2017年4月10日（月　Monday）1) 16:30-17:30, 2) 17:40-18:40

※主催：Tokyo Workshop on International Development、日時に注意

1) 16:30-17:30 Yasuyuki Sawada (Asian Development Bank)
Impact Assessment of Infrastructure Projects on Poverty Reduction

References)
1) https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154248/adbi-wp511.pdf

2) Yasuyuki Sawada, Ryuji Kasahara, Keitaro Aoyagi, Masahiro Shoji and Mika Ueyama (2013) "Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country," Asian Development Review 30(1), 31-51, MIT Press for Asian Development Bank. [paper]

2) 17:40-18:40 Nobuhiko Fuwa (The University of Tokyo)
Disasters and Commitments: Evidence from Japan and the Philippines

2017年4月11日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Kensuke Teshima (ITAM)

Job Loss and Violent Crime in Mexico

2017年4月18日（火　Tuesday）10:25-12:10

Alessandro Gavazza (London School of Economics and Political Science)

Internet and Politics: Evidence from U.K. Local Elections and Local Government Policies (joint with Mattia Nardotto and Tommaso Valletti) [paper]

We empirically study the effects of broadband internet diffusion on local election outcomes and on local government policies using rich data from the U.K. Our analysis suggests that the internet has displaced other media with greater news content (i.e., radio and newspapers), thereby decreasing voter turnout, most notably among less-educated and younger individuals. In turn, we find suggestive evidence that local government expenditures (and taxes) are lower in areas with greater broadband diffusion, particularly expenditures targeted at less-educated voters. Our findings are consistent with the idea that voters’ information plays a key role in determining electoral participation, government policies and government size.

2017年4月25日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Milo Bianchi (Toulouse School of Economics)

Pooling Cherries and Lemons - Some Simple Economics of Complex Financial Products (joint with Philippe Jehiel) [paper]

We study banksíincentives to create complex securities backed by assets of heterogeneous quality. When banks offer complex securities, investors disagree on their value. Disagreement is beneficial to the banks when investors are wealthy enough since then prices are determined by more optimistic investors. In bad times instead, banks prefer to offer simple securities as these create no disagreement. The incentives to issue complex securities are exacerbated in more competitive banking environments. Moreover, competition may induce a form of prisonersí dilemma in which banks end up issuing complex securities while they would be better off if they all committed to issuing simple securities.

2017年5月9日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Marco Caliendo (University of Potsdum)

Long-Term Effects of Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed: New Evidence from Germany (joint with Stefan Tübbicke)

GRIPS-UTokyo Empirical Workshop "Economics of Education"

2017年5月15日（月　Monday）13:00-17:40　※日時に注意

※共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

13:00　Reception

13:30　Eric Hanushek (Stanford University)

The Value of Smarter Teachers: International Evidence on Teacher Cognitive Skills and Student Performance

14:45　Break

15:05　Hisaki Kono (Kyoto University (presenter))

         　Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)

        　 Abu Shonchoy (New York University and Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) JETRO)

DVD-based Learning Program for University Entrance Exams: Experimental Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

15:50　Yuta Kikuchi (Hokkaido University (presenter))

         　Ryo Nakajima (Keio University)

Evaluating Professor Value-added: Evidence from Professor and Student Matching in Physics

16:35　Break

16:55　Tomohiko Inui (Gakushuin University)

            Naomi Kodama (Hitotsubashi University)

            Masaru Nagashima (GRIPS)

The Effect of Saturday School on Private Tutoring Demand in Japan

17:40　Adjourn

Organizers:

Stacey H. Chen (GRIPS), Daiji Kawaguchi (The University of Tokyo)

Sponsors:

Japan Society of Promotion of Science (#16H06322, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University) and The University of Tokyo

2017年5月16日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Shinsuke Tanaka (Tufts University)

Mind the Gap! Tax Incentives and Incentives for Manipulating Fuel Efficiency in the Automobile Industry

