Tokyo Workshop on International Development　2016

April 8, 2016 (Friday) 11:00-12:00　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Junsen Zhang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

"Hard to Get: The Scarcity of Women and the Competition for High-Income Men in Chinese Cities"

There have been increasing reports in China of the difficulties of elite women to find suitable mates despite the growing scarcity of women. To help explain this, we consider the influence of women's preference for men who have higher incomes than themselves. We show that the key characteristic of this "reference dependent preference" (RDP) is to escalate the competition women face as their incomes increase by reducing the pool of men they desire while simultaneously expanding the pool of other women who desire those men. Consequently, high-income women can be made worse off when high-income men are even richer or more plentiful, because both increase the returns to poorer women in competing for those men.We exploit variations in local sex ratios and men's incomes across major cities in China to test for changes in the online dating search intensity, marriage probability, and household bargaining power of women. As predicted, the search intensity, singles probability, and share of housework of only the high-income women increase significantly with the incomes and availability of men. Our findings with online dating, census, and time-use data suggest that the reported difficulties of elite women are likely the most conspicuous consequences of the competitive effects of women’s RDP for mate income.

ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

May 23, 2016 (Monday) 1) 15:00-16:00 2)16:10-17:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

1) 15:00-16:00 Ni Bin (Waseda University)

The Origin of FDI and Domestic Firms’ Productivity—Evidence from Vietnam (joint with Mariana Spatareanu, Vlad Manole, Tsunehiro Otsuki and Hiroyuki Yamada)

2) 16:10-17:10 Kazushi Takahashi (Sophia University)

Index-Based Livestock Insurance, Social Networks, and Informal Risk Sharing: Evidence from Rural Ethiopia (joint with Christopher B. Barrett and Munenobu Ikegami)

 

1) Technological spillovers from foreign direct investment are thought to be vehicles for economic growth. This study examines how the origin of foreign investors affects the degree of horizontal and vertical technological spillovers, using firm-level panel data from Vietnam 2002-2011. We examine if foreign investment from different continents has different impact on domestic firms’ productivity. The results show a positive association between the presence of Asian firms in downstream sectors and the productivity of Vietnamese firms in the supplying industries, and no significant relationship in the case of European and North American affiliates. Within Asian area, we find that foreign direct investment (FDI) from China and Taiwan generates positive spillover to increase Vietnamese suppliers’ productivity, which coincides with the fact that multinational firms whose origins are these two countries tend to source locally, whereas firms from other regions do not have significant impact. FDI from the major Asian regions all generate negative horizontal spillovers to Vietnamese firms, indicating a potential “crowding-out” effect. Various robustness checks that account for heterogeneity in both domestic and foreign firms are performed.

2) We study whether index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) complements or substitutes for informal risk sharing among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia. Using random matching within sample social networks data, we find that both perceptions of and actual peer behavior are positively associated with both own insurance uptake and with respondents’ willingness to make informal transfers to that same peer. We find no evidence that formal insurance crowds out informal transfers. These results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and estimators, suggesting complementarity between formal and informal insurance arrangements in this setting.

 

June 1, 2016 (Wednesday) 14:00-16:30　※曜日に注意　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

1) 14:00-14:35
Nobuhiko Fuwa (The University of Tokyo)
Hyperbolic Discounting and a Technology-induced Informal Credit Institution: The Case of Debit Card Pawning in the Philippines

2) 14:35-15:10
Yoshito Takasaki (The University of Tokyo)
How effective is antenatal care in developing countries?: Experimental evidence from rural Nigeria

3) 15:20-15:55
Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)
Election, Implementation, and Social Capital in School-Based Management: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of COGES Project in Burkina Faso

4) 15:55-16:30
Kenichi Ueda (The University of Tokyo)
Monopoly Rights and Economic Growth: Inverse-U Relation　(joint with Stijn Claessens)

 

June 1, 2016 (Wednesday) 16:50-18:30　※曜日に注意　

共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Nancy Qian (Yale University)

Political Reform in China: The Effect of Local Elections [paper]

We examine the effects of introducing village elections on public goods expenditures, income distribution and land use in rural China. We construct a large panel data set of village administrative records to document the history of political reforms and economic policies for over two hundred villages. We exploit the staggered timing of the introduction of village elections to find that elections significantly increased public goods expenditure financed by villagers. In addition, we find that the introduction of elections caused a moderate decline in income inequality and likely reduced corruption. The results suggest that local officials are better controlled by local elections rather than by centrally managed bureaucratic monitoring.

