Workshop: "Incentives, Preferences, and Management in Developing and Developed Countries"

April 9, 2015 （Thursday）　※場所にご注意下さい。

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、 Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟　６階 大会議室
Meeting Room on the 6th floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]

 

9:55-10:00 Opening Remark by Yasuyuki Sawada

Session 1: Management Performance (Chaired by Yasuyuki Sawada)
10:00-11:00 Oriana Bandiera (London School of Economics)
                    "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work" (joint with Andrea Prat and Raffaella Sadun)

11:00-11:50 Tsutomu Miyagawa (Gakusyuin University)
                   "Is Productivity Growth Correlated with Improvements in Management Quality?  An empirical study using interview surveys in Korea and Japan (joint with Keun Lee, Kazuma Edamura, Young Gak Kim, Hosung Jung)
                   
11:50-12:50 Lunch

Session 2: Incentives and Preferences (Chair Hideshi Itoh)
12:50-13:40 Albert Park (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
                   "Promotion Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from Chinese Schools" (Joint with Naureen Karachiwalla)

10 min. break

13:50-14:40 Yasuyuki Sawada (University of Tokyo)
                   "Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract" (joint with Jun Goto,Takeshi Aida, and Keitaro Aoyagi)

14:40-15:30 Hideo Owan (University of Tokyo)
                   "Monetary Incentives for Corporate Inventors: Intrinsic Motivation, Project Selection and Inventive Performance (joint with Sadao Nagaoka and Koichiro Onishi)

30 min. Break

Session 3: Public service delivery (Chaired by Hideo Owan)
16:00-16:50 Andrew Griffen (University of Tokyo)
                    "Election, Implementation, and Social Capital in School-Based Management: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of COGES Project in Burkina Faso" (joint with Yasuyuki Sawada, Takeshi Aida, Eiji Kozuka, Haruko Noguchi, and Yasuyuki Todo)

16:50-17:50  Imran Rasul (University College London)
                     "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service" (joint with Daniel Rogger)

 

May 18, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Vivek Ghosal　（Georgia Institute of Technology）

Competition and Innovation in Automobile Markets (joint withJiayao Ni)

※　配付資料なし (no presentation materials)

Using data on the U.S. automobile market, we empirically examine the link between competition and innovation. While the automobile industry is a traditional one and has existed for well over a 100 years, it remains dynamic with multiple firms striving to push the frontiers of innovation and technology, and vying for market share. To examine the above relationship, we use firm-level time-series data over a long horizon (1969-2012) for nine well established firms selling in the U.S. market (GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, BMW and Daimler).

Using the partial-adjustment model to structure firms’ innovation and patenting dynamics, we specify a dynamic panel data model to examine the intertemporal linkages between market share, market-wide competition and patenting. We include a wide range of control variables that may influence firms’ patenting. Our findings from estimating the dynamic panel data models using GMM and fixed-effects instrumental variables estimators are as follows.

1. There is considerable persistence in the intertemporal path of patenting. The estimated elasticities are in the 0.6 to 0.8 range. This path-dependence is consistent with the notion that firms’ R&D and innovative activities are slow moving and show stability at least in the short-to-medium run.

2. Regarding the main focus of the paper related to firms’ market share and market-wide competition, we find:
(a) An increase in firms’ own market share leads to increase in patenting, with the estimated elasticities being in the 0.12 to 1.05 range;
(b) In contrast, market-wide competition (HHI) elasticities vary considerably from +0.06 to -1.01. The negative elasticity, however, is entirely driven by the U.S. firms. We discuss the linkages to specific theories – which ones our findings tend to support, and others we find little evidence in favor of;
(c) When examining firms’ patenting response to their own-country rivals’ market shares, the estimates are negative, but generally insignificant; and
(d) When examining firms’ patenting response to their other-country rivals’ market shares, the elasticities are positive and significant for overall panel and U.S. group, but negative and insignificant for Japanese group.

3. In terms of our other findings from the wide set of control variables we include, we find:
(a) The Clean Air Act (emissions controls) dummies show impact of emissions and fuel standards on patenting. CAA1 (1969-1974) is generally positive and significant with an elasticity of about 0.12. In contrast, CAA2 (1989-1994) shows mixed results. These findings are roughly consistent with the findings in Lee et al. (Research Policy, 2011).
(b) GM’s patenting fell substantially during bankruptcy, with an estimated elasticity of about -0.8.
(c) The Daimler-Chrysler merger had a positive effect on Chrysler’s patents, but no meaningful effect on Daimler.
(d) Patenting is weakly procyclical, with an estimated GDP elasticity of about 0.01.

The overall picture that emerges is one of considerable heterogeneity in automobile firms’ innovation responses to the full range of variables we consider, in particular the market share and market-wide competition effects. This heterogeneity is consistent with the findings in several previous studies such as Lieberman and Dhawan (Mgt. Science, 2005), Lieberman and Dermeester (Mgt. Science, 1999), and Lieberman (Mgt. Science, 2000) who find significant differences between U.S. and Japanese automobile firms across a wide range of characteristics related to managerial structure, organizational structure, lean production, productivity, inventory management, etc. The findings are also consistent with Lee at al. (Research Policy, 2011) where they find wide diversity of firms’ environmental patenting paths.

We discuss the broader implications of our findings related to competition, market dynamics, growth and economic welfare, as well as the conduct of competition policy which is often confronted with having to weigh the countervailing forces of market power versus innovation and efficiency.

