Workshops

Microeconomics Workshop 2013

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2014年3月14日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

 

<本年度終了分>

日時

2013年4月16日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

金融センター・ワークショップと共催。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (University of Tokyo)

Impact of Financial Regulation and Innovation on Bubbles and Crashes due to Limited Arbitrage: Awareness Heterogeneity [PDF] [slides]

Abstract

We examine the impact of financial regulation and innovation on bubbles and crashes due to limited arbitrage by modeling timing games among strategic arbitrageurs whose rationality is not commonly known. An unproductive company raises funds by issuing shares, and for purchasing shares, arbitrageurs borrow money from positive feedback traders. The key concept is awareness heterogeneity: positive feedback traders are unaware of euphoria, but arbitrageurs are aware of it. We show the impact of high leverage ratio depends on whether naked CDS is available, and the impact of naked CDS depends on growth balance between positive feedback traders' capital and loan.

日時

2013年4月23日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Soohyung Lee (University of Maryland)

Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets (joint with Muriel Niederle)

Abstract

While a large literature on signaling exists, it is challenging to prove that signaling private information would affect outcomes in a real market and thus can be effectively used for market design. This paper provides clean supporting evidence based on a field experiment in an online dating market. Participants are randomly endowed with two or eight "virtual roses" that a participant can use for free to signal his/her special interest in other participants. We find that recipients accept a dating request with a rose attached more often, and therefore participants with eight roses have more dates than the rest.

日時

2013年4月30日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Aloysius Siow (University of Toronto)

Directed search versus frictional transfers in the marriage market [slides]

Abstract

This lecture presents the CS frictionless transferable utility marriage matching models, a directed search non-transferable utility marriage matching model and a CS marriage matching model with frictional transfers. The CS model is identified with the marriage distribution from one marriage market. Male and female spousal preferences are not identified. The directed search model needs multi-market data for identification. Male and female preferences are identified. The CS model with frictional transfers needs multi-market data for identification. Male and female preferences are identified. An empirical application to the marriage market of the famine born cohorts in China is presented.

日時

2013年5月7日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

清田耕造 (Kozo Kiyota) (Yokohama National University)

Product and labor market imperfections and scale economies: Micro-evidence on France, Japan and the Netherlands (joint with Sabien Dobbelaere and Jacques Mairesse) [PDF]

Abstract

Allowing for three labor market settings, this paper relies on an extension of Hall's econometric framework for estimating simultaneously price-cost margins and scale economies. Using three large unbalanced panels of manufacturing firms in France, Japan and the Netherlands, we first apply two procedures to classify 30 comparable manufacturing industries in 6 distinct regimes that differ in the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets. We then investigate industry differences in the estimated product and labor market imperfections and scale economies. We find important regime differences across the three countries and differences in the degree of imperfections within regimes.

日時

2013年5月14日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

鈴木豊(Yutaka Suzuki) (Hosei University)

Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "Bao (Contract)" and "Bisai (Contest)": A Contract Theory Analysis of Development Governance [PDF]

Abstract

We use a contract theory/mechanism design framework to analyze the fiscal relations and reforms between the Central and Local governments in China, which are said to have made great contributions to economic growth since the "Economic Reform". First, we present the mechanism (a fiscal incentive contract model), which has created incentives for the development agent (Local government), and clarify theoretically how the concept of "Bao (Contract)" works. We then comprehend the concept of "Bisai (Contest)" within the framework of the yardstick competition between Local governments, and review the mechanism which encourages proper information revelation through intergovernmental comparison and competition. Lastly, we make a theoretical comparative analysis on the fiscal system reform (from the Fiscal Contracting system to the Tax Sharing system), from the perspective of how much room was left for the "Ratchet Effect" in the dynamic relation between the Central and Local governments, and how it was solved (or mitigated) in the two fiscal systems.

 

International Workshop

2013年5月18日 (土 Saturday) 14:00-, 5月19日(日 Sunday) 10:00-
The International Workshop on Search and Match

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

 

[Program]

 

Day 1: May 18, Saturday 

14:00-:15:20 Artyom Shneyerov (Concordia University), 'Price Setting with Interdependent Values' (with Pai Xu) [PDF]
15:50-17:10 Keisuke Kawata (Hiroshima University), 'Working Out the Impacts of Labor Market Integration' (with Kentaro Nakajima, and Yasuhiro Sato) [PDF]

Day 2: May 19, Sunday
10:00-11:20 In-Koo Cho (University of Illinois), 'Search, Adverse Selection and Market Clearing' (with Akihiko Matsui) [PDF]
11:30-12:50 Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern University), 'Search with Adverse Selection' (with Stephan Lauermann), 'A Common Value Auction with Bid Solicitation' (Subject to change.) [PDF]

   

日時

2013年5月21日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Harrison Cheng (University of Southern California)