June 4, 2016 (Saturday) 13:30-16:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

 

【講演イベント】　教育が変える未来
〜フィリピンの子どもたちから見えてきたもの〜

　[詳細]

１部：NGO職員による講演　（フィリピンでの教育支援について） 　　　　

２部：経済学者による講演 （ライフスキル教育構築のための調査研究について） 　　　　

３部：トークセッション (登壇者によるパネルディスカッション)

＜登壇者＞
澤田康幸教授（東京大学）
中室牧子准教授（慶応義塾大学）
真野裕吉講師（一橋大学）
小川恵美子（ソルト・パヤタス、事務局長）

＜主催＞
特定非営利活動法人ソルト・パヤタス
団体URL：http://www.saltpayatas.com/

＜共催＞
科学研究費（A)「貧困と災害の教育経済学：社会的不利や困難に打ち勝つ子供をどう育てるか」プロジェクト（代表：慶応義塾大学　中室牧子准教授）

科学研究費（S)「グローバル社会変動下のリスクとくらし」プロジェクト（代表：澤田康幸教授）
東京大学経済学研究科付属 日本経済国際共同研究センター（CIRJE）

 

 

＜申込方法＞
下記URLのイベントページからお申し込み下さい。
URL：http://www.saltpayatas.com/?p=3072

＜参加費＞
一般：事前支払＝2500円、当日支払い=3000円　学生＝無料（当日受付で学生証の提示をお願いします。）

 

June 27, 2016 (Monday) 12:10-13:10

共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Ahram Moon (University of Southern California)

Demand Systems of Private Tutoring in South Korea

In Korea, household expenditure for private tutoring in 2006 was estimated to be US$24 billion or 2.8 percent of GDP, which was similar in size to Korean automobile industry. Given the magnitude of this spending, its analysis and researches for appropriate public policy have attracted authorities' attention. Since the policy, such as taxation of tutoring services, can have important impacts on the demand for tutoring, this paper investigates the demand system for private tutoring which has not been well-developed. One of the challenges in tutoring studies that examine price responsiveness is the lack of high quality data on the price of tutoring. We use unit values as a proxy for prices by dividing the expenditure on specific types of private tutoring by hours spent. When the quality of goods such services as tutoring varies, the usage of unit values can then lead to biased estimates of price effects. In order to correct for this bias, an approach developed by Angus Deaton is used. Findings indicate positive quality elasticities with respect to total educational expenditure per capita; better-off households paying more per hour. Educational expenditure elasticities for most types of private tutoring are larger than unity so that all types of private tutoring are luxury goods. Own-price elasticities for all kinds are negative and inelastic, and small-group tutoring is almost three times as elastic as cram school tutoring. In terms of cross-price elasticities, the effects are very small. According to the inverse-elasticity rule, cram schools with inelastic demand should be taxed more heavily than are small-groups. But the equity-efficiency trade-off can more severely impact the welfare of households of a lower economic status.

July 5, 2016 (Tuesday) 17:00-19:00

※日時・会場にご注意下さい。

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No. 3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]

※会場は「経済学研究科棟」になります。

 

1) 17:00-18:00　Yoko Kijima（The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))
Who got subsidized fertilizer from e-Voucher program? Communal Violence, Political Connection, and Personal Traits in North Central Nigeria

2) 18:00-19:00　Takaaki Nomoto (Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan)
Rainfall Variability and Macroeconomic Performance: A Case Study of India, 1952 -2013 [paper]

 

1) In many Sub-Sahara African countries, fertilizer subsidy has been re-introduced in a supposed to be “smart” form so as to reach the neediest farmers. Under the newly introduced subsidy scheme in Nigeria, voucher is distributed electronically to farmers’ mobile phone. Although more farmers are supposed to become the beneficiaries than the old scheme, the proportion of those who received subsidized fertilizer remains low. This study uses household-level penal data collected in 2013 and 2015 and examines what restrains from accessing subsidized fertilizer by using sequential logit model, and whether beneficiaries of the subsidy increased the fertilizer intensity and agricultural productivity by using Propensity-score matching and Difference-in-Differences method (PSM-DID). While proximity to extension workers enhances awareness of the subsidy program, households living in village whose member has held top government position tend to apply for the program. Living in a village with communal violence decreases the probability of receiving e-voucher, while personal traits of accomplishing hard projects when being opposed increases the probability of obtaining subsidized fertilizer. The results from PSM-DID estimates indicate that there are no impacts of receiving subsidy on fertilizer intensity and agricultural productivity.

