Workshops

Microeconomics Workshop 2012

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

※ 2013年3月21日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

※2012年度より、授業時刻が 16:40-18:20となりましたのでご注意下さい。※

 

<本年度終了分>
日時

2012年4月5日 (木 Thursday) 16:40-18:20

※曜日と時間にご注意ください

マクロワークショップ, UTIPE Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30と共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics)

Reputation as an Entry Barrier in the Credit Rating Industry (joint with Stefano Lovo)

Abstract

We study competition between an incumbent Credit Rating Agency (CRA) and a sequence of entrant CRAs that are potentially more e¤ective but whose ability in appraising default risk is unproven when they enter the market. We show that free entry competition fails to select the most competent CRA as long as two conditions are met. First, investors and issuers trust the incumbent CRA to provide a sincere, although imperfect, assessment. Second, CRAs cannot charge higher fees for low rating than for high rating. Then, a rather incompetent CRA can dominate the market without concerns about entry. We derive policy implications.

日時

2012年4月10日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (University of Tokyo)

Japanese Package Auction Format (JP): Practical Design for 4G Spectrum Allocation in Japan [slides]

Abstract

 

日時

2012年4月17日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

佐野隆司 (Ryuji Sano) (Osaka University)

The Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions [PDF]

Abstract

This paper considers a class of combinatorial auctions with ascending prices, which includes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and core-selecting auctions. We analyze incentives in ascending combinatorial auctions under complete information. We show that in every ascending auction, the "Vickrey-target strategy" constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium if bidders' strategy space is restricted. The equilibrium outcome is in the bidder-optimal core and unique under some criteria. This implies that equilibrium selection is done by an ascending price scheme from many equilibria of sealed-bid auctions. The equilibrium outcome is "unfair" in the sense that winners with low valuations tend to earn high profits. This payoff non-monotonicity leads to inefficiency in the equilibrium under unrestricted strategy space.

日時

2012年5月8日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

UTIPE Distinguished Research Seminar Series funded by Global 30と共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Stephanie Lluis (University of Waterloo)

Uncertainty, Task Environment, and Organization Design: An Empirical Investigation (joint with Avner Ben-Ner and Fanmin Kong) [PDF]

Abstract

The paper addresses two broad research questions: 1. How do internal uncertainty associated with the task environment and external uncertainty arising from market volatility impact organization design? 2. What are the relationships among various elements of organization design: delegation of decision-making, incentives, monitoring, and internal labor market practices (promotion, training, employment security)? We expand on Prendergast (2002a), who challenged the conventional view of a tradeoff between risk and incentives, and build a single unified framework for answering our two research questions. Using a uniquely rich dataset that contains detailed information about the task environment of core employees and organization design at the individual, group and firms levels in 530 Minnesota firms in the mid 1990s, we first find support for Prendergast's key argument that internal uncertainty (over which employees have control) affects directly the allocation of decision-making and only indirectly incentives (via allocation of decision-making). This confirms similar findings by Foss and Laursen (2005), DeVaro and Kurtulus (2010) and Shi (2011). We also find that internal uncertainty has much impact on organization design through the choice of delegation of decision-making at the employee level, less so at the group level, and very little at the firm level, whereas external (market) uncertainty has little effect on organization design, especially at the individual and group level. Decision-making, monitoring, various internal labor market practices and incentives are strongly related to each other through substitution and complementarity.

日時

2012年5月22日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Eric Weese (Yale University)

Efficiencies of Scale in Local Public Good Provision: Estimation via Coalition Panel Data

Abstract

Preferences of players in a coalition formation game can be estimated using a constrained maximum likelihood approach if there if there is data available for two periods, where coalitions were formed in only one of these periods due to an exogenous change, such as a new policy instituted by a higher level of government. Using this technique, revealed preference data from two sets of Japanese municipal mergers is compared with official Japanese ministry estimates of efficiencies of scale in the production of local public goods. The official estimates state that public goods which cost $10,000 per capita to provide in a municipality with a population of 1,000 can be provided for $1,200 per capita in a municipality with a population of 100,000. Actual returns to scale appear to be over 70% of these official estimates. The null hypothesis of zero returns to scale is rejected.