First Auctions with Speculative Resale

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the model of speculative resale in auctions. Resale (or secondary trade) is allowed for each bidder, but in equilibrium we show that there is only speculative resale. We consider a standard first-price auction with symmetric independent private values (IPV) among N bidders and several speculators. In the presence of resale, the winner in the first-price auction uses an optimal mechanism to resell the object to the losers. We establish a single crossing property of the model. We show the bidding function of the regular bidders to be symmetric, and is the maximum of two simple functions. We characterize the conditions under which speculators are active in equilibrium, and the bidding intervals in which they are active. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given for the speculators to be active in equilibrium. General and explicit welfare and efficiency consequences of speculative resale are given. Resale enhances the seller revenue when speculators are active in equilibrium, but there is a loss of efficiency. We show the equilibrium to be essentially unique (except for the individual speculators). For many use value distribution functions, speculators are inactive in equilibrium, and so are they when there are many regular buyers. In general speculators are active in disjoint bidding intervals, a phenomenon that we expect to hold in more general auctions with resale.

日時

2013年5月24日(金 Friday)18:00-19:30 ※日時・場所にご注意下さい。

金融センター特別セミナーマクロワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
参照 第65回金融センター特別セミナー
参加方法 ※定員に達したため申し込みを締め切らせていただきました。
報告

Jean Tirole (Chairman of the board of the Jean-Jacques Laffont Foundation/Toulouse School of Economics (TSE))

Cognitive Games and Cognitive Traps

※資料は当日配布されます。

Abstract

 

日時

2013年5月28日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

中原裕之 (Hiroyuki Nakahara) (RIKEN Brain Science Institute)

Learning to Simulate Others' Decisions [PDF1] [PDF2 (supplemental)]

Abstract

A fundamental challenge in social cognition is how humans learn another person's values to predict their decision-making behavior. This form of learning is often assumed to require simulation of the other by direct recruitment of one's own valuation process to model the other's process. However, the cognitive and neural mechanism of simulation learning is not known. Using behavior, modeling, and fMRI, we show that simulation involves two learning signals in a hierarchical arrangement. A simulated-other's reward prediction error processed in ventromedial prefrontal cortex mediated simulation by direct recruitment, being identical for valuation of the self and simulated-other. However, direct recruitment was insufficient for learning, and also required observation of the other's choices to generate a simulated-other's action prediction error encoded in dorsomedial/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These findings show that simulation uses a core prefrontal circuit for modeling the other's valuation to generate prediction and an adjunct circuit for tracking behavioral variation to refine prediction.

日時

2013年6月4日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Xiaodong Fan (University of New South Wales)

Retiring Cold Turkey [PDF]

Abstract

This paper documents "sharp retirement"—retirement accompanied by a discontinuous decline in labor supply—across three data sets, which previous literature found difficult to explain. I propose and estimate a life-cycle labor supply model with habit persistence wherein sharp retirement can be explained by workers quitting "cold turkey." In much the same way that one might quit smoking, workers with accumulated "working habit" exit the labor force with a pronounced, discontinuous decline in labor supply. The working habit model is consistent with the data, where workers reduce yearly labor supply by scaling back more in hours worked per week (over 50% reduction) than in weeks worked per year (20% reduction). The fixed costs approach, which has been the standard model used to understand sharp retirement, cannot explain these trends. After estimating the model, counterfactuals show that reducing Social Security benefits by 20% causes individuals work an additional 8.6 months. Individuals choosing sharp retirement respond mostly on the extensive margin by delaying retirement eight months, while individuals choosing smooth retirement respond mostly on the intensive margin by increasing yearly labor supply and delaying retirement only one month.

日時

2013年6月11日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

芹澤成弘 (Shigehiro Serizawa) (Osaka University)

Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule (joint with Shuhei Morimoto) [PDF]

Abstract

We consider the problems of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Nonquasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The "minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule" is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.

日時

2013年6月18日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Shintaro Yamaguchi (McMaster University)

Changes in Returns to Task-Specific Skills and Gender Wage Gap [PDF]

Abstract

How did skilled-biased technological change affect wage inequality, particularly between men and women? To answer that question this paper constructs a task-based Roy model in which workers possess a bundle of basic skills, and occupations are characterized as a bundle of basic tasks. The model is structurally estimated using the task data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the PSID. The main empirical finding is that men have more motor skills than women, but the returns to motor skills have dropped significantly, accounting for more than 40% of the narrowing gender wage gap.

日時

2013年6月25日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

橋本理 (Tadashi Hashimoto) (Stanford University)

The Generalized Random Priority Mechanism with Budgets [PDF]

Abstract

This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as multi-unit auctions, school choice, and course assignment. For this class of problems, we introduce a generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (GRP). This mechanism is always ex-post incentive compatible and feasible. Moreover, as the market grows large, this mechanism can approximate any incentive compatible mechanism in the corresponding continuum economy. In particular, GRP can be used to approximate efficient and envy-free allocations, while preserving incentive compatibility and feasibility.

