

# Spatial wage disparities: Sorting matters!

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**ABSTRACT:** Spatial wage disparities can result from spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce, in non-human endowments, and in local interactions. To distinguish between these explanations, we estimate a model of wage determination across local labour markets using a very large panel of French workers. We control for worker characteristics, worker fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the characteristics of the local labour market. Our findings suggest that individual skills account for a large fraction of existing spatial wage disparities with strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. Interaction effects are mostly driven by the local density of employment. Not controlling for worker heterogeneity leads to very biased estimates of interaction effects. Endowments only appear to play a small role.

**Key words:** Local labour markets, spatial wage disparities, panel data analysis, sorting.

**JEL classification:** R23, J31, J61.

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## 1. Introduction

In many countries, spatial disparities are large and a source of considerable policy concern. In most developed countries, the workers in the richest regions have incomes or wages that are typically double those in the poorest regions. In developing countries, the gaps are often larger.<sup>1</sup> In this paper we propose a new approach to account for spatial wage disparities. We implement it on a large panel of French workers.

To explain large spatial wage disparities, three broad sets of explanations can be proposed. First, differences in wages across areas could *directly* reflect spatial differences in the skill composition of the workforce. There are good reasons to suspect that workers may sort across employment areas so that the measured and un-measured productive abilities of the local labour force may vary. For instance, industries are not evenly distributed across areas and require different labour mixes. Consequently, we expect a higher mean wage in areas specialised in more skill-intensive industries. Differences in local amenities may also imply some sorting by skills across areas. All these skills-based explanations essentially assume that the wage of worker  $i$  is given by  $w_i = A s_i$ , where  $s_i$  denotes individual skills and  $A$ , the productivity of labour, is independent of location. Consequently, in area  $a$  the average wage is the product of the average skill in the area,  $\bar{s}_a$ , by the productivity of labour:  $w_a = A \bar{s}_a$ .

That sorting could be at the root of systematic wage differences between groups of workers is a long-standing concern of labour economists. They researched this question intensively in the case of wage differences across industries (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992; Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999) but they have mostly left aside the geographic dimension. On the other hand, scholars interested in regional issues have paid remarkably little attention to this type of explanation.<sup>2</sup>

Instead, the study of spatial disparities has mostly focused on two alternative strands of explanations, which both assert that wage disparities reflect 'true' productivity differences across places. The first alternative contends that wage differences across areas are caused by differences in local non-human endowments (hereafter endowments). For instance, workers in some areas may have a higher marginal product than in others because of geographical features such as a favourable location (like a port or a bridge on a river), a climate more suited to economic activity, or some natural resources. Arguably, local endowments cannot be restricted to natural features and should also encompass factors of production such as public or private capital, local institutions, and technology. More formally, this type of argument implies that in area  $a$  with endowments  $E_a$  affecting positively the productivity of labour, the wage is given by  $w_a = A(E_a)$ .

This (very) broad group of explanations is often at the heart of the work done by growth economists. The literature on this topic is extremely voluminous (see Durlauf and Quah, 1999, and Temple, 1999, for recent surveys).

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<sup>1</sup>See Aten and Heston (2005) for some broad international comparisons and a discussion of the data sources. See also Braunerhjelm, Faini, Norman, Ruane, and Seabright (2000) for a recent survey on regional inequalities in Europe.

<sup>2</sup>They usually perform some regressions at the regional level using aggregate measures of skills. In their attempts to use micro-data, Glaeser and Maré (2001) on the urban wage premium in US cities and Duranton and Monastiriotis (2002) on UK regional convergence stand out as exceptions.

The second alternative argues that some interactions between workers or between firms take place locally and lead to productivity gains. Interactions-based explanations have a wealth of theoretical justifications. Following Marshall (1890), denser input-output linkages between buyers and suppliers, better matching of workers' skills with firms' needs in thicker labour markets, and technological externalities resulting from more intense direct interactions are frequently mentioned (see Duranton and Puga, 2004, for a review).<sup>3</sup> A key issue in the literature is whether these benefits stem from the size of the overall market (*urbanisation economies*) or from geographic concentration at the industry level (*localisation economies*). Stated formally, these arguments imply that the mean wage in area  $a$  and industry  $k$  is given by  $w_{a,k} = A(I_a, I_{a,k})$ , where  $I_a$  and  $I_{a,k}$  are two vectors of interaction variables to capture urbanisation and localisation economies, respectively (which we also refer to as between- and within-industry interactions).

Interaction-based explanations have received a lot of attention from urban and regional economists. Work on agglomeration economies is usually done at the aggregate level by regressing a measure of local productivity on a set of variables relating to the extent and local composition of economic activity. Results are generally supportive of the existence of both localisation and urbanisation economies.<sup>4</sup>

In summary, although there is a very large literature dealing with the last two of these three broad explanations (or more specific theories therein), we are not aware of any work using individual data considering all three of them in a unified framework. This is the main purpose of this paper. In our specification, we allow skills, endowments, and interactions to determine local wages. More formally, our model implies that in equilibrium the wage of worker  $i$  in area  $a(i)$  and industry  $k(i)$  is given by  $w_i = A(E_{a(i)}, I_{a(i)}, I_{a(i),k(i)})s_i$ .<sup>5</sup>

Such a unified framework encompassing skills-, endowments-, and interactions-based explanations is important to provide us with a sense of magnitudes about the importance of these three types of explanations in determining wage disparities across areas. These magnitudes are crucial to inform policy and to guide future theoretical work. Unfortunately, a unified framework also imposes formidable data requirements. To deal properly with skills-based explanations, we must control for unobserved worker heterogeneity, which requires a panel of workers. In our empirical analysis, we use a large scale panel of French workers comprising almost 9 million observations between 1976 and 1998 to account for wage disparities across French employment areas. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a large panel is used to investigate regional and urban questions.

In the first stage of our approach, we regress individual wages on some time-varying worker characteristics, a worker fixed effect, an area-year fixed effect, an industry fixed effect, and a set of variables relating to the local characteristics of the industry (to capture local interactions within

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<sup>3</sup>The theories relying on input-output linkages and more generally on market access differ starkly with respect to the spatial scale they consider. The traditional focus of urban economics is the city whereas that of the 'New Economic Geography' (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999) is more regional and even inter-regional. We pay attention to these issues below.

<sup>4</sup>The main references in the literature are Sveikauskas (1975), Moomaw (1981), Henderson (1986), Ciccone and Hall (1996), and Henderson (2003). See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey and further references.

<sup>5</sup>See Rice and Venables (2003) for a related typology. In the UK case, their work focuses on the differences between explanations with respect to their aggregate implications.

industries). In this regression, worker fixed effects capture all the unobserved skill differences between individuals, which do not depend on location. The area-year fixed effects can be interpreted as local wage indices after controlling for observed and unobserved worker characteristics and industry effects. Conceptually, the first stage of the regression allows us to assess the importance of explanations based on differences in the productive abilities of the workforce (i.e., skills-based explanations) against those highlighting true productivity differences across areas (i.e., between-industry interactions and endowments-based explanations).

Our main results for the first stage of the analysis are the following. First, to explain wages, the explanatory power of worker fixed effects (i.e., of skills) is larger than that of area fixed effects and industry variables by several orders of magnitude. The second key result is that differences in the skill composition of the labour force account for 40 to 50% of aggregate spatial wage disparities. This suggests that skills are of fundamental importance to explain wage disparities, not only across workers, *but also across areas*. This is because workers sort across locations according to their measured and unmeasured characteristics: The correlation between the local mean of worker fixed effects and de-trended area fixed effects (which are computed controlling for worker fixed effects) is large at 0.29. This suggests that previous approaches, which typically do not pay much attention to sorting of workers across areas, are likely to suffer from an important omitted variable problem.

In the second stage of the regression, we use the area fixed effects estimated in the first stage and regress them on a set of time dummies, several variables capturing local interactions between industries, and some controls for local endowments. We use a variety of panel data techniques and instrumental variables approaches to deal with estimation concerns.

Our findings for the second stage point first at substantial local interactions despite the importance of sorting. Urbanisation economies (measured by the density of local employment) play the most important role. Market access plays a less important part, while endowments play a weak role. Second, controlling for sorting nearly halves standard estimates of the intensity of agglomeration economies. Our favourite estimate for the elasticity of wages with respect to employment density is at 3%. This is below previous estimates that are typically around 5 – 6% (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Third, after controlling for skills and interactions, residual spatial wage disparities are smaller than disparities in mean wages by a factor of around three. This result is of course consistent with a major role for skills-based explanations, a moderate role for interactions, and a weak role for endowments.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first document wage disparities between French employment areas in the next section. Then, in Section 3 we propose a general model of spatial wage disparities. In Section 4, this model is estimated on individual data to assess the importance of skills-based explanations. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss the issues relating to endowments- and interactions-based explanations and assess their importance. In Section 7, we reproduce our regressions using aggregate data. Finally some conclusions are given in Section 8.

## 2. Wage disparities across French employment areas

### *Data description*

The data is extracted from the Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales (DADS) or Annual Social Data Declarations database. The DADS are collected by the French Institute for Statistics (INSEE) from all employers and self-employed in France for pension, benefits and tax purposes. A report must be filled by every establishment for each of its employees so that there is a unique record for each employee-establishment-year combination. The extract we use covers all employees in manufacturing and services working in France and born in October of even-numbered years. The data run from 1976 to 1998. Because of lack of sampling by INSEE, 1981, 1983 and 1990 are excluded.

The raw data contains 19,675,740 observations. For each observation, we have some basic personal data (age, gender, occupation at the one-digit level but not education), basic establishment level data (including location and firm industry at the three-digit level), number of days worked, and various measures of earnings. For consistency with the model below, we focused only on total labour costs for full-time employees deflated by the French consumer price index. We refer loosely to the real 1980 total labour cost per full working day as the wage.

Workplace location is identified at the level of employment areas ('zones d'emploi'). Continental France is fully covered by 341 employment areas, whose boundaries are defined on the basis of daily commuting patterns. Most employment areas correspond to a city and its catchment area or to a metropolitan area.

Although the data is of high quality, we carefully avoided a number of pitfalls. After eliminating public sector workers, part-timers (for whom hours are missing before 1993), outliers, incomplete observations, and various industries for which there are some coding problems, we ended up with 8,826,422 observations. For reasons of computational tractability, we keep only six points in time (every four years: 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996).<sup>6</sup> This left us with 2,664,474 observations when estimating the model on individual data. Appendix A and Abowd *et al.* (1999) provide further details on the data and some background information on wage setting in France.

### *Wage disparities across French employment areas*

In this sub-section we briefly document the extent and persistence of wage disparities between employment areas in France. To do this, we consider the mean wage in each French employment area for each year between 1976 and 1996.

Typically, in and around Paris wages are 15% higher than in large French cities such as Lyon or Marseille, 35% higher than in mid-sized French cities, and 60% higher than in predominantly rural employment areas. To be more systematic, we compute a series of inequality measures between employment areas. The ratio of the highest average to the lowest across all French employment areas remains between 1.62 and 1.88 during the 1976 – 1996 period. The ratio of the ninth to the first decile is between 1.19 and 1.23. Finally, the coefficient of variation also remains between

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<sup>6</sup>The six years were selected to cover different phases of the business cycle and thus avoid bias in the estimates.