日時

2012年6月5日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

松島斉 (Hitoshi Matsushima) (University of Tokyo)

Optimal Exchange Design: Intermediary and sponsored search [PDF]

Abstract We investigate multiunit exchange where a central planner and participants both bring commodities to sell and the central planner plays the role of platform provider. The central planner has restrictions on allocations. We characterize the optimal mechanism concerning his (her) revenue under incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the ex-post term. We introduce modified virtual valuation and show that the optimization problem can be replaced with the maximization of modified virtual valuations. We apply our results to important problems of single-unit demands and position exchanges. We demonstrate a clock auction design that implements the optimal position allocation through dominant strategies.

日時

2012年6月12日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Shoshana Grossbard (San Diego State University)

Racial Intermarriage and Household Production: Are There Compensating Differentials? (joint with J. Ignacio Gimenez Nadal and José Alberto Molina)

Abstract

We investigate whether in the U.S.A. hours of household work vary by whether individuals are in different-race or same-race couples. Data from the American Time Use Survey data for years 2003-2009 are analyzed for samples of White and Black male and female respondents. We find that White women married to Black men devote 0.7 fewer hours per day to housework than their counterparts in all-White marriages, which is comparable to the effect of a young child on their hours of housework. Findings for White men also indicate that they work less at housework when in couple with Black women than when in all-White couples. Conversely, Blacks appear to do more housework if they are in couple with Whites than when in all-Black couples. Results are sensitive to whether time use was measured on weekdays or weekends, relationship status, and employment status in ways that are consistent with our theoretical framework based on Becker's second Demand and Supply model and the concept of Work-In-Household for the benefit of a partner or spouse.

日時

2012年6月19日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

郡山幸雄 (Yukio Koriyama) (Ecole Polytechnique)

Optimal Apportionment [PDF]

Abstract This paper provides a theoretical foundation which supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems. The core of the argument is that each individual derives utility from the fact that the collective decision matches her own will with some frequency, with marginal utility decreasing with respect to this frequency. Then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules which exhibit degressive proportionality. The model is applied to the case of the 27 states of the European Union.

日時

2012年6月21日 (木 Thursday) 17:00-18:30

※日時と場所にご注意下さい。 

都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Sminar Room No. 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Marcus Berliant (Washington University at St. Louis)

Explaining the Size Distribution of Cities: X-treme Economies (with Hiroki Watanabe)

Abstract

日時

2012年6月26日 (火 Tuesday) 16:40-18:20

都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

長町康平 (Kohei Nagamachi) (University of Tokyo)

Comparative Advantage and Relative Skill Premium of Regions

Abstract The U.S. regional data shows that there is observed a positive correlation between the share of high-skilled workers and the skill premium of a region, which suggests there exists something beyond the law of supply and demand. Unlike the typical interpretation by urban economists, this paper provides a simple static two-region general equilibrium model of comparative advantage with monopolistic comepetition, interpreted as skill-biased technical change, in order to explain the fact without relying on technological externality. It is shown that the ex-ante identical regions specialize in industries with different skill intensities as a result of circular causation working through the interaction between comparative advantage and skill-biased technical change, and the associated essentially unique equilibrium exhibits the positive correlation under a certain set of parameters. The model is then extended by introducing technological externality in order to argue that technological externality itself does not guarantee welfare improvements given the existence of scarce land and more importantly that the welfare consequence depends on comparative advantage and skill-biased technical change in an interesting way.

日時

2012年7月3日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

小島武仁 (Fuhito Kojima) (Stanford University)

Efficient Assignment with Interdependent Values (joint with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim)[paper]

Abstract We study the "house allocation" problem in which n agents are assigned n objects, one for each agent, when the agents have interdependent values. We show that there exists no mechanism that is Pareto efficient and ex post incentive compatible, and the only mechanism that is group ex post incentive compatible is constant across states. By contrast, we demonstrate that a Pareto efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism exists in the 2 agent house-allocation problem, given sufficient amount of congruence of preferences and the standard single crossing property.
日時

2012年7月10日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

糟谷祐介 (Yusuke Kasuya) (Northwestern University)

Anti-bullying School Choice Mechanism Design

Abstract

The implications of peer effects on school choice mechanism design are of important, yet underexplored educational concerns. This paper addresses school bullying incidents as documented sources of significant negative peer effects among students. I require that bullies and victims be assigned to different schools, and redefine the concepts of stability and efficiency accordingly. I then show that variants of the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the top trading cycles mechanism achieve these social goals respectively. Moreover, the mechanisms can potentially help prevent bullying in, for example, primary schools since they assign less preferable secondary schools to bullies thereby punishing them. I also discuss collaborative interaction between anti-bullying programs and school choice.