日時

2013年6月28日 (金 Friday)15:00-16:15 ※日時に注意

※Job Market Seminar, UTIPE Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30と共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Daniel Janusz Marszalec (University of Oxford)

An Empirical Analysis of Polish Tr easury Bill Auctions [PDF]

Abstract

This paper applies two structural econometric models - the fully non- parametric model of Hortacsu (2002), and the semi-parametric model of Fevrier, Preget and Visser (2002) - to Polish treasury bill auction data. The paper has two main aims: firstly, to compare the performance of discriminatory and uniform-price auctions on the Polish market, and secondly, to evaluate the mutual (in)consistencies of predictions from the two econometric models. I conclude that both of the models considered suggest that the current setup, which uses a discriminatory auction, performs better than a uniform-price auction would, and that both models agree on this conclusion. The number of cases in which predictions from the two auctions are inconsistent is small, though in part this is due to the weakness of the conclusions implied by the Hortacsu model.

日時

Conference

2013年7月1日 (月 Monday), 7月2日 (火 Tuesday)

IO Conference at University of Tokyo

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Abstract

 

[Program]

 

July 1 (Monday)

9:30‐10:00 Kota Mori (Yale): Advertisement and Newspaper Differentiation

10:00‐10:30 Ken Onishi (Northwestern): Quantity Discounts and Misallocation of Goods

10:45‐11:45 Naoki Wakamori (Mannheim): How would hedge fund regulation affect investor behavior? Implications for systemic risk (with Naoaki Minamihashi)

12:00‐13:00 Mitsuru Igami (Yale): Cannibalization and Preemptive Entry with Multi‐Product Firms (with Nathan Yang)

 

14:30‐15:30 Kim, Kyoo il (Minnesota): Estimating Production Functions with Control Functions when Capital is Measured with Error.

15:45‐16:45 Junichi Suzuki (Toronto): Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit (with Victor Aguirregabiria)

17:00‐18:00 Jeff Thurk (Notre Dame)

 

July 2 (Tuesday)

9:00‐10:00 Yasutora Watanabe (Northwestern): Entry by Merger: Estimates from a Two‐Sided Matching Model with Externalities (with Kosuke Uetake)

10:15‐11:15 Jeffrey Campbell (Chicago Fed): Simple Markov‐Perfect Industry Dynamics" (with Jaap Abbring and Nan Yang)

11:30‐12:30 Mitsukuni Nishida (Johns Hopkins): Consumer Search and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the US Retail Gasoline Markets (with Marc Remer)

 

日時

2013年7月2日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Antonio Guarino (University College London)

Social learning: Theory and Experiments [paper (theory part)]

Abstract

We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after observing their predecessors and a private signal. They are unable to make perfect inferences from their predecessors' decisions: they only understand the relation between the aggregate distribution of actions and the state of nature, and make their inferences accordingly. We show that, in a discrete action space, even if agents receive signals of unbounded precision, there are asymptotic inefficiencies. In a continuous action space, compared to the rational case, agents overweight early signals. Despite this behavioral bias, eventually agents learn the realized state of the world and choose the correct action.

日時

2013年7月9日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

大林真也 (Shinya Obayashi) (Tohoku University)

Joint Labor Disputes in Community Unions: An Application of OLG Repeated Games

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyze why members in community unions participate in joint labor disputes. Community unions are one specific type of labor unions; they are individual-affiliate unions in which anyone can easily join. They include various kinds of laborers such as regular workers, non-regular workers and even unemployed people, and they all work at different companies. Because they join a community union in order to solve their own labor problems such as dismissal, personnel change and unpaid overwork, they have different claims. In order to attain each member's claim, they have to hold a specific type of labor disputes (protest actions against companies). These are joint labor disputes with which only one member is or a few members are concerned, but in which not only the people of interest participate but also the rest of the members in their community unions do. These helping behaviors in joint labor disputes are thought of as individual-focused net generalized exchange in exchange theory. In preceding works, this exchange can be maintained in a fixed and long-run relationship at a group and community level. However, members in community unions are flexible because they do not impose any penalties for exit. To account for this puzzle, the mechanism of joint labor disputes in community unions is examined by field survey and mathematical modeling. The analysis shows that cooperation in joint labor disputes is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in an OLG repeated game.