**Table 1.** Some simple correlations  
Mean local wage in 1998 ( $\log w_{a,98}$ ) as a function of:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$\log w_{a,97}$	$\log w_{a,88}$	$\log \text{Density}_{a,98}$	$\log \text{Emp}_{a,98}$	$\log \text{Diversity}_{a,98}$	$\text{Skill}_{a,98}$
Intercept	0.128* (0.072)	0.424*** (0.132)	5.720** (0.014)	5.147*** (0.025)	5.329*** (0.037)	5.352*** (0.006)
Coefficient	0.976*** (0.013)	0.943*** (0.025)	0.049*** (0.003)	0.049*** (0.004)	0.047*** (0.012)	1.763*** (0.085)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.94	0.81	0.51	0.34	0.04	0.56

341 observations. Standard error between brackets.  $w_{a,t}$  is the wage in employment area  $a$  and year  $t$ ;  $\text{Density}_{a,t}$  is the density of employment;  $\text{Emp}_{a,t}$  is total employment;  $\text{Diversity}_{a,t}$  is the diversity of employment as measured by an inverse-Herfindhal index,  $\text{Diversity}_{a,t} = \text{Emp}_{a,t}^2 / \sum_k \text{Emp}_{a,k,t}^2$  where subscript  $k$  denotes the industries; and  $\text{Skill}_{a,t}$  is the employment share of professionals. \*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%, and \*\*\*: significant at 1%.

0.08 and 0.09. All this points to rather large and persistent wage disparities between French employment areas. Reporting the correlation between local wages over time, columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 provide further evidence of the persistence of spatial wage disparities. Even with a 10-year lag, this correlation is above 0.9.

Table 1, columns 3 – 6 reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates suggesting that local wages are strongly linked to the structural attributes of their employment area. Column 3 regresses the log of the mean local wage in 1998 on the log of the local density of employment in the same year. The coefficient indicates an elasticity of 4.9% (as typically found in the literature). The explanatory power of this single variable is very strong since the R<sup>2</sup> is 51%. Similar results are obtained in column 4 when using total employment instead of density. In column 5, local wages are regressed on an index of industrial diversity. The effect of this variable is also highly significant but its explanatory power is much weaker. Finally, regressing local wages in column 6 on the share of workers in professional occupations also yields very good results.

In summary, denser, more populous, and more educated employment areas seem to command on average a higher wage. The objective of the rest of the paper is to assess the robustness of these basic results and uncover the determinants of spatial wage disparities.

### 3. Theory and estimation

#### *The model*

The profit function of a competitive representative firm operating in employment area  $a$  and industry  $k$  in year  $t$  is:

$$\pi_{a,k,t} = p_{a,k,t} y_{a,k,t} - \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} w_{i,t} \ell_{i,t} - r_{a,k,t} z_{a,k,t}, \quad (1)$$

where  $p_{a,k,t}$  is the price of its output  $y_{a,k,t}$ . For any worker  $i$  employed in this firm in year  $t$ ,  $w_{i,t}$  and  $\ell_{i,t}$  are the daily wage and the number of working days, respectively. Finally,  $z_{a,k,t}$  represents the other factors of production and  $r_{a,k,t}$  their price. Note that this specification allows for markets to be either segmented or integrated (when  $p_{a,k,t} = p_{k,t}$  and  $r_{a,k,t} = r_{k,t}$ ) for both output and non-labour

inputs. Output is Cobb-Douglas in effective labour and the other factors of production:

$$y_{a,k,t} = A_{a,k,t} \left( \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} s_{i,t} \ell_{i,t} \right)^b (z_{a,k,t})^{1-b}, \quad (2)$$

where the coefficient  $b$  is such that  $0 < b \leq 1$ ,  $s_{i,t}$  denotes the skills of worker  $i$  in year  $t$ , and  $A_{a,k,t}$  is the total factor productivity in  $(a,k,t)$ . At the competitive equilibrium, worker  $i$  employed in employment area  $a(i,t)$  and industry  $k(i,t)$  in year  $t$  receives a wage equal to her marginal product:

$$w_{i,t} = b p_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t} A_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t} \left( \frac{z_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}}{\sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} s_{i,t} \ell_{i,t}} \right)^{1-b} s_{i,t}. \quad (3)$$

Using the first-order condition for profit maximisation with respect to the other factors and inserting it in equation (3) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} w_{i,t} &= b(1-b)^{\frac{(1-b)}{b}} \left( p_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t} \frac{A_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}}{\left( r_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t} \right)^{1-b}} \right)^{\frac{1}{b}} s_{i,t} \\ &= B_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t} s_{i,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

As discussed in the Introduction, wage differences across areas can reflect differences in individual skills or alternatively they can also reflect true productivity differences caused by endowments and local interactions. Skills are captured by the last term,  $s_{i,t}$ , in equation (4) whereas the other two explanations enter the term  $B_{a,k,t}$  in equation (4). As made clear by this latter term, ‘true productivity differences’ can work through total factor productivity,  $A_{a,k,t}$ , or through the price of outputs,  $p_{a,k,t}$ , or even through the price of non-labour inputs,  $r_{a,k,t}$ . This implies that we cannot identify price and technology effects separately.

To understand this point better, consider for instance employment area  $a$ , which is located in a mountainous region, and industry  $k$ . Mountains may have a negative effect on wages in  $(a,k)$  because shipping the final output of the industry to the main consumer markets is more expensive, which depresses *f.o.b.* prices. Mountains may have another direct negative effect on wages in  $(a,k)$  because operating a plant is more difficult when land is not flat. Finally mountains may have a positive effect on wages because some raw materials such as wood may be more readily available. In this toy example, the first effect works through  $p_{a,k,t}$ , the second through  $A_{a,k,t}$ , whereas the third goes through  $r_{a,k,t}$ . With our approach, we can only estimate the overall effect of local characteristics, the presence of mountains say, in area  $a$  and industry  $k$ . In other words, we can *identify the determinants* of spatial wage disparities (i.e., endowments, interactions, and skills) but not *the exact channel* through which agglomeration economies percolate.<sup>7</sup>

Note further that some local characteristics like employment density may have a positive effect on  $B_{a,k,t}$  (e.g., agglomeration economies) as well as a negative effect (e.g., congestion). However

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<sup>7</sup>The theoretical micro-foundations of increasing returns generated by local interactions are reviewed in Duranton and Puga (2004). A crucial feature in this literature is that many different microeconomic mechanisms yield similar reduced forms. Following this, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) divide their review of the empirical literature into two main parts: the measurement of agglomeration economies on the one hand and the identification of the mechanisms at stake on the other. The two exercises are sufficiently different (and difficult) to justify separate approaches.

we are not able to identify these effects separately. We can only estimate the overall effect of a variable. In other words, the estimated effects of interaction variables include both agglomeration economies and any decreasing returns due to crowding.

Note finally that the production function specified in (2) is very simple for expositional reasons. This is fine for our purpose since, as already hinted above, our analysis is closer to a growth accounting exercise than a structural estimation. More sophisticated production functions will also in general imply a multiplicatively separable expression for the wage as in (4). Using this expression, we then estimate the overall effects of local characteristics on wages.<sup>8</sup> This flexibility in the underlying production function comes at the cost of being unable to disentangle between factors of production to estimate all the cross partial elasticities.

### *A micro-econometric specification*

To take equation (4) to the data, we need a specification for both the skill term,  $s_{i,t}$ , and the 'local industry productivity' term,  $B_{a,k,t}$ . Assume first that the skills of worker  $i$  are given by:

$$\log s_{i,t} = X_{i,t}\varphi + \delta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (5)$$

where  $X_{i,t}$  is a vector of time-varying worker characteristics,  $\delta_i$  is a worker fixed effect, and  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  is a measurement error. The errors are assumed to be i.i.d. across periods and workers.

Turning to  $B_{a,k,t}$ , which reflects true productivity differences in equation (4), we assume that it is given by:

$$\log B_{a,k,t} = \beta_{a,t} + \mu_{k,t} + I_{a,k,t}\gamma_k, \quad (6)$$

where  $\beta_{a,t}$  is an area-year fixed effect,  $\mu_{k,t}$  is an industry-year fixed effect, and  $\gamma_k$  is the vector of coefficients associated with  $I_{a,k,t}$ , the vector of within-industry interactions variables for each area-industry-year.

Note that in equation (6), it might be simpler to use area-industry-year fixed effects rather than area-year fixed effects *plus* industry-year fixed effects. However there would be two problems with doing this. First, it would force us to include more than 200,000 fixed effects in the model (341 employment areas  $\times$  99 industries  $\times$  6 years). These would come in addition to the worker fixed effects introduced in equation (5). Estimating such a large number of worker and area-industry fixed effects is computationally too demanding.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, many of these fixed effects would be estimated with a very small number of workers (if any at all). This would raise some problems of both identification and statistical significance.

Combining equations (4), (5), and (6) yields:

$$\log w_{i,t} = \beta_{a(i,t),t} + \mu_{k(i,t),t} + I_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}\gamma_{k(i,t)} + X_{i,t}\varphi + \delta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (7)$$

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<sup>8</sup>In particular we do not need to impose Hicks-neutrality and the effects of the local environment on wages can be specified as non-linear. We do not emphasise this aspect in what follows since we did not find strong evidence of non-linear effects after experimenting in this direction.

<sup>9</sup>Non-standard techniques, such as those developed by Abowd *et al.* (1999) would allow us to estimate both worker and area-industry-year fixed effects. For reasons made clear below, these techniques are nonetheless not appropriate here.



In equation (7) the interpretations of  $I_{a,k,t}\gamma_k$  and  $X_{i,t}\varphi$  are problematic. For instance, an industry may employ younger workers. If wages increase with age, this industry will pay lower wages all else equal. We want to think of such systematic industry component as being part of the ‘industry effect’. As a consequence, we centre  $I_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}$  and  $X_{i,t}$  around their industry mean. The systematic industry components in  $I_{a,k,t}\gamma_k$  and  $X_{i,t}\varphi$  are added to the industry fixed effect to form a ‘total industry effect’. For tractability, we also need to limit the number of coefficients in the model and assume that the time trend is the same for all industries so that this total industry effect can be decomposed into an industry fixed effect and a year effect (which can be normalised to zero for all years since the temporal evolution is also captured by the area-year fixed effect).<sup>10</sup> The final specification for the first stage of the analysis is thus:

$$\log w_{i,t} = \beta_{a(i,t),t} + \mu_{k(i,t)} + \tilde{I}_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}\gamma_{k(i,t)} + \tilde{X}_{i,t}\varphi + \delta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}. \quad (8)$$

where  $\tilde{I}_{a(i,t),k(i,t),t}$  is the centred vector of within-industry interactions variables and  $\tilde{X}_{i,t}$  is the centred vector of individual time-varying characteristics.

Equation (8) corresponds to an inverse labour demand equation.<sup>11</sup> To sum up, we estimate the wages of workers (expressed in constant 1980 francs) as a function of their observed and unobserved characteristics (age and its square plus a worker fixed effect), the area in which they are employed (area-year fixed effects), their industry (industry fixed effects), and the local characteristics of their industry: log share of employment, log number of establishments, and share of workers in professional occupations. The local share of employment and the number of establishments are standard variables appearing in most models of localisation economies (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). The share of professionals in the industry is a proxy for the average education locally in the industry. This should capture the external effects of human capital in the local industry in the spirit of the literature on human capital externalities (Moretti, 2004).

This estimation allows us to identify separately the effects of ‘people’ (skills-based explanations) versus those of ‘places’ (endowments- and interactions-based explanations).<sup>12</sup> It also allows us to assess the respective explanatory power of the effects of skills ( $\tilde{X}_{i,t}\varphi + \delta_i$ ), of within-industry inter-

<sup>10</sup>Formally, the effects of within-industry interactions,  $I_{a,k,t}\gamma_k$ , can be decomposed into an industry specific component independent of location,  $I_{\cdot,k,t}\gamma_k$ , and a component net of national industry effects,  $\tilde{I}_{a,k,t}\gamma_k \equiv (I_{a,k,t} - I_{\cdot,k,t})\gamma_k$  where  $I_{\cdot,k,t}$  is the mean of the  $I_{a,k,t}$  weighted by local employment in the industry ( $I_{\cdot,k,t} = \frac{1}{N_{k,t}} \sum_{a \in (k,t)} N_{a,k,t} I_{a,k,t}$  where  $N_{a,k,t}$  is employment in area  $a$ , industry  $k$  and year  $t$  and  $N_{k,t}$  is total employment in industry  $k$  in year  $t$ ). Similarly the effect of age can be decomposed into an industry specific component  $X_{\cdot,k(i,t),t}\varphi$  and a component net of national industry effect  $\tilde{X}_{i,t}\varphi \equiv (X_{i,t} - X_{\cdot,k(i,t),t})\varphi$ . The total industry effect is thus  $\mu_{k,t} + I_{\cdot,k,t}\gamma_k + X_{\cdot,k,t}\varphi$ . This consists of the industry effect as defined above, plus a national average industry interaction effect and a national average composition effect (in terms of workers’ observable characteristics). Then we assume:  $\mu_{k,t} + I_{\cdot,k,t}\gamma_k + X_{\cdot,k,t}\varphi = \mu_k + \rho_t$ . Finally, since it is not possible to identify  $\rho_t$  and  $\beta_{a,t}$  separately, we normalise  $\rho_t$  to zero for all years.