日時

2012年7月17日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

室岡健志 (Takeshi Murooka) (University of California, Berkeley)

The Market for Deceptive Products (joint with Paul Heidhues and Botond Köszegi)[PDF]

Abstract

We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception and incentives for innovation in a competitive market for potentially deceptive products. Firms selling homogenous products simultaneously set a transparent "up-front price" and an "additional price," and decide whether to shroud the additional price from naive consumers. To model especially financial products such as banking and credit-card services, actively managed mutual funds, and non-traditional mortgages, we assume that there is a binding floor on the product's up-front price. In a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, at least one firm is willing to unshroud, so a deceptive equilibrium does not exist. But perversely, if the product is socially wasteful, unshrouding would eliminate the industry, so in this case a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. In a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. Regarding innovation decisions, because learning ways to charge higher additional prices increases the profits from shrouding and thereby lowers the motive to unshroud, a firm may have a strong incentive to make such exploitative innovations and have competitors copy them. In contrast, the incentive to make innovations that increase the product's value to consumers is zero or negative if other firms can copy the innovation, and even otherwise is strong only if the product is socially wasteful.

日時

2012年7月31日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

齊藤紘多(Kota Saito) (California Institute of Technology)

Impure Altruism and Temptation

Pride, Shame, and Temptation to be Selfish

Abstract

A decision maker can behave altruistically even though he is not altruistic: he might feel pride if other agents know his altruistic actions; he would feel shame if other agents know his selfish action. On the other hand, the decision maker might behave selfishly because of his temptation to be selfish in spite of his altruism. To distinguish between pride, shame, temptation, and altruism, we provide an axiomatic model of preferences over sets of allocations between the decision maker and other passive agents. In the model, pride, shame, temptation, and altruism are captured by unique real numbers separately. We apply our model to the problem of the provision of public goods. We show that a decision maker exhibits warm glow giving (Andreoni (1988)) if and only if his parameter for pride is positive. In addition, we apply our model to the problem of voting, where the ∗This paper is a significantly improved version of a chapter in my thesis "Role conflict and Choice" (2011). I am indebted to my adviser, Eddie Dekel, for continuous guidance, support, and encouragement. I would like to thank David Dillenberger for continuous discussion and generous comments that have led to improvement of the paper. I would also like to thank Marina Agranov, Colin Camerer, Giorgio Coricelli, Mark Dean, Federico Echenique, Jeff Ely, Hayashi Takashi, Yuichiro Kamada, Yilmaz Kocer, Peter Klibanoff, Mark Machina, Jawwad Noor,Klaus Nehring, Pietro Ortoleva,Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Matthew Rabin, Todd Sarver, Joel Sobel, Marciano Siniscalchi, Barton Lipman, Simon Wilkie, and Leeat Yariv and seminar participants at Brown Experimental and Economic Theory Group Annual Spring Conference (2011), California Institute of Technology, University of Southern California, University of Texas Austin, University of California San Diego, New York University, University of Pennsylvania, and RUD (Risk Uncertainty and Decision) 2012 at Northwestern University. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Center for Economic Theory of the Economics Department of Northwestern University. 1 effect of a decision maker's vote on the turnout is negligible relative to the cost of voting. We show that the decision maker participates in voting if and only if he believes that his vote improves the social welfare and his parameters for pride and shame are large enough. Moreover, we show that the model is consistent with experiments in dictator games under double blindness as well as zero blindness, dictator games with exit option, and dictator games under uncertainty over recipients' payoffs. Keywords: Pride, shame, temptation, social pressure, warm glow, voting, dictator games, and preferences on sets.

日時

2012年10月2日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

森口千晶 (Chiaki Moriguchi) (Hitotsubashi University)

Taxation and Public Goods Provision in China and Japan before 1850 (joint with Tuan-Hwee Sng) [PDF]

Abstract

We develop a principal-agent model to study the state in China and Japan on the eve of the modern age. Before 1850, both Qing China and Tokugawa Japan were ruled by stable dictators who relied on bureaucrats to govern their domains. We hypothesize that principal-agent problems increase with the geographic size of a domain. In a large domain, the ruler's inability to closely monitor bureaucrats creates opportunities for the bureaucrats to exploit taxpayers. To prevent overexploitation and maintain political stability, the ruler has to keep taxes low and government small. By contrast, in a smaller domain, lower monitoring costs allow the ruler to tax and regulate the economy to a greater extent without risking popular resistance. To test these implications, we assemble primary and secondary sources and find that tax rates were higher and the rulers more active in public goods provision in Japan than in China. Furthermore, tax revenues tracked demographic patterns more closely and public goods provision was more responsive to socio-economic change in Japan. We conjecture that these factors contributed to Japan's greater resilience to the rise of the West after 1850.