Many governments institute environmental policies aimed at improving automobile fuel efficiency. There is, however, little empirical evidence to date as to the efficacy of these policies using real-world fuel efficiency data. The recent scandals over automakers’ falsification of official fuel efficiency figures and emissions data have rendered evidence based on automakers’ reports of fuel efficiency unreliable. This study identifies and examines the extent of a fuel efficiency gap—the disparity between official test results and what is actually achieved on the road—and the underlying incentives for manipulation on the part of the automobile industry. Using extensive high-frequency real-world fuel consumption data during on-road vehicle use, our identification strategy employs a regression discontinuity design that exploits Japanese consumers’ eligibility for large tax incentives based on vehicle fuel efficiency. The findings highlight a discontinuous increase in the fuel efficiency gap by 6% at the eligibility thresholds. While we have identified some of the mechanisms whereby automakers can inflate fuel efficiency figures during tests, the potential remains for ongoing manipulation. A variety of evidence supports the identification assumption, in particular suggesting the absence of a discontinuity in the efficiency gap at the levels of fuel efficiency not tied to the eligibility criteria.

2017年5月18日（木　Thursday）　1)16:00-17:00, 2)17:10-18:10

※ 会場は法学部の建物になります。

※ The venues is in the building of the Faculty of Law.

東京大学法学部・大学院法学研究科 法学政治学系総合教育棟（ガラス棟(正門横））3階301教室 [地図]

in Room 301 on the 3rd Floor, Hongo Sogo Building (Law and Politics Sogo Building (Glass Building, right next to the Main Gate)) , Faculty of Law, Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, The University of Tokyo [Map]

Bruce Lyons (University of East Anglia)

Consumer Uptake of Internet Banking, Regionalised Markets and Retail Bank Concentration in Europe [slides]

2)17:10-18:10

Howard Shelanski (Georgetown University)

Keeping Merger Enforcement Relevant in the Modern Global Economy [slides]

2017年5月23日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10 ※日時に注意

Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University)

Weak dominance: A mystery cracked (joint with John Hillas) [paper]

What strategy profiles can be played when it is common knowledge that weakly dominated strategies are not played? A comparison to the case of strongly dominated strategy is in order. A common informal argument shows that if it is common knowledge that players do not play strongly dominated strategies then players can play only profiles that survive the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. We formalize and prove this claim. However, the analogous claim for the case of weak dominance does not hold. We show that common knowledge that players do not play weakly dominated strategies implies that they must play pro les that survive an iterative elimination of pro les, called aws of weakly dominated strategies, a process described by Stalnaker (1994). The iterative elimination of flaws of strongly dominated strategies results in the same set of profiles as the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Thus, the case of weak dominance and strong dominance are completely analogous: Common knowledge that players do not play weakly, or strongly dominated strategies implies iterative elimination of flaws of weakly, or strongly dominated strategies, correspondingly. These processes, for both weak and strong dominance, are independent of the order of elimination.

2017年5月23日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Johann Caro (Hiroshima University)

Optimal Voting Rules for International Organizations, with an Application to the United Nations

This paper examines a self-enforcing mechanism for an international organization that interacts repeatedly over time. A random shock determines which countries would be in favor of or against taking a collective action. If the organization wants to take the action, some countries may disagree with participating; and therefore, incentives must be provided to such countries. I characterize the optimal mechanism under two equilibrium concepts: Markov Perfect and Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Then I show that an optimal mechanism can be implemented by a weighted voting rule, and those voting weights can be history dependent under the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Finally, I discuss how this history dependent voting weights can rationalize rotation at the UN Security Council, and I show empirically that compliance with UN resolutions is followed by a higher probability of election as a Security Council member.

2017年5月30日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University and Hitotsubashi University)

A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets [paper]

Motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. In the presence of the non-negative price constraint, tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the constraint in the tied market without inciting aggressive responses by the rival firm. We identify conditions under which tying in two-sided markets is profitable and explore its welfare implications. In addition, we show that our model can be applied more widely to any markets in which sales to consumers in one market can generate additional revenues that cannot be competed away due to non-negative price constraints.