<sup>11</sup>A competitive wage-setting mechanism is assumed. Any imperfect competition framework where the wage is a mark-up on marginal productivity would lead to similar results since in a log specification this mark-up would enter the constant or the industry fixed effects if such mark-ups vary between industries but not between areas. In France, there is some empirical support for the competitive/fixed-mark-up assumption (see Appendix A and Abowd *et al.*, 1999).

<sup>12</sup>We do not consider the case where individuals may benefit differently from local labour markets depending on their abilities. An analysis of specific benefits from worker-area matches would require to define some individual fixed effects that are area-specific. This is beyond the scope of this paper. Our aim is only to capture the average benefits from locating in a given place through area fixed effects. Provided mobility is exogenous, our results will be unbiased. The broader issue of how endogenous worker mobility may affect our results is discussed below.

actions  $(\tilde{I}_{a,k,t}\gamma_k)$ , and the joint explanatory power of endowments and between-industry interactions  $(\beta_{a,t})$ . Next, the second stage of the estimation, which uses  $\beta_{a,t}$  as dependent variable, allows us to assess separately the explanatory power of between-industry interactions and endowments. It is presented in detail in Section 5.

### *Identification of industry and area fixed effects*

Under which conditions can we empirically identify equation (8)? Regarding area fixed effects, workers staying in the same area and industry are informative with respect to the variation of the area fixed effect over time. For instance, workers staying in employment areas 1 and 2 between  $t$  and  $t + 1$  allow us to identify  $\beta_{1,t+1} - \beta_{1,t}$  and  $\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{2,t}$ , respectively. Then, workers moving from one area to the other between  $t$  and  $t + 1$  but staying in the same industry enable us to identify  $\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{1,t}$ . Using the decomposition  $\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{1,t} = (\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{2,t}) + (\beta_{2,t} - \beta_{1,t})$  and since the first term is already identified thanks to the stayers, movers thus make it possible to identify  $\beta_{2,t} - \beta_{1,t}$ . By the same token, the same migrants also allow the identification of  $\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{1,t+1}$  thanks to the decomposition  $\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{1,t} = (\beta_{2,t+1} - \beta_{1,t+1}) + (\beta_{1,t+1} - \beta_{1,t})$ . More generally, to identify area fixed effects, it is enough to have workers staying in the same industry such that: (i) some workers remain in each of the employment areas between any two consecutive dates and (ii) there is no area or group of areas with no worker flow to the rest of the country. We have enough observations for these two conditions to be met.

Considering that area fixed effects are identified, we now give sufficient conditions for the identification of industry fixed effects,  $\mu_k$ , to be secured. Note that a worker remaining in the same industry is such that  $\mu_{k(i,t)} = \mu_{k(i)}$ . In this case, the industry effect cannot be distinguished from the worker effect  $\delta_i$ . Hence, industry fixed effects can only be identified with workers changing industries. When taking the first-difference to eliminate the worker effect, any worker moving from, say, industry 1 to industry 2 allows us to identify  $\mu_1 - \mu_2$ . More generally, the identification of all industry fixed effects requires all industries to be 'connected' with each other (at least indirectly) through worker flows (see also Abowd *et al.*, 1999). Given the amount of data we have, this condition is easily met.

Since the area fixed effects, just like the industry fixed effects, are identified only relative to each other, some identification constraints are necessary. With respect to area fixed effects, we set the coefficient for Central Paris in 1980 to zero. Turning to industries, we take the first industry (meat processing) as the reference:  $\mu_1 = 0$ .

### *Estimation method and estimation issues*

Our very large number of observations (with a very large number of worker fixed effects) restricts us to a simple estimation procedure for this first stage. We estimate equation (8) using the *within* estimator. This allows us to compute the coefficients on all time-varying variables and thus recover all parameters except the worker fixed effects. Only workers appearing at least twice in the panel contribute to the estimation. This leaves us with 653,169 workers representing 2,221,156

observations. Next, we can recover an estimator of each worker fixed effect by computing the mean prediction error. By the Frish-Waugh theorem, this estimator is the OLS estimator.

In our econometric specification, the choice of area and industry is assumed to be strictly exogenous. Nonetheless, since our specification contains both area-year fixed effects and industry fixed effects, this assumption should not be too restrictive. It is discussed in Appendix B. In essence, our results will be biased if we have spatial or industry sorting based on the unobservables but they will not be biased if we have some sorting based on the explanatory variables, *including the area-year and industry fixed effects*. More concretely, there is a bias when the location decision is driven by the exact wage that the worker can get at locations in a given year. However, there is no bias when workers base their location decision on the average wage of other workers in an area and their own fixed effects, i.e., when they make their location decision on the basis of their expected wages.<sup>13</sup>

If this selection bias is relevant, we can think of several reasons why it is likely to be much attenuated. First, in a country like France with numerous barriers to internal mobility, we expect migration to be driven mostly by long-term considerations. Provided the local shocks are uncorrelated over time, there is then no bias since workers migrate on the basis of future expected wages rather than the wage they can get today (Topel, 1986). Second, we also expect location decisions to be driven by factors unrelated to wages such as idiosyncratic preferences (Gobillon and Le Blanc, 2003). Third, with time-varying local effects and industry fixed effects, we expect much of the variation caused by the environment to be captured. This should limit the scope of selection. Finally, a recent paper by Dahl (2002) proposes a new approach to deal with selection problems with many possible choices, but this can be applied to cross-section data only.<sup>14</sup> He shows that this type of selection bias has only minimal effects on the estimates of the returns to education across US states. To summarise, we acknowledge a possible selection problem here, albeit less important than it may seem at first sight, and hope that future work will find a solution.

Some concerns also arise with the characteristics of the local industries in  $I_{a,k,t}$ . As discussed by Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002), some local characteristics like a high level of specialisation in an industry could be endogenous to high wages in this industry. We leave these concerns aside here on the ground that these variables only have a small explanatory power (see below). Similar concerns with respect to between-industry interactions will be tackled in the second-stage estimation.

Finally, according to Abowd *et al.* (1999) a wage equation with industry fixed effects should also contain establishment fixed effects. This is because these fixed effects may be correlated with industry fixed effects. This also applies to area fixed effects. Such a correlation would bias the estimates when establishment fixed effects are omitted. However the method developed by Abowd *et al.* (1999) to deal with large scale matched employer-employee data (using both worker and plant

<sup>13</sup>As in standard Roy models, a bias will also arise if the returns to the unobserved characteristics differ across areas and workers choose their location accordingly (see Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo, 1992, for more on this). In this respect note that a primary objective of our paper is to decompose spatial disparities. Considering that spatial differences in individual productivity could have multiple dimensions would make such decomposition much more cumbersome and far less transparent (see Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2002, for more on this). We believe that it is better to consider only one dimension for a first pass on the issue.

<sup>14</sup>We do not know of any method to correct for such selection biases in panel.

fixed effects) would not allow us to compute the standard deviations for the estimated area fixed effects that are necessary to perform the second stage of the estimation correctly. This approach would also lack theoretical foundations since area fixed effects would then have to be computed by calculating a weighted average of establishment fixed effects by location. A final problem with this alternative approach is that establishment fixed effects are constrained by the estimation to be constant over time. The resulting area fixed effects constructed by aggregating time-invariant establishment fixed effects can then evolve only through the entry and exit of establishments and internal changes in employment and not by changes in interactions and endowments.

#### 4. Skills and sorting across employment areas using individual data

This section presents the results for the *within* estimation of equation (8). Recall that the explanatory variables are the area-year fixed effects, the industry fixed effects, the worker fixed effects, the worker's age and its square, the log share of local industry employment, the log number of establishments, and the share of professionals. Note that in absence of education data, worker fixed effects will capture all the permanent characteristics of workers including their education. Since we are interested in the effects of skills rather than their determinants, this is not an issue provided the coefficients are properly interpreted. We first present a variance analysis and our results about sorting before commenting on the coefficients.

##### *The importance of workers' skills*

For a first pass at assessing the relative importance of workers' skills against true productivity differences, we estimate wages as a function of worker fixed effects *only*. This first regression yields an  $R^2$  of about 70%. When using area-year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and local industry effects, the  $R^2$  is 31%. When adding worker fixed effects in the complete baseline specification, it jumps to 80%. These results suggest that skills are of fundamental importance and play a much greater role than the local environment and the industry in the determination of individual wages.

These results are confirmed when we perform a more complete variance analysis as in Abowd *et al.* (1999). Table 2 shows the explanatory power of the different variables for the baseline regression. For each variable or group of variables, the Table reports the standard deviation of *their effect* and their correlation with wages, worker fixed effects and de-trended area fixed effects.

To construct this Table, we computed *the effect of each variable* by multiplying its coefficient by its value for each observation. For instance, consider worker  $i$  in  $(a,k,t)$ . The effect of specialisation is equal to the estimated coefficient on this variable for industry  $k$  times the specialisation of area  $a$  in this industry. For a group of variables, the sum of the effects is computed. Then, the variability of the effect of each variable across workers can be calculated. When the standard deviation of the effect of a variable is large and when it is highly correlated with wages, this variable has a large explanatory power. When on the contrary the standard deviation of the effect and its correlation with wages are small, this variable explains only a small fraction of the variations of wages.

Worker fixed effects have by far the largest explanatory power. Their standard deviation, at 0.284, is close to that of log wages at 0.364 and the correlation between worker fixed effects

**Table 2.** Summary statistics for the variance decomposition — estimation of equation (8)

Effect of	Std dev	Simple correlation with:		
		$\log w$	$\delta$	$\beta - \theta$
log real wage ( $\log w$ )	<b>0.367</b>	1.00	0.78	0.26
residuals ( $\epsilon$ )	0.166	0.45	0.00	0.00
worker effects ( $\delta + X\varphi$ )	0.294	0.80	0.98	0.09
worker fixed effects ( $\delta$ )	<b>0.284</b>	<b>0.78</b>	1.00	0.10
age ( $X\varphi$ )	0.058	0.23	0.08	0.00
industry fixed effects ( $\mu$ )	0.043	0.25	0.16	0.05
within-industry interactions ( $\tilde{I}_k\gamma_k$ )	<b>0.024</b>	−0.01	0.00	−0.45
within-industry share of professionals	0.011	0.16	0.12	0.29
within-industry establishments	0.019	−0.13	−0.08	−0.62
specialisation	0.017	0.03	0.02	−0.13
area fixed effects ( $\beta$ )	<b>0.140</b>	0.34	−0.05	0.55
de-trended area fixed effects ( $\beta - \theta$ )	0.065	0.26	0.10	1.00
time ( $\theta$ )	0.118	0.26	−0.11	0.10

2,221,156 observations. All correlations between the effects that are not orthogonal by definition are significant at 1%. The effect of within-industry share of professionals is that of the share of professional times its coefficient (in vector  $\gamma_k$ ). The effect of within-industry establishments is that of the log of the number of establishments times its coefficient. The effect of specialisation is that of the log of the industry share in employment times its coefficient. Area fixed effects are de-trended using the time fixed effects ( $\theta$ ) estimated in the second stage.

and wages is very high at 0.78. For no other variable, or group of variables, are the standard deviation and the correlation with wages as high. When looking at the effects of observable worker characteristics, it is worth noting that age and its square also have a moderate explanatory power with a standard deviation at 0.058 and a correlation with log wages at 0.23. Altogether, with a standard deviation of 0.294 and a correlation of 0.80 with wages, the combined effect of individual observed and unobserved characteristics is of overwhelming importance.