日時

2012年10月16日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

坂井豊貴 (Toyotaka Sakai) (Keio University)

Intergenerationally equitable representations

Abstract

Equal treatment of all generations is a fundamental ethical principle in intertemporal welfare economics. This principle is expressed by anonymity axioms of orderings defined on the set of infinite utility streams. We first show that an ordering satisfies finite anonymity, weak Pareto, weak non-substitution, and sup continuity if and only if it is represented by a monotone, continuous function that is a natural extension of the limit function. More importantly, we next show that whenever such an ordering is infinitely anonymous, its representation depends only on the liminf and the limsup of any utility stream. Our results suggest that in ethically ranking utility streams, only reflecting infinitely long-run movements is possible, but respecting finite generations is impossible.

日時

2012年10月23日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Jean-François Tremblay (University of Ottawa)

Non-Cooperative Pollution Control in an Inter-Jurisdictional Setting (joint with Robin Boadway and Zhen Song) [PDF]

Abstract

This paper examines various circumstances under which decentralized pollution policies can be efficient both in federal settings and in multi-region settings with labour mobility. We consider a model in which pollution control policies are set by regional governments non-cooperatively and pollution damages are borne by the residents of all regions. We characterize the efficiency of pollution policies, and of population allocation among regions, in a variety of scenarios, including when pollution policies are enacted before interregional transfers are determined by the federal government and before migration occurs; when migration decisions are taken before policy decisions; in the absence of a central government if regional governments can make voluntary interregional transfers; when decisions over pollution control policies are followed by voluntary contributions by regions to a national public good; when regions can commit to matching the abatement efforts of each other; and when regions can commit to specific levels of abatement contingent on the emissions of other regions not exceeding some maximum level.

日時

2012年11月6日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Keith Head (University of British Columbia)

The Economics of Cross-Border Travel (joint with Ambarish Chandra and Mariano Tappata) [PDF]

Abstract

We model the decision to travel across an international border as a trade-o between bene ts derived from buying a range of products at lower prices and the costs of travel. Using micro-data on Canada-US travel, we structurally es- timate this model. Price di erences motivate cross-border travel; our estimates indicate that a 10% home appreciation raises the frequency of cross-border day trips by 8% to 26%. The larger elasticity arises when the home currency is strong, a result predicted by the model. Distance to the border strongly in- hibits crossings, with an implied cost of 87 cents/mile. Geographic di erences can partially explain why American travel is less exchange-rate responsive.

日時

2012年11月13日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

宇井貴志 (Takashi Ui) (Hitotsubashi University)

Characterizing the Social Value of Information (joint with Yasunori Yoshizawa)[paper]

Abstract

This paper studies the social value of information in symmetric Bayesian potential games with quadratic payoff functions and normally distributed public and private signals. The main result provides necessary and sufficient conditions for welfare at a given information structure to increase with public and private information respectively. Using this result, we classify games into eight types with respect to the social value of information and characterize each of them. In addition, we obtain the optimal information structure that maximizes welfare in each type. In a class of games in which welfare is the lowest when there is no information, there are three types. In type I, welfare necessarily increases with both public and private information. In type II, welfare necessarily increases with private information but can decrease with public information. In type III, welfare can decrease with both public and private information. The optimal information structure of type I and II is complete information, but that of type III is incomplete information with noisy private signals and no public signal. A Cournot game with linear demand and cost functions is of type I if the number of players is two, of type II if it is three, of type III if it is greater than or equal to four.

