-effects estimator and employ an instrumental variable – the diagnosis of placenta previa, which provides exogenous variation in gestation length. We find protective effects of additional birthweight against infant mortality and health capital loss, such as cerebral palsy, but in contrast to sibling and twin studies, no strong evidence for nonhealth long-run outcomes, such as test scores. We also find that short-run birthweight effects have diminished significantly over the decades.

 

2) Demanding Babies: How Unexpected Birth Outcomes Alter Parents’ Life (joint with Eskil Heinesen)

Children with severe health problems and disabilities require continuing care from parents. Understanding the impacts of unexpected care needs on parents and how parents cope with these shocks is an essential first step in designing policies to support impacted parents and reduce the catastrophic risk in the life of families. There is a large, long-standing literature on the effect of children’s health on parental labor supply, but two major limitations of the literature are identified. First, the vast majority of the literature relies on a simple regression framework without a causal research design. Second, the majority of the literature focuses on the impact on maternal labor supply. Many studies found statistically significant negative effects of children’s health problems and disabilities on the mother’s labor supply, but an important knowledge gap is whether this is a temporary adjustment or a catastrophic life-long event to families even in a contemporary developed country. In this paper, we use population data from Denmark to investigate the impact of severe child care needs on not only parental labor supply but also the family stability, future fertility decision, and parental crime. To obtain more credible causal estimates than previous studies, we focus on birth outcomes, which can be interpreted as the initial health endowment. Because many birth outcomes, such as birthweight and perinatal infection, are often non-random and significantly correlated with the socio-demographic status of parents, we study three plausibly exogenous unexpected birth 2 shocks that tend to result in non-negligible care needs but have little long-term impact on the health of mothers: (1) placenta previa, an obstetric complication that tends to cause premature birth; (2) twin births; and (3) congenital heart disease. We argue that, after controlling for an extensive set of independent variables, these shocks at birth are fairly random. Our results show statistically significant effects of these unexpected birth outcomes: these birth shocks decrease parental labor supply and future fertility and increase the risks of parental separation and committing a crime by the 5th birthday of the child. These effects are particularly strong in the group of parents who are younger, immigrants, and lower educated. This study highlights that even in one of the most developed welfare states, the low SES group faces a substantial life-long risk in having a child.

Daiji Kawaguchi

February 21, 2019（Thursday）17:00-18:30 ※日時に注意

※主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Matthew Backus (Columbia University and NBER)

"Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017" (joint with Christopher Conlonz Michael Sinkinson)

When competing firms possess overlapping sets of investors, maximizing shareholder value may provide incentives that distort competitive behavior, affecting pricing, entry, contracting, and virtually all strategic interactions among firms. We propose an approach to the measurement of this phenomenon for the universe of S&P 500 firms between 1980 and 2017. Over this period, the incentives implied by the common ownership hypothesis have grown dramatically. Contrary to popular intuition, this is not primarily associated with the rise of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street: instead, the trend in the time series is driven by a broader rise in diversified investment strate- gies, of which these firms are only the most recent incarnation. In the cross section, there is substantial variation that can be traced, both in the theory and the data, to observable firm characteristics - particularly the share of the firm held by retail investors. Finally, we show how common ownership can theoretically give rise to incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the "widely held firm."

Hiroshi Ohashi

February 25, 2019 (Monday) 10:40-12:10 ※時間・場所に注意

*Registration is Required

※ミクロ経済学ワークショップと共催

GRIPS Lecture Room J (5th floor), National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677[Map]

 

 Register Here

 

Jonathan Meer (Texas A&M University)

“Dropouts Need Not Apply: Minimum Wages and Skill Upgrading,” with Jeff Clemens (UC-San Diego) and Lisa Kahn (University of Rochester)

We explore whether minimum wage increases result in substitution from lower-skilled labor to slightly higher-skilled labor. Exploiting statutory minimum wage increases from 2011-2016 and American Community Survey data, we show that workers employed in low-paying jobs are older and less likely to be high school dropouts following a minimum wage hike. We then examine the Burning Glass Technologies job vacancy postings dataset to better understand how firm behavior impacts these changes. We find that job ads in low-wage occupations are more likely to require a high school diploma following a minimum wage hike, consistent with the evidence of employed workers. We see substantial adjustments to skill requirements even within firms.  

Daiji Kawaguchi

March 11, 2019 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Peter K. Schott (Yale University)

Using Equity Market Reactions to Infer Exposure toTrade Liberalization (joint with Andrew Greenland, Mihai Ion and John Lopresti) [paper]

We propose using average abnormal equity returns (AAR) to identify firm sensitivityto trade liberalization. This approach captures the net impact of all avenues of exposureand yields estimates for both goods-producing and service firms, provided they arepublicly traded. Applying our method to a specific change in US trade policy, we findthatAARs vary substantially across firms within narrowly defined industries and thatthey are correlated with, but provide explanatory power beyond, standard measures ofimport competition in predicting firm outcomes

Taiji Furusawa

 

Industrial Organization Conference at The University of Tokyo

March 21, 2019 (Thursday) 9:30-17:35

※日時と場所に注意, Registration is Required

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

Please click here for the PDF file of the program.