Turning to within-industry interactions, their explanatory power is very small. The standard deviation of the effect of all within-industry interaction variables together is less than a tenth of that of worker fixed effects. Furthermore, the correlation between log wages and the effect of within-industry interactions is close to zero. Within this group of variables, neither the share of professionals, the number of establishments nor specialisation particularly stands out.

Finally, the explanatory power of area-year fixed effects is substantial, albeit much less so than that of worker fixed effects. Because wages increased everywhere in real terms between 1976 and 1996, a good fraction of the area fixed effects is explained by the time trend over the period. After taking away this trend however, area fixed effects still have an explanatory power more important than that of industry, age, or within-industry interactions. Although this result was to be expected, this is rather interesting in light of the small amount of attention location factors have received so far in the labour literature relative to industry and age.

### *Spatial wage disparities and sorting*

To evaluate the importance of workers' skills on spatial wage disparities, we can also study the variations of a wage index net of worker fixed effects and industry effects. This 'net wage' is

**Table 3. Spatial wage disparities, 1976 – 1996**

	Mean wage	Net wage
Max/Min	1.74	1.38
P90/ P10	1.21	1.14
P75/ P25	1.11	1.06
Coefficient of variation	0.08	0.05

Mean wage refers to the de-trended mean wage by employment area. Net wages are calculated as in equation (9). Figures are the average over 1976-1998 of each inequality measure. Max/Min is the ratio between the two extremes of the distribution. P90/ P10 is the ratio of the ninth to the first decile. P75/ P25 is the interquartile ratio.

computed from the results of the first-stage regression. It corresponds to the local wage obtained by an ‘average’ worker in an ‘average’ industry. We can define such an index  $w_{\text{net},a,t}$ , which we refer to as the net wage, in the following way:

$$\log w_{\text{net},a,t} \equiv W_t + \hat{\beta}_{a,t}, \quad (9)$$

where  $W_t$  is a normalising time-dependant term such that  $w_{\text{net},a,t}$  can be interpreted as a wage.<sup>15</sup>

These net wages can then be compared with the real mean wages per area computed in Section 2. Table 3 compares systematically disparities in mean and net wages. Depending on the inequality measure taken, disparities in net wages may be as low as half of those in mean wages. Put differently, workers’ skills explain 40 to 50% of spatial wage disparities.<sup>16</sup>

This result is caused by a strong sorting pattern whereby workers with high fixed effects tend to live in the same areas. To go further on this issue, it is interesting to correlate the average worker fixed effects within each areas with de-trended area fixed effects. The correlation between the two is large at 0.29. Hence, areas where workers with high individual fixed effects work are also areas where the productivity of labour (after controlling for skills) is high. An immediate implication is that large spatial wage disparities reflect true productivity differences across areas that are magnified by the sorting of workers by skills.

### *Analysis of the coefficients*

Table 4 reports some summary statistics regarding the coefficients computed in the first stage of the estimation.<sup>17</sup> Note first that 88% of the area fixed effects differ significantly from the national mean (weighted for the period). Moreover, the distribution is skewed since only 10% of these area

<sup>15</sup>Formally, we have  $W_t \equiv \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^K N_j \hat{\mu}_j + \frac{1}{N_{t_0}} \sum_{i \in t_0} \hat{\delta}_i + \frac{1}{N_{t_0}} \sum_{m=1}^Z N_{m,t_0} \hat{\beta}_{m,t_0} - \frac{1}{Z} \sum_{m=1}^Z \hat{\beta}_{m,t}$  where  $t_0 = 1980$  and  $Z$  is the number of areas.

<sup>16</sup>Our computations do not account for the differences in local industry characteristics. However since the effects of the latter are very small, their contribution to explaining wage disparities is marginal.

<sup>17</sup>Our identification constraints ( $\mu_1 = 0$  and  $\beta_{\text{Paris},1980} = 0$ ) imply that standard Student’s tests about the significance of the industry and area effects with respect to 0 are not very informative because they depend on the choice of references. We instead test the significance of the coefficients with respect to their weighted industry mean or their weighted area mean for a given year. That is, we test the equalities:  $\mu_k = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^K N_j \mu_j$  and  $\beta_{a,t} = \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{j=1}^Z N_{j,t} \beta_{j,t}$ , where  $N_{j,t}$  is the number of workers in employment area  $j$  in period  $t$ ,  $N_t$  denotes the total number of workers in year  $t$ ,  $N_j$  is the total number of workers in industry  $j$  across all years,  $K$  is the number of industries, and  $Z$  is the number of employment areas. These tests can easily be implemented from the estimated coefficients and their covariance matrix. Directly constraining the mean of all area or industry fixed effects to zero in the estimation would have been computationally too demanding.

**Table 4.** Summary statistics for the coefficients estimated in equation (8)

Variable	Number of coefficients	Percentage > 0 at 5%	Percentage < 0 at 5%	P90–P10
area fixed effects (de-trended)	2046	10%	78%	0.16
industry fixed effects	99	58%	33%	0.11
age	1	100%	0%	—
squared age	1	0%	100%	—
specialisation	99	95%	0%	0.02
share of professionals	99	81%	3%	0.20
industry establishments	99	1%	85%	0.02

For area fixed effects, significance is calculated relative to the weighted national mean for the period. For industry fixed effects, significance is calculated relative to the weighted national mean. P90–P10 is the difference between the ninth and the first decile.

fixed effects are significantly higher than the mean whereas 78% are significantly lower. This is because a few populous employment areas (Paris, its suburbs, and other large French cities) offer significantly higher wages than the national mean.

In line with previous findings in the literature, we find that most specialisation elasticities are positive and significant. The average for all industries is at 2.1%, which is at the lower bound of the estimates found in the literature (Henderson, 1986; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). The largest specialisation coefficients are found for business services (3.6%) and for two high-tech industries, namely medical instruments (3.9%) and artificial fibres (4.3%). At the other end of the spectrum, the five industries with a coefficient not significantly different from zero are oil refinery, air transport, tobacco, production of weapons and bullets, and production of steel. Given the reliance of most of these industries on localised natural advantage (or some localised infrastructure), these results are not very surprising. The average coefficient on the share of professionals across industries is quite large at 11.8%. This is in line with the findings in the literature on human capital externalities (see Rauch, 1993, and his followers). Finally, the elasticity with respect to the number of industry establishments is on average at –1.4%. This coefficient is highest in industries such as machine tools and various instrument industries that produce very differentiated goods. The smallest coefficients are obtained in industries where instead efficient plant size is expected to be very large like various extractive industries, naval construction, and energy or water utilities.

## 5. The determinants of area fixed effects: estimation

So far we have assessed the relative importance of ‘people’ versus ‘places’ to explain spatial wage disparities. The objective of the second stage of the estimation is to assess the relative importance of endowments and between-industry interactions in explaining the area-year fixed effects.

## Specification

The area fixed effects estimated in equation (8) are assumed to be a function of a year fixed effect, of local interactions between industries, and endowments. The econometric specification is:

$$\beta_{a,t} = w_0 + \theta_t + I_{a,t}\gamma + E_{a,t}\alpha + v_{a,t}. \quad (10)$$

where the  $\theta_t$  are time dummies and  $\alpha$  is a vector of coefficients associated with the endowments variables,  $E_{a,t}$ .  $\gamma$  is the vector of coefficients associated with local *between-industry* interactions,  $I_{a,t}$ . The error terms  $v_{a,t}$  that reflect local technology shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across areas and periods.<sup>18</sup> Finally, we take 1980 as reference so that the coefficient for this year is set to zero.

To capture *between-industry* interactions, we follow the literature (e.g., Ciccone and Hall, 1996) and use the log of the density of local employment (log *Density*) as main explanatory variable. To distinguish density effects from pure scale effects, we also use the log of land area (log *Area*).<sup>19</sup> The diversity of the local composition of economic activity may also matter (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Schleifer, 1992). To capture this, we use the log of the inverse of a Herfindhal index (log *Diversity*, which is calculated as in Table 1). Finally, it could well be that wage differences across areas are driven by the proximity to markets for intermediate and final goods. These markets may have a spatial scale larger than employment areas as argued by much of the recent literature (Fujita *et al.*, 1999). Hence, we also constructed and experimented with a series of market access variables. The one we retained (log *Potential*) is the log of the market potential computed as:  $Potential_{a,t} = \sum_{a' \neq a} \frac{Den_{a',t}}{d(a,a')}$  where  $d(a,a')$  is the great-circle distance between areas  $a$  and  $a'$ .

Turning to productive endowments, note that they can increase wages through one of the three channels highlighted above (lower exporting costs, cheaper supplies, or higher productivity). There are many possible endowments that may work through these channels. One can think about airports, high-speed train lines, a favourable climate, closeness to a navigable river or a deep-sea harbour, etc. On the other hand, using a complete set of endowments (assuming the data are available) would raise serious endogeneity concerns (more on that below). To avoid this, we only considered four endowment variables, the percentage of population in each employment area living in a municipality with the following location attributes: a sea shore, mountains, a lake, and outstanding cultural or architectural heritage.

This last explanatory variable is of course unlikely to have a direct effect on local productivity. However, recall that equation (4) shows that the price of non-labour inputs matters in the determination of local wages. As highlighted first by Roback (1982), better consumption amenities (i.e., amenities unrelated to production like an architectural heritage) increase the willingness

<sup>18</sup>Note that endowments, between-industry interactions, and productivity shocks are assumed to affect all industries symmetrically. As already stated above, a full  $(a,k,t)$  analysis would bring the number of estimated effects well above our computational limits.

<sup>19</sup>Note that to be consistent we use the log values of the share of employment by industry (in the first stage) and of density and land area (in the second stage). This allows us to estimate the effect of a change in composition of activity keeping all else constant, a change in population keeping land area and composition constant, and a change in land area keeping density and composition constant (i.e., an increase in population keeping density constant). The effects of other changes can be easily computed by summing the coefficients. Alternative specifications using for instance industry employment, density, and total employment are certainly possible. However one must be careful with respect to the interpretation of the coefficients (Combes, 2000).



of consumers to pay for land and thus imply higher local land rents. As a result, firms use relatively less land. In turn, this lowers the marginal product of labour when land and labour are imperfect substitutes in the production function. Put differently, wages may capitalise the effect of non-production variables. Some of these variables are missing in our specification as they are not observed. This, in itself, is not an issue for our purpose since it would only imply more noisy estimates for the wage effects (as observationally identical employment areas end up paying different wages). It becomes an issue when such consumption amenities affect an explanatory variable like employment density — an issue that we discuss in detail below.

### *Estimation method*

Note that equations (8) and (10) constitute the full econometric specification. We speak of a two-stage estimation because in equation (10), the second stage, we use as dependent variable the area fixed effects estimated in equation (8), the first stage. The alternative is to perform a single-stage estimation and use all the explanatory variables at once.

Such a single-stage estimation is problematic because it does not allow us to compute the variance of local shocks,  $v_{a,t}$ .<sup>20</sup> This has two consequences. First, it is hard to assess the importance of the local shocks in the error term. Distinguishing local shocks from purely idiosyncratic shocks at the worker level is important since we lack many endowment variables. Second, in a single-stage estimation, the variance of local shocks has to be ignored when computing the covariance matrix of estimators. As shown by Moulton (1990), this creates large biases in the standard errors for the estimated coefficients of aggregate explanatory variables.<sup>21</sup> Our estimation method avoids these pitfalls.<sup>22</sup> As robustness check, we nonetheless ran a single-stage estimation and found qualitatively similar results for estimated coefficients (see Section 6).