日時

2013年7月16日 (火 Tuesday)14:50-16:30

金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

田中知美 (Tomomi Tanaka) (World Bank)

Behavioral Repeated Game Theory: Imperfect Private Monitoring (joint with Hitoshi Matsushima and Tomohisa Toyama)

Abstract

 

 

日時

2013年7月16日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

Yuichi Yamamoto (University of Pennsylvania)

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Individual Learning (joint with Takuo Sugaya)

Abstract

 

日時

2013年7月23日 (火 Tuesday)15:00-16:20  ※時間にご注意下さい。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Stefano Battiston (ETH Zurich)

Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: New Challenges

Abstract

The application of network analysis to financial markets is providing a number of insights for financial regulation. I will review recent results related to the DebtRank analysis to various datasets. I will then discuss the policy considerations and questions that these results are raising.

日時

2013年7月23日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

金融センターワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

花木伸行 (Nobuyuki Hanaki) (Aix-Marseille University)

It is not just confusion! Strategic uncertainty in an experimental asset market

Abstract

To what extent the observed price deviations from the fundamental values in experimental asset markets Smith, et al. 1988 are caused by strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about others behavior) and by individual bounded rationality (or confusion)? We address this question by comparing the initial, as well as subsequent, price forecasts submitted by subjects in two call market environments a la Haruvy et al 2007 -- one where all six traders are human subjects (6H), and the other where one human subject interacts with five computer traders who submit orders at the fundamental values (1H5C). Subjects in the latter environments are all told how computer traders behave and the fact that all the other traders in their markets are computer traders. Our analysis shows that about 50% of the median initial forecast deviations from the FVs are due to strategic uncertainty and remaining 50% are due to individual bounded rationality. While the effect of strategic uncertainty is larger (about 70%) for subjects with the perfect score (3) in Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005), it is not significant for those with low scores of CRT (0 or 1).

日時

2013年7月30日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

金融センターワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

飯島良太 (Ryota Iijima) (Harvard University)

Continuous Revision Games (joint with Akitada Kasahara)

Abstract

We embed a one-shot strategic interaction in continuous-time models with a preparation phase. During the preparation phase before the final payoffs realize, players can make flexible and frequent adjustments. In the first model, imperfect monitoring model, players observe public signals about opponents' adjustment. In the second model, public noise model, players are subject to commonly observable noises that disturb game payoffs. We show that introducing such noise and adjustment cost, even if arbitrarily small, leads to a unique equilibrium. The proof is based on backward stochastic differential equations. Partial differential equations that describe players' equilibrium strategy are derived. They are generally applicable to a variety of economic settings and yield analytical solutions in special cases. Furthermore, we use our model to analyze equilibrium selection problem in potential games, and prove that the potential maximizer is selected as frictions vanish.

日時

2013年9月10日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20 

金融センター・ワークショップと共催。

※通常の開始時刻へ変更致しました。/Schedule has been changed to the regular slot.

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)

Contract Negotiation and the Coase Conjecture [paper]

Abstract

This paper analyzes an explicit protocol of contract negotiation between a principal who has all the bargaining power and an agent with a privately known type, and provides a foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts in such environments. The model extends the framework of the Coase conjecture to situations in which the seller and the buyer must determine the quantity or the quality of the good being sold. All equilibria converge to the same type-specific contracts as renegotiation frictions become negligible. Those contracts are efficient and the principal extracts a strictly positive share of the gain from negotiation.

日時

2013年9月17日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

石黒真吾 (Shingo Ishiguro) (Osaka University)

Contracts, Conformity and Signaling with Friction

Abstract

In this paper we investigate how and why different organizations conform to similar rules or norms of incentive schemes despite underlying heterogeneities in a directed search model with contract posting and signaling. The principals have private information about the terms of trades before posting contracts to agents who in turn decide which contracts to apply to. We then show that all the different types of the principals conform to a single pooling contract in any limit equilibrium as search friction becomes sufficiently small without any belief-based refinement.

日時

2013年9月24日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

丸山士行 (Shiko Maruyama) (University of New South Wales)

Do Siblings Free-Ride in "Being There" for Parents? (joint with Meliyanni Johar) [paper]

Abstract

When siblings are concerned for the well-being of their elderly parents, the costs of caregiving and long-term commitment create a free-rider problem. If siblings living near their parents can share the costs, this positive externality exacerbates the under-provision of proximate living. Location decisions allow siblings to make a commitment to not provide long-term support for parents, and if decisions are made in birth order, elder siblings may enjoy the first-mover advantage. To quantify these effects, we study siblings' location decisions relative to parents by estimating a sequential participation game that features rich heterogeneity. We find moderate altruism and cooperation in the US that imply: (1) limited strategic behavior: more than 90% of children have a dominant strategy; and (2) non-negligible free-riding: of the families with multiple children, had sibling fully internalized externality and jointly maximized their utility, 18.3% more parents would have had at least one child nearby..