Master Thesis Defence Presentations

2017年6月6日（火　Tuesday） 1) 12:30-13:00, 2) 13:00-13:30 ※日時・会場に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 赤門総合研究棟５階コンファレンスルーム
in Conference Room on the 5th floor of Akamon General Research Building

1) 12:30-13:00 Ms. Fangqi Shi (Adviser: Kawaguchi, Examiners: Tanaka, Kondo)

2) 13:00-13:30 Ms. Xiaofeng Fan (Adviser: Kawaguchi, Examiners: Tanaka, Kondo)

2017年6月9日（金　Friday） 1) 11:30-12:15, 2) 12:15-13:00 ※日時に注意

主催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、共催：マクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

1) 11:30 - 12:15 David Jinkins (the Copenhagen Business School)
Wage Inequality and the Location of Cities

2) 12:15 - 13:00  Marcus Asplund (the Copenhagen Business School)
Multi-agent Bargaining under Asymmetric Information: Retrofitting an Elevator

2017年6月13日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10　

※時間・会場に注意

Qingyin Ma (Australian National University)

Optimal Timing of Decisions: A General Theory Based on Continuation Values [paper] [slides]

We develop a comprehensive theory of optimal timing of decisions based around continuation values as functions of the state and operators that act on them. Rewards can be bounded or unbounded. One advantage of this approach over standard Bellman equation methods is that continuation value functions are smoother than value functions. Another is that, for a range of problems, the continuation value function exists in a lower dimensional space than the value function. We exploit these advantages to obtain new results and more efficient computation.

2017年6月13日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Proposal for Master Thesis Defence Presentations

1) Atsushi Yamagishi (The University of Tokyo)

Tiebout Meets Zodrow and Mieszkowski: A Unified Framework for Fiscal Competition

2) Ippei Ozawa (The University of Tokyo)

Empirical work of educational selection

Master Thesis Defence Presentations

3) Neng Zhang (Adviser: Masaki Nakabayashi, Examiners: Keisuke Kawata and Ryuichi Tanaka)

Male Marriage Premium Due to Specialization or Selection? An Empirical Evidence from China

2017年6月16日 (金　Friday) 10:30-12:00　

※日時・会場に注意

主催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

Till von Wachter (University of California, Los Angeles)

Firming Up Inequality (joint with Jae Song, David J. Price, Fatih Guvenen and Nicholas Bloom) [paper]

Using a massive, new, matched employer-employee database that we construct for the United States, we show that the rise in earnings inequality between workers over the last three decades has primarily been a between-firm phenomenon. Over two-thirds of the increase in earnings inequality from 1981 to 2013 can be accounted for by the rising variance of earnings between firms and only one-third by the rising variance within firms. This rise in between-firm inequality was particularly strong in smaller and medium-sized firms (explaining 84% for firms with fewer than 10,000 employees). In contrast, in the very largest firms with 10,000+ employees, almost half of the increase in inequality took place within firms, driven by both declines in earnings for employees below the median and sharp rises for the top 50 or so best-paid employees. Finally, examining the mobility of employees across firms, we find that the increase in between-firm inequality has been driven by increased employee segregation—high- and low-paid employees are increasingly clustering in di ↵ erent firms.

2017年6月20日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Jeremy Fox (Rice University)

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games with an Application to Venture Capital (joint with David H. Hsu and Chenyu Yang) [paper]

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification. We estimate the contribution of observables and unobservable complementarities to match production in venture capital investments in biotechnology and medical firms.

2017年6月22日（木　Thursday）16:50-18:35　※曜日に注意

※主催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ、共催：応用統計ワークショップ

Jeremy Fox (Rice University)

Heterogenous Production Functions, Panel Data, and Productivity Dispersion

Master Thesis Defence Presentations

2017年6月27日（火　Tuesday） 1) 12:30-13:00, 2) 13:00-13:30 ※時間に注意

1) 12:30-13:00 Hao Wang (Adviser: Nakabayashi, Examiners: Kawata, Tanaka)

2) 13:00-13:30 Anlin Chen (Adviser: Wakamori, Examiners: Marszalec, Griffin)

2017年6月27日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

野田 俊也 (Shunya Noda) (Stanford University)

Strategic Experimentation with Random Serial Dictatorship [paper]

We consider one-sided matching problems in which agents can endogenously acquire information about objects to evaluate their values more precisely. In such situations, whether agents acquire information or not crucially depends on their beliefs about their choice set, i.e., the set of objects each agent can obtain by changing his report. In this paper, we fix the assignment rule to the random serial dictatorship, and study the efficiency of each disclosure policy of choice sets. With a stylized environment where there is only one object that has ex ante unobservable private-value component, we demonstrate that the full disclosure policy, which always discloses each agent's choice set, is typically inefficient, because it fails to internalize the positive externality of information acquisition. Then, we illustrate that obscuring the information about the best available fixed-valued objects, we can induce more efficient information acquisition. We also show that in the worst case, the loss of the full disclosure policy relative to the optimal one is large.