Before turning to the estimation issues, note that our estimation method allows us to estimate consistently not only the effect of a particular area on wages (Section 4) but also what determines such area fixed effects, thanks to the second stage. This is in contrast with the labour market literature, which often estimates industry effects, but usually does not attempt to explain them by industry characteristics (with Katz and Summers, 1989, being a rare exception in this literature).

### *Heteroscedasticity*

In the estimation of equation (10), note first that the true value of the dependent variable,  $\beta_{a,t}$ , is unknown. We use instead the unbiased and consistent estimators  $\hat{\beta}_{a,t}$  provided by the first-stage results. However, the fixed effects for areas with few workers are less precisely estimated than those for areas with many workers. Thus, the use of  $\hat{\beta}_{a,t}$  as dependent variable introduces some

<sup>20</sup>This is because (i) the model is projected in the *within* dimension and (ii) workers can move between areas.

<sup>21</sup>Alternative approaches like standard robust clustering methods do not work either because the covariance matrix of error terms is too complex for the reasons already mentioned in the previous footnote.

<sup>22</sup>The two-stage estimation does not account for some heteroscedasticity that could be generated by unobservable local industry effects in the first stage. However, these variables play a minor role in the estimation while both area and industry fixed effects capture most of the variation.

heteroscedasticity through measurement errors. This can be dealt with by computing a feasible generalised least-square (FGLS) estimator. The procedure is detailed in Appendix C.

As shown below, the second-stage results using the FGLS correction are very close to those obtained with simpler estimation techniques without any correction. This shows that the effects of the measurement errors on the coefficients estimated at the second stage are negligible.<sup>23</sup> Consequently, when dealing with endogeneity problems, we will ignore them to keep the econometrics reasonably simple.

### *Endogeneity*

Some local characteristics are likely to be endogenous to local wages. For instance, employment areas receiving a positive technology shock may attract migrants and thus lead to a positive correlation between the second-stage residuals and the density of employment. In this particular case, reverse-causality is going to bias the estimates upwards. Alternatively, as shown by Wheaton and Lewis (2002), missing consumption amenities may imply a negative correlation between employment density and the residuals and thus bias the estimates downwards.<sup>24</sup> Hence, endogeneity is potentially a serious concern for the second stage of the estimation (and all the more so since the direction of the bias is unclear).

To deal with this issue, we consider two solutions. Following Ciccone and Hall (1996), the first one is to argue that endogeneity may be caused by 'contemporaneous' local shocks. Considering that these shocks did not have any effect on the distribution of the population in the past, we can instrument employment density between 1976 and 1998 by long-lagged population variables. This strategy rests on the hypothesis that population agglomeration in the past is not related to modern differences in productivity, an hypothesis that is more likely to hold for very long lags. Our instruments are the log density of urban population in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921. We also use the log market potential calculated using 1831 population data and a peripherality index (the log mean-distance to all other employment areas). Resting on several instruments (instead of only 1831 urban population) offers two additional benefits. Since the population is taken in log, using a multiplicity of census dates is equivalent to instrumenting by past levels *and* long-run historical growth rates. Furthermore, having multiple instruments allows us to instrument not only for employment density but also for the market potential, diversity, and even land area.<sup>25</sup> We can also

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<sup>23</sup>This is because we have a very large number of observations with many stayers and large flows of movers between areas. This allows us to estimate the area-year fixed effects very precisely.

<sup>24</sup>Better consumption amenities imply higher land prices. In turn, higher land prices have a negative effect on local wages (equation 4). Since land prices are omitted from the wage equation, their negative effect enters the residual. Given that at the same time, better consumption amenities attract more workers, employment density is then negatively correlated with the residual and its coefficient is thus biased downwards. Such unobserved heterogeneity across locations is not specific to our analysis. It can potentially affect any attempt to estimate agglomeration effects (through wages or the estimation of production functions). It is however rarely mentioned in this literature. Rauch (1993) and Wheaton and Lewis (2002) are two exceptions.

<sup>25</sup>The reason why land area needs to be instrumented is because areas were defined depending on employment density so that any bias affecting density is likely to affect land area as well.

conduct exogeneity and instruments validity tests.<sup>26</sup>

The second strategy is to assume that areas have permanent characteristics affecting their productivity and introduce area fixed effects in (10). First-differencing will then remove these fixed effects together with observed permanent characteristics such as land area and amenities. With this strategy, contemporaneous shocks may nonetheless bias the results since a rise in productivity may lead to an increase in employment density. We can then instrument the changes in employment density (rather than their level). The instruments we use are the same as above since past levels may drive current growth (be it only through a mean-reversal effect) just like long-run population growth rates. We also use a bunch of variables from the 1968 population census. These variables refer mostly to the demographics, average education, composition of employment and state of the housing stock of each employment area in 1968 (see below for details).

If we obtain similar coefficients with these two strategies, we can be reasonably confident about our results.

## 6. The determinants of area fixed effects: results

We start by a variance analysis before turning to the analysis of coefficients and residual spatial disparities.

### *The importance of employment density*

We perform first a variance decomposition. The results are reported in Table 5 for the complete OLS regression. Employment density clearly stands out. Its effect and that of local fixed effects are very correlated at 0.84. Their standard errors are nearly equal. Market potential comes second in importance with land area. The explanatory power of the diversity of local industrial composition and amenity variables is close to nil. This suggests a small explanatory power for local endowments. It could be that our amenity variables do not capture all endowments well. However, the relatively small variance of the second-stage residuals also points at a small explanatory power for endowments.<sup>27</sup>

### *Analysis of the coefficients*

The coefficients obtained in the estimation of equation (10) are given in Table 6. The first column reports results for the baseline specification where density, land area and diversity are used as

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<sup>26</sup>With respect to the literature, note that (i) our lags go further back in time than Ciccone and Hall (1996), (ii) we instrument more explanatory variables, and (iii) we test over-identifying restrictions. Ciccone (2002) instruments density by land area only. We cannot do this here as land area is already used as a regressor. *Not* using land area as a regressor implies the absence of scale effects (since the coefficient on land area captures the effect of an increase in the size of the employment area keeping density constant). In the data, we do find evidence of such scale effects.

<sup>27</sup>Note that we perform our variance analysis on the complete OLS specification rather than our preferred specification where interactions variables are instrumented. However the results for the variance analysis on our preferred estimation are very similar. The standard deviations for the effects of employment density and market potential decrease slightly but the standard deviation for all interaction effects (when jointly considered) is unchanged.

**Table 5.** Summary statistics for the variance decomposition — estimation of equation (10)

Effect of	Std dev	Simple correlation with:		
		$\log w$	$\delta$	$\beta - \theta$
between-industry interactions ( $I\gamma$ )	0.077	0.22	0.12	0.90
density	<b>0.067</b>	0.20	0.12	<b>0.84</b>
land area	0.024	−0.15	−0.08	−0.62
diversity	0.002	−0.04	−0.06	−0.31
market potential	0.036	0.19	0.08	0.78
amenities ( $E\alpha$ )	0.011	−0.10	−0.06	−0.48
residuals ( $\eta$ )	0.029	0.04	−0.08	0.03

2,221,156 observations. Variables in the first column are all centred around their year mean.

explanatory variables.<sup>28</sup> At 3.7%, the coefficient on density is at the lower bound of previous estimates in the literature (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). This suggests that worker heterogeneity was captured in part by density in previous work (see Section 7 for more on this). The coefficient on land area is smaller than that on density by a factor of three. An increase in population through a higher density has a much larger wage effect than the same population increase obtained by a larger land area keeping density constant.

When using the same variables directly in equation (8) to perform a single-stage estimation (whose results are available upon request), we find very similar values for the effects of industry characteristics. The average coefficient of industry specialisation is 2.2% (against 2.1% in the two-stage estimation). The coefficient on employment density is also very close: 3.2% (against 3.7% in the two-stage estimation). That on land area shows a larger discrepancy at 2.1% (against 1.1%). The insignificant coefficient on industrial diversity changes sign. These differences between the two-stage and single-stage estimations find their sources in the correlations between the individual explanatory variables and the aggregate error terms (recall that the error structure in the two-step estimation differs from that of a single step estimation). In any case, the explanatory power of both land area and diversity remains small so that these changes in the coefficients do not alter our conclusions.

Column 2 in Table 6 performs the same regression as the baseline but uses the FGLS correction discussed above, which corrects for heteroscedasticity. The differences with the baseline are minimal. This reflects the fact that the area fixed effects are precisely estimated in the first stage.

In column 3, we added some controls for productive endowments and amenities (seaside, lake, mountains and architectural heritage) and market potential to the baseline regression. Comparing with column 1, the addition of these extra controls lowers the coefficient on density by 0.5 percentage point and increase that on land area by about 1 percentage point. The coefficient on the diversity of the composition of activity becomes negative and significant. Among the added variables, the coefficient on market potential is positive and highly significant. Its magnitude is comparable to that on density. If the market potential of an area doubles (e.g., employment

<sup>28</sup>It is likely that employment density does not affect all industries with the same intensity (Henderson, 2003). The two-step estimation prevents us from exploring this issue further. We leave it for future work.

**Table 6.** Estimation results for equation (10)

Regression	(1) Levels OLS 1	(2) Levels FGLS	(3) Levels OLS 2	(4) Levels 2SLS	(5) First-Dif OLS	(6) First-Dif 2SLS
log <i>Density</i>	0.0371*** (0.0008)	0.0357*** (0.0010)	0.0322*** (0.0007)	0.0302*** (0.0063)	0.0349*** (0.0043)	0.0289 (0.0175)
log <i>Area</i>	0.0113*** (0.0014)	0.0106*** (0.0016)	0.0218*** (0.0013)	0.0041 (0.0154)	-	-
log <i>Diversity</i>	0.0020 (0.0023)	0.0006 (0.0025)	-0.0046** (0.0020)	-0.0407* (0.0208)	-0.0047 (0.0032)	-0.0296 (0.0200)
log <i>Potential</i>			0.0351*** (0.0014)	0.0244*** (0.0042)	0.1385*** (0.0474)	0.1427* (0.0715)
Sea			0.0111*** (0.0033)	0.0004 (0.0046)	-	-
Mountain			0.0333*** (0.0032)	0.0209*** (0.0041)	-	-
Lake			-0.0254*** (0.0054)	-0.0263*** (0.0088)	-	-
Heritage			-0.0091** (0.0043)	-0.0202*** (0.0068)	-	-
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup> (within time)	60%	-	72%	-	-	-

2,046 observations. Standard error between brackets. \*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%, and \*\*\*: significant at 1%. In column 4, density, land area, and diversity are instrumented by urban population density in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921 together with market potential computed using 1831 urban population data and mean distances to other areas. The R<sup>2</sup> for the instrumental regressions are 0.64 for density, 0.35 for area, 0.17 for diversity, and 0.92 for market potential. A test of overidentifying restrictions shows that our instruments are valid even at a 10% level. Diversity and market potential are clearly endogenous while density and land area are only marginally exogenous. In column 6, we instrument the changes in log density, log diversity and log area with the same variables as in column 4 plus a set of variables from the 1968 population census: mean age, mean age when leaving education, shares of the different occupational groups, share of population born in France, share of workers employed in the public sector, share of population living in an accommodation with hot water, with flushing toilet, with toilet inside, share of people living in a 'normal accommodation' (apartment or house as opposed to second residence, flat-share, etc), and mean deterioration of accommodation. The R<sup>2</sup> for the instrumental regressions are 0.35 for changes in density, 0.05 for changes in diversity, and 0.89 for changes in market potential.

density doubles in all other areas) wages increase by 3.5%. If distances (or trade costs if they are proportional to distances) are divided by two, the increase in wages is  $0.035 \times 50\% = 1.75\%$ . Turning to the four amenity variables, recall that they can have both a direct effect as productive endowments and an indirect effect of opposite sign as consumption amenities (through land prices affecting the quantity of land used by firms and thus the marginal product of labour). We expect the presence of an outstanding heritage to have a minimal direct productive effect and a much larger amenity effect. This is what we observe. The same holds for the presence of a lake for which the productivity benefits are also likely to be very small. The coefficients on sea and mountains are positive. In the case of the sea variable, the positive productivity effect slightly dominates the negative amenity effect. The case of mountains is more ambiguous since the sign of both the direct and indirect effects is unclear. In any case, note that the net effects for all four variables are significant but small.