May 21, 2015 (Thursday) 12:10-13:10 　※曜日にご注意下さい。

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kosuke Uetake (Yale University)

Mergers, Innovation, and Entry-Exit Dynamics: The Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry (1976--2014) (joint with Mitsuru Igami)

We measure the impact of mergers on competition, innovation, and welfare. We develop a dynamic oligopoly model of mergers, R&D, and entry/exit, and estimate it using data from the hard disk drive industry. We find mergers became a dominant mode of exit in the later phase of industry consolidation and often generated productivity improvement (i.e., synergies). Our counterfactual simulation suggests a more restrictive antitrust policy may not necessarily increase welfare because a higher exit rate partially offsets its pro-competitive effect, and R&D does not fully make up for the forgone synergies.

May 25, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Migiwa Tanaka　（Wilfrid Laurier University）

Testing the Theory of Multitasking: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment in Chinese Factories (joint with Fuhai Hong, Tanjim Hossain, and John A. List) [PDF]

Using a natural field experiment where we observe factory workers under varying incentive schemes, we quantify the impact of one-dimensional monetary incentives on both incentivized and non-incentivized dimensions of output. While the management observes only the incentivized output (quantity), we also observe the non-incentivized output (quality) by hiring inspectors who secretly inspected the quality. Unlike most prior studies, we find sharp evidence that workers trade off quality for quantity when a quantity-based performance-pay scheme is introduced. Moreover, consistent with our theoretical model, treatment effects are much stronger for workers whose base salary structure is a flat wage compared to those under a piece-rate base salary.

May 29, 2015 (Friday) 12:10-13:10 　※曜日にご注意下さい。

Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yuhei Miyauchi (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Interest Rate Cap, Relationship Lending and Bank Competition in Bangladesh

I study the short-term and long-term impact of the interest rate cap on loans for large and medium enterprises introduced in 2009 and lifted in 2011 and 2012 in Bangladesh. Using the branch-level variation of pre-regulation interest rates and loans for consumer goods as a placebo, I find that the introduction of the interest rate cap significantly increased the aggregate outstanding amount, though the removal of the cap had a minor negative impact. This persistence of the policy is consistent with a model of relationship banking, where banks with market power face borrowers with unknown types over multiple periods. In such an environment, banks "under-experiment" borrowers by setting high interest rates, and the lending rate cap "forces" banks to experiment more borrowers. This predicts that banks have information about more borrowers ex-post, hence the credit supply and the per-period profit increases after the cap is lifted. Overall, the results show that there is a distortion in the banking market in Bangladesh due to under-experimentation and insufficient competition, and the lending rate cap was effective in resolving it.

June 1, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Oleksandr Movshuk　（Toyama University）

Child poverty in Japan: comparing the accuracy of alternative measures [PDF]

In this paper I compare income and consumption as alternative indexes of child poverty in Japan. Using micro data from the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditures, I found that consumption-based measures showed less child poverty compared with income-based measures. To explain the difference, the paper considered three explanations: under-reporting of incomes (which would inflate the number of income-poor), over-reporting of consumption (which would reduce the number of consumption-poor), and consumption smoothing in response to negative income shocks. I present evidence that the lower rate of consumption-based poverty primarily reflects the income under-reporting, with little evidence for the over-reporting of consumption and for the consumption smoothing among the poor. I also compared income and consumption in their ability to identify households with lower material well-being (such as the lack of major household appliances, or inability to own a house). In cases of significant differences in such comparisons, consumption was almost always better than income in identifying materially disadvantaged households with children.

June 8, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Anders Frederiksen　（Aarhus University）

Working Hours and the Gender Gap in Executive Appointment

Workshop on Natural Disasters: "What Can We Learn from Natural Disasters? Empirical Investigations"

June 11, 2015 （Thursday）　

※ Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

9:15-9:45 Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)
                   "How Does a Natural Disaster Change People's Preference? Evidence from the Convex Time Budget Experiments in Japan and the Philippines" (joint with Yusuke Kuroishi)

9:45-10:15 Hitoshi Shigeoka (Simon Fraser University)
                   "Do Risk Preferences Change? Evidence from Panel Data Before and After the Great East Japan Earthquake" (joint with Chie Hanaoka and Yasutora Watanabe)
                   
10:15-10:45 Naoki Kondo (The University of Tokyo)
                   "Building Community Social Capital after Disasters: Evidence from Great East-Japan Earthquake"

15 min. break

11:00-11:30 Keiko Iwasaki (The University of Tokyo)
                   "Determinants of Mental Health after Natural-Technological Disaster: Evidence from Fukushima Evacuees" (joint with Yasuyuki Sawada and Daniel Aldrich)

11:30-12:00 Christian Dimmer (The University of Tokyo)
                   "Pluralising Place-Making Practices, Emerging Place Governance, and Empowerment in Post-Tsunami Ishinomaki"

12:00-12:30 Masahiro Shoji (Seijo University)
                    "Peer Effects in Employment Status: Evidence from Housing Lotteries for Forced Evacuees in Fukushima" (joint with Ayako Kondo)

12:30-13:00 Keynote Speech by Daniel Aldrich (Purdue University)

 

June 15, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Marc Henry (Pennsylvania State University)

Single Market Nonparametric Identification of Multi-Attribute Hedonic Equilibrium Models (joint with Victor Chernozhukov, Alfred Galichon, and Brendan Pass)

This paper derives conditions under which preferences and technology are nonparametrically identified in hedonic equilibrium models, where products are differentiated along more than one dimension and agents are characterized by several dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity. With products differentiated along a quality index and agents characterized by scalar unobserved heterogeneity, single crossing conditions on preferences and technology provide identifying restrictions. We develop similar shape restrictions in the multi-attribute case and we provide identification results from the observation of a single market. We thereby extend identification results in Matzkin (2003) and Heckman, Matzkin, and Nesheim (2010) to accommodate multiple dimensions of unobserved heterogeneity.

