CIRJE特別セミナー/CIRJE Special Seminar 2009







          ※ 2012年2月17日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

 

  <2009年度 終了分>
日時

2009年12月7日(月 Monday) 8:30-10:10, 10:20-12:00
2009年12月8日(火 Tuesday) 8:30-10:10, 10:20-12:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Steven Stern (University of Virginia/Short Term Vistor, CIRJE)
12月7日(月) 8:30-10:10 Structural dynamic model estimation
12月7日(月)10:20-12:00 Structural static model estimation
12月8日(火) 8:30-10:10 Cohabitation, marriage, divorce in a model of match quality
12月8日(火)10:20-12:00 Computation Methods

 

UTIPE Frontier Economic Lecture Seriesと共催



日時

2010年1月13日(水 Wednesday) 12:00-13:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

田中知美(Tomomi Tanaka) (Arizona State University/Short Term Vistor, CIRJE)
Competition as a Saving Incentive: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment with Homeless People in Arizona (joint with Sera Linardi and Rajiv Sinha)

要旨 

3.5 million people, 1 percent of the entire population, experience homelessness in a given year in the United States. In 2005, the demand for emergency shelters in 270 U.S. cities has increased by 25 percent, and 22 percent of those requesting emergency shelter were turned away. In February 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, providing $1.5 billion in funding for homeless prevention. Even though various government agencies provide grants and vouchers to the homeless and have tried to help them reenter the social main stream, people are challenged with becoming self-sufficient.

This project aims at understanding the determining factors of under-saving among homeless people, and designing policies that could help them increase savings and become self-sufficient. Our partner organization, Central Arizona Shelter Services (CASS), is the largest homeless shelter in Phoenix, with 415 beds for single men and women. CASS is a transitional shelter. Their goal is to aid homeless people in making the transition to permanent housing. Their clients are provided room and board for up to 6 months and given legal, administrative, and case management support. In return clients are required to obtain jobs and are encouraged to save 70% of their earnings.

The first part of this study focuses on measuring time preferences, and tries to identify causes of impatience among homeless people. Homelessness may in part be caused by people's preferences. If people are impatient, they may be tempted to choose certain comfort today and, as a result, postpone a job search, for example. Impatience may explain, in part, why some people remain homeless. The results of this study show confidence and a sense of self-determination largely explain individual difference in present-bias and discount rates in the quasi-hyperbolic model.

In the second part of this study, we designed and tested programs to help homeless individuals to increase saving. We randomly assign our subjects into three groups; 1) social recognition group, 2) monetary reward group and 3) control group.

People who were assigned to the social recognition group were told that they were selected for a 2-month savings program under which the winner of the competition, who saved the highest percentage of their income in the next two months, would be publicly announced and would be awarded the certificate of achievement at the end of the program. Instead of public recognition, the winner in the monetary reward group was offered cash reward of $100. A case manager at CASS recorded income and saving of each participant so we can investigate the change in saving behaviors in each group.

The results of this study suggest monetary rewards give strong motivations for homeless people to save. The average saving rate went up from 10% to 40 % in the monetary reward group. The winner of the competition saved 92 % of his income even though he was earning just above a minimum wage. He saved over $2,200 in two months and obtained his own apartment.

We also develop a theoretical model to explain that the welfare of time inconsistent individual is not harmed when they compete against each other in a winter-takes-all completion game.