日時

2013年10月1日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

青木昌彦 (Masahiko Aoki) (Stanford University)

A Strategic View of Institutional Transition from the Malthusian Stage: Theory and Comparative Cases of Japan and China [PDF]

Abstract

 

日時

2013年10月8日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

岡田 章 (Akira Okada) (Hitotsubashi University)

A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types

Abstract

We consider a non-cooperative two-person sequential bargaining game with incomplete information. Players' types are verifiable when a contract is implemented. We show no-delay of agreements and the inscrutability principle under the property of independence of irrelevant types (IIT) that a response of every type of a player is independent of proposals to his other types. We prove the existence of a stationary sequential equilibrium satisfying IIT and a self-selection property for every discount factor of future payoffs, and show that the equilibrium proposal of every player converges to the ex post Nash bargaining solution as the discount factor goes to one.

日時

2013年10月15日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

上東貴志 (Takashi Kamihigashi) (Kobe University)

An Order-Theoretic Approach to Dynamic Programming [PDF1] [PDF2]

Abstract

 

日時

2013年10月22日 (火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10  

※時間にご注意下さい, Brown Bag Semianr

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Karl Warneryd (Stockholm School of Economics)

Evolution Without Group Selection

Abstract

 

日時

2013年10月22日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

森 知也 (Tomoya Mori) (Kyoto University)

City Size Distributions: Does Space Matter? (joint with Wen-Tai Hsu and Tony E. Smith)

Abstract

 

日時

2013年10月29日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Minki Kim (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST))

Reference Quality-based Competitive Market Structure for Innovation Driven Markets (joint with WonJoon Kim)

Abstract

 

日時

2013年11月12日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

前川 淳 (Jun Maekawa) (University of Tokyo)

Securitization and Heterogeneous-Belief Bubbles with Collateral Constraints

Abstract

 

日時

2013年11月15日 (金 Friday)12:10-13:10

※日時・場所にご注意下さい, Brown Bag Semianr

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Alex White (Tsinghua University)

On the Antitrust Economics of the Electronic Books Industry [PDF]

Abstract

We show that the observed increase in prices charged for ebooks following Apple's entry into the market can be explained completely by Amazon's Kindle device losing its position as an essential component for reading ebooks. Simply put, when it became convenient for consumers to access ebooks sold by Amazon using third-party devices, such as the iPad, Amazon's incentive to hold down the retail prices of ebooks diminished. This explanation contrasts with the view, advocated by the U.S. Department of Justice and armed in a recent court decision, that the price increase stems froma switch in the industry from using wholesale contracts towards using agency contracts. Moreover, we show that, in the absence of an essential device, if contracts revert to wholesale form, as is stipulated by the court decision and related settlements, this will likely push ebook prices up even further.

日時

2013年11月19日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

国本 隆 (Takashi Kunimoto) (Hitotsubashi University)

Interim Equilibrium Implementation

Abstract

A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solution concept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adopt interim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where agents' interim beliefs are not necessarily derived via Bayesian updating) as a solution concept and investigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incomplete information environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditions under which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doing so, I also unify the so-called Bayesian implementation and Nash implementation.

日時

2013年11月26日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小井田 伸雄 (Nobuo Koida) (Iwate Prefectural University)

Anticipated Stochastic Choice

Abstract

This paper axiomatizes an anticipated stochastic choice (ASC) representation in the context of menu choice, in which the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expected utility by controlling the mood, i.e., probability measure over mental states governing the ex post stochastic choice of alternatives. A key prerequisite is that the DM identifies randomizations between two menus with the perfectly correlated mixtures of the menus; that is, the mixture of two menus includes only the mixtures of specific pairs of alternatives. ASC representations exhibit a preference for commitment to singleton menus and do not necessarily satisfy extremeness. The essential uniqueness of an ASC representation enables us to define an index of the DM's ability to control the ex post choice. Special cases of ASC include trembling hands and choice with limited attention. Furthermore, ASC representations accommodate potentially stochastic choice anomalies such as the attraction effect, cyclical choice, and Allais paradox.

日時

2013年12月3日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

マクロワークショップと共催。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Seung-Gyu Sim (University of Tokyo)

Economic Growth and Labor Market Institutions in East Asian Structural Transformation (joint with Seungjoon Oh) [paper]

Abstract

This paper develops a new growth model by incorporating labor market friction into the multi-sector growth framework and calibrates it on the Japanese and South Korean structural transformation episodes in order to analyze the underlying link between economic growth and labor market institutions in a transitional economy. The model demonstrates that lifetime employment (and the implied lengthy job tenure) have enhanced human capital accumulation and facilitated physical capital investment, enabling the Japanese and South Korean economies to achieve, during its structural transformation, a Ricardian comparative advantage in the sectors in which substantial investment and a skilled work force are required. The counterfactual experiment finds that had the average job duration of Japanese workers been 1 year rather than current 12.5 years, the non-agricultural employment share in 1990 would account for 75 percent of the actual value and the non-agricultural GDP per capita in 1990 would account for only half of the actual value, suggesting inappreciable and sluggish structural transformation. Also, had the Japanese labor market maintained from 1960-1990 the high job-finding and separation rates as the U.S. labor market, the sectoral GDP per capita in 1990 would have declined by 8 and 21 percent in agricultural and non-agricultural sector, respectively.