Column 4 is our preferred specification. Density, land area, diversity and market potential are instrumented by long-lagged population variables dating back to 1831 and the peripherality of the area. Comparing the results to the previous column, endogeneity appears to be a serious concern. It can be noted first that the coefficient on density decreases, though only slightly so. This mild decline is consistent with previous work on this issue (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002). Our coefficient on density, at 3%, is below most estimates in the literature, which are in the 4 – 8% range. To repeat, the major reason for this difference is the failure of previous literature to control properly for unobserved individual heterogeneity. After instrumenting, the coefficient on land area becomes insignificant. It turns out that the endogeneity bias is much larger for this variable. Similarly, after instrumenting, the coefficient on market potential also declines from 3.5 to 2.4%. The coefficient on diversity becomes much more negative (although less significant since the instruments are performing less well with this variable). Overall we find that endogeneity is a more serious concern than previously concluded. In part, this is because we consider more variables (density, land area, diversity, and market potential) and more instruments than previous work. This may also be caused by the fact that French employment areas are rather small so that the effects of local shocks are easier to pick up. Finally the coefficients on the amenity variables remain quite similar except for that on sea, which gets close to zero.

In column 5, we report the results for a simple first-difference estimation. Interestingly, the results are not very different from the results of Column 3 except for that on market potential. This suggests that controlling for permanent unobserved characteristics of employment areas does not affect the results. In column 6, when instrumenting the changes in density, diversity and market potential, we find again results very close to those of our IV regression in levels (column 4). The coefficient on density is just below 3% while that on diversity is also negative. The coefficient on market potential remains positive but its standard error is also large like for the other variables. This is because our instruments for the first differences are rather weak.

To sum up, our favourite estimate for the elasticity of wages to employment density is at 3%. It is below most estimates of the literature. Our coefficient on the market potential is of the same magnitude. We also found small net effects of endowments and a small negative effect of industrial diversity.

### *Residual spatial wage disparities*

To examine spatial wage disparities, we can now compute a ‘residual wage’, that is a local wage controlling for skills and all interactions, from the results of the baseline regression for the second stage. We can define such index  $w_{\text{resid},a,t}$  (or residual wage) as:

$$\log w_{\text{resid},a,t} \equiv W + \hat{\eta}_{a,t}, \quad (11)$$

where  $W$  is defined in a similar way as after equation (9). This residual wage corresponds to the local wage obtained by an ‘average’ worker employed in an ‘average’ industry and in an area with ‘average’ interactions.

The ratio of the highest to the lowest residual wage across all employment areas is 1.23 instead of 1.38 for the de-trended net wage (i.e., the wage after controlling for skills and industry) and 1.74

for the de-trended mean wage. The ratio of the first to the last decile is 1.07 instead of 1.14 and 1.21 for net and mean wages, respectively. For the interquartile ratio, we find 1.04, 1.06 and 1.11 for residual, net, and mean wages respectively. Finally, the coefficient of variation for residual wages is 0.03 against 0.05 for net wages and 0.08 for mean wages. The salient result is thus that once skills and interactions are controlled for, about two thirds of the wage disparities between employment areas disappear. Conversely, the remaining room for a possible role of local public endowments on spatial disparities is necessarily small.

## 7. Aggregate wage differences across employment areas

Research is usually restricted in the data it can use. Existing studies on regional disparities typically use mean wages (or output per worker) by industry and location.<sup>29</sup> It is of course impossible to directly implement our micro-founded specifications (8) and (10) with aggregate data. In this section, we first show how the simple model introduced above (where wages are determined *at the worker level*) can be aggregated and estimated at the level of each employment area and industry. We then compare the aggregate data results with those obtained above using individual data and with those in the literature and underline the corresponding biases.

### Aggregation issues

Once we abstract from the longitudinal dimension of the panel, there is not much in the data about the skills of workers. Fortunately, we can use the information about occupations (self-employed, professional, skilled, unskilled white-collar, unskilled blue-collar), which proxy well for skills according to Abowd *et al.* (1999). However, occupations may change over time. They thus proxy for worker fixed effects ( $\delta_i$ ) in a noisy fashion. We assume  $\delta_i = \sum_{k,c} d_{i,k,c,t} \delta_{c,k} + \iota_{i,t}$  where  $d_{i,k,c,t}$  is an occupation dummy taking value one when worker  $i$  is in occupation  $c$  and industry  $k$  at date  $t$ ,  $\delta_{c,k}$  is the corresponding coefficient, and  $\iota_{i,t}$  is a residual term. Averaging (7) over all  $N_{a,k,t}$  workers in the same local industry ( $a,k$ ) in year  $t$  yields:

$$\log w_{a,k,t} = \frac{1}{N_{a,k,t}} \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} \log w_{i,t} = \beta_{a,t} + \mu_{k,t} + I_{a,k,t} \gamma_k + \frac{1}{N_{a,k,t}} \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} \left( X_{i,t} \varphi + d_{i,k,c,t} \delta_{c(i,t),k} \right) + \varsigma_{a,k,t}, \quad (12)$$

where  $\varsigma_{a,k,t} = \frac{1}{N_{a,k,t}} \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} (\epsilon_{i,t} + \iota_{i,t})$ .

If there is some sorting across space or industries that leads the mean of the residual term  $\iota_{i,t}$  to be correlated with some of the explanatory variables at the  $(a,k,t)$  level, the estimated coefficients are biased by aggregation. Put differently, if for instance workers with better unobservable characteristics are more likely to be located in denser areas, wage disparities across areas may be wrongly attributed to urbanisation economies. This is potentially a first major limitation when using aggregate data.

Another aggregation problem in equation (12) regards data availability. Typically, one may have access to the mean-wage in an industry and area but not to the mean of log-wages. Hence the mean of log-wages must be proxied by the log of mean-wages. A similar problem arises among

<sup>29</sup>Henderson (2003) and the literature on human capital externalities (following Rauch, 1993) are two exceptions.

the explanatory variables when using (as we do) the squared-age of workers. Again the mean of squared individual ages requires individual level data. With aggregate data, it can only be proxied by the square of the mean-age. This implies some measurement problems for wages and squared-age at the area-industry level. However, these measurement problems are very minor. The correlations between mean-log-wage and log-mean-wage by industry and location and between mean-squared-age and squared-mean-age by location are both equal to 0.99.

We can again centre within-industry interactions and worker time-varying characteristics so that all systematic industry components can be brought together with the industry fixed effect.<sup>30</sup> The main difference with the analysis on individual data is that the total industry effect now also reflects the average occupational composition of the industry. Then, using the same reasoning as with individual data, we obtain:

$$\begin{cases} \log w_{a,k,t} = \mu_k + \beta_{a,t} + \tilde{I}_{a,k,t}\gamma_k + \tilde{X}_{a,k,t}\varphi + \sum_c \tilde{q}_{c,a,k,t}\delta_{c,k} + \varsigma_{a,k,t}, \\ \beta_{a,t} = w_0 + \theta_t + E_{a,t}\alpha + I_{a,t}\gamma + v_{a,t}. \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

These two equations mirror equations (8) and (10). As argued above, the share of workers in professional occupations in industry and employment areas should be used as one of the regressors in the vector  $\tilde{I}_{a,k,t}$  to capture human capital interactions within industries. However this variable also now appears independently in equation (13) following the aggregation of individual skills. Hence the coefficient on the share of professionals captures both skill composition effects *and* local interactions in the industry. The two cannot be separately identified. This constitutes another limitation of aggregate data.

Finally, the first stage equation must be estimated by weighting each observation by the square-root of its number of workers to avoid heteroscedasticity (Coelho and Ghali, 1973).<sup>31</sup> Turning to the second stage (and as previously), we do not know the true values of the area fixed effects,  $\beta_{a,t}$ . Hence, we use  $\hat{\beta}_{a,t}$  rather than  $\beta_{a,t}$  keeping a similar estimation method as before (again see Appendix C). We also impose the same identification conditions:  $\mu_1 = 0$  and  $\theta_{1980} = 0$ .

To summarise, aggregation throws up two main problems. First, sorting with respect to unobserved characteristics can lead to strong biases. Second, skill composition effects can no longer be identified separately from human capital interactions/externalities.

## Results

At the aggregate level, we perform the two-stage estimation using all the twenty years of data available as we are not limited by sample size. The first stage of the regression with all the variables (7,514 in total) has a  $R^2$  of 81% compared with 31% for the same regression with individual data without the worker fixed effects. This difference is obviously explained by the considerable variation in individual wages that is averaged out by aggregation.

<sup>30</sup>Define the centred share of occupation  $c$  in  $(a,k,t)$ :  $\tilde{q}_{c,a,k,t} \equiv q_{c,a,k,t} - q_{c,,k,t}$  where  $q_{c,a,k,t} \equiv \frac{1}{N_{a,k,t}} \sum_{i \in (a,k,t)} d_{i,k,c,t}$  is the share of occupation  $c$  in  $(a,k,t)$  and  $q_{c,,k,t}$  its weighted mean across all employment areas. To mirror the approach developed in Section 4, we assume  $\mu_{k,t} + I_{.,k,t}\gamma_k + X_{.,k,t}\varphi + \sum_c q_{c,,k,t}\delta_{c,k} = \mu_k + \rho_t$ , that is the sum of all the industry effects can be decomposed into a time-invariant industry effect and a time effect (which is again normalised to zero).

<sup>31</sup>Existing work on aggregate data tends not to weight the mean wage for local industries. This would be odd in our context because local industries are not autonomous agents but rather a collection of different workers.



We then perform the same detailed variance analysis of the first stage of the estimation as done with individual data. It shows that the share of professionals has a much larger explanatory power. This is true more generally for the effect of all the explanatory variables we consider. The standard deviation for the wages is at 0.258 (against 0.367 with individual data). The standard deviation for the de-trended area fixed effect is at 0.074 (against 0.065). That for the effect of age and its square is unchanged at 0.058, that for industry fixed effects is at 0.097 (against 0.043), that for specialisation is at 0.047 (against 0.017), and that for the number of establishments is at 0.035 (against 0.019). Finally with aggregate data the standard deviation for the share of professionals is four times as large at 0.046 (against 0.011). The effect of all the occupations has a standard deviation equal to 0.110.

With respect to the share of the various occupations, a higher explanatory power was to be expected given that these variables now capture both the skill composition of the local industry and some interactions therein. For the other variables (specialisation in particular), this indicates that some correlation with individual unobserved heterogeneity is present.

As can be seen from Table 7, the same conclusion arises with the second stage of the regression. The  $R^2$  (*within* time) of the second stage of the baseline regression is well above what we obtained with individual data at 77% (against 60%). Hence when workers' unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for, some of it is captured by aggregate variables.

The first-stage coefficients are nearly all significant. For instance only 0.3% of the area fixed effects fail to be significant at 5% (instead of 12% with individual data). Because they capture within-industry interactions together with compositional effects, the coefficients on the share of professionals are much higher than with individual data. More interestingly the specialisation coefficients are also much higher: on average 4.3% against 2.1%.