 

2) The present and emerging climate change highlights the need to understand the impact of weather shocks on the economy in the context of macroeconomic dynamism. In this regard, the present paper develops an empirical framework applicable to macro-data such as GDP to distinguish the impact of weather shocks on agricultural production, the indirect impact on non-agricultural production through its impact on agriculture, and the direct impact on non-agricultural production. For policymakers, distinguishing the direct and indirect impact on non-agriculture is critical in deciding the proper and efficient allocation of limited resources to adaptation and mitigation efforts. The present paper applies the developed framework to assess the impact of rainfall variability on India’s macroeconomic performance during 1952 to 2013 as a case study, finding that rainfall’s impact on non-agriculture is mostly rooted in its impact on agriculture. In this way, the paper contributes to the growing climate-economy literature.

November 30, 2016 (Wednesday) 　1) 15:30-17:00, 2) 17:10-18:40

※会場に注意。

スケジュールが変更いたしました。Schedule Changed

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

1) 15:30-17:00 Bipasha Maity (Osaka University)
Comparing Health Outcomes Across Scheduled Tribes and Castes in India

2) 17:10-18:40 Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University)
Scarce Trustworthy Workforce?: Evidence from Lao Textile Industry

1) 15:30-17:00 Bipasha Maity (Osaka University)
Comparing Health Outcomes Across Scheduled Tribes and Castes in India

The Scheduled Tribes and Castes (STs and SCs) in India are the two most disadvantaged social groups that have been subjected to similar affirmative action policies by the government. Previous studies have usually grouped the STs and SCs together as one disadvantaged group and have compared their educational and occupational mobility with the higher castes. This paper instead seeks to compare health outcomes of the STs with not only the upper castes but also especially the SCs. This paper finds that STs consistently perform poorly even relative to the SCs in terms of knowledge as well as usage of modern contraceptives, antenatal and postnatal healthcare and child immunization. However, female infant mortality is significantly higher among SCs than among STs, with no significant difference in male infant mortality between these groups. This paper finds that ST women enjoy high social status and thus are unlikely to face impediments in accessing healthcare due to social norms that restrict women's autonomy. Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methodology reveals that the health disparity between the STs and SCs for some key outcomes can be explained by greater disadvantage STs face in accessing healthcare relative to SCs on account of potentially greater marginalization that STs face.

2) 17:10-18:40 Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University)
Scarce Trustworthy Workforce?: Evidence from Lao Textile Industry

Non-farm industries in developing counties are often characterized by dominance of low-growing micro-enterprises. This paper investigates whether this feature is at least partly due to a constant in hiring trustworthy workers. This may be driven by agency problems between employers and workers arising from the weak rule of law. In such a situation, a unit hiring cost will be increasing in firm size because the cost becomes higher once employer exhausts hiring from her personal network. In order to test such a possibility, we conducted a carefully-designed survey with business owners of the Lao hand-weaving textile industry. Our empirical results supports this hypothesis with two main findings. First, employer’s trust to people in other villages whom the employer can potentially hire has positive effect on the total revenue and production quantity. Second, the size of potential workforce in employer's relatives, instrumented by the number of females (dominant gender in this industry) in relatives, also matters for the total revenue and production quantity. Finally, we discuss the remaining issues to be examined by on-going experiments.

※　以下のセミナーは都合により中止となりました。
　　　This seminar schedule has been cancelled.

December 5, 2016 (Monday) 12:00-13:15

James Andreoni （University of California, San Diego）

Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan (joint with Michael Callen, Karrar Hussain, Muhammad Yasir Khan, and Charles Sprenger)

主催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

December 13, 2016 (Tuesday) 12:10-13:20

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Hyuncheol Bryant Kim （Cornell University）

Is Knowing Half the Battle? Behavioral Responses to Risk Information from the National Health Screening Program in Korea (joint with Wilfredo Lim and Suejin Lee)

The benefits of screening rest on the idea that information can change individual behaviors. This study provides empirical evidence on changes in health behaviors and outcomes resulting from risk information obtained from general health screening. We draw on the National Health Screening Program in South Korea, which provides free general health screening to individuals aged 40 and over. Using a 2% random sample of the administrative data, we apply a regression discontinuity design to estimate behavioral responses to information about one’s risk classifications for diabetes, obesity, and high cholesterol, which vary discontinuously with levels of fasting blood sugar, BMI, and LDL cholesterol, respectively. We find evidence of weight loss around the blood sugar level threshold of 126, where risk information is combined with secondary examination and medical intervention. However, we find little to no differences around the risk classification thresholds of obesity and hyperlipidemia, which were not accompanied by further intervention. This suggests that the marginal benefit to health outcomes could be limited if providing only information on risk status, and that screening may be more effective if combined with other interventions such as counseling and medical treatment.

ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催

 

2016 Conference on Disasters and Recovery

December 19, 2016 (Monday) 9:30-17:10

[program]

 

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yasuyuki Sawada　(The University of Tokyo), Daniel P. Aldrich (Northeastern University)

 

9:30 Conference Welcome from Professor Yasuyuki Sawada

Session 1: 9:40-12:10 Chair: Yasuyuki Sawada

1) 9:40-10:30
Toru Tsuboya (Tohoku University)
Types of disaster damage and change in depressive symptoms among survivors in Iwanuma, Miyagi

2) 10:30-11:20
Naoki Kondo (The University of Tokyo)
Disasters, economic crisis, and social capital: evidence from social epidemiology

3) 11:20-12:10
Daniel Aldrich (Northeastern University)
How social capital matters during and after disasters

12:10-12:40 Lunch

Session 2: 12:40 – 17:10 Chair: Daniel P. Aldrich

4) 12:40-13:30
Jamie　W. Lien (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Major Earthquake Experience and Present-Focused Expenditures

5) 13:30-14:20 Yuki Higuchi (Nagoya City University)
Disaster aid targeting and political connection: Evidence from the Philippines (joint with Nobuhiko Fuwa, Kei Kajisa, and Yasuyuki Sawada)

14:20-14:40 Coffee break

6) 14:40-15:30 Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)
Disaster and Preference: A Unified Theory and Evidence from the Philippines and Japan

7) 15:30-16:20 Masaharu Tsubokura (The University of Tokyo)
Medical assistance for the 23km zone after the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear disaster”

8) 16:20-17:10 Minhaj Mahmud (BIGD, BRAC University)
Natural Disaster and Risk Sharing Behavior: Experimental Evidence from Bangladesh

17:10 Conference ends

18:00 Dinner (Invitation only)

 

December 21, 2016 （水　Wednesday）16:50-18:35 ※日時・会場に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟３階 第４教室
in Lecture Hall No.4 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building [Map]

Manabu Nose (International Monetary Fund)

Roles of Guarantees and Fiscal Institution in Enforcing Public-Private Partnership Contract

Over the last 30 years, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have spread across emerging and developing countries. Recently, governments in developing countries have increased fiscal commitments in guarantees and direct subsidies to promote PPPs, while the frequency of contractual disputes remains to be high. This paper examines the effectiveness of the fiscal commitments in mitigating dispute risk of PPPs. Empirical analysis using about 6,000 PPP contract-level data shows that indebted governments tend to issue more guarantees to attract private capitals ex-ante especially when the fiscal transparency is low. Propensity score matching estimate shows that contracts with guarantees tend to face higher dispute risk due to the adverse selection of riskier projects. The result also highlights the importance of fiscal management in PPPs especially when guarantees are granted.

主催：マクロ経済学ワークショップ、共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

February 16, 2017 (Thursday) 　1) 15:00-16:30, 2) 16:40-18:20

※曜日・会場に注意。

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

1) 15:00-16:30 Johann Caro (Hiroshima University)

Creating a Toilet Habit in Kenya

2) 16:40-18:20 Stephan Litschig (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)

Which Tail Matters? Inequality and Growth in Brazil (joint with María Lombardi)

1) 15:00-16:30 Johann Caro (Hiroshima University) Creating a Toilet Habit in Kenya

Poor sanitation leads to diseases and other negative outcomes, especially in developing countries. Clean toilets are a necessity, and yet they are not widely used in many of these countries. We study the case of a slum in Nairobi, Kenya. In this slum, people have access to clean and affordable toilets, however, they often use unhygienic alternatives. We implement a large-scale field experiment to study whether providing monetary incentives for clean toilets usage can create persistence in usage after the incentive is removed. We show that subjects who used clean toilets more often during the discount period are more likely to still use these toilets afterwards. However, this continued usage decays slowly over time. Inspired by the behavioral psychology literature, we hypothesize that people who use the toilets during a consistent time of the day are more likely to create a habit. We construct a measure of consistency for the usage during the discount period, and show that it has a positive an significant effect on the post-discount usage.

 

2) 16:40-18:20 Stephan Litschig (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)
Which Tail Matters? Inequality and Growth in Brazil (joint with María Lombardi)

We estimate the effect of initial income inequality on subsequent income per capita growth using sub-national data from Brazil over the period 1970-2000. Controlling for initial income per capita and other standard confounders, we find that places with higher initial inequality exhibit higher subsequent growth. This effect is entirely driven by the lower tail of the initial income distribution: places with a higher share of income going to the middle quintile at the expense of the bottom quintile grow more rapidly, while places with a higher share of income going to the top quintile at the expense of the middle quintile get no growth boost at all. We document that physical and human capital accumulation in places with higher inequality in the lower tail of the initial income distribution outpace capital accumulation in more equal places, while inequality in the upper tail of the distribution is uncorrelated with subsequent physical or human capital growth. These results are consistent with credit constraints and setup costs for human and physical capital investments as well as an increasing and concave individual propensity to save.