日時

2013年12月4日 (水 Wednesday)17:00-18:30 ※日時にご注意下さい。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

鎌田 雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada) (University of California, Berkeley)

Games with Private Timing (joint with Sofia Moroni)

Abstract

This paper considers games with private timing. Two players draw moving times according to some distribution, one for each player, and are potentially unsure whether the moving time is before or after the opponent's. When a player moves, there is an option to disclose her action to the opponent with a small cost. The payoffs realize after both players have chosen their actions. In common interest games in which there is a "best action profile" that strictly dominates all other action profiles, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition on the timing distribution such that when the disclosure cost is sufficiently small, the only equilibrium outcome is for both players to play the best actions and not to pay the cost.

日時

2013年12月10日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20 *Seminar Cancelled*

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

**This seminar has been cancelled.**

Michal Fabinger (University of Tokyo)

Asymmetric Information, Stochastic Filtering, and Endogenous Default on Sovereign Debt (joint with Konstantin Egorov)

Abstract

We construct a model of endogenous default on sovereign debt, in which government bond investors are imperfectly informed about that state of the government and/or the state of the economy and need to update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion upon observing macroeconomic variables. Models of sovereign default based on perfect information are unable to naturally explain the frequency of sovereign default and the dynamics of interest rates associated with sovereign debt crises. One goal of this work in progress is to provide a resolution to this puzzle by bringing more realism to the modelling namely removing the assumption that government bond investors are always perfectly informed. Another goal is to empirically estimate potential welfare gains that could result from greater government transparency, for example, due to stricter international oversight of national accounting.

日時

2013年12月17日 (火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10

※日時にご注意下さい, Brown Bag Semianr

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

菅谷拓生 (Takuo Sugaya) (Stanford University)

Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games (joint with Alexander Wolitzky) [PDF]

Abstract

This note presents three results on repeated games. First, players can be better off with imperfect private monitoring than with perfect monitoring, even in the presence of a mediator who can condition her recommendations on the entire history of actions and recommendations. Second, the folk theorem holds with mediated perfect monitoring without any full-dimensionality conditions, so private monitoring cannot improve on mediated perfect monitoring when players are patient. Third, if the mediator can condition her recommendations on actions only, then even patient players can benefit from private monitoring.

日時

2013年12月17日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

青柳 真樹 (Masaki Aoyagi) (Osaka University)

Bertrand Competition under Network Externalities [paper]

Abstract

Two sellers engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either seller to any buyer depends on the numbers of neighbors on the network who consume the same good. For at generic specification of consumption externalities, we show that an equilibrium price equals the marginal cost if and only if the buyer network is complete or cyclic. When the externalities are approximately liner in the size of consumption, we identify the class of networks in which one of the sellers monopolizes the market, or the two sellers segment the market.

日時

2014年1月7日 (火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10

※日時にご注意下さい, Brown Bag Semianr

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

渡辺 誠 (Makoto Watanabe) (VU University Amsterdam)

Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty (joint with Marc Möller) [PDF]

Abstract

This paper sheds light on an empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination. We propose a model in which consumers learn their preferences over time and show that firms offer advance purchase discounts. Consumers choose between an early (uninformed) purchase at a low price and a late (informed) purchase at a high price. Competing firms offer higher discounts to secure a large market share in advance. Competition decreases welfare and may affect consumers negatively. The empirical finding, that competition may influence price dispersion positively or negatively, can be explained by differences in the level of demand uncertainty.

日時

2014年1月28日 (火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10

※時間にご注意下さい, Brown Bag Semianr

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Kei Kawai (New York University, Stern School of Business)

Detecting Large-Scale Collusion in Procurement Auctions [PDF]

Abstract

This paper documents wide-spread collusion among construction firms in Japan using data set that account for most of the construction projects procured by the national government of Japan during 2003 to 2006. By examining rebids that occur for auctions that failed to meet the reserve price, we use ideas similar to regression discontinuity for identifying collusion. We identify about 690 firms whose conduct is inconsistent with competitive behavior. The number of the projects awarded to these bidders is about 7000, or about 1/6 of the total number of construction projects awarded by the national government during the period, totaling about $7billion.