Similar discrepancies occur with regard to the second stage coefficients (see Table 7). In the most basic specification (column 1), the coefficient on density is at 6.3% instead of 3.7% with individual data. That on land area is at 3.4% against 1.1% with individual data. In the aggregate data equivalent of our preferred specification (column 4), we find that the coefficient on employment density is still at 5.6% against 3% with individual data. This is confirmed by the results of columns 5 and 6. Since unobserved individual heterogeneity at the area level is likely to be fairly stable over time because migration rates are fairly low, its effects will be in large part conditioned out when first-differencing. This is what is observed in column 5. The coefficient on density becomes negative in column 6 when instrumenting but with large standard errors, so that the equality between the two cannot be rejected.

As can be seen from Table 8, the discrepancies between estimations with aggregate and individual data are easily explained by the sorting of workers by skills. We have already underlined in Section 4 that the correlation between the average worker fixed effect by area and the de-trended area-year fixed effect at 0.29 is high in individual regressions. It is even higher (0.53) when the area-year fixed effects are computed on aggregate data. This implies that in the aggregate analysis area-year fixed effects capture a large fraction of the worker fixed effects that is not captured by occupation shares and within-industry interactions. As the average worker fixed effects also have a high correlation (0.44) with employment density, estimated coefficients are biased. In conclusion,

**Table 7.** Estimation results for the second stage of equation (13)

Regression	(1) Levels OLS 1	(2) Levels FGLS	(3) Levels OLS 2	(4) Levels 2SLS	(5) First-Dif OLS	(6) First-Dif 2SLS
<i>log Density</i>	0.0625*** (0.0005)	0.0618*** (0.0005)	0.0584*** (0.0005)	0.0562*** (0.0041)	0.0336*** (0.0031)	−0.0281 (0.0274)
<i>log Area</i>	0.0344*** (0.0008)	0.0359*** (0.0008)	0.0419*** (0.0008)	0.0245** (0.0100)	-	-
<i>log Diversity</i>	0.0007 (0.0014)	−0.0008 (0.0014)	−0.0033*** (0.0012)	−0.0507*** (0.0136)	−0.027 (0.0021)	−0.0588 (0.0301)
<i>log Potential</i>			0.0279*** (0.0008)	0.0192*** (0.0027)	−0.0627 (0.0474)	0.2527** (0.1259)
Sea			0.0151*** (0.0020)	0.0059** (0.0029)	-	-
Mountain			0.0435*** (0.0019)	0.0307*** (0.0026)	-	-
Lake			−0.0143*** (0.0033)	−0.0154*** (0.0055)	-	-
Heritage			−0.0266*** (0.0027)	−0.0389*** (0.0042)	-	-
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup> (within time)	77%	-	82%	-	-	-

6,820 observations. Standard error between brackets. \*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%, and \*\*\*: significant at 1%. In columns 4, density, land area, and diversity are instrumented by urban population density in 1831, 1861, 1891, and 1921 together with market potential computed using 1831 data and mean distances to other areas. The  $R^2$  for the instrumental regressions are 0.64 for density, 0.35 for area, 0.17 for diversity, and 0.92 for market potential. A test of overidentifying restrictions shows that instruments are valid at 5%. All our instrumented variables are endogenous at 5%. In column 6, we instrument the changes in log density, log diversity and log area with the same variables as in column 4 plus a set of variables from the 1968 population census: mean age, mean age when leaving education, shares of the different occupational groups, share of population born in France, share of workers employed in the public sector, share of population living in an accommodation with hot water, with flushing toilet, with toilet inside, share of people living in a 'normal accommodation' (apartment or house as opposed to second residence, flat-share, etc), and mean deterioration of accommodation. The  $R^2$  for the instrumental regressions are 0.35 for changes in density, 0.05 for changes in diversity, and 0.89 for changes in market potential.

when sorting is not taken into account the coefficient on density is over-estimated by more than 80%, that on land area is over-estimated by up to several orders of magnitude whereas those on specialisation are over-estimated by 100%. These are clearly large biases.

## 8. Concluding comments

This paper proposes a general framework to investigate the sources of wage disparities across local labour markets: skills, endowments and within- and between-industry interactions. This framework unites different strands of literature that were so far mostly disjoint. It shows that the research about the 'estimation of agglomeration economies' is closely intertwined with those dealing with 'regional disparities', 'local labour markets' and 'migration'. Empirically, the main novelty of the paper is to use a very large panel of workers and a consistent approach to exploit it. This allows us to assess precisely the effects of unobserved worker heterogeneity. We find that the

**Table 8.** Correlation between the effects of the variables after aggregation by area and year

	area f.-e.	density	area	diversity	market potential	residuals (agg)
mean worker f.-e.	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.44</b>	0.22	−0.01	0.17	−0.10
area f.-e.	1	0.77	0.34	−0.23	0.62	0.56
density		1	0.58	−0.21	0.52	0.02
land area			1	0.25	0.49	−0.39
diversity				1	−0.10	−0.42
market potential					1	0.04

2,046 observations computed from the estimations at the individual level (using column 4 of Table 6). Area fixed effects are estimated from (8) and we subtracted time fixed effects estimated from (10). Worker fixed effects are estimated from (8) and then averaged by employment area. The effects of density, land area and diversity are computed using their coefficients as estimated in (10) times the value of the variable.

effect of individual skills is quantitatively very important in the data. Up to half of the spatial wage disparities can be traced back to differences in the skill composition of the workforce. Workers with better labour market characteristics tend to agglomerate in the larger, denser and more skilled local labour market. We believe more work is now needed to understand the nature of this sorting.<sup>32</sup>

We also pay considerable attention to the issues of simultaneity. When correcting for possible biases, our estimates for economies of density, at around 3%, are lower than in previous literature. Nonetheless they still play an important role in explaining differences in local wages. We find that the market potential also matters. The evidence on other types of local interactions such as those taking place within particular industries is more mixed. They are significant but do not matter much quantitatively in explaining local wages disparities. Our approach also suggests at best a modest direct role for local non-human endowments in the determination of local wages. Local public goods in particular may not have a large direct impact on productivity and wage disparities. However, what remains to be tested, and should be the purpose of future research, is whether they might be responsible for the observed spatial sorting of skilled workers, and thus exert an indirect influence on productivity. In any case, the final picture we reach is one where high local wages are primarily the outcome of high-skill workers gathering in dense local labour markets.

<sup>32</sup>One explanation could be based on a self-selection effect in internal migrations. As suggested long ago by Alfred Marshall, it may be that "the most enterprising, the most highly gifted, those with the highest physique and strongest character go [to the large towns] to find scope for their abilities" (Marshall, 1890). Nocke (2006) proposes a formalisation of this argument. Alternatively, the largest cities may offer some particular amenities that appeal more to the workers commanding the highest wages. A third hypothesis (Glaeser and Maré, 2001) is that workers may learn more in larger cities.

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## Appendix A. Data description and background

In this appendix, we further describe the data and wage setting in France. These descriptions are by no means comprehensive. A very detailed description of the data can be found in Abowd *et al.* (1999). Cohen, Lefranc, and Saint-Paul (1997) and Abowd, Kramarz, Lemieux, and Margolis (2000) propose broad syntheses of recent research on the French labour market.

### *The DADS data*

The DADS extract we use covers around 5% of the employees and self-employed in France. It contained initially 19,675,740 observations from 1976 to 1998. The selection method (persons born in October of even years) and the mandatory aspect of the underlying data guarantee that this sample is representative and not plagued by non-response problems. A few issues must however be discussed.

- *Missing years.* The three missing years (1981, 1983 and 1990) are due to lack of sampling by INSEE during census periods. Since in the individual estimations we keep only one year every four starting in 1976, this does not create any particular problem in our analysis (beyond the obvious missing data issue in the aggregate estimations).
- *Unemployment.* Unemployment spells can be detected only indirectly through interruptions between different episodes of employment for which only the year is known. This impossibility to track precisely unemployment is not an important issue here.
- *Wages, earnings and labour costs.* For each observation, total net nominal earnings, number of days worked and the work status (full-time or part-time) are known. It is thus possible to calculate the annualised nominal wage. Then mandatory payroll taxes for both employees and employers can be calculated and added to net nominal earnings to obtain total annualised labour costs. These payroll taxes are large (for low wages they are of the same order of magnitude as net earnings) and have increased over time. They also differ across wage levels and work status — for instance the fiscal and pension regimes of executives (*cadres* in French) differ from that of non-executives. These payroll taxes however are uniform across industries (the exception, textile, is taken into account) and across mainland France.
- *Imputed wages.* For workers in the same establishment in year  $t$  and  $t + 2$  but no observation for year  $t + 1$ , the original data contains an imputed value for this missing year. Since our estimation methods apply to unbalanced panels, we deleted these imputed values and ended up with 18,581,470 observations.
- *Missing values and coding errors.* We deleted all the observations for which one or more variables of interest was missing. We also deleted all workers with a duration of employment equal to zero, workers with negative wages and workers not born in October of even years who should not be in the data. After these deletions, we were left with 17,495,335 observations. We also deleted all the observations for which we could not determine the industry of employment or the employment area. This left us with 16,458,989 observations.

- *Mainland private sector employees of working age.* We excluded all apprentices and workers not employed in the private sector. We also restricted the sample to workers aged 15 to 65 employed in mainland France. Workers employed in Corsica and overseas territories were deleted to end up with 14,067,326 observations.
- *Part-timers.* Because the number of hours is unknown before 1993, we excluded all part-time workers. In case of multiple observations for a worker over a given year (corresponding to more than one job), we kept only one observation (the one with the most working days). This left us with 10,551,810 observations.
- *Non-wage compensations.* Our results might be biased if firms choose, for fiscal reasons, to substitute in favour of non-wage compensations in high wage areas. We think that any bias here is bound to be minimal because the fiscal treatment of non-wage compensations in France is not particularly favourable.
- *Agriculture, fishing and small industries.* The French sectoral classification comprised around 600 finely defined industries before 1993 and 700 after this date following an overhaul of the industrial classification system. We aggregated these finely-defined industries into 114 industries whose definition has remained constant over time. Agriculture and fishing industries are not normally covered by the extract. Remaining workers in these sectors were excluded. We also excluded various other industries:
  - All industries with less than 500 observations over the period were excluded. This includes: Spatial transport (70 observations), Extraction of uranium (129) and Extraction of metals (311).
  - In a few industries, firms with a large number of establishments can aggregate their reporting at the regional level. In the data, one particular branch (which may change from year to year) appears to host all the employees for a large region. Since this biases the estimates regarding the effects of local specialisation, we excluded these industries: financial intermediation, insurance, financial auxiliaries, telecommunications, and postal services.
  - Finally we also excluded a few non-competitive industries: public administration, extra-territorial activities, and associations.

In total, 15 industries in 114 were excluded and we ended up with 9,389,838 observations.

- *Outliers.* The initial data had a significant number of outliers with wages either unrealistically high or well below the minimum wage. These seem to be caused by reporting mistakes in the net nominal earnings or in the number of working days. We decided to get rid of the 3% lowest and highest wages for every year.

The final sample contains 8,826,422 observations. When working with the 6 years we selected (1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996), the sample contains 2,664,474 observations. When we aggregate the data by area, industry, and year we have 378,022 observations for the 1976-1998 period.

### *French employment areas and area based data*

The units of analysis are the 341 Employment areas (or 'zones d'emploi'), which entirely and continuously cover mainland France. Each employment area has an average area of 1570km<sup>2</sup>, which is fairly small (equivalent to a square of 40 by 40 kilometres. Counties in mainland US are about 60% larger). The standard deviation, at 987km<sup>2</sup>, is quite large. French employment areas have been defined primarily by worker's commuting patterns. Other criteria such as access to a major infrastructure have also been used to make French employment areas more homogenous than administrative units and minimise border effects. We think French employment areas closely match the idea of local labour markets. This makes French employment areas ideally suited for our analysis.

Each municipality (or 'commune') is fully included in an employment area. This makes it possible to use the 1988 census of facilities ('inventaire communal') conducted in all municipalities to compute the amenity variables. It also allows us to use data from all available French censuses since 1831.

