Research | CIRJE

すべて「学術動向調査研究会」との共催

Zoomを利用したオンライン開催について　（Online Seminars Using Zoom)　

以下の注意事項を必ずご確認の上ご準備をお願いいたします。

Please read the following instruction for participation.

※　登録 (Registration) 事前登録が必須となります。下記よりご登録頂きますとミーティングURLがemailで送付されます。事前にご利用の端末にZoomアプリケーションのインストールをお済ませください。（Zoomアカウントをお持ちの方は、emailにあるID、パスワードでサインインして頂くことも可能です。） ご登録URLが変更しております。これまでご登録頂いている方も新規登録が必要となりますので下記ご案内のURLにて改めてご登録ください。

Registration is required to join a seminar. Please register in advance at the following website so that detailed information containing meeting URL will be provided via email. Please make sure to install ZOOM Cloud Meetings (application)on your computer or cell phone in advance. (If you have a Zoom account, sign-up using ID and password included in the email is also available.)

事前登録はこちらから（**2023年度** のURLが変わりました。新規登録をお願いいたします。Zoom URL has been changed from the one of FY2022. Please register again for participation.）

https://u-tokyo-ac-jp.zoom.us/j/85690615803?pwd=ZTg3aHJBVDBWZVdYSnRSdlFuckJ3dz09

参加までの手順は下記より事前にご確認ください。 For more details, please see the following website.

日本語　・　English

※　注意 (Note)

1) 参加者名には、ご自分の氏名をお使い下さい。　Please register your full name when you participate.

2) 登録は初回のみ。すでにご登録されている方は、登録時にご案内済みのミーティングURLまたはミーティングID、パスワードでご入室頂けます。ただし、共催セミナーの場合、URLが変わる場合がありますのでお気をつけください。

Those who already registered previously need not register again. You can join the following meetings with the same meeting URL or the meeting ID as the one you received. Please note that the meeting URL will be changed when the seminar is hosted by another workshop.

※　セミナー中 (During Seminars)

ご自身の音声は、質疑応答時を除き、OFFにしてください。 Please mute your microphone during a speaker's talk except for Q&A session.

音声OFFの手順 (Muting Participants in Zoom)

日本語　・　English publicdesktop

幹事 (Organizer)：　小川　光 (Hikaru Ogawa)

■　以下、本年度終了分　■

日時	2023年4月28日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo [Map] 東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	髙橋　済 (Wataru Takahashi)（高崎経済大学) Interactions among Local Governments over the Provision of Nursery Facilities: A Quasi-Experimental Approach [Paper]
要旨	The development policy for nursery facilities has become an important issue in Japan in recent years. We thus examine the existence of a strategic interaction among local governments over the provisioning policies for nursery facilities by estimating their reaction function. To this end, we employ a quasi-experimental framework to validate the strategic interaction and evaluate the spatial autocorrelation coefficient changes between the Kanto and Kansai regions using the institutional and informational changes in the development policy in the 2010s. The estimation results show that the “blog frenzy” of 2016 increased media coverage in the Kansai urban area and significantly raised the spatial autocorrelation coefficients on the public and total provision rates compared to similar local governments in the Kansai region. By contrast, the “Zero Children on Waiting Lists Declaration” by the City of Yokohama in 2013, which marked a turning point in the development policy of the Kanto region, had no region-specific effect on spatial autocorrelation. This result may be due to the regional nature of the event and the regional and temporal differences in local governments’ responses.

日時	2023年5月12日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	持田信樹 (Nobuki Mochida) （中央大学） Macroeconomic Impact of Tax Shocks: Evidence from Japan Using a Narrative Approach [Paper]
要旨	This paper analyzes the effects of tax shocks on the economic activity. Following David and Christina Romer's narrative approach, we identify, from scratch, 486 tax changes enacted in Japan into endogenous tax changes motivated by the state of the economy and more exogenous tax changes . These provide new datasets following those for the US and UK. We found that exogenous tax changes have a large and long- term impact on the economic activity in Japan as well. Exogenous tax shocks negatively impact the GDP trajectory, with consumption as the main transmission channels. In other words, tax cuts motivated by a desire to raise long-term growth have a positive effect on consumption, thereby increasing GDP. Deficit- driven tax changes have a negative effect on residential investment but has a positive effect on corporate investment, thereby increasing GDP.

日時	2023年6月9日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	後藤剛志（千葉大学） Tax-Price Elasticities of Charitable Giving and Selection of Declaration: Panel Study of South Korea [Paper]
要旨	This study estimates the tax-price elasticity of donations, addressing the bias caused by the existence of nondeclared giving and presenting the estimation method based on the intention-to-treat analysis to eliminate the bias. Using the method and the exogenous variation of tax incentives in the 2014 South Korean tax reform, we estimate that the giving price elasticity is -1.6, more elastic than the standard results. The control function approach confirms similar results and shows that less declaration of those with large amounts of donations without tax incentives causes the elasticity to be incorrectly estimated to be inelastic.

日時	2023年7月28日（金）16：50-18：30　　　*会場が変更いたしました。
場所	Seminar Room 1on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）1階第1セミナー室 [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	小林克也 (法政大学) Effort complementarity and role assignments in group contests [Paper]
要旨	This study characterizes role assignments in maximizing a group’s winning probability under the influence of the complementarity of group members’ efforts in a group contest, in contrast to prize and multiple resource allocations. We use a CES effort aggregator function to parameterize the complementarity. While the prize and resource allocation rules depend on the complementarity, the assignment rule does not when multiple roles are assignable to a single group member: All roles are assigned only to the most productive group member. However, when only a single role per group member is assignable, the assignment rule depends on the complementarity: Roles from greater to less importance are assigned to group members in descending order of their productivity under strong complementarity; only the most important role is assigned to the most productive group member and the others have no effect under weak complementarity.