日時

2014年2月3日 (月 Monday)16:30-17:45

※日時にご注意下さい

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Jin Yeub Kim (University of Chicago)

Endogenous Choice of a Mediator: Inefficiency of Bargaining [PDF]

Abstract

In this paper, I build a theory of how privately informed parties choose mediators, which is a topic that is not well developed in the literature. I consider a bargaining problem in which two parties with private information about their types negotiate the choice of a mediator. A mediator, in my context, is equivalent to a communication mechanism that respects private information. I use a two-pronged approach, cooperative and noncooperative, to show that the selection of a mediator is endogenous and is driven by the "information leakage" problem. With the noncooperative approach, I consider a threat-secure mediator who survives a vote against any alternative mediators. For a benchmark class of examples, I show that the threat-secure mediator exists and is unique. In the cooperative approach, I find that there exists a unique neutral bargaining solution - an incomplete information version of the Nash bargaining solution. I establish that the selected mediators in both approaches are the same. Moreover, the selected mediator is - among all the interim incentive efficient mediators - the worst for the parties ex ante and the least peaceful mediator. Therefore, I argue that the very process of selecting a mediator may exhibit an inherent inefficiency in bargaining if the parties already know their types. This paper represents a first attempt to build a bridge between cooperative and noncooperative game theories in the context of bargaining with incomplete information.

日時

2014年3月13日 (木 Thursday) 1) 15:30-17:00,  2) 17:00-18:30

※日時にご注意下さい

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

1) 15:30-17:00 Marc Rysman (Boston University)

  Measuring Network Effects in a Dynamic Environment (joint with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Minsoo Park) [PDF]

2) 17:00-18:30 Jacques Crémer (University of Toulouse I)
  The value of incumbency in heterogenous networks (joint with Gary Biglaise) [PDF]

  

Abstract

1) This paper proposes methods for identifying indirect network effects with dynamically optimizing consumers purchasing a durable hardware good and associated software. We apply this model to data drawn from the DVD player and titles markets. We observe model-level prices, sales and characteristics of DVD players and sales and availability of DVDs monthly for 10 years. We augment these aggregate data with household survey data on player holdings. In our model, forward looking consumers buy possibly multiple DVD players over time and benefit from the evolution of the titles market. We provide a framework for addressing a series of econometric problems which have not been systematically addressed before.

 

2) We study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new equilibrium concept which takes formally into account the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model. We then embed this static analysis in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with two networks will emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the profits of the incumbent when there is only one network at equilibrium.

日時

2014年3月18日 (火 Tuesday)12:00-13:15

※日時にご注意下さい

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Lin William Cong (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Auctions of Real Options [PDF]

Abstract

Corporations and governments frequently sell assets with embedded real options to competing buyers using both cash and contingent bids. Examples include natural resource leases, real estate, patents and licenses, and start-up firms with growth options. This paper models these auctions of real options, incorporating both endogenous auction initiation and post-auction dynamics. I find that common security bids create moral hazard and distort investment. Strategic auction timing affects auction initiation, security ranking, equilibrium bidding, and investment, and should be considered jointly with security design and seller's commitment level. Optimal auction design aligns investment incentives using a combination of down payment and royalty payment, but inefficiently delays sale and investment. I also provide suggestive evidence for model predictions using data from the leasing and exploration of oil and gas tracts. Altogether, these results reconcile theory with several empirical puzzles and imply novel predictions when compared with those from the existing literature.

日時

2014年3月18日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

ミクロ実証分析ワークショップと共催。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

David Neumark (University of California-Irvine)

Testing for Age Discrimination

Abstract

 

日時 ※ 2014年1-2月 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

1.下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

(Please note that the following schedule might be changed)。

2.発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

(Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

発表者の方へ

発表論文についてはCIRJEにて印刷し、当日会場にて配布いたします。つきましては、下記の期日までに最終稿のファイルまたはハードコピーをご提出ください。

 

発表論文提出期限(厳守):

1月14日(火)発表者=1月14日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月15日(水)発表者=1月14日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 21日(火)発表者= 1月20日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 22日(水)発表者= 1月21日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 28日(火)発表者=1月27日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 29日(水)発表者= 1月 28日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

 

 

提出先:学術交流棟(小島ホール)6階CIRJE・田中公子(kimiko [at mark]e.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

  1. 上記提出期限の日時を過ぎたものについてはいかなる理由があっても受け付けられません。ご自身で15部のコピーをご用意の上、当日会場にご持参ください。
  2. 論文は必ず最終稿をご提出ください。提出後の差し替えは受け付けませんので、差し替えなければならない事態が発生した場合には、論文はご自身で印刷して(15部)当日持参して頂くことになります。
  3. 添付ファイルが破損している等、ファイルが開けない場合は連絡を差し上げるため、ファイルで提出される方はお申し込み時に携帯電話番号等、当日すぐに連絡のつく連絡先をお書き添え下さい。
  4. 別途、正式な修士論文口述試験が行なわれるので、修士論文提出時に大学院係 から配付される審査日程を参照のうえ、必ずご出席下さい。
  5. パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。(プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。)

Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to Kimiko Tanaka at kimiko [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):
January 14 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 14 (Tuesday)

January 15 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 14 (Tuesday)
January 21 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 20 (Monday)

January 22 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 21 (Tuesday)
January 28 (Tuesday)…by 9:00am., January 27 (Monday)

January 29 (Wednesday)…by 9:00am., January 28 (Tuesday)

 

Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend an official oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue on the presentation day:  make sure they should be back into place after use.