### *Wage setting in France*

Before 1982, wages were set through centralised collective bargaining at the industry level. The agreements reached by workers' and employers' unions were binding for all parties involved in the negotiation. These agreements were then usually extended by the French government to all firms and workers in the industry. Despite a low level of unionisation (circa 15%), these agreements would cover up to around 95% of the workforce. In 1982, a new legislation also required firms with at least 50 employees to conduct firm level negotiations. Such agreements could only improve on the industry level agreements. Around 30% of the workforce was covered by these agreements in the mid 1980s (see Abowd *et al.*, 1999, and the references therein for more on this issue).

A high minimum wage is another key feature of the French labour market. The minimum wage was introduced in France in the early 1950s. It was originally indexed on the average blue-collar worker's wage and the consumer price index. In addition to this indexation, the government often increased the minimum wage between 1976 and 1998. According to Abowd *et al.* (2000) the real hourly minimum wage increased by around 40% between 1976 and 1994. Furthermore, over the 1980s payroll taxes also increased as a proportion of the earnings making the increase in minimum wage even larger for employers. The minimum wage is also widely used as an index for other low wages. In 1990, 28% of the workforce employed in France were paid below 120% of the minimum wage (Abowd *et al.*, 2000). It is at least a third of the French wages which are affected directly by changes in the minimum wage.

These institutional settings are not very different from those in other countries from Continental Europe but they seem to differ widely from those prevailing in the US and UK. Recent comparisons between the French and US labour markets (Cohen *et al.*, 1997; Abowd *et al.*, 1999, 2000) nonetheless suggest that wage setting outcomes in the two countries have many features in common. For instance, standard wage regressions on individual workers yield coefficients that are remarkably



close in the two countries (Abowd *et al.*, 1999). It was also found that the upper half of the wage distribution looks very similar in both countries (Cohen *et al.*, 1997), etc.

## Appendix B. Endogeneity of location and industry choices

We examine here the necessary assumptions about migrations and workers flows between industries for the strict exogeneity of the industry and location of employment to be warranted.

Consider worker  $i$  having to choose an employment area and an industry in a static framework. We assume that this worker's utility depends only on her level of consumption of a composite good whose price is the same everywhere. Indirect utility can then be written as a function of the wage:  $v = v(w)$ . Worker  $i$  chooses her employment area and industry so as to maximise her wages net of the (monetary) costs of migration. This choice can be decomposed in three steps.

1. At the beginning of period  $t$ , any industry  $k$  in an employment area  $a$  can be characterised by a wage  $w_{i,a,k,t}$ . This wage depends not only on individual attributes and local characteristics of the industry, but also on a shock noted  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$ . Using (4) and (5), the wage satisfies:

$$\log w_{i,a,k,t} = \log B_{a,k,t} + X_{i,t}\varphi + \delta_i + \psi_{i,a,k,t}. \quad (\text{B } 1)$$

We assume that all the explanatory variables in  $B_{a,k,t}$  and  $X_{i,t}$  are strictly exogenous.

2. The worker then chooses an employment area  $a(i,t)$  and an industry  $k(i,t)$  so as to maximise her utility. Assume first that the worker knows the distribution of the shocks  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$  without knowing their exact values. The maximisation programme of the worker is then:

$$\max_{(a,k) \in t} E_{\psi_{i,a,k,t}} [v(w_{i,a,k,t} - c_{a,k})], \quad (\text{B } 2)$$

where  $E_{\psi_{i,a,k,t}}$  is the expectation operator on the distribution of  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$ , and  $c_{a,k}$  is a mobility cost equal to zero when  $a = a(i, t-1)$  and  $k = k(i, t-1)$ . In this case, the choice of  $a(i,t)$  and  $k(i,t)$  is independent from the realisation of  $\epsilon_{i,t} = \psi_{i,a(i,t),k(i,t),t}$ . The location and industry of employment are thus determined solely on the basis of exogenous variables entering the wage equation and the mobility costs. Hence, when the worker knows only the distribution of the shocks, the assumption of strict exogeneity is satisfied.

Turning now to the case where the worker can observe all the  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$ , the maximisation programme is:

$$\max_{(a,k) \in t} [v(w_{i,a,k,t} - c_{a,k})]. \quad (\text{B } 3)$$

In this case, the choice of  $a(i,t)$  and  $k(i,t)$  is correlated with the realisation of all shocks  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$ , and in particular  $\epsilon_{i,t} = \psi_{i,a(i,t),k(i,t),t}$ . Hence, the assumption of strict heterogeneity of location and industry choice does not hold.

There are finally intermediate cases for which only some  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$  are observed by the worker. If these observed shocks are not correlated with  $\epsilon_{i,t}$ , the exogeneity assumption is satisfied. If they are, the model is misspecified again.

3. After choosing an employment area and industry, the individual shock,  $\epsilon_{i,t}$ , is known and the worker is paid according to (7). The worker then faces the same decision at period  $t + 1$ .

### In a dynamic framework

Consider for simplicity that the explanatory variables other than area-year and industry dummies, noted  $Y_{i\tau}$ , are strictly exogenous. We also ignore savings. At period  $t$ , the worker chooses her location and industry taking into account all available information including the observed shocks  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$  and their past evolution. We introduce the following notations:  $Y_i^t = \{Y_{i\tau}\}_{\tau \leq t}$  and  $\psi_i^t = \{\psi_{i,a,k,\tau} | a \leq Z, k \leq K, \tau \leq t, \psi_{i,a,k,\tau} \text{ known by } i\}$ . The vector of state variables at the beginning of period  $t$  is  $(\psi_i^{t-1}, a(i, t-1), k(i, t-1))$ . Past employment area  $a(i, t-1)$  and industry  $k(i, t-1)$  enter this vector because mobility costs can depend on them. The history of observed shocks  $\psi_i^{t-1}$  is included because it can be used to predict the current and future realisations of shocks. The sequences of expected locations and industries are noted  $\{a(i, \tau)\}_{t \leq \tau \leq T}$  and  $\{k(i, \tau)\}_{t \leq \tau \leq T}$ , respectively, with  $T$  the last period of work for  $i$ . Any worker solves:

$$\max_{(a_t, k_t) \in t, \dots, (a_T, k_T) \in T} E \left[ \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^\tau v(w_{i,a_\tau, k_\tau, \tau} - c_{a_\tau, k_\tau}) \mid Y_i^t, \psi_i^{t-1}, Z(i, t-1), K(i, t-1) \right], \quad (\text{B } 4)$$

with  $\rho$  the discount rate.

We can reach different conclusions depending on the dynamic process determining the shocks  $\psi_{i,a,k,t}$ . If we first suppose that shocks are idiosyncratic, the same conclusions as in the static case apply. The location  $a(i, t)$  and the industry  $k(i, t)$  are correlated with  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  if and only if the worker can collect information on  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  at period  $t$ . If we suppose instead that shocks follow an  $AR(1)$  process and that the worker can obtain some information on  $\epsilon_{i,t}$  through her history of shocks  $\psi_i^{t-1}$ , then three issues arise:

1. The location  $a(i, t)$  and the industry  $k(i, t)$  are correlated with  $\epsilon_{i,t}$ . This correlation is however much weaker than in the static case because workers take into account future wages in their mobility decisions. Indeed, the information related to current shock present in future wage shocks is decreasing with the time horizon and becomes negligible when it grows arbitrarily large.
2.  $a(i, t)$  and  $k(i, t)$  are correlated with past shocks  $\{\epsilon_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau < t}$  as shocks follow an  $AR(1)$  process.
3.  $a(i, t)$  and  $k(i, t)$  are correlated with future shocks  $\{\epsilon_{i,\tau}\}_{\tau > t}$ . However, the predictive power of the information set at  $t$  decreases over time. Thus, the worker can form only inaccurate expectations about future shocks. Thus the correlation between  $a(i, t)$  and  $k(i, t)$  in the one hand, and  $\epsilon_{i,\tau}$ , for  $\tau > t$ , in the other hand, decreases when  $\tau$  increases.

These three remarks suggest that the results may be biased because the explanatory variables can be correlated not only with present shocks, but also with past and future shocks. However, although we may have more sources of bias than in the static case, these correlations are likely to be weak because workers take future wages into account in their mobility decision while having little information about future shocks. Extensions to other dynamic processes for the shocks are straightforward.

## Appendix C. Two-stage estimation

What follows is a complete description of our two-stage estimation procedure.

Equation (10) can be re-written compactly:

$$\beta = D\Phi + \eta, \quad (\text{C } 1)$$

where  $\beta = (\beta_{1,1}, \dots, \beta_{Z,T})'$ ,  $\Phi = (w_0, \theta_1, \dots, \theta_T, \gamma)'$ ,  $D$  is the matrix of all aggregate explanatory variables after vectorisation, and  $\eta = (\eta_{1,1}, \dots, \eta_{Z,T})'$ .

The first area-year fixed effect is set arbitrarily to zero as a constraint was necessary to secure identification in the first-stage estimation. Because the exact value of the area fixed effects is unknown, this equation cannot be directly estimated with OLS. It is however possible to compute a consistent and unbiased estimator of  $\beta$  from the first stage results. Note first that (C 1) can be transformed into:

$$\hat{\beta} = D\Phi + \eta + \Psi, \quad (\text{C } 2)$$

where  $\hat{\beta} = (\hat{\beta}_{1,1}, \dots, \hat{\beta}_{Z,T})'$  is the estimator of  $\beta$  obtained in the first stage of the regression (with  $\hat{\beta}_{1,1}$  set to zero for convenience) and  $\Psi = \hat{\beta} - \beta$  is a measurement error. Equation (C 2) can then be estimated in the following way:

1. Compute the OLS estimate of  $\Phi$  from (C 2):

$$\hat{\Phi}_{OLS} = (D'D)^{-1}D'\hat{\beta} = \Phi + (D'D)^{-1}D'(\eta + \Psi) \quad (\text{C } 3)$$

2. It is then possible to define  $\hat{\sigma}^2$  such that:

$$\hat{\sigma}^2 = \frac{1}{\text{tr}(M_D)} \left\{ \left( \widehat{\eta + \Psi} \right)' \left( \widehat{\eta + \Psi} \right) - \text{tr} \left[ \hat{V}(\Psi | \Omega) \right] \right\}, \quad (\text{C } 4)$$

where  $M_D = I - D(D'D)^{-1}D'$ ,  $\widehat{\eta + \Psi} = \hat{\beta} - D\hat{\Phi}_{OLS} = M_D(\eta + \Psi)$ ,  $\Omega$  is the set of all explanatory variables in the model, and  $\hat{V}(\Psi | \Omega)$  is the estimator of the covariance matrix obtained from the first stage estimation bordered with zeros in the first line and first column. As shown by Gobillon (2004),  $\hat{\sigma}^2$  is an unbiased estimator of  $\sigma^2$  when  $\eta$  is orthogonal to  $\epsilon$ . It is also consistent under some reasonable assumptions.

3. We can now compute an unbiased estimator of the covariance matrix  $V(\eta + \Psi | \Omega)$ :

$$\hat{V} = \hat{\sigma}^2 I + \hat{V}(\Psi | \Omega). \quad (\text{C } 5)$$

4. Measurement errors on the dependant variable create some heteroscedasticity. To control for this, the feasible generalised least-square (FGLS) estimator of  $\Phi$  can be computed. It is given by:

$$\hat{\Phi}_{FGLS} = \left( D' \hat{V}^{-1} D \right)^{-1} D' \hat{V}^{-1} \hat{\beta}. \quad (\text{C } 6)$$

5. Finally, it is possible to compute a consistent estimator of the variance of

$\hat{\Phi}_{FGLS}$ :

$$\hat{V} \left( \hat{\Phi}_{FGLS} | \Omega \right) = \left( D' \hat{V}^{-1} D \right)^{-1}. \quad (\text{C } 7)$$