日時

2012年11月22日 (木 Thursday) 16:40-18:20

※曜日と時間にご注意ください

マクロワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

西村幸浩 (Yukihiro Nishimura) (Osaka University)

Interregional Tax Competition, Environmental Standards, and the Direction of Strategic Delegation (joint with Kimiko Terai) [PDF]

Abstract

The phenomenon of strategic voting (strategic delegation) is well acknowledged in different contexts. Citizens including median voters deliberately choose a delegate with different preferences from their own to pursue strategic advantages. In the context of regions competing for mobile capital, this paper explores the outcome of non-cooperative decision making by elected politicians. The formal model is an augmented version of the conventional tax-competition framework by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986) and Wildasin (1988) in which regions use the environmental standards subject to the trade-off between improving the quality of life and decreasing the capital-productivity. The looser environmental standard can be used to attract mobile factor capital in addition to (or substitution to) lowering the capital taxes. Our model allows illuminating various dimensions of the political tensions and economic effects, including (i) the trade-off between tax-incentives and redistribution under endogenous wage and the return of capital and (ii) the interaction between the capital taxes, the environmental standards and interregional capital flow, where the strategic delegation through interregional dependence can result in either policy-divergence or policy-convergence. We showed the following: (i) When regions are identical, the political effect for income redistribution and the strategic delegation quantitatively dominate the force of the conventional tax-competition effect towards the lower tax rates. However, when the marginal productivity of the looser environmental standards is sufficiently high relative to the environmental damage, the strategic delegation goes towards ``political race to the bottom'' in which regional policies are delegated to wealthier policymakers who aim to lower the equilibrium capital taxes. (ii) We also examined various types of asymmetries across regions, such as capital productivities, impacts of environmental standards, and population sizes, as well as the median voter's types. It turns out that the extent of interregional divergence in capital employment crucially depends on what is asymmetric. For example, we show that the region with high capital productivity sets a higher tax rate relative to the self-representation case, aiming to gain higher tax revenue from the foreigners. The opposite is observed in the low-productivity region, so that the so-called tax-exporting effect is strengthened by the strategic delegation. We also examine the effect of interregional cooperation in environmental actions. In a situation where regions cooperatively decide on the environmental standards but taxes on capital are still decided noncooperatively, tighter environmental regulation may be complemented by more intensive tax competition under the cooperative scenario.

日時

2012年11月27日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

鈴木豊 (Yutaka Suzuki) (Hosei University)

Collusive Supervision and Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types [PDF1] [PDF2]

Abstract

We apply the Monotone Comparative Statics method and the First Order ( Mirrlees) Approach to the continuous-type, three-tier agency model with hidden information and collusion a la Tirole (1986,1992), thereby providing a framework that can address the issues treated in the existing literature (e.g. Kofman and Lawarree 1993) in a much simpler fashion. We characterize the nature of equilibrium contract that can be implemented under the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent, and then obtain a general comparison result on the two- tier vs. three-tier organization structures. Next, we introduce the recent behavioral contract theory idea, "shading" (Hart and Moore (2008)) into the model. By combining the two ideas, i.e., collusion and shading, we can not only enrich the existing collusion model, including a new result on the choice of Collusion-proof vs. Equilibrium Collusion regimes, but also give a micro foundation to ex-post haggling costs, addressed by Transaction Cost Economics (e.g. Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975)). This will contribute to a deep understanding of resource allocation and decision process in inside hierarchical organization.

日時

2012年12月4日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

肥前洋一 (Yoichi Hizen) (Hokkaido University)

A Referendum Experiment with Participation Quorums [PDF]

Abstract

This paper analyzes a yes-no referendum in which its outcome is valid only if the voter turnout is greater than a predetermined level. Such a participation quorum is argued to induce the minority group of voters to abstain strategically with the intention to spoil the outcome by achieving a low voter turnout. We first construct a game-theoretic model to derive a theoretical prediction about the relationship between quorums and voting outcomes. It is shown that there exist multiple equilibria, and that strategic abstention can happen if such a participation quorum is imposed. To examine which type of outcome is more likely to be realized, we then conduct a laboratory experiment. We observe that (i) if the quorum is small, all voters go to the poll, and (ii) if the quorum is large, voters in the ex-ante majority group go to the poll whereas voters in the ex-ante minority group tend to abstain. As a result, it is less likely that the ex-post minority group wins the referendum, but it frequently happens that the voting outcome is made invalid due to low voter turnout when the quorum is large.

日時

2012年12月11日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

宮本拓郎 (Takuro Miyamoto) (Policy Research Institute, MOF)

Legislature Size and Local Public Decit: Evidence from Japanese Cities in the 1990s (joint with Haruo Kondoh)

Abstract

By exploiting facts that many Japanese cities reduced their council size in 1990s, we examine a causal relationship between council size and scal performance and decompose eect of council size on scal performance into pure size eect and interaction eect between council size and composition. We employ spatial econometric models of decision on council size change and scal performance and simultaneously estimate them to control for dual causality between council size and scal performance and to control for spatial correlation of error terms due to similarity in unobservable characteristics. We nd no pure size eect of council size reduction on scal performance nor its dynamic eect. However, we nd the signicant reverse causal eect of public decit on council size change and interaction eect between change in council size and composition; scal performance would be improved if council size and political fragmentation decrease whereas scal performance would be worsened if council size decreases and seat share of conservative party.

