Microeconomics Workshop 2004

※ 21世紀COEプログラムと共催 ※

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※ 1月28日現在　近い予定から順に掲載しています。

1-2月の予定は 修士論文報告会, セミナーの順に掲載しています。ご注意下さい。

※ 以下本年度終了分

日時：

4月6日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Walter Beckert(Birkbeck College, University of London)

Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand

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***COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series***
※場所が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい。

報告：

Drew Fudenberg(Department of Economics, Harvard University)

日時：

4月19日（月 Monday） 10:20-12:00 Lecture I "The Replicator Dynamics and Evolutionarily Stable Strategies"

Note for Lecture I and II

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟３階 第３教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

日時：

4月19日（月 Monday） 13:10-14:50 Lecture II "Applications and Extensions"

Note for Lecture I and II

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟３階 第２教室

at the Lecture Hall No.2(B) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

日時：

4月20日（火 Tuesday） 13:10-14:50 Lecture III "Evolution in Finite Populations"

Note for Lecture III

場所：

東京大学経済学部 旧棟（赤門総合研究棟）１階 第１３演習室

at the Seminar Room No.13(Enshu-shitsu) on the ground floor of Old Econ. Building (Akamon Building)

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***COE Distinguished Seminar Series***

日時：

4月20日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第2教室 ※通常と会場が異なりますのでご注意下さい※

at the Lecture Hall No.2(B) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Drew Fudenberg(Department of Economics, Harvard University)

Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi (joint with David K. Levine)

Abstract:

The code of Hammurabi specified a "trial by surviving in the river" as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. This system is puzzling for two reasons. First, it is based on a superstition: We do not believe that the guilty are any more likely to drown than the innocent. Second, if people can be easily persuaded to hold a superstitious belief, why such an elaborate mechanism? Why not simply assert that those who are guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We attack these puzzles from the perspective of the theory of learning in games. We give a partial characterization of patiently stable outcomes that arise as the limit of steady states with rational learning as players become more patient. These "subgame-confirmed Nash equilibria" have self-confirming beliefs at certain information sets reachable by a single deviation. We analyze this refinement and use it as a tool to study the broader issue of the survival of superstition. According to this theory Hammurabi had it exactly right: his law uses the greatest amount of superstition consistent with patient rational learning.

日時：

4月27日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Hitoshi Matsushima(Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Multi-Object Large Auction Design

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第１回　***Lecture in Japanese***

4月30日（金 Friday） 10:20-12:00 ※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第4教室

at the Lecture Hall No.4(D) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

２者択一問題 (Stochastic Choice Problem)

Mcfaddenの確率選択モデル

Edgewer boxの確率的扱い

Gibbs分布とIngeberの近似

Uncertaintyと政策効果の関係

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第２回 ***Lecture in Japanese***

5月7日（金 Friday） 15:00-16:40　　※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

組合せ論的確率過程 (Combinational Stochastic Process) の利用： Exchangeable Random Partitionとしての経済主体の群の扱い

※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

報告： ※Lecture Iの時間と場所が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい。

Eric Maskin(The School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study) Reference Paper for the Lectures

日時：

5月11日（火 Tuesday） 13:10-14:50 Lecture on Cooperative Game Theory I

場所：

東京大学経済学部旧棟（赤門総合研究棟）１階 第１３演習室

at the Seminar RoomNo.13(Enshu-shitsu) on the ground floor of Old Econ. Building

日時：

5月12日（水 Wednesday） 9:20-11:00 Lecture on Cooperative Game Theory II

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟３階 第３教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

日時：***COE Distinguished Seminar Series***

5月11日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第2教室 ※通常と会場が異なりますのでご注意下さい。

at the Lecture Hall No.2(D) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Eric Maskin(Harvard University)

On the Robustness of Majority Rule (with Partha Dasgupta)

Abstract:

We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties --- the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (genetic) transitivity --- on a bigger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule.

日時：

5月18日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Patricia Ann Nelson(University of Edinburgh Management School/CIRJE)

The Effect of Innovation and Technological Change on Information Flows, Authority and Industry Associations in Japan

Abstract:

How did innovation and technological change affect information flows and the degree of legitimacy afforded authorities such as industry associations? In this paper, six cases from the photography industry are analyzed over time. The findings indicate first that changes in innovation affected information flows and the degree of legitimacy afforded authorities such as industry associations. Second, in response to changes spurred by technological innovation, the legitimacy of authority that was lost could be regained.

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第３回 ***Lecture in Japanese***

5月21日（金 Friday） 15:00-16:40　　※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

エントロピーは系の"Most Probable"な状態を測る 資料1 資料2

Empirical分布とKullback-Leibler Measure

正の相関をもつ主体の群の扱い (Strategic complementarity, Global Game Theoryの欠陥）

日時：

5月25日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Tetsuo Yamamori 山森哲雄(GS of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Voice Matters in a Dictator Game (joint with Kazuhiko Kato, Toshiji Kawagoe and Akihiko Matsui 加藤一彦、川越敏司、松井彰彦と共著）

Abstract:

We examine a dictator game with a "voice" option in the laboratory. In our experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for the minimum acceptable offer before the dictator dictates his/her offer. In this game, it is predicted not only by the standard game theory, but by the behavioral game theory such as theories of other-regarding preferences, that the dictator's offer is independent of the recipient's request. Some findings based on our data are as follows: the above independence hypothesis is rejected; as the recipient's request increases, the dictator's offer increases when the requests are less than 50% of the pie; on the other hand, when the request goes beyond 50% of the pie, the offer decreases as the request increases. That is, "voice" matters in a dictator game. We also conduct a clustering analysis to classify the dictators into three notable clusters: the pecuniary payoff maximizers, the compliers, and the punishers of the greedy.

日時：

6月1日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Fuhito Kojima　小島武仁(Harvard University)

Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability(joint with Satoru Takahashi)

Abstract:

We introduce the class of anti-coordination games, including the hawk-dove game as a special case. A symmetric two-player game is said to have the anti-coordination property if any worst response to a mixed strategy is in the support of that mixed strategy. Every anti-coordination game has a unique interior Nash equilibrium. We investigate stability of the static equilibrium under several dynamics with one-population setting. Specifically we focus on the best response dynamics (BRD), where agents in a large population take myopic best responses, and the perfect foresight dynamics (PFD), where agents take best responses to the time average of the action distributions from the present to the future. For any anti-coordination game we show (i) that, for any initial distribution, BRD has a unique solution, which reaches the static equilibrium in a finite time, (ii) that the same path is one of the solutions in PFD, and (iii) that no path escapes from the static equilibrium in PFD once the path reaches the equilibrium. Moreover, in some subclasses of anti-coordination games, we show that any solution from any initial state converges to the static equilibrium in PFD. All the results for PFD hold for any discount rate.

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第４回 ***Lecture in Japanese***

6月7日（月 Monday） 15:00-16:40　　※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

***日程と場所の変更がありましたのでご注意下さい。***

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第4教室

at the Lecture Hall No.4(D) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

群の距離をultrametricsで測る *Revised Version posted on June 9.

樹型経済構造の反応の計算；べき乗(Power Law)モデル；経済系の温度という概念

日時：

6月8日（火 Tuesday） 16:00-18:30 ※開始時間・場所が通常と異なりますのでご注意下さい

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第4教室

at the Lecture Hall No.4(D) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告： *two back to back seminars

Carlos Alos-Ferrer (University of Vienna)

Does Learning lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions? (with Georg Kirchsteiger, University of Maastricht)

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, in the long run traders may fail to coordinate exclusively in market clearing institutions.

Ana B. Ania (University of Vienna)

Evolutionary Stability in Finite-Population Models

Abstract:

THe paper relates the properties of imitative behavioral rules with evolutionary stability of Nash equilibrium in finite-population models. It is pointed out that, in games where imitative behavior is individually improving, finite-population evolutionarily stable strategies always correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. These properties are illustrated in the context of a Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product and decreasing returns to scale. There, it is shown that price imitation is always individually improving, which allows to characterize the set of evolutionarily stable prices.

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第５回 ***Lecture in Japanese***

6月11日（金 Friday） 15:00-16:40　　※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

組合せ論的最適化問題とメトロポリスの手法の適用 Lecture Note    Reference Paper 1    Reference Paper 2    Reference Paper 3    訂正 CORRECTION

Entropic barrierと緩やかな反応速度のモデル

日時：

6月15日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

John de Figueiredo(Sloan School, MIT)

The Structure of Legislatures and the Timing of Interest Group Lobbying

Abstract:

This is the first paper to statistically examine the timing of interest group lobbying. It introduces a theoretical framework based on recurring "structural policy windows" and argues that these types of windows should have a large effect on the intensity and timing of interest group activity. Using a new database of all lobbying expenditures in the U.S. states ranging up to 25 years, the paper shows interest group lobbying increases substantially during one of these structural windows in particular -- the budgeting process. Spikes in lobbying during budgeting are driven primarily by business groups. Moreover, even groups relatively unaffected by budgets lobby more intensely during legislative budgeting, consistent with the theory that these interests are attempting to have legislators attach (de)regulatory riders to the budget bills. Overall, the paper demonstrates that these structural policy windows largely determine lobbying expenditures.

日時： ※ COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series※

"経済系のゆらぎ(fluctuations)と緩やかな反応(Sluggish Response)現象の新しい解析法"第６回 ***Lecture in Japanese***

6月18日（金 Friday） 15:00-16:40　　※ COE/Macroworkshopと共催 ※

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masanao Aoki 青木正直(Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles)

Schumpeter流の長期産業構造モデルの解析法

日時：

6月22日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Tetsushi Sonobe(GRIPS)

From Inferior to Superior Products: An Inquiry into the Wenzhou Model of Industrial Development in China (joint with Dinghuan Hu and Keijiro Otsuka) * forthcoming in J. Comparative Economics

Abstract:

Although the vitality of small private enterprises as the prime mover of the substantial economic growth in Wenzhou is widely recognized, empirical research investigating the development process of such private enterprises is useful. Based on a survey of enterprises producing low-voltage electric appliances, we find that the entry of a large number of new enterprises producing poor-quality products was followed by the upgrading of product quality and the introduction of new marketing strategies. Hence, we attempt to identify statistically the mechanisms underlying this evolutionary process of industrial development.

日時：

6月25日（金 Friday） 12:00-14:00, 16:50-18:30

報告：

12:00-14:00 Tsunehiro Otsuki (World Bank) 第１共同研究室 at the Conference Room No.1 (A) on the 12th floor of New Economics Building

The Costs of Complying with Foreign Product Standards for Films in Developing Countries: An Econometric Study

16:50-18:30 Leslie Hannah (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo) 第５教室 at the Lecture Hall No.5 (E) on the 4th floor of New Economics Building　※経済史研究会と共催※ 通常と異なりますので場所にご注意下さい。

Why was the whole world developed? The cigarette industry in the US, UK, Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and Italy 1900-1950

日時：

6月29日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Olivier Tercieux(University of Paris I)

P-Best Response Set.

Abstract:

This paper introduces a notion of p-best response set (p-BR). We build on this notion in order to provide a new set-valued concept: the minimal p-best response set (p-MBR). After proving general existence results of the p-MBR, we show that it characterizes set-valued stability concepts in a dynamic with Poisson revision opportunities borrowed to Matsui and Matsuyama (1995). Then, we study equilibrium selection. In particular, using our notion of p-BR, we generalize Morris, Rob and Shin (1995) that aimed to provide sufficient condition under which an equilibrium "spreads" through a state space.

日時：

7月6日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Takashi Kurosaki (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University)

Labor Contracts, Incentives, and Food Security in Rural Myanmar

Abstract:

This paper develops an agency model of contract choice in hiring labor and estimates the determinants of the choice in rural Myanmar based on the model. As a salient feature relevant for the agricultural sector in a low income country like Myanmar, the agency model incorporates considerations for food security as well as incentive concerns. It is shown that when food security considerations are important for an employee, possibly due to poverty, a contract with wages paid in kind (food) is preferred to labor contracts paid in cash. At the same time, when output is more responsive to workers' efforts but efforts are private information to workers or not enforceable, a contract with piece-rate wages is preferred to labor contracts with hourly wages. The case of sharecropping can be understood as the combination of the two: piece-rate wages paid in kind. Implications of the theoretical model are tested using a cross section dataset collected in rural Myanmar through a sample household survey conducted in 2001 covering about 600 households with diverse agro-ecological environments. Estimation results are consistent with the theoretical implications: wages in kind are more likely to be adopted when workers have higher budget shares of food; piece-rate wages are more likely to be adopted when workers are male; fixed effects of crops and farming operations are jointly significant and more effort-oriented crops or operations are associated with piece-rate contracts.

日時：

7月8日（木 Thursday） 16:50-18:30 ***COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series***

報告：

Xavier Vives(INSEAD)

Complementarities and Games: New Developments PAPER 1  PAPER 2

10:20-12:00 Lecture I 第１共同研究室 at the Conference Room No1 (A) , 12th floor

13:10-14:50 Lecture II 第１共同研究室 at the Conference Room No1 (A) , 12th floor

15:30-16:40 Lecture III 第１共同研究室 at the Conference Room No1 (A) , 12th floor

日時：

7月9日（金 Friday） 16:50-18:30 ***COE Distinguished Seminar Series***

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第2教室

at the Lecture Hall No.2(B) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Xavier Vives(INSEAD)

Innovation and Competitive Pressure

日時：

7月12日（月 Monday） 12:00-13:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟12階　第1共同研究室

at the Conference Room No.1(A) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Emiko Usui 臼井恵美子 (Wayne State University)

Wages, Non-Wage Characteristics, and Predominantly Female Jobs

Abstract:

Many previous studies have found that proportion male in an occupation has a significant positive effect on wages. This paper uses a wage change specification to eliminate unobserved individual characteristics that affect the wage, but also deals with the problem of selection on the job match specific component of the error term of the wage equation. I show that the change in job match specific components resulting from a quit and a layoff are oppositely related to proportion male in an occupation, and therefore the estimates of the change in proportion male on wage growth for a quit and a layoff provide upper, lower, or unbiased estimate of the wage premium. The direction of the selection bias depends on whether the wage premium compensates for the worse job-characteristics in predominantly male jobs. I find that the wage premium is large, and that the wage premium overcompensates for the non-wage characteristics in male jobs.

日時：

7月13日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Masayoshi Hirota 廣田正義(Tokyo University of Science 東京理科大学)

On the Probability of the Competitive Equilibrium Being Globally Stable: The C.E.S. Example

Abstract:

This paper extends an analysis proposed by Hirota(1981) to a class of economies with C.E.S. utility functions that include Scarf (1960)'s second example as a special case and shows by the use of numerical methods that (i) a Walrasian price adjustment mechanism converges to an equilibrium with very high probability and (ii) the weak axiom in revealed preference for market excess demands is satisfied with high probability, but the gross substitutability is rarely satisfied. Also, this paper suggests a possible interpretation of a Walrasian price adjustment that is based on the observation of experiments done by Anderson, Plott, Shimomura and Granat (2000).

日時：

7月20日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

渡辺安虎 Yasutora　Watanabe (University of Pennsylvania)

Ministerial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model (joint with Takanori Adachi)

Abstract:

This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, our method combines a bargaining model of government formation with maximum likelihood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party's voting weight is, and what ministerial seats each party obtains. We use variation of the data and the structure of the bargaining model to recover ministerial weights and other parameters. Additionally, the method can measure the effects of voting weights and formateur advantage. We apply our proposed method to the case of Japan. Our results statistically show that political players value pork-related posts (such as the Minister of Construction) more than prestigious ones (such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs). We also find that there is a significant formateur advantage, while voting weights do not have a significant scale effect.

日時：

7月27日（火 Tuesday） 14:00-16:00, 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学部 新棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Atsuko Ueda 上田貴子 (Waseda University 早稲田大学政治経済学部)

2:00-4:00pm COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series

4:50-6:30pm A Dynamic Decision Model of Marriage, Childbearing, and Labor Force Participation of Women in Japan

Abstract:

This paper empirically examines the life-time joint decision problem of marriage, childbearing, and labor force participation for women in Japan, motivated by the recent decrease in the number of marriages and the total fertility rate. Using the 1994-99 Japanese Panel Surveys of Consumers, the structural estimation result of a dynamic decision model suggests that, overall, women are better-off with the second or subsequent child, but worse-off with marriage, taking care of a baby, and labor force participation, except for financial benefit from earnings. An estimated probability to find full-time position in a year is 12-18%. Simulation result illustrates that less negative effect of marriage leads an increase of marriage, that an improvement of the child-care benefit leads an increase of childbirth from full-timers but only slightly, and that a reduction in negative effect of child-care also leads an increase of childbirth.