June 24, 2015 (Wednesday) 12:10-13:10 *曜日・会場に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Christopher Taber (University of Wisconsin -Madison)

Estimation of a Roy/Search/Compensating Differential Model of the Labor Market (joint with Rune Vejlin) [PDF]

June 25, 2015 (Thursday) 12:10-13:10 *曜日に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Sarath Sanga (University of California, Berkeley)

The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation [PDF]

This paper empirically analyzes a private ordering solution to mutliforum shareholder litigation: exclusive forum provisions in corporate charters and bylaws. These provisions, whose use has become quite widespread, require that all corporate law-related disputes be brought in a single forum, typically a court in the statutory domicile. Using hand-collected data on the 746 U.S. public corporations that have adopted the provision, we examine what drives the growth in these provisions and whether, as some critics contend, their adoption reflects managerial opportunism. We separately analyze companies that adopt the provision at the IPO stage (which usually occurs through a charter amendment) and those that adopt “midstream” or after IPO stage (which usually occurs through a bylaw amendment). We find that nearly all new Delaware corporations adopt the provision at the IPO stage, and further that the transition from zero to near-universal IPO adoption is primarily - if not entirely - driven by law firms. The characteristics of individual companies appear to play little or no role in adoption decisions. Instead, the pattern of adoption follows what can be described as a light switch model, in which law firms suddenly switch from never adopting to always adopting the provision in the IPOs they advise. This pattern contrasts with the decision to include takeover defenses in IPO charters, and suggests that lawyers have come to perceive that exclusive forum provisions are universally value-increasing. For midstream adoptions, we compare corporate governance features of midstream bylaw adopters to a matched sample of non-adopters in order to test the hypothesis that midstream bylaw adoption reflects managerial opportunism. If the hypothesis were correct, then we would expect to find that midstream adopters exhibit poor corporate governance compared to nonadopters (using the metrics of good governance practices as identified by critics of the provisions). We find, however, that there are either no significant differences in governance or that it is actually adopters that have higher quality governance features. We also find no significant differences in governance and ownership structures between firms whose boards adopt the provisions as bylaws and those who obtain shareholder approval. The absence of significant differences across firms using disparate adoption procedures suggests that the method of adopting an exclusive forum provision – whether with or without shareholder approval - should not be a matter of import for investors.

June 26, 2015 (Friday) 12:10-13:10 *曜日に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Christopher Taber (University of Wisconsin -Madison)

Methods for Using Selection on Observed Variables to Address Selection on Unobserved Variables”

We develop new estimation methods for estimating causal effects based on the idea that the amount of selection on the observed explanatory variables in a model provides a guide to the amount of selection on the unobservables. We discuss two approaches, one of which involves the use of a factor model as a way to infer properties of unobserved covariates from the observed covariates. We construct an interval estimator that asymptotically covers the true value of the causal effect, and we propose related confidence regions that cover the true value with fixed probability.

July 13, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10　

※ Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of th

e Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Menno P. Pradhan　（VU University and University of Amsterdam）

Double for Nothing? Experimental Evidence on the Impact of an Unconditional Teacher Salary Increase on Student Performance in Indonesia (Joint with Joppe de Ree, Karthik Muralidharan, and Halsey Rogers)

How does a large unconditional increase in salary affect employee performance in the public sector? We present the first experimental evidence on this question to date in the context of a unique policy change in Indonesia that led to a permanent doubling of base teacher salaries. Using a large-scale randomized experiment across a representative sample of Indonesian schools that affected more than 3,000 teachers and 80,000 students, we find that the doubling of pay significantly improved teacher satisfaction with their income, reduced the incidence of teachers holding outside jobs (and the hours worked on them), and reduced self-reported financial stress. Nevertheless, after two and three years, the doubling in pay led to no improvements in measures of teacher effort or student learning outcomes, suggesting that the salary increase was mostly a transfer to teachers with no discernible impact on student outcomes. While higher salaries may increase teacher quality on the extensive margin in the long-run, we find no evidence of meaningful positive impacts of teacher salary increases on student learning from intensive margin increases in teacher effectiveness as predicted by gift-exchange, and efficiency wage models of employee behavior.

July 17, 2015 (Friday) 14:00-15:00, 15:00-16:00

Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

※日時・会場にご注意下さい。

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No. 3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]

※会場は「経済学研究科棟」になります。 The venue is in the Economics Research Building.

1) 14:00-15:00 Yi Lu (the National University of Singapore)

Do Place-Based Policies Work? Micro-Level Evidence from China's Economic Zones Program [PDF]

2) 15:00-16:00 Menghan Shen (Columbia University)

Intergenerational Effect of Political Influence

 

1) This paper examines the impact of a prominent place-based program in China – the Economic Zones program on economic activity of the targeted areas. To do so, we exploit two geo-coded comprehensive waves of Chinese …firm censuses, which allow the construction of a panel dataset for areas before and after the zone establishment. By pairing areas across zone boundaries, we …find that, …first, the economic zones have a positive effect on the employment, output and capital of the targeted area. The program has also increased the number of fi…rms located in the zones. Second, the extensive margin (…firm births and deaths) plays a larger role in explaining the SEZ effect than the intensive margin (incumbents). Finally, the zones’effectiveness depends on program features. Across sectors, for fi…rms in more capital-intensive sectors, the zones exhibit larger positive impacts on fi…rm performance than those in more labor- intensive sectors. Meanwhile, location characteristics such as market potential and transportation accessibility are not critical factors in enhancing the program effects.

2) This paper considers the effect of fathers’ political influence on offspring’s labor market outcomes. Political influence refers to the ability to convert political power into economic benefits. The empirical strategy identifies the dissolution of political influence by exploiting an age-based mandatory retirement rule in China. I present a difference-in-difference approach that exploits the variation of political influence in three dimensions: bureaucrat status, retirement status instrumented by retirement policy, and offspring gender. Using cross-section data from China Household Income Survey, I find the retirement of a bureaucrat translates into a decrease in offspring’s income of 13 percent. In addition, I find the effect of bureaucrat retirement on labor market is larger when there’s more scope for political influence.

July 27, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jérôme Adda　（Bocconi University）

The Dynamics of Return Migration, Human Capital Accumulation, and Wage Assimilation

We develop a life-cycle model where immigrants decide about labor market participation, consumption, and investment in human capital together with the optimal length of their migration. We estimate this model using panel data for immigrants that provides repeated information on immigrants' return intentions and realized return migrations. We show that the interplay between return intentions and investment in human capital leads to selective outmigration, in addition to selection by unobserved productivity. Simulating the effects of policies that influence migrants' return decisions, we show that these may lead to suboptimal career profiles, inducing welfare losses not just for immigrants, but also or the host country population.

Special Workshop　　

Poor Economics" in Tokyo: Frontiers of Development Economics

August 3, 2015 (Monday) 13:30-17:40

※ Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

定員に達したため、応募を打ち切らせて頂きました。

* Registration has been closed since there is no more place available.

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟6階大会議室
in Meeting Room on the 6th floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]

*会場は経済学研究科棟です。
Venue is in the Economics Research Building.

 

 

13:30-14:00 Abu Shonchoy (Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO)
"Does DVD-based Distance Learning Program Enable Rural Students to Enter University? An RCT Experiment in Bangladesh"

14:00-14:30 Yasuyuki Sawada (University of Tokyo) "Election, Implementation, and Social Capital in School-Based Management: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of COGES Project in Burkina Faso"

14:30-15:00 Jun Goto (Hitotsubashi University)
"Incentives and Social Preferences: Experimental Evidence from a Seemingly Inefficient Traditional Labor Contract"

15:00-15:30 Minhaj Mahmud (BRAC University)
"Infrastructure and Well-being: Employment Effects of Jamuna Bridge in Bangladesh"

15:30-15:40 Break

Keynote lectures

15:40-16:40 Abhijit Banerjee (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
"Information is Power: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia"

16:40-17:40 Esther Duflo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
"Can E-Governance Reduce Capture of Public Programs? Experimental Evidence from a Financial Reform of India's Employment Guarantee"

 

September 7, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of th

e Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yuta Kikuchi　(Yokohama National University）

The Impact of University Reform on Research Performance: Evidence from the Partial Privatization (Corporatization) of Japanese National Universities

This paper investigates how university governance (reform) affects their research performance. Specifically, I examine the effect of partial privatization of Japanese national universities since 2004, a university governance reform that exogenously introduced additional autonomy and a competitive environment to national university scientific publications. The analyses suggest that the reform significantly increased the research performance of national universities in the field of engineering and economics, and that the effect coincided with intensified efforts to acquire competitive-type research funding also induced by the reform. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that an increase in university autonomy and competitiveness increases research output. However, research output in medical science by national universities has shown a pronounced decrease. This result is consistent with the expectation that partial privatization, which encourages income-generating activity, results in a decrease in the research output of university hospitals. This finding reflects the special characteristics of university hospitals that render them the main producers of research output and the greatest national university revenue earners from the provision of clinical services.

September 14, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10　

※ Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of th

e Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Tomomi Tanaka　（World Bank）

Trait perceptions influence economic out-group bias: Lab and field evidence from Vietnam (joint with Colin F. Camerer) [PDF]

Group favoritism is typically directed toward in-group members and against out-group members, but these cross-group effects often vary. Little is known about why group effects on economic choices vary. We use a survey method developed in social psychology to measure stereotyped attitudes of one group toward another. These attitudes are then associated with prosociality in five experimental games (also using an unusual amount of individual-level sociodemographic control). We present evidence from an artificial field experiment of a majority group with high status (Vietnamese) exhibiting no disfavoritism toward a lower-status out-group (Khmer) and typical disfavoritism to a second out-group (Chinese). Both Vietnamese and Chinese groups see the Khmer as warm but incompetent, attitudes which seem to activate empathy rather than contempt. The results suggest that measuring between-group stereotype attitudes can be used to predict the sign of cross-group favoritism in other natural settings.

September 28, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Satoshi Tanaka　（University of Queensland）

Multidimensional Skill Mismatch (joint with Fatih Guvenen, Burhanettin Kuruscu and David Wiczer) [paper]

What determines the earnings of a worker relative to his peers in the same occupation? What makes a worker fail in one occupation but succeed in another? More broadly, what are the factors that determine the productivity of a worker-occupation match? In this paper, we propose an empirical measure of skill mismatch for a worker-occupation match, which sheds light on these questions. This measure is based on the discrepancy between the portfolio of skills required by an occupation (for performing the tasks that produce output) and the portfolio of abilities possessed by a worker for learning those skills. This measure arises naturally in a dynamic model of occupational choice with multidimensional skills and Bayesian learning about one's ability to learn these skills. In this model, mismatch is central to the career outcomes of workers: it reduces the returns to occupational tenure, and it predicts occupational switching behavior. We construct our empirical analog by combining data from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), O*NET, and National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Our empirical results show that the effects of mismatch on wages are large and persistent: mismatch in occupations held early in life has a strong effect on wages in future occupations. Skill mismatch also significantly increases the probability of an occupational switch and predicts its direction in the skill space. These results provide fresh evidence on the importance of skill mismatch for the job search process.

October 5, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jin-Young Choi　（Goethe University Frankfurt）

Regression Discontinuity with Multiple Running Variables Allowing Partial Effects (joint with Myoung-jae Lee) [PDF]

In regression discontinuity (RD), a running variable (or “score”) crossing a cutoff determines a treatment that affects the mean regression function. This paper generalizes this usual ‘one-score mean RD’ three ways: (i) considering multiple scores, (ii) accommodating quantile/mode regressions, and (iii) allowing ‘partial effects’due to each score crossing its own cutoff, not just the full effect with all scores crossing all cutoffs. This generalization is motivated by (i) many multiple-score RD cases, (ii) informative quantile/mode regression functions, and (iii) the full-effect identi…cation needing the partial effects to be separated. We establish identi…cation for ‘multiple-score RD (MRD)’, and propose simple estimators that become ‘local difference in differences (DD) ’in case of double score. We also provide an empirical illustration with German data where partial effects exist for quantile regressions.

October 22, 2015 (Thursday) 12:10-13:10

※曜日・会場に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 第3セミナー室
in Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jiro Kondo (McGill University)

Agency Statistics: Empirical Analysis as a Principal-Agent Problem

October 26, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

William H. Dow　（University of California at Berkeley）

Choice Architecture and the Demand for Information: Opt-In, Active-Choice, and Opt-Out Defaults for HIV Screening

Defaults have been found to have powerful behavioral effects in many domains, particularly in settings subject to behavioral biases such as inattention and present bias.Health screening tests have been hypothesized to be strongly affected by such biases, which in combination with standard pecuniary and time prices could help explain the low apparent demand for many such tests.In this paper we test for alternative behavioral influences, as evidence by the impact of choice architecture on the acceptance of HIV screening tests.We field a randomized controlled trial among 4,800 adults in a hospital emergency room, comparing HIV test acceptance rates under opt-in, active choice, and opt-out regimens.In all three arms we hold constant standard neoclassical price effects by reducing the out-of-pocket and time costs of testing to essentially zero; this also largely eliminates the influence of behavioral biases such as inattention and present bias.We find that 38.0% of patients in the opt-in testing group accepted an HIV test, compared to 51.3% in the active-choice arm (difference 13.3%, 95% confidence interval 9.8% to 16.7%) and 65.9% in the opt-out arm (difference 27.9%, 24.4% to 31.3%).These dramatically different test rates were induced by changing just a few words in the test-offer script.One interpretation of these results is that rather than low screening rates being driven by high costs or behavioral biases, many patients do not get screened simply because they have very low demand for the resulting information.We further examine subgroups based on level of HIV risk, and discuss implications for policy-makers whose goal is to increase HIV screening rates.

November 9, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Keisuke Kawata　（Hiroshima University）

Social Pressure and Indirect Reciprocity: Evidence from Laboratory Experiment

This paper examines roll of exit-option from share decision-making in indirect reciprocity behavior. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which three agents (A, B, and C) play the sequential helping game; player A decides how to share her endowment between herself and player B, and player C then decide how to share his endowment between himself and player A. Participants of an experiment are first pure-randomly assigned into treatment and control groups; player C in control groups can avoid the share decision-making in stage 2, while in treatment groups, they must decide. Experimental results first show that many participants prefer to avoid the share decision-making. Next and more important finding is that share amount by player A and C are lower in treatment group than in control group, which can be interpreted that indirect reciprocity behavior are partly based on social pressure.

November 13, 2015 (Friday) 12:10-13:10 *曜日に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Keunkwan Ryu　（Seoul National University）

Multidimensional heterogeneity and nature of selection in consumer credit market (joint with Miroo Kim)

Consumers in the credit market are heterogeneous not only in their risk type but also in their inter-temporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Like for firms, unmeasured heterogeneity in risk type causes a positive relation between interest rate and default. Unlike for firms, though, unmeasured heterogeneity in IES causes a negative relation between interest rate and default. It is because consumers with a lower degree of IES enjoy a bigger utility gain from inter-temporal consumption smoothing, suffer more from denial of access to the consumer credit market, and thus face a stronger incentive to avoid default by honoring existing debts. By estimating proportional hazard models with varying sets of control variables, we have found that once observable risk factors are controlled for those consumers who borrow money at a higher interest rate are not more but less likely to default, an evidence counter to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)'s theoretical prediction on borrowing firms. Consumers are not like firms in the credit market.

November 16, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

※応用統計ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Roger Koenker　（University of Illinois）

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Income Dynamics: An Empirical Bayes Perspective (joint with Jiaying Gu) [paper]

  Empirical Bayes methods for Gaussian compound decision problems involving longitudinal data are considered. The new convex optimization formulation of the nonparametric (Kiefer-Wolfowitz) maximum likelihood estimator for mixture models is employed to construct nonparametric Bayes rules for compound decisions. The methods are first illustrated with some simulation examples and then with an application to models of income dynamics. Using PSID data we estimate a simple dynamic model of earnings that incorporates bivariate heterogeneity in intercept and variance of the innovation process. Profile likelihood is employed to estimate an AR(1) parameter controlling the persistence of the innovations. We find that persistence is relatively modest, ρ≈0.48, when we permit heterogeneity in variances. Evidence of negative dependence between individual intercepts and variances is revealed by the nonparametric estimation of the mixing distribution, and has important consequences for forecasting future income trajectories.

November 30, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Anthony Wray　（Hitotsubashi University）

Childhood health and long-run economic opportunity in Victorian England (Joint with Krzysztof Karbownik) [PDF]

We study the long-run effects of childhood health deficiencies on occupational outcomes for males, in addition to marital status for both genders, using a sibling-fixed-effects identification strategy. We construct a longitudinal data set consisting of in-patient admission registers, from two hospital in London, England, during the late-nineteenth century, linked to census and marriage records. Health deficiencies during childhood, proxied by the in-hospital mortality rate of the admitted condition, decrease the occupational log wage, and increase the probability of downward mobility relative to one’s father, for male patients in comparison to their brothers. The effect of health deficiencies offsets 30 percent of the effect of an increase in father’s occupational log wage on own occupational log wage. Female patients were less likely to be married as adults in comparison to their sisters, but there is no evidence of a marriage penalty for males.

December 4, 2015 (Friday) 10:00-11:30　※日時に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Pamela Giustinelli (University of Michigan)

Multilateral Decision Making with Uncertain Outcomes Main Mechanisms and New Survey Measures on Child-Parent Choice of the High School Track

December 14, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Naoki Wakamori　（University of Tokyo）

Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Vertical Relationships: The Case of the MRI Industry (joint with Ken Onishi, Chiyo Hashimoto and Shun-ichiro Bessho)

Workshop on “Institutions, Preferences and Economic Development”

December 14, 2015 （Monday）　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

SNU 2015 Project “Building a Foundation for National Unification”

Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

 

9:00-9:10 Registration

9:10-9:15 Opening Remarks (Byung-Yeon Kim (Seoul National University))

9:15-10:00 Robert Veszteg (Waseda University)
                    "Peer Punishment Does Not Eliminate Free-Riding in Social Dilemmas in Japan"

10:10-10:55 Jiahua Che (Fudan University)
                   "A Three-Person Game of Institutional Resilience versus Transition"
                
11:05-11:50 Syngjoo Choi (Seoul National University)
                   "Institutions, Competition Aversion, and Underconfidence: Experimental Evidence from North Korean Refugees"
                

12:00-13:30 Lunch

13:30-14:15 Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Hitotsubashi University)
                   "Future Design"

14:25-15:10 Harounan Kazianga (Oklahoma State University)
                   "Cash Transfers and Child Schooling: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of the Role of Conditionality"

15:20-15:50 Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)
                   "How Does a Natural Disaster Change People’s Preference? Evidence from the Convex Time Budget Experiments in Japan and the Philippines"

15:50-16:05 Tomohiro Hara (The University of Tokyo)
                   "Information from Media and Pro-Social Behavior toward Minority: Evidence from Laboratory Experiment with Korean in Japan "

16:15-17:00 Daniel Aldrich (Northeastern University)
                    "Social Capital’s Role in Reducing Mortality and Speeding Recovery"

 

December 16, 2015 (Wednesday) 15:00-16:30 ※日時にご注意下さい。

※応用統計ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yuichi Kitamura　（Yale University）

"Methods for Microeconometric Analysis of Heterogeneous Agents

This talk deals with recent methodological developments in microeconometric analysis that treats unobserved heterogeneity in flexible ways. It emphasizes the direct use of preference orderings (e.g. revealed preference), which are potentially powerful in terms of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity in high-dimensions (Kitmaura and Stoye, 2013). We explore the approach based on preference orderings in details, though we also contrast it with other recently proposed nonparametric methods which often rely on smoothing techniques. The nonparametric methods discussed in the course require computation in high dimensions, and therefore we investigate their algorithmic aspects as well.

As recognized in the recent literature, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is tremendously important for applied microeconometric analysis (Compiani and Kitamura, 2015). In particular, it is highly desirable and often crucial to incorporate infinite dimensional heterogeneity in empirical research. This makes some of conventional nonparametric methods, which often demand monotonicity type restrictions and smoothness assumptions, difficult to apply. We pursue an alternative framework based on preference orderings. It enables us to avoid reliance of smoothness assumptions and other ad hoc restrictions on functional properties: it instead utilizes geometric properties (see, for example, Ziegler, 1995, Gruber, 2007 and Grunbaum, 2003 for geometric background) provided by economic theory. Another benefit is that implementing this approach typically requires only linear/quadratic programming, which can be carried out even in extremely high dimensions, and recent progress in computational methods can be used to execute them. Our approach is quite general and avoids arbitrary restrictions, and consequently we typically need to deal with partially identified objects. To that end, we briefly review basics of modern methods in partially identified models and moment inequalities

December 21, 2015 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Naoki Aizawa　（University of Minnesota）

Advertising and Risk Selection in Health Insurance Markets (joint with You Suk Kim) [PDF]

We study impacts of advertising as a channel of risk selection in Medicare Advantage. We show evidence that both mass and direct mail advertising are targeted to achieve risk selection. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model of Medicare Advantage with advertising to understand its equilibrium impacts. We find that advertising attracts the healthy more than the unhealthy. Moreover, shutting down advertising increases premiums by up to 40% for insurers that advertised by worsening their risk pools, which further reduces the demand of the unhealthy. We argue that risk selection may make consumers better off by improving insurers’ risk pools.