日時

2012年12月18日 (火 Tuesday)12:15-13:15

※日時・場所が変更いたしました。 / Schedule and Venue Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Eduardo Faingold (Yale University)

The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs (joint with Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio and Siyang Xiong) [paper]

Abstract

Previous research has established that the predictions made by game theory about strategic behavior in incomplete information games are quite sensitive to the assumptions made about the players' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. We evaluate the severity of this robustness problem by characterizing conditions on the primitives of the model—the players' hierarchies of beliefs—for the strategic behavior of a given Harsanyi type to be approximated by the strategic behavior of (a sequence of) perturbed types. This amounts to providing characterizations of the strategic topologies of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) in terms of beliefs. We apply our characterizations to a variety of questions concerning robustness to perturbations of higher-order beliefs, including genericity of common priors, and the connections between robustness of strategic behavior and the notion of common p-belief of Monderer and Samet (1989).

日時

2012年12月18日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

高橋悟 (Satoru Takahashi) (National University of Singapore)

Generalized Belief Operator and the Impact of Small Probability Events on Higher Order Beliefs (joint with Daisuke Oyama)

Abstract

We explore the restrictions that prior beliefs impose on higher order beliefs. We consider a generalization of belief operator, introduce a notion of potential, and study implications of existence/non-existence of a potential with a certain property. In particular, we obtain a nontrivial lower bound of the prior probability of a common belief event that is uniform over type spaces. As an application, a full characterization of robust equilibrium is obtained for binary supermodular games.

日時

2012年12月21日 (金 Friday)12:10-13:10

※日時にご注意下さい。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Takuo Sugaya (Stanford Unviersity)

Folk Theorem in Stochastic Games with Private State and Private Monitoring [PDF (reference)]

Abstract

We show the folk theorem in stochastic games, where each player has private information about the state and the other players' actions. The punishment payoff is characterized analogously to a static Nash equilibrium in repeated games.

日時

2013年1月15日 (火 Tuesday)12:10-13:10

※時間にご注意下さい。

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

鎌田雄一郎 (Yuichiro Kamada) (Yale University)

Rationalizable Partition-Confirmed Equilibrium, II: Heterogeneous Beliefs (joint with Drew Fudenberg) [関連論文]

Abstract

In many laboratory experiments, different subjects or agents in the same player role have different beliefs and play differently. We extend rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) to model such situations, and provide examples to highlight the impact of heterogeneous beliefs. We also show that heterogenous-belief RPCE corresponds to RPCE with unitary beliefs in a model where each agent in a large pool is viewed as a separate player, and that heterogeneous beliefs permit RPCE to capture the idea that mixed strategies correspond to a population of agents using pure strategies. This talk will not require any prior knowledge of rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium.

日時

2013年2月19日 (火 Tuesday)16:40-18:20

都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Marcus Berliant (Washington University)

Locational Signaling and Agglomeration (joint with Chia-Ming Yu) [PDF]

Abstract

Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling e ect: The location choice of workers signals their pro- ductivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at that location. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing is negatively correlated with their productivity, only the core-periphery (par- tially strati ed) equilibria are stable. When workers' marginal willingness to pay for housing and their productivity are positively correlated, there is no core-periphery equilibrium. Location can at best be an approximate rather than a precise sieve for high-skill workers.

日時

2013年3月19日 (火 Tuesday)16:00-17:30  ※時間に注意

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]
報告

Valerie Smeets (Aarhus University)

Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control (joint with Michael Waldman and Frederic Warzynski) [PDF]

Abstract

There is an extensive theoretical literature based on what is called the scale-of-operations effect, i.e., the idea that the return to managerial ability is higher the more resources the manager influences with his or her decisions. This idea leads to various testable predictions including that higher ability managers should supervise more subordinates, or equivalently, have a larger span of control. And although some of this theory's predictions have been empirically investigated, there has been little systematic investigation of the theory's predictions concerning span of control. In this paper we first extend the theoretical literature on the scale-of-operations effect to allow firms' beliefs concerning a manager's ