※ 2013年4月1日現在
＜今年度終了分＞
| 日時 | 2012年6月1日（金 Friday）9:00-12:00 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | 海道宏明 (Hiroaki Kaido) (Boston University) Estimation and Inference for Partial Identified Models: Recent Developments and Applications |
| Abstract |
|
| 日時 | 2012年6月1日（金 Friday）12:15-13:45 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Michael D. Hurd (RAND) Consumption Dynamics Following Unemployment and Re-Employment (joint with Susann Rohwedder (RAND) ) |
| Abstract |
|
| 日時 | 2012年5月31日（木 Thursday）16:40-18:20 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Robert Willis (University of Michigan) The Implications of Alzheimer's Risk for Household Financial Decision-Making (joint with Joanne W. Hsu (Federal Reserve Board)) |
| Abstract |
|
| 日時 | 2012年7月5日（木 Thursday）9:00-12:00 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Xiaohong Chen (Yale University) Semi-nonparametric Models and Methods |
| Abstract |
|
Special Joint SeminarEvaluation of Development Assistance: Monday October 8, 2012, 3:00PM-5:15PM | |
| Venue | in Lecture Hall No.1 on the basement floor of the Economics Research Building [Map] |
| Schedule | Organizers: IEG, World Bank; JICA Research Institute; ESPD project, University of Tokyo (No Reservation Required) Evaluation of development assistance is an indispensable, key means to improve development effectiveness. In this seminar, we invite experts from the World Bank Group and JICA Research Institute to learn from their experiences in post-disaster reconstruction, social protection, and other technical assistance. 15:00-15:30 Remarks by Ms. Caroline Heider, Vice President, IEG, World Bank
16:00-17:15 Panel Discussion
17:30- Reception |
特別ジョイントセミナー開発援助評価を再考する −世界銀行グループとJICAの見地から− [PDF] 2012年10月8日（月 Monday）15:00-17:15 | |
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 地下1階 第一教室 [Map] |
| 報告 | オーガナイザー: IEG, World Bank; JICA研究所; 東京大学ESPD プロジェクト （予約は不要です） 開発援助の評価は、援助効果の改善にとっての「鍵」であることは言うまでもありません。今回、世界銀行独立評価局副総裁Caroline Heider氏とJICA研究所細野昭雄所長らをお招きして、世界銀行とJICAの様々な分野における支援の評価、例えば災害復興、社会的保護やその他技術協力などの評価の経験について学び、 議論をしたいと思います。
15:30-16:00 講演 |
| 日時 | 1) 2012年10月24日（水 Wednesday）14:50-18:20
2) 2012年10月25日（木 Thursday) 14:00- |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 1) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 セミナー室 2) 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）6階 CIRJE内 |
| 報告 | John Riew (Pennsylvania State University, USA/Short Term Vistor, CIRJE) アメリカのPh. Dプログラムにおける研究活動に関する特別講義 [PDF] ※ 大学院生・学生向けのセミナーです。 |
| Abstract | phD留学予定・希望の大学院生・学生に向けて、アメリカ留学についてお話し頂く特別講義です。 |
| 日時 | 2013年1月29日（火 Tuesday）12:00-13:30 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Hitoshi Tsujiyama (University of Minnesota)
|
| Abstract | Among those who are neither eligible for public health insurance nor offered employer-provided insurance in the United States, more than three-fourths are uninsured. This paper examines how upcoming health care reform aiming to increase insurance coverage affects savings and welfare. I develop a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle model of insurance choice in which households face medical expenditure risk in addition to uninsurable income risk. The existence of an uninsured population reflects limited liability in the medical services market and actuarially unfair premiums in the health insurance market. I estimate key structural parameters so that the model broadly replicates the joint distribution of insurance coverage by age, health, earnings and wealth across active participants in the individual insurance market. I then use the model to explore the implications of the Affordable Care Act which prohibits insurers from price-discriminating based on health risk and mandates the purchase of insurance. I find that the health care reform induces wealth accumulation among the uninsured poor who no longer take advantage of limited liability, leading to lower wealth inequality. The reform also generates welfare gains for the rich who are less exposed to risk, but welfare losses for the poor who lose the benefit of access to free emergency care. |
| 日時 |
※ 以下のセミナーは中止となりました。 |
|---|---|
| 報告 | Chaehee Shin (University of Chicago)
|
| 日時 | 2013年2月4日（月 Monday）12:00-13:30 ※会場にご注意下さい。 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 第２セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Xuan Tam (University of Cambridge)
|
| Abstract | Limited commitment for the repayment of consumer debt originates from two places: (i) formal bankruptcy laws granting a partial or complete legal removal of debts under certain circumstances, and (ii) informal default and renegotiation, "delinquency." In the US, both channels are used routinely. The usefulness of each of these routes as a way out of debt depends on the costs and benefits available through the other: delinquency exposes a household to collections processes initiated by lenders, while formal bankruptcy appears to carry more visible consequences for future transactions, including restrictions to even secured forms of credit. This paper introduces a model of unsecured consumer credit markets in the presence of both bankruptcy and delinquency. A key feature of our model is to allow lenders to deal with debtors in delinquency by choosing the (implicit) interest rate on debt owed by delinquent borrowers to maximize the market value of these obligations. We show that these two options to default on unsecured debt indeed interact in important ways. We first show that households with a large amount of debt who have received negative income shocks prefer delinquency. As long as their income does not improve, they remain there. This behavior occurs as lenders' optimal behavior is to offer write-offs to households in delinquency, but only when they have very low incomes. As income improves, lenders can extract more from the households that stay delinquent, so the households look to reorganize their financial situation by either repaying the debt or filing for bankruptcy. We also show that stricter control of delinquency, defined by a relatively high ability to garnish wages, increases the risk of bankruptcy and lowers equilibrium credit use, in line with cross-state comparisons in the U.S. From a normative perspective, such policies lower welfare, in part because they encourage excessive use of bankruptcy. |
| 日時 | 2013年2月5日（火 Tuesday）12:00-13:30 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Alexis Akira Toda (Yale University) |
| Abstract | Although securitization is widely used in reality, few general equilibrium models |
| 日時 | 2013年2月8日（金 Ｆｒｉday）12:00-13:30 |
|---|---|
| 場所 | 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 セミナー室 |
| 報告 | Annaïg Morin (European University Institute)
|
| Abstract | In this paper, I establish a positive correlation between wage dispersion and GDP at business cycle frequencies. Moreover, I provide a rationale for the procyclical properties of wage dispersion by studying a dynamic search model with wage-posting in which workers can get multiple job offers each period. I analyze the channels through which the business cycle influences the shape of the wage distribution. The presence of search frictions gives firms monopsony power, i.e. power to impose wage levels on workers, and generates differences in wage policy across firms. The speed at which workers can move to other jobs affects the degree of firms competition over workers and impacts the extent to which firms exploit their monopsony power. Therefore, in booms, the value of workers' outside option goes up as the quantity and the quality of job offers increase, and this, in turn, erodes firms' monopsony power in wage setting. In consequence, firms post more high-paying vacancies. Such strategic reaction of firms thickens the upper tail of the wage distribution, shifts the mass of the wages to the right and, as a result, generates a larger wage dispersion. |