日時	2023年9月22日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	盛本圭一（明治大学） Global Corporate Income Tax Competition, Knowledge Spillover, and Growth (joint work with Noritaka Maebayashi)　[Paper]
要旨	We analyze the welfare consequences of global corporate income tax competition, using a two-country model of endogenous growth with international knowledge spillovers. Although the Nash equilibrium tax rate can be excessively high or low, according to the degree of spillover, this does not lead to significant welfare losses. The key to this outcome is that corporate income tax competition for growth maximization, which we consider hypothetically, attains the maximum growth rate, despite complex externalities and strategic interactions.

日時	2023年11月24日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	大野太郎（財務省）個人所得課税の自動安定化効果
要旨	我が国における個人所得課税の研究では家計マイクロデータを使用した取り組みが進む中、マイクロシミュレーションという手法を扱う研究も増えている。これは各世帯の家族構成や収入の情報から、世帯ごとの税額を推計するもので、これを利用して例えば税制改正の影響を試算することも可能となる。こうしたマイクロシミュレーションの活用は幅広く、海外では税制・社会保障制度の安定化効果（所得変動縮小の度合い）についても考察されてきた。他方、日本において同様の考察は少ないが、家計はコロナ禍をはじめ断続的に所得変動に直面しており、税制・社会保障制度による安定化機能は一層期待されている。本報告では税や社会保険料の安定化効果を計測し、現行制度におけるビルトイン・スタビライザーの大きさについて定量的な評価を行う。その際、マイクロシミュレーションを活用することにより、他の要素を一定とし、当該制度のみがもたらす安定化効果の大きさを計測することが可能となる。また、安定化効果の時点間比較について要因分解を行い、制度変更による真の寄与についても計測する。

日時	2023年12月22日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面とZoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	鈴木崇文（愛知淑徳大学） Do Place-Based Policies Drive Economic Revitalization in Rural Areas? Evidence from Japan
要旨

日時	※ 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※ 2024年1月11日（木）13：00-14：00
場所	報告会はすべてZoomを使ったオンラインで開催されます。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 The presentations are held only online using Zoom. Please see the instruction above for dateils.
報告	13:00-13:30 Yu Li Gatekeeping Behavior under the Community-based Integrated Care System：Empirical Research of Long-term Care Insurance Grants on Eligibility Assessment （主査: 林　正義　　副査：岩本康志，小川　光） 13:30-14:00 城　貴大日本における選挙権年齢引き下げが地方財政に与えた影響（主査: 林　正義　　副査：小川　光，佐藤泰裕）

日時	2024年1月26日（金）16：50-18：30
場所	Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）1階第１セミナー室 [Map] 対面とZoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	高松慶裕（明治学院大学） Optimal policy mix of in-work benefits and unemployment benefits: The case of misusing unemployment benefits
要旨	We investigate the optimal combination of labor income taxation and search-contingent unemployment benefits in an economy where some job seekers may fail to find job offers. When a household receives a job offer, it must decide whether to accept it. Households receive unemployment benefits only if they actively seek jobs but remain unemployed. We assume that the government cannot distinguish between a job seeker who does not receive a job offer and one who rejects a received offer. Therefore, if the size of the unemployment benefit is sufficiently large, it may be misused by households that are not willing to accept jobs but pretend to be actively searching. We derive optimal rules for employment tax and search-contingent unemployment benefits, and we show that the optimal size of unemployment benefits is likely to be positive. Our numerical simulations suggest the following: (i) Implementing an in-work benefits policy for low-income workers is beneficial. (ii) The optimal size of unemployment benefits is large, making it desirable for the government to intentionally permit some households to misuse them. (iii) Frictions in job markets affect the desirability of in-work benefits and search-contingent unemployment benefits.

日時	2024年3月22日（金）16:00-18:45
場所	Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall), Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo (Kojima Hall) [Map] 　東京大学大学院経済学研究科学術交流棟（小島ホール）2階小島コンファレンスルーム [Map] 対面Zoomを使ったオンラインでの開催(オンラインは事前登録制）となります。詳細は本ウェブサイト上部の説明をご確認ください。 This seminar is held online (using Zoom) and in-person (Online: Pre-registration is required). Please see the top of this webpage for online registration.
報告	1) 16:00-17:00　星合佑亮（東京大学） Does the electronic filing system (e-tax) reduce tax evasion? Evidence from Japanese corporations 2) 17:05-18:45 石田三成（東洋大学） The Impact of Pay Cuts for Public Officials on Misconduct: An Empirical Analysis Focusing on the Differences between Shirking and Corruption (joint with Hidemasa Yoneoka)
要旨	1) With the rapid progress of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), the digitalization of administrative processes in governments has gained much attention. The electronic filing (e-tax) for corporate tax returns is one of the practical examples. This paper investigates the effect of introducing an e-tax on tax evasion behavior using a policy reform in Japan that mandates large corporations to adopt e-tax. We apply difference-in-differences methods to find that the introduction of e-tax reduces amendments to declaration, which can potentially become unintentional tax evasion, by about one-third. On the other hand, we cannot find any evidence that e-tax reduces intentional tax evasion. 2) There are numerous empirical papers on corruption to date, but corruption is only a small part of the misconduct of public officials. According to the efficiency wage hypothesis, salaries should affect not only corruption but also shirking. Therefore, this paper focuses on the event that the Japanese Government requested local governments to reduce the salaries of local civil servants in 2013 in order to raise funds for reconstruction following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and estimates the impact of salary reductions on shirking and corruption by using PSM-DID respectively. Our results support the efficiency wage hypothesis, showing a significant increase in both shirking and corruption in municipal governments that implemented the pay cut compared to those that did not.

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