While democracy often leads to the tyranny of the majority, alternatives that have been proposed by economists suffer even more severe problems related to multiple inefficient equilibria and budgets. A simple mechanism, Quadratic Voting (QV), addresses all of these concerns, offering a practical efficient alternative to one-man-one-vote. Voters making a binary decision purchase votes from a centralized clearing house paying the square of the number of votes purchased. Funds raised are refunded to participants in an essentially arbitrary manner. If individuals take the chance of a marginal vote being pivotal as given, as market participants take prices as given, QV is the unique pricing scheme that is efficient for all valuation arrangements. We make detailed conjectures about the rates and constants of convergence of any Bayesian equilibrium in an independent private values environment towards this efficient limiting outcome and provide extensive analytic and computational support for these results but have as of yet been unable to prove these from first principles. We provide similar conjectural analysis of the mechanism in a range of other environments that reassure us of the robustness of QV, in contrast to existing mechanisms. I am pursuing a range of applications through my collaboration with law professor Eric Posner, especially in the context of the start-up venture Collective Decision Engines that we have founded to commercialize the mechanism for internal decision-making in firms and market research surveys.