※COE Seminars and Lectures※

8月2日, 3日, 4日, 5日 Andy Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania) and David Schmeidler (Tel Aviv University)

COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series

8月3日(火 Tuesday) David Schmeidler (Tel Aviv University)

COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

8月4日(水 Wednesday) Andy Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania)

COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

日時：

8月31日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall No.3(C) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Yiting Li(National Taiwan University)

International Currency and Public Goods Provision (joint with Akihiko Matsui)

Abstract:

This paper studies how government uses inflation tax to finance public goods affects the circulation of a currency in a two-country search theoretic model. Agents obtain utility from private good and the public good of his own country. Each government prints fiat money to purchase goods, taxes on money holdings, and provides public goods by purchasing private goods from its fellow citizens. While government purchases increase the demand for private goods, it also induces a crowding-out effect by reducing the matching rates among private agents. We find that, a higher inflation tax rate makes a currency less likely to circulate locally and internationally. A cost and a benefit accompany a policy of lower inflation tax. The cost is that a better equilibrium associated with a higher inflation tax is eliminated. A benefit is that it also eliminates the equilibria that entail lower welfare. The negative impact of a country's inflationary policy on the realm of circulation of its currency provides an inflation discipline.

日時：

9月2日（木 Thursday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟12階　第１共同研究室

at the Conference Room No.1(A) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Hiroyuki Nakata 中田啓之(Essex Finance Centre, University of Essex)

A Model of Financial Markets with Endogenously Correlated Rational Beliefs

Abstract:

This paper studies how communication amongst agents influences the equilibria of a financial economy. We set up a standard overlapping generations (OLG) model with assets, while allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. The paper explicitly describes how communication causes the beliefs of the agents to be correlated. In particular, it is shown that communication may generate large fluctuations even if the unconditional probability beliefs themselves are uncorrelated. Because of the complex nature of the problem, we use simulations to examine the characteristics of the equilibria.

日時：

9月9日（木 Thursday） 11:00-12:00 ※曜日・時間帯・場所が通常と異なりますのでご注意下さい。

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟12階　第3共同研究室

at the Conference Room No.3(C) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Heiko Gerlach(University of Auckland)

Partial Communication and Collusion with Demand Uncertainty

***COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series***

Eddie Dekel (Department of Economics, Tel Aviv University)

Lecture I

9月27日 (月 Monday） 10:20-12:00 "Preferences for Flexibility and Commitment"

Lecture II*Additionaly Scheduled*

9月28日（火 Tuesday) 10:20-12:00 "Preferences for Flexibility and Commitment"

Lecture III

9月29日 (水 Wednesday） 13:10-14:50 "Preferences for Flexibility and Commitment"

References:

Title: Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"

Author: David M. Kreps

Econometrica, Volume: 47, Issue: 3, Published: May 1979

Title: Preferences with a Unique Subjective State Space

Author: Eddie Dekel , Barton L. Lipman , Aldo Rustichini

Econometrica, Volume: 69, Issue: 4, Published: July 2001

Title: Temptation and Self-Control

Author: Faruk Gul , Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Econometrica, Volume: 69, Issue: 6, Published: November 2001.

***COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series***

9月28日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Eddie Dekel(Tel Aviv University)

Vote Buying (with Matt Jackson and Asher Wolinsky)

Abstract:

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.

***COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series***

10月8日（金 Friday） 16:50-18:30 ※Macroworkshopと共催

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟12階　第3共同研究室

at the Conference Room C (No.3) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

John Riew(Professor Emeritus, Pennslyvania State University)

The Role of Education in Globalized Economies: With Focus on Secondary Schools

Abstract:

Today's globalized, competitive economy brings forth added urgency and importance to the educational goal of helping young generations develop creative minds and discover and nurture their innate abilities to become more innovative and productive members of the work force. The best results would require policy focus on youths during their more receptive and intensely formative years of adolescence, at the level of secondary schools. In this context, our discussions on school designs cover the following specific issues: 1) Teacher qualifications and the role of the teacher, with related issues of teacher salary (level and structure); 2) School curriculum - (a) the range and level of course offering and (b) a flexible elective system vis-a-vis a largely rigid structured curriculum (relative merits and budget considerations); 3) School size and cost efficiency (urban and rural); 4) School choice (residence-based school assignments and self selection); 5) Admissions criteria ; and 6) Financing schools (division of cost bearing among levels of government). These issues are interrelated. Measures to affect one part of the issues would also impact on other parts.