 

9:55 - 10:00 Opening Remarks

10:00 - 10:45 Ken Onishi (Federal Reserve Board)
"Compatible Mergers: “Compatible Mergers: Service Areas and Market Power"

10:45 - 11:30 Mario Samano (HEC Montreal)
"Incentivized Mergers and Cost Efficiency: Evidence from the Electricity Distribution Industry"

11:30 - 11:45 Coffee Break

11:45 - 12:30 Aniko Öry (Yale University)
"Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding"

12:30-14:00 Lunch (only available for registered participants)

14:00 - 14:45 Kohei Hayashida (University of Tokyo)
"Bargaining Power between Food Processors and Retailers: Evidence from Japanese Milk Transactions"

15:30 - 16:00 Long Coffee Break

16:00 - 16:45 Takeshi Murooka (Osaka University)
"Zero Prices: Optimal Pricing of Experience Goods under Consumer Loss Aversion"

16:45 - 17:30 Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)
"A Structural Model of Multi-Tasking Salesforce: Job Task Allocation and Incentive Plan Design," (joint with Minkyung Kim and K. Sudhir)

17:35 Closing Remarks

 

 

下記"From Organizer"をご一読のうえ、参加を希望される方は、こちらの参加登録フォームより2019年3月8日までにお申込みください。

We are asking that all participants in the conference register in advance. Registration deadline is March 8, 2019.　Please read a message below and Click here for registration form.

 

 

通常のカンファレンスでは（非発表者の研究を発表者に知ってもらう システマティックな手段がないため）発表者と参加者の交流が若干難しく、 いつも何とかならないものかと考えていました。

今回はそれを解決すべく Lightning Talks というセッションを設け、参加者の皆様に （希望者に限り） 一人当たり３分程度で自己紹介・研究紹介をして頂くセッションを設ける予定です。

これにより、コーヒーブレイクやディナーの間に、発表者間だけでなく非発表者の研究の話も促進できればと考えております。

もし参加して頂けるようであれば、上記のRegistration Formから、参加を 3月8日までに表明して頂けると幸いです。（申し訳ございませんが、夕食に 付随するアルコール代は各自払いでお願いしたいと思います。）

 

Empirical Microeconomics Workshop

(The 2nd CREPE Conference on Program Evaluation)

March 25, 2019 (Monday) 9:30-18:00

※日時と場所に注意, Registration is Required

※主催：政策評価教育研究センター(CREPE)

東京大学国際学術総合研究棟２階・第６教室にて開催予定　[地図] Lecture Hall No. 6, International Academic Research Building [MAP]

 

For the latest program, please look at the Conference Website.

 

Program 9:30 am Welcome and registration

10:00 am Hitoshi Shigeoka, Simon Fraser University
"How Do Peers Impact Learning? An Experimental Investigation of Peer-to-Peer Teaching and Ability Tracking," coauthored with Erik O. Kimbrough (Chapman University) and Andrew D. McGee (University of Alberta)

10:50 am Break

11:00 am Hikaru Kawarazaki, University of Tokyo
"Revealing the Hidden Mechanism: the Effects of Early Childhood Education and Care After Half a Century"

11:50 am Lunch (only available for registered participants)

1:00 pm Mari Tanaka and Chiaki Moriguchi, Hitotsubashi University
"Meritocracy and Its Discontents: Evidence from Centralizing and Decentralizing School Admissions"

1:50 pm Break

2:00 pm Yuki Onozuka, Western University
"Heterogeneous Skill Growth across College Majors"

2:50 pm Break

3:00 pm Hiromi Hara, Japan Women’s University
"Curriculum and Gender Norms: The Effect of Co-Education"

3:50 pm Break

4:30 pm Victor Lavy, University of Warwick (Speaker of Empirical Micro WS and Keynote of UTokyo-GRIPS Workshop)
"How Return to Schooling Affects College Attainment and the Choice of Major" (coauthored with Ran Abramitzky, Stanford, and Maayan Segev, Hebrew University)

 

 

Victor Lavy先生をお招きして東京大学と政策大学院大学によるEmpirical Microeconomics Workshopを開催いたします。 聴衆として参加を希望される方は参加登録フォームより2019年3月3日までにお申込みをお願いします。 参加登録フォームはこちら

UTokyo and GRIPS are pleased to announce Empirical Microeconomics Workshop led by Warwick Professor Victor Lavy. The workshop will run all day on March 25, 2019 at UTokyo. The workshop is open to advanced students, postdocs, faculty members, policy analysts, and data analysts in general. We are asking that all participants in the conference register in advance. Registration deadline is March 3, 2019. Partial participation is welcome too.　Click here for registration form

 

Stacey H. Chen (GRIPS), Daiji Kawaguchi (The University of Tokyo), Ryuichi Tanaka (The University of Tokyo), Shintaro Yamaguchi (The University of Tokyo)

Grant-in-Aid in Scientific Research (Service Sector Productivity in Japan: Determinants and Policies, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University)

CREPE (The University of Tokyo)