財政・公共経済ワークショップ
Public Economics Workshop
2018年2月20日現在
※ 発表は原則として日本語で行われます。Presentations are basically in Japanese.
※ 経済学研究科教員・学生の方はご自由にご参加頂けます。
予定
今年度終了分
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| 要旨 | This paper uses two nationally representative sets of medical claim data from medical assistance (MA) and universal public health insurance (PHI) systems to examine how MA system assignment affects the demand for and supply of outpatient health care. Since the assignment of public assistance in Japan is not random but subject to means testing by the local government, I employ the instrumental variable model to estimate the consistent causal effect. I find that MA assignment increases medical expenditure, with an arc price elasticity ranging from 0.160 to 0.171. This is comparable to that found for outpatient care in the randomized RAND Health Insurance Experiment and slightly lower than that of recent empirical studies on low-income populations. It is also found that elderly and clinic patients are especially price sensitive. In addition, separating the medical expenditure into the demand and supply side effects, the empirical results suggest that the effect of the demand side exceeds that of supply side in various situations. I also find that the demand side effect is especially large in the repeated month but have negative impacts on medical expenditure in the first month. In addition, a large supply side effect is found in the first month.
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| 要旨 | This paper proposes an efficient scheme named "break-even shadow toll" for joint infrastructure project by multiple local governments,such as inter-regional transportation network and public facilities with significant scale economy. Shadow tolling in our inter-regional framework is a per-usage fee of infrastructure charged not to users but to government of the region where each user resides. By setting the shadow toll such that total revenue of user fee and shadow toll just covers construction cost of the infrastructure, voluntary investment of each individual region leads to efficient investment level. This scheme is also useful for providing the facilities in which no user fee is charged such as library. However, we also show that both regions agree to the joint project only when they have relatively even demand size for the infrastructure.
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| 備考 | ※都市経済ワークショップと共催 |
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※主催; ミクロ経済ワークショップ |
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| 要旨 | Higher education is not just a signal of innate ability. At least a certain level of educational achievement (degree level, degree mark) is strictly required to perform a graduate job. School leavers fall into two categories, the rich and the poor. Ability is distributed in the same way in both groups. Graduate jobs are differentiated by quality. The output of each graduate job-worker match depends on the worker’s ability and educational achievement as well as on the quality of the job. Individual wealth and ability are private information. Educational achievement and realized productivity are common knowledge. Graduates and graduate jobs are matched by tournament. In laissez faire, only the rich can buy enough education and enter the tournament. The poor are confined to the non-graduate labour market. This is doubly inefficient because some of the rich buy too much education, and some of the graduates have lower ability than some of the non-graduates. Student loans allow the more able among the poor to buy a higher education, discourage the less able among the rich from so doing, and bring individual education investments closer to their efficient levels. Unless the loan is large enough to allow a poor school leaver to invest as much, and thus get as good a job, as a rich one of the same ability, however, jobs of the same quality are assigned to graduates with the same education but different ability. Competition among employers will then result in poor graduates being paid a higher salary than rich graduates doing the same job. |
| 備考 | ※英語による報告となります。 |
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| 要旨 | The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a fiscal common pool
problem in Japanese municipal mergers. Specifically, we
investigate whether the merged municipalities rapidly increase
their expenditures and bonds just before mergers. Because the
likelihood of Japanese municipal mergers depends on a
municipality's characteristics such as population size, area,
and fiscal conditions, municipal mergers are a non-voluntary and
non-random phenomenon in Japan. Therefore, we identify causal
effects by applying propensity score matching within a
differences-in-differences framework to address the problems of
endogeneity bias and sample selection bias. In particular, we
focus on the subordinate merger partner in absorption-type
mergers. Our results show that the subordinate merger partner
suffers from adverse fiscal conditions and creates a fiscal
common pool problem in public projects just before mergers.
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| 要旨 | 1. "Corporate Tax Asymmetries and R&D: Evidence from the Introduction of Consolidated Tax Returns in Japan" Economic theory dating back to Domar and Musgrave (1944, Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 388-422) suggests that the tax treatment of gains and losses can affect incentives for firms to undertake high-risk investments. We take advantage of a 2002 tax reform in Japan as a natural experiment to test this theory. The reform introduced a consolidated taxation system (CTS) which allows business groups to offset gains with losses across firms in their group. Thus, we predict that the CTS can mitigate disincentives to high-risk investments. Using information on R&D as the investment risk measures, we find that the CTS increases R&D, in agreement with Domar and Musgrave (1944). We also provide evidence that the CTS stimulates risk-sharing across group members. These findings suggest that mitigating tax asymmetries is an effective policy both for risk-taking and risk-sharing. 2. "Self-education, Fully Funded Social Security and Economic Growth" This paper evaluates the policy effects on economic growth of fully funded social security in a small open economy with overlapping generations and pays attention to individuals’ trade-off between self-education and intergenerational education. In our model, individuals make decisions not only on educating their children but also on educating themselves. We find that accumulation of human capital by individuals themselves is a kind of ‘waste’ to economic growth and fully funded social security could be a policy tool to reduce this waste. There could exist an optimal scale of social security which maximizes economic growth rate. We also show that in a small open economy, an increase in the interest rate reduces the optimal scale of fully funded social security and improves economic growth. 3. "Emergence of Populism under Ambiguity" I construct a dynamic elections model with information asymmetries in which a representative voter who is ambiguity-averse chooses a policymaker among elites and non-elites in each period. Then, I investigate the effect of the uncertainty the voter faces about an elite's degree of bias on the emergence of populism. I show that an increase in risk and in ambiguity work in the opposite directions. An increase in risk makes populism less likely to arise so long as the reward and punishment mechanism to incentivize politicians is limited. By contrast, an increase in ambiguity makes populism more likely to arise. These results suggest that an increase in ambiguity rather than in risk is a crucial source of populism. 4. "Municipal Merger under Tax Competition with Debt" This paper analyzes whether municipal merger increases social welfare in a dynamic tax competition model. Though some papers about tax competition show that municipal merger increases social welfare because it terminates tax competition, the analysis finds that a welfare-decrease effect of municipal merger might eclipse a welfare-increase effect of municipal merger since it causes `common pool problem'. Another result of this paper shows that governments issue excessive debts in both municipal merger and non-municipal merger cases, while the reason of this is different in each case. 5. "Capitalization and Municipal Mergers: An Evaluation of the Heisei Territorial Reform in Japan" In this paper, we evaluate the effects of municipal mergers with the capitalization framework, exploiting the massive number of municipal mergers in the Heisei territorial reform and the large and detailed data set of land prices complied by the Japanese government. We allow the effects of municipal mergers to vary in time. Our results show that the positive impact of mergers require five or more years to be realized, increasing its degree with the passage of years. This implies that the territorial reform benefitted local residents in the long run. We also consider the effects of the second and/or third rounds of municipal mergers for those merged more than once in the 2000s. We estimate their impacts to be negative, implying that more-than-once amalgamations within a short period of years tend to harm local residents. |
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