Discussion Papers 2022

CIRJE-J-303	『需給調整メカニズムの現況と課題：欧米の比較を踏まえた2024年度以降に向けての考察と提言』 "Future of Balancing Electricity Market in Japan: 2024 and Beyond"
Author Name	大橋弘（Hiroshi Ohashi）・山本敏之（Toshiyuki Yamamoto）
Date	March 2022
Full Paper	PDF file (only Japanese version available)
Remarks

Abstract (in Japanese)	Abstract (in English)
需給調整メカニズムの2つの形態（分散型と集中型）を取り上げ、両者の得失を比較衡量しつつ、わが国にふさわしい需給調整のあり方を論じる。需給ひっ迫時において、小売事業者と系統運用者との間で電源の取り合いが生じるような事態に対して、小売事業者にインバランス負担を適切に求めないのであれば、系統運用者にセーフティーネットを提供させる集中型に自然と制度が近づいていくことを指摘する。ドイツと米国PJMの経験を振り返りながら、わが国の特徴（系統が一国に閉ざされている点、揚水比率が高い点、燃料調達のリードタイムが長い点等）を考慮したとき、分権型が完成する2024年度以降において、更に求められる制度上の留意点を指摘する。	This paper focuses on the mechanism of balancing electricity market with a particular emphasis on the market reform in Japan. It compares the cost and benefit of two typical balancing mechanisms (decentralized system exemplified by Germany and centralized system by PJM in the United States). To avoid blackout, imbalance of electricity has to be resolved either by demand-side (i.e., a supplier) or supply-side (a transmission system operator), or both. This paper argues that decentralized system, which Japanese electricity market is currently aiming at, may not work well if it does not impose appropriate imbalance charges on suppliers. Otherwise, the system will be essentially degenerated to the centralized system. We consider several elements unique to Japan, including (1) the network connected solely within the domestic market; (2) high proportion of pump-up hydro in supply resources; and (3) long lead-time taken to carry fossil fuels. We conclude that we should keep the option of centralized market mechanism for future reform of balancing market in and after 2024, when the current market reform completes.

Abstract (in Japanese)

Abstract (in English)

需給調整メカニズムの2つの形態（分散型と集中型）を取り上げ、両者の得失を比較衡量しつつ、わが国にふさわしい需給調整のあり方を論じる。需給ひっ迫時において、小売事業者と系統運用者との間で電源の取り合いが生じるような事態に対して、小売事業者にインバランス負担を適切に求めないのであれば、系統運用者にセーフティーネットを提供させる集中型に自然と制度が近づいていくことを指摘する。ドイツと米国PJMの経験を振り返りながら、わが国の特徴（系統が一国に閉ざされている点、揚水比率が高い点、燃料調達のリードタイムが長い点等）を考慮したとき、分権型が完成する2024年度以降において、更に求められる制度上の留意点を指摘する。

This paper focuses on the mechanism of balancing electricity market with a particular emphasis on the market reform in Japan. It compares the cost and benefit of two typical balancing mechanisms (decentralized system exemplified by Germany and centralized system by PJM in the United States). To avoid blackout, imbalance of electricity has to be resolved either by demand-side (i.e., a supplier) or supply-side (a transmission system operator), or both. This paper argues that decentralized system, which Japanese electricity market is currently aiming at, may not work well if it does not impose appropriate imbalance charges on suppliers. Otherwise, the system will be essentially degenerated to the centralized system. We consider several elements unique to Japan, including (1) the network connected solely within the domestic market; (2) high proportion of pump-up hydro in supply resources; and (3) long lead-time taken to carry fossil fuels. We conclude that we should keep the option of centralized market mechanism for future reform of balancing market in and after 2024, when the current market reform completes.