2015-16 9th Asian Conference on Applied Micro-Economics/Econometrics

January 9 (Saturday), 9:00-17:15 , January 10 (Sunday), 9:30-17:00, 2016

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　

※日時・場所にご注意下さい。

Risk and Well-Being under Changing Global Societ y Project, JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S), The University of Tokyo

Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
一橋大学「現代経済システム研究センター」

A New Step in the Development of Suicide Pr evention Policy by Interdisciplinary Approach with An International Scope funded by Japan ese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Project Number H26-Seishin-Ippan-003 (2014-2016)), Kyoto Prefectural University of Medicine

Tokyo Workshop on International Development

[Detailed Information (PDF File)]

 

Day 1) January 9 (Saturday) , 2016

Opening Remarks
9:00-9:05

Session 1: Labor I
9:05-11:20

Chair: Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)

1. Jinyoung Kim (Korea University)
   “Research Teamwork in Technology Race”

2. Yoonsoo Park (Korea Development Institute)
    ”Employment protection and long-term employment relationship”

3. Daiji Kawaguchi (Hitotsubashi University)
    “Estimating the causal impact of alcohol consumption on earnings using genotype as the instrumental variable”

Session 2: Ability, Morbidity and Mortality
11:30-12:15

Chair: Daiji Kawaguchi (Hitotsubashi University)

1. Hitoshi Shigeoka (Simon Fraser University)
    “Evaluating the ‘Least Restrictive Environment’ Mandate:
    The Effects of Mainstreaming on Cognitive and Noncognitive Development”

12:15-13:30 Lunch

13:30-15:00

2. Kamhon Kan (Academia Sinica)
    “The Impact of Schooling on Morbidity”

3. Tetsuya Matsubayashi (Osaka University) and Michiko Ueda (Syracuse University)
    “Relative Age in School and Suicide among Young Individuals in Japan:
    A Regression Discontinuity Approach”

Session 3: Labor II
15:15-17:30

Chair: Jinyoung Kim (Korea University)

1. Andrew Sim (The University of Tokyo)
    “Schooling Investment in Frictional Labor Markets”

2. Carl Sanders (Washington University in St.Louis)
    “The Dimensionality of Worker Skills”

3. Drew Griffen (The University of Tokyo)
    “Evaluating the Effects of Child Care Policies on Children's Cognitive Development and Maternal Labor Supply”

Day 2) January 10 (Sunday) 2016

Session 4: Political Economy
9:30-11:45

Chair: Jungmin Lee (Sogang University)

1. Eric Weese (Yale University)
    “Coalition structures of insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan”

2. Gordon B. Dahl (University of California San Diego)
    “Do Politicians Change Public Attitudes?”

3. Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)
    “Election, Implementation, and Social Capital in School-Based Management: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of COGES Project in Burkina Faso”

Session 5: Competition, Discrimination, and Segregation
11:45-12:30

Chair: Kamhon Kan (Academia Sinica)

1. Yi Lu (National University of Singapore)
    “Does Competitive Experience Affect Gender Difference in Economic Preference and Academic Performance?”

12:30-13:30    Lunch

13:30-15:00

2. Jungmin Lee (Sogang University)
    “Ripped Off? Price Discrimination against Foreign Shoppers: Evidence from a Field Experiment at a Shopping Mall”

3. Menghan (Mandy) Shen (Columbia University)
    “The　Intergenerational Effect of School Desegregation”

Session 6: Econometric Theory and Applications
15:15-17:30

Chair: Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)

1. Arthur Lewbel (Boston College)
   “Unobserved Preference Heterogeneity in Demand Using Generalized Random Coefficients”

2. Hidehiko Ichimura (The University of Tokyo)
    “The Influence Function of Semiparametric Estimators”

3. Myoung Jae Lee (Korea University)
    “Regression discontinuity with integer running variables” 

 

January 15, 2016 (Friday) 8:30-10:00

※日時に注意

ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、 Tokyo Workshop on International Development と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Mari Tanaka 　（Stanford University）

Exporting Sweatshops? Evidence from Myanmar [PDF]

There is a long-standing debate over the impact of global trade on workers and firms in developing countries. In this paper I investigate the causal effect of exporting on working conditions and firm performance in Myanmar. This analysis draws on a new survey I conducted on Myanmar manufacturing firms from 2013 to 2015. I use the rapid opening of Myanmar to foreign trade after 2011 alongside firm product, geographic and industry variations to obtain causal estimates of the impact of trade. I find that exporting has large positive impacts on working conditions in terms of improved fire safety, health-care, union recognition, and wages. My results also indicate that exporting increases firm sales, employment, management practice scores, and the likelihood of receiving a labor audit.

February 1, 2016 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Stacey H. Chen 　（Academia Sinica）

The Impact of Family Composition on Educational Achievement (joint with Yenchien Chen and Jin-Tan Liu)

Parents preferring sons tend to go on to have more children until a boy is born, and to concentrate investment in boys for a given family size. Thus, having a brother (relative to a sister) may affect the human capital formation of a child in two ways: an indirect effect by decreasing sibsize and a direct effect where sibsize remains constant. Previous estimation of the direct effect requires observed sibsize to be fixed as sibling sex composition changes. But son-preferring fertility-stopping rules suggest that observed sibsize cannot be truly fixed, which leaves neither of the effects well defined. By allowing potential sibsize to change across counterfactual worlds, we redefine and estimate the direct and indirect effects using 0.8 million Taiwanese first-borns, and the proposed method uncovers new evidence of sibling rivalry and gender bias that has not been detected in the previous literature.