日時

2014年1月14日(火 Tuesday)16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

朝川雅晴 (Readers: 市村 飯塚 (大橋) )

On the possibility of free-riding on students and parents' effort

日時

2014年1月14日(火 Tuesday)17:20-18:00

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

報告

壽福朝子 (Readers: 市村 澤田 (鈴木) )

An economic analysis of the effect of smoking on stress

日時

2014年1月14日(火 Tuesday) 18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

奥山陽子 (Readers: 市村 澤田 (鈴木)

Nonparametric bounds on college premium with self-selection into education and employment

日時

2014年1月14日(火 Tuesday) 18:40-19:20 *Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

野田俊也 (Readers: 松島 尾山 (柳川) )

Full Surplus Extraction in Dynamic Environments

日時

2014年1月15日(水 Wedensday) 16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

NGUYEN Nghia Huu (Readers: 佐々木 松村 (大橋)

On the Endogeneity of market leader-follower formation in Quantity Setting Competition

日時

2014年1月15日(水 Wedensday)17:20-18:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

シュウ ギョウレイ(Readers:  松村 佐々木 (大湾)

Advertising competition in an open mixed oligopoly

日時

2014年1月15日(水 Wedensday) 18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

安井佑太(Readers:  松村 佐々木 (大湾)

Why do firms offer "free delivery"?

日時

2014年1月15日(水 Wedensday) 18:40-19:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

原口純一(Readers: 松村 佐々木 (大湾)

Price vs. Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly under Foreign Penetration

日時

2014年1月15日(水 Wednesday)19:20-20:00 *Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

坂本美南 (Readers: Fabinger 田渕 (市村))

The effect of an increase in Chinese imports on the regional labor market in Japan

日時

2014年1月21日(火 Tuesday)16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

吉田雅裕(Readers: 神取 松島 (渡辺)

Bargaining with Incomplete Information under Multi-Deadlines

日時

2014年1月21日(火 Tuesday)17:20-18:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

石丸翔也(Readers: 市村 沈 (Griffen)

The effect of firing cost on labor turnover

日時

2014年1月21日(火 Tuesday)18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

亀井彰人(Readers: 澤田 市村 (大湾)

Child Labor Response to Its Demand Increase in Urban Colombia -through the Incidence of Tourism Boom in the 2000s-

日時

2014年1月21日(火 Tuesday)18:40-19:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

泉 佑太朗(Readers: 澤田 市村 (飯塚) )

The effect of user fee abolition on the health care providers in Kenya

日時

2014年1月22日(水 Wedensday) 16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

田中雄太(Readers: 田渕 林 (高橋孝) )

東京都市圏におけるサブセンターの決定

日時

2014年1月22日(水 Wedensday) 17:20-18:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

佐々木 祐(Readers: 田渕 林 (大橋) )

中古戸建て住宅の建物部分の価値に関する実証分析

日時

2014年1月22日(水 Wedensday) 18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

荻原 いなほ(Readers: 田渕 佐々木 (松村) )

不確実性を導入した企業立地と経済集積

日時

2014年1月28日(火 Tuesday) 16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

槁立洋祐(Readers: 松井 尾山 (神取) )

Choice with Multi-Rationale : An Approach to Choice Procedure Analysis

日時

2014年1月28日(火 Tuesday) 17:20-18:00        

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

赤坂洋輔(Readers: 松井 尾山 (神取) )

Competitive issue of money

日時

2014年1月28日(火 Tuesday) 18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

ゴ ブンコウ(Readers: 松井 尾山 (神取) )

Analysis of Herd behavior by cognitive dissonance

日時

2014年1月29日(水 Wedensday) 16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

吉原啓介(Readers: 大橋 松村 (佐々木) )

電子書籍市場の定量的経済分析

日時

2014年1月29日(水 Wedensday) 17:20-18:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

XU Chongyue(Readers: 大橋 佐々木 (松村) )

Distinct Behavior in TIBOR Data Across Time -Evidences to potential coordination on TIBOR

日時

2014年1月29日(水 Wedensday) 18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

畠山寛希(Readers: 飯塚 大橋 (澤田) )

大気環境と自動車規制 -自動車NOx 法による車種規制を事例に-

日時

2014年1月29日(水 Wedensday) 18:40-19:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

KUMUTPONGPANICH Suphatana (Readers: 後藤 澤田 (柳田) )

Environment and Foreign Direct Investment

日時

2014年1月29日(水 Wedensday) 19:20-20:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

CHUASUWAN Chotiga(Readers: 後藤 澤田 (竹野) )

Environment and Population Aging