　　 　

日時：

10月12日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

岡崎哲二(東京大学大学院経済学研究科)

Emergence and Development of Capital Market in Pre-war Japan（with Yasushi Hamao 浜尾泰（UCSC）、Takeo Hoshi 星岳雄（UCSD）)

日時：

10月19日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Takashi Shimizu 清水崇(関西大学経済学部)

Tax-Subsidy Schemes in Money Search Models (with Kazuya Kamiya 神谷和也 （東京大学))

Abstract:

This paper studies the roles of tax-subsidy schemes in money search models with divisible money. Recently, real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria has been found both in specific and general search models with divisible money. In the literature, the welfare effect of monetary policy has often been discussed in search models with money. In most of these models, money is indivisible and the stationary equilibria are determinate. Thus the effects of the policies are determinate as well. However, if we assume the divisibility of money in these models, the stationary equilibria become indeterminate. Thus it is quite difficult to make accurate predictions of the effects of simple monetary policies in such models. Instead, in this paper we show that some tax-subsidy scheme selects a determinate efficient equilibrium. In other words, for a given efficient equilibrium, there exists a tax-subsidy scheme that makes the equilibrium locally determinate.

　

日時：

10月26日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

福井直樹(上智大学外国語学研究科)

Biolinguisticsについて

日時：

11月2日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Chongwoo Choe (University of New South Wales/大阪大学社会経済研究所）　

Multinational Transfer Pricing: The Relationship between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices (joint with C. E. Hyde)

PAPER 1  PAPER 2

日時：

11月9日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in Japanese

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

石川路子(神戸大学経済経営研究所）　

Oligopolistic and Monopolistic Competition Unified (with 下村研一、Jacque-Francois Thisse)

日時：

11月16日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

下村耕嗣(神戸大学経済経営研究所）　

A New Dynamic Model of International Trade (co-authored with Been-Lon Chen and Kazuo Nishimura)

Abstract:

We present a dynamic two-country model of international trade with endogenous time preference. We show that if the two countries have similar preferences, production technologies, and labor endowments, there exists a unique and stable steady state such that both consumption and investment goods are produced in both countries. Unlike the case of constant time preferences, the steady state is independent of the initial international distribution of capital. We prove a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin theorem such that the labor-abundant country exports the labor-intensive good.

日時：

11月22日（月 Monday） 12:00-13:10 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟12階　第1共同研究室

at the Lecture Hall A (No.1) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Alessandro Lizzeri(NYU）　

Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment (with Paolo Dudine and Igal Hendel)

Abstract:

We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time.

The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the case of storable goods the stockpiling motive has been documented in recent empirical literature. Advance purchases can also arise in the case of durables, although the literature has not focused on this case.

We show that if the monopolist cannot commit, then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the literature on the Coase conjecture.

日時：

11月30日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in Japanese

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

入谷純（神戸大学経済学部）・山本真一(神戸大学）　

公共財の自発的供給について

Abstracts:

The Number of Public Goods: Are Two Public Goods Too Many?

This paper shows that there exists a basic difficulty for us to deal with multiple public goods in the theory of private provision of public goods. We can deal with two situations, i.e., either the situation where one individual contributes multiple public goods or that where many individuals contribute one kind of public good. This implies that the present state of theory does not describe a phenomenon where more than two number of individuals contribute multiple public goods, which is usually seen in real life.

The Private Provision of Public Goods: Neutrality, Efficiency, Equity and Population

In this paper, we develop a new neutrality theorem in the theory of private provision of public good. Our new theorem is qualitative or global in the sense that it does not depend on the original equilibrium allocation. Applying the theorem repeatedly, we will estabilish that the equilibrium obtained under an appropriate income redistribution can be made more efficient in the strict Pareto's sense than the original allocation. It is noteworthy that the redistribution leading to the improvement also makes the inequity of income distribution extremely high. Finally, we establish a proposition that the inefficiency of Nash equilibria becomes big as the population expands.

日時：

12月7日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

伊藤秀史（一橋大学大学院商学研究科）　

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem　(joint with Hodaka Morita)

Abstract:

We study the holdup problem in repeated transaction between a seller and a buyer such that the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that in situations where formal contracts have no value under spot transaction due to the cooperative nature of investment, writing a simple fixed-price contract can be valuable under repeated transaction: There is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal price contract is written and combined with a relational contract. We also show that there are cases in which not writing a formal contract but entirely relying on a relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and the seller. The key condition is how the investment affects the renegotiation price in general, and the alternative-use value in particular.

