財政・公共経済ワークショップ
Public Economics Workshop

2018年10月26日（金）14:55-18:35

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）
2階　第3セミナー室 [MAP]

1. 松本睦（立命館大学）
"Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and partial tax coordination"

2.西村幸浩（大阪大学）
"Taxing Multinationals: The Scope for Enforcement Cooperation (joint with Jean Hindriks)" [download]

1."Production inefficiency, cross-ownership and partial tax coordination"
Using a simple asymmetric capital-tax competition model where the allocation of mobile capital is distorted in non-cooperative equilibrium, this paper analyzes the welfare impact of tax coordination made by subsets of regions. Under the assumption that the ownership of immobile factors (e.g., business land) is diversified across regions, a new possibility of beneficial tax coordination arises which has not been identified before: reducing the difference in tax rates “between capital-exporting regions” or “between capital-importing regions” may improve the welfare of all regions. This is in contrast to the case without cross-ownership where tax coordination must be made “between capital-exporting and capital-importing regions” to achieve Pareto improvement.

2. "Taxing Multinationals: The Scope for Enforcement Cooperation (joint with Jean Hindriks)"
We present a tax-competition model with two policy instruments: the corporate tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement (i.e., controls on profit shifting by multinational enterprises). Tougher enforcement increases the cost of profit shifting, and thus mitigates tax competition. In a framework of noncooperative tax choices, we compare the equilibria of the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement choices. After showing that enforcement cooperation may not benefit the low-tax country, we indicate two drivers that promote enforcement cooperation. The first driver of cooperation is complementarity (imperfect substitutability) of countries’ enforcement efforts, taking into account that dispersed enforcement efforts among the involved countries are less effective. We show that cooperation is more likely with greater enforcement complementarity. The second driver of cooperation is tax leadership, which reduces the extent of disagreement on tax enforcement.

2018年11月27日（火）10:25-12:10

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）
1階　第1セミナー室 [MAP]

長谷川誠 (Makoto Hasegawa) (Kyoto University)
Territorial Tax Reform and Profit Shifting by US and Japanese Multinationals

In 2009, Japan began to exempt dividends paid by Japanese-owned foreign affiliates to their parent firms from home-country taxation. This tax reform switched Japan's corporate tax system to a territorial tax system that exempts foreign income from home-country taxation. In this paper, I examine the impact of the territorial tax reform on the profit-shifting behavior of Japanese multinationals. I analyze the sensitivity of the reported profits of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries to the tax incentive for profit shifting, measured by host countries' tax rates, and the introduction of the territorial tax system, using US-owned foreign subsidiaries as a comparison group. I find that the profits of US-owned foreign subsidiaries, particularly intangible-intensive or large subsidiaries, are more sensitive to host countries' tax rates than are those of Japanese-owned foreign subsidiaries. I find no evidence that the sensitivity of the pre-tax profits of Japanese multinationals to corporate tax rates increased after 2009 relative to US multinationals. These results imply that Japanese multinationals are less sensitive to the tax incentive for profit shifting than are US multinationals.

主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ　

2018年12月7日（金）14:55-18:35

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）
2階　第3セミナー室 [MAP] 　

1. 山口力（広島大学）
"Who is the Small Country Assumption for?" 　

2. 福村晃一　日本学術振興会特別研究員（東京大学経済学研究科）
"Minimum Wage Competition" [download]

1."Who is the Small Country Assumption for?"
In this paper we extend the horizontal tax competition by endogenizing the small country assumptions made by the competing asymmetric countries. For that purpose we consider a pre-play stage, where governments commit themselves to act as price-takers or non-price-takers. We show that the small country is always a non-price-taker, while the large country behaves as a small country when governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans. The main driving force for the result is that their goal of tax revenues rather than the utility of residents makes the fiscal externality more rigorous, but weakens the pecuniary externality. The higher the elasticity of capital, the more likely the capital exporting country becomes a price-taker at the cost of its residents' well-being.