2017年7月4日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Kentaro Tomoeda (University Technology Sydney)

Implementation of Efficient Investments in Mechanism Design [paper]

This paper investigates when we can eliminate investment inefficiency in mechanism design under quasi-linear utility. We show that when agents invest only before participating in the mechanism, inefficient investment equilibria cannot be ruled out for some cost types whenever an allocatively efficient social choice function is implemented. We then consider when agents invest before and after participating in the mechanism. When ex post investments are possible and an allocatively constrained-efficient social choice function is implemented, efficient investments can be fully implemented in subgame-perfect equilibria if and only if the social choice function is commitment-proof (a weaker requirement than strategy-proofness). We also show that efficient investments and allocations are implementable even given a budget-balance requirement. Our positive result continues to hold in the incomplete information setting when the social choice function to be implemented is strategy-proof.

2017年7月11日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

※財政・公共経済ワークショップと共催

Alessandro Cigno (University of Florence)

Student loans and the allocation of graduate jobs [paper]

Higher education is not just a signal of innate ability. At least a certain level of educational achievement (degree level, degree mark) is strictly required to perform a graduate job. School leavers fall into two categories, the rich and the poor. Ability is distributed in the same way in both groups. Graduate jobs are differentiated by quality. The output of each graduate job-worker match depends on the worker’s ability and educational achievement as well as on the quality of the job. Individual wealth and ability are private information. Educational achievement and realized productivity are common knowledge. Graduates and graduate jobs are matched by tournament. In laissez faire, only the rich can buy enough education and enter the tournament. The poor are confined to the non-graduate labour market. This is doubly inefficient because some of the rich buy too much education, and some of the graduates have lower ability than some of the non-graduates. Student loans allow the more able among the poor to buy a higher education, discourage the less able among the rich from so doing, and bring individual education investments closer to their efficient levels. Unless the loan is large enough to allow a poor school leaver to invest as much, and thus get as good a job, as a rich one of the same ability, however, jobs of the same quality are assigned to graduates with the same education but different ability. Competition among employers will then result in poor graduates being paid a higher salary than rich graduates doing the same job.

2017年7月18日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Mira Frick (Yale University)

Dynamic Random Utility (joint with Ryota Iijima and Tomasz Strzalecki)

We study dynamic stochastic choice behavior resulting from an agent (or population of agents) solving a dynamic decision problem subject to evolving private information. A key feature of our model is that observed choices are typically history dependent: different sequences of past choices reflect different private information of the agent, which may lead to different distributions of her current choices. Our main axioms impose discipline on the amount of history dependence that choices can display: We identify simple equivalence classes of past choices that reflect the same private information and thus have the same implications for current choices. Additional axioms allow us to distinguish between two sources of history dependence: randomly evolving utility vs. gradual learning about fixed but unknown tastes. An agent's observed choices allow for essentially unique identification of her underlying utility process/private information. We characterize the relationship between persistence in choices and in tastes. Finally, we relate our model to dynamic discrete choice models widely used in empirical work, highlighting new modeling tradeoffs in this literature.

2017年9月19日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

粟屋祐 (Yu Awaya) (University of Rochester)

Communication and Cooperation in Repeated Games [paper]

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of ε depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with "cheap talk" that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set ε-CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.

2017年9月25日（月　Monday）8:30-12:10　

GRIPS-UTokyo workshop

Empirical Studies on Innovation and Entrepreneurship [program]

Call for Papers

The third meeting for GRIPS-UTokyo workshop will take place on 25 September 2017, Monday, at University of Tokyo. Professor Pierre Azoulay from MIT Sloan School will keynote the workshop.

We invite submissions of extended abstracts (2-4 pages including title and research question along with a summary of methods and results) for papers relating to Empirical Studies on Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Please feel free to forward this invitation to interested scholars (including Ph.D. students) whom it might not otherwise reach.

For submission, please upload an anonymous copy of your extended abstract

here (https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/conference.cgi?action=login&db_name=GRIPSUTokyo).

Please help us to implement a single-blind submission process by removing author names in any place of the abstract.