日時：

12月14日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

瀧井克也（大阪大学）

Ｔhe Endogenous Growth and Decline of a Firm

日時：

12月20日（月 Monday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第2教室　※通常と場所が異なりますのでご注意下さい。

at the Lecture Hall B (No.2) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

岡田　章 Akira Okada（一橋大学 Hitotsubashi University）

A Noncooperative Approach to General n-Person Cooperative Games

Abstract:

We present a noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution for a general n-person cooperative game in strategic form with coalition formation. In this setup, the Nash bargaining solution should be immune to any coalitional deviations. Unlike the classic approach of von Neumann and Morgenstern, our noncooperative approach shows that a threat by the complementary coalition should be consistent with the Nash bargaining solution. This result leads to a new concept of the core, called the Nash core, for a cooperative game in which any deviating coalition anticipates the Nash bargaining solution behavior of the complementary coalition. The main theorem shows that, in the limit that the probability of negotiation failure goes to zero, a (totally) efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoff of the bargaining model is equal to the Nash bargaining solution of the cooperative game, provided that it belongs to the Nash core. The weights of players in the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution are endogenously determined by a probability distribution to select a proposer.

日時：

12月21日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟3階　第3教室

at the Lecture Hall C (No.3) on the 3rd floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

渡辺　誠（University of Essex）

Middlemen: The Visible Market Makers

Abstract:

This paper presents a search-theoretic general equilibrium model where the size and number of intermediaries in the market are determined endogenously. I show how middlemen can emerge endogenously to intermediate between ex ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of coordination frictions. Middlemen compete against each other and the buyer-seller private market by setting price, and provide a high matching service by holding an inventory. Entry of middlemen, however, increases the amount of coordination frictions and reduces the amount of inventory each individual middleman holds. The resulting high bargaining power of middlemen lowers buyers' welfare. The frictionless Warlasian outcome emerges in the limit where a single middleman holds an excess inventory to wipe off buyer-seller direct trades. Remarkably, the asymptotic efficiency is attained, if and only if, the entry cost is set prohibitively high to induce a single middleman.

日時：

1月14日（金 Friday）17:00-18:30のセミナーは中止になりました。***CANCELLED***

日時：

1月17日（月 Monday） ***COE Conference***

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟6階　大会議室

at the Faculty Meeting Room on the 6th floor of New Econ. Building

Economics of Collusion: Evicence from Korea and Japan Conferenceの詳細はこちらへ

13:10‐14:50 Session 1:

"Econometric Damage Estimation from the Bid Rigging in the Korean Military Oil Procurement Auctions during 1998-2000"

Sonku Kim, Inkwon Lee, Keunkwan Ryu, and Sang-Seung Yi

15:00‐16:40 Session 2:

"An empirical analysis about Japanese 'Dango'"

Toshiko Suzuki, Yuji Kimura, and Noriyuki Yanagawa

日時：

1月21日（金　Friday）17:00-18:30 SCHEDULE CHANGED ※ 都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所：

東京大学経済学研究科棟12階　第3共同研究室

at the Conference Room C (No.3) on the 12th floor of New Econ. Building

報告：

Tae Hoon Oum（The University of British Columbia）

An Analysis of Airport Pricing and Regulation in the Presence of Competition Between Full Service Airlines and Low Cost Carriers (with Xiaowen Fu and Mark Lijesen) PAPER   ABSTRACT

COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series ※Macroworkshopと共催

日時：

2005年1月26日(水)　午後5時半〜午後7時（開場は午後5時です）

17:30-19:00, Wednesday January 26, 2005　(open at 17:00)

(Open to public; Reservation is NOT required)

（予約は必要ありませんが、先着順で満員になり次第締め切らせていただきますのでご了承ください。）

場所：　

東京大学・赤門総合研究棟 2階　第6番教室

Room #6, 2nd floor, Akamon-sogo-kenkyutou, University of Tokyo (in front of "Akamon" red gate)

講演者：

Professor Muhammad Yunus (Managing Director, Grameen Bank)

演題：　

"We Can Create a Poverty-Free World"

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