2."Minimum Wage Competition"
This paper challenges the view that factor mobility leads to shrinking minimum wages. By focusing on geographical mobility, we propose a minimum wage competition model and show that minimum wage rates may be increased after the significant increase in mobility. This result is consistent with the data on European countries in the period of the massive enlargement of the EU. We also show that minimum wage rates respond positively to increased geographical mobility when (i) mobile workers face significantly worse labor market conditions, (ii) the concerns of economic efficiency are small, and (iii) the share of mobile workers is relatively small. The model also yields a normative implication that coordination in setting minimum wages is needed to achieve a desirable outcome. 

2019年1月25日（金）15:30-19:10 　※時間に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）
2階　第3セミナー室 [MAP] 　

1.角谷快彦　(広島大学)
TBA

2.宮下量久 （拓殖大学）
「市町村におけるスポーツ施設建設費の決定要因 」

1.

2.「市町村におけるスポーツ施設建設費の決定要因 」
本稿では，地方自治体別スポーツ施設の建設費データを独自に構築したうえで，市町村における財政状況や政治的要因がスポーツ施設の普通建設事業費に与える影響をパネルデータから明らかにした。本稿の分析結果から，各市町村はこれまで発行された地方債現在高に対し普通交付税の基準財政需要額に算入される元利償還金が小さければ，その元利償還の交付税措置の恩恵を受けようと，地方債を財源としてスポーツ施設を建設していることがわかった。また，各市町村は国体開催の2年前にスポーツ施設の建設費をもっとも増加させていた。特に，市町村は国体に関わるスポーツ施設を開催前年度まで補助事業よりも単独事業を中心に整備している傾向がみられた。各市町村が単独事業による国体のスポーツ施設整備を行える背景には，地方債の元利償還に伴う交付税措置があると思われる。  

2019年2月22日（金）14:55-18:35 　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 国際学術総合研究棟
8階　第３共同研究室 [MAP] 　

※場所が再度変更いたしました。

1. 宮崎智視（神戸大学）
"Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Stimulus and Regional Employment: Evidence from Japan"

2. 小川光（東京大学）
"Productivity Dynamics during Major Crises in Japan: A Quantile Approach"

1."Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Stimulus and Regional Employment: Evidence from Japan"
This paper examines the effects of the interactions between “unconventional” monetary policy and fiscal stimulus on regional employment in Japan. To do so, a mixed vector autoregressions (VARs)/event study approach is used, which allows us to consider the size and persistence of each policy change’s impact. We run VARs for 9 regions in Japan over the sample period from 1986 Q1 to 2016 Q4. Our empirical findings are as follows. First, the interactions between aforementioned policies are effective to increase employment (number of workers) for most regions. Second, however, when it comes to unemployment rate, the results from VAR estimations are not robust.  

2019年3月15日（金）14:55-18:35 　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）
2階　会議室 [MAP] 　※場所変更あり。ご注意ください。

1. 溝口哲郎（高崎経済大学）
"Does Efficiency Wage Assuage Corruption?"

2. 大島考介（日本大学）
"Privatizing Differentiated Public Duopoly in a Two-City Model"

1. "Does Efficiency Wage Assuage Corruption?"
In this paper, we analyze the corruption in entry regulation that involves an entrepreneur and a track of bureaucrats. Instead of formulating a game in extensive form to analyze the sequential nature of the process involved in the application for a permit, we focus on the corruption in entry regulations that involves both entrepreneur and multiple bureaucrats to negotiate simultaneously for bribes from the mechanism design perspectives. Based on the modified bilateral trading model by Mizoguchi and Quyen (2009), our result confirms the efficiency wage argument; that is, a higher wage discourages corruption by lowering the probability that bureaucrat will accept bribes for fear of losing their jobs if get caught. More rigorous law enforcement to increase the probability of detection also helps to reduce corruption.

2. "Privatizing Differentiated Public Duopoly in a Two-City Model"
Models of public duopoly have been used to analyze industries such as international ports and airports where the two public firms reside in different countries. In the present paper we suppose a country that consists of two cities, in each of which a public firm resides and produces a good or service. The two goods are, at least to some extent, substitutes just as neighboring airports. The firms are owned either by city governments (competition between cities) or by state and city governments (competition between state and city). While earlier studies on public duopoly compared full public ownership and full privatization, we investigate to what extent the governments privatize the public firms under different substitutability of the two goods.