Submissions must be received by 3 August 2017.

Based on the anonymous abstracts, Professor Azoulay will shortlist speakers for the meeting in the middle of August.

If you have any question, please contact us at <s-chen_at_grips.ac.jp> , or <owan_at_iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>. (Please replace "_at_" with @ mark.)

We look forward to receiving your submissions.

Best,

Stacey Chen, Daiji Kawaguchi, and Hideo Owan

2017年9月26日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Roberto Serrano (Brown University)

Level-k Mechanism Design (joint with Georoy de Clippel and Rene Saran) [paper]

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to the maximal set of functions that are implementable in mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. Focusing on single-valued rules, we discuss the role and implications of different behavioral anchors (arbitrary level-0 play), and prove a level-k revelation principle. If a function is level-k implementable given any level-0 play, it must obey a slight weakening of standard strict incentive constraints. Further, the same condition is also sucient for level-k implementability, although the role of specific level-0 anchors is more controversial for the suciency argument. Nonetheless, our results provide tight characterizations of level-k implementable functions under a variety of level-0 play, including truthful, uniform, and atomless anchors.

2017年10月3日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Wing Suen (University of Hong Kong)

The Comparative Statics of Optimal Hierarchies (joint with Cheng Chen) [paper]

Several types of models of hierarchical decision making share two common properties: the characteristics at different levels of the hierarchy are complementary, but this complementary does not extend beyond adjacent levels. We propose a unified yet simple approach with few assumptions to study comparative statics of decision making in all these models. We use this new approach to study organizational decision making, and show that increased delay cost incentivizes the organization to empower lower level employees more than upper level employees.

2017年10月10日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10

※日時に注意

John Stachurski (Australian National University)

Solving Recursive Utility Models with Nonstationary Consumption　(joint with Jaroslav Borovička) [paper]

We study existence, uniqueness and computability of solutions for a class of discrete time recursive utilities models. By combining two streams of the recent literature on recursive preferences—one that analyzes principal eigenvalues of valuation operators and another that exploits the theory of monotone concave operators—we obtain conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for existence and uniqueness of solutions. We also show that the natural iterative algorithm is convergent if and only if a solution exists. Consumption processes are allowed to be nonstationary.

2017年10月10日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

※Speaker Changed・発表者が変更いたしました。

Seung-Gyu Sim (The University of Tokyo)

On-the-job Training and On-the-job Search: Wage-Training-Promotion in a Frictional Labor Market [paper]

This paper analyzes the coexistence of on-the-job (general) training and on-the- job search in a frictional labor market where rms post wage-training-promotion contracts to preemptively back-load compensation. The back-loaded compensation discourages trained workers' efficient job-to-job transition, as if they jointly accumu- lated relationship-specic capital, which induces over-intensied training among more productive rms. The quantitative analysis predicts that the market equilibrium, relative to the efficiency benchmark, gets more skilled workers (training inefficiency) and less output (allocation inefficiency). Aggregate efficiency loss, being offset by future employer externality in the previous literature, is moderate. Interestingly, it can be even improved, as search friction is mitigated.

2017年10月10日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

※共催：ミクロ実証分析ワークショップ

Rong Hai (University of Miami)

* Speaker Changed/発表者が変更いたしました。詳細は上記をご参照ください。

2017年10月17日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:35　

Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University)

Do Middle and Vocational Schools Foster Meritocracy? [paper]

Around the 1890s in Japan, middle and vocational schools underwent a large and rapid construction process. This study examines how this rapid period of school construction affected the country’s transition from a feudal society, in which noble families dominated public sector jobs and exclusively received higher education, to a meritocratic society, in which commoners had access to education and the opportunity to become elites. By exploiting the variations across cohorts and regions in the availability of schools, I examine the extent to which improved access to middle and vocational school education affected occupational outcomes by social class. Occupational outcomes are measured by the number of elites on the Japanese Personal Inquiry Records, which list the biographies of notable people and high taxpayers in the 1920s–1930s. I find strong evidence of the positive effect of middle school construction on the production of commoner elites in both the private and the public sectors as well as increases in tax payments by commoners, with mixed evidence of these for noble elites. In addition, the results imply that vocational schools that specialized in business contributed to producing business elites from commoner families and helped raise the incomes of and corporate tax payments by commoners.