February 15, 2016 (Monday) 16:50-18:35　　※時間にご注意下さい。

※マクロファイナンス・金融&国際金融ワークショップ、 ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yasushi Hamao （Unversity of Southern California）

Selectiive Disclosure: The Case of Nikkei Preview Articles (joint with William N. Goetzmann)　[PDF]

Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Nikkei for short) is a leading Japanese daily newspaper specializing in economy and business. During earnings announcement season, the Nikkei morning edition often publishes “preview” articles that are about companies’ sales and earnings. These predate the actual company announcements, and forecast more accurately the actual results than extant forecast, making the Nikkei forecasts value-relevant information. We identify 2,835 preview articles in the newspaper from 2000 to 2010. We find that share prices on average react to information before the preview articles are printed, suggesting some prior leakage of the date and content of preview information. The reaction is asymmetric: the stock price reacts positively to positive news but it does not react negatively to negative news. The costs and benefits (or incentives) for companies. Nikkei, and investors are investigated using changes in returns and information content around the events. We find a positive correlation between previewing and positive news sentiment.

February 29, 2016 (Monday) 12:10-13:10　　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Setsuya Fukuda （National Institute of Population and Social Security Research）

Gender Role Shift and New Assortative Mating: Evidence from Japan

The weakening and reversing of the negative educational gradient in women’s marriage is a phenomenon observed in several high income nations. This shift in the educational gradient in marriage has been documented in the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, some European countries, and Taiwan as a possible sign of the shift towards gender-egalitarian couple arrangements. In this paper, I provide new evidence of such shifts in women’s earnings and educational gradients in the latest marriage behaviors in Japan. Followed by these analyses, we present the detailed description of the country’s gender contexts in the market and domestic activities as well as young adults’ gender role expectations. Our examination of women’s earnings and educational differentials in Japanese marriage aims to provide alternative views to the interpretation of the change in educational marriage patterns in contemporary East Asia.

March 9, 2016 (Wednesday) 12:00-13:15　　※日時にご注意下さい。

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Lorenzo Caliendo （Yale University）

Trade and Labor Market Dynamics (joint with Maximiliano Dvorkin and Fernando Parro) [PDF]

We develop a dynamic trade model where production and consumption take place in spatially distinct labor markets with varying exposure to domestic and international trade. The model recognizes the role of labor mobility frictions, goods mobility frictions, geographic factors, and input-output linkages in determining equilibrium allocations. We show how to solve the equilibrium of the model without estimating productivities, migration frictions, or trade costs, which are usually difficult to identify. We calibrate the model to 38 countries, 50 U.S. states, and 22 sectors and use the rise in China’s import competition to quantify the effects across more than a thousand U.S. labor markets. We find that China’s trade shock resulted in a loss of 0.8 million U.S. manufacturing jobs, about 50 percent of the change in the manufacturing employment share unexplained by a secular trend. We find aggregate welfare gains but, due to trade and migration frictions, the welfare and employment effects vary across U.S. labor markets. Estimated transition costs to the new long-run equilibrium are also heterogeneous and reflect the labor dynamics.

March 14, 2016 (Monday) 12:10-13:25　　※時間にご注意下さい。

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Munir Squires （London School of Economics and Political Science）

Kinship Taxation as a Constraint on Microenterprise Growth: Experimental Evidence from Kenya [paper]

Developing country entrepreneurs face family pressure to share income. This pressure, a kinship tax, can distort capital allocations. I combine evidence from a lab experiment -which allows me to estimate an individual- level sufficient statistic for the distortion- with data I collected on a sample of Kenyan entrepreneurs, to quantify the importance of the tax. My data reveal high kinship tax rates for a third of entrepreneurs in my sample. My quantitative analysis makes use of a simple structural model of input allocation fitted to my data, and implies that removing distortions from kinship taxation would increase total factor productivity by 26%, and increase the share of workers in firms with five or more employees from 9% to 56%. These effects are substantially larger than those coming from credit market distortions, which I estimate using a cash transfer RCT. My analysis also implies strong complementarities between kinship taxation and credit constraints.

March 17, 2016 (Thursday) 16:50-18:20　　※日時にご注意下さい。

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Réka Juhász（Princeton University）

Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade [PDF]

This paper uses a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of temporary trade protection on long-term economic development. I find that regions in the French Empire which became better protected from trade with the British for exogenous reasons during the Napoleonic Wars (1803-15) increased capacity in mechanized cotton spinning to a larger extent than regions which remained more exposed to trade. In the long-run, regions with exogenously higher spinning capacity had: i.) higher activity in mechanized cotton spinning; ii.) higher labor-productivity for mechanized cotton-spinning firms, and; iii.) higher value-added per capita in industry.

March 25, 2016 (Friday) 16:50-18:30　　※日時にご注意下さい。

共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Mitsuru Igami （Yale University）

Privatization and Innovation: Productivity, New Products, and Patents in China (joint with Yuyu Chen and Mo Xiao) [paper]

We study Chinese firms' innovative activities in the period of privatization. We use Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer’'s (forthcoming) method to estimate TFP, which suggests domestic private firms' average TFP converged with that of foreign firms, whereas that of state-owned enterprises lagged behind. We then investigate the relationships between our TFP estimates and other, observed measures of innovation, including the introduction of new products and patent applications. We find: (1) process and product innovations seem complementary to each other, (2) “invention” patents appear more reliable as an indicator of innovations than the other types of Chinese patents, and (3) patenting behaviors are highly heterogeneous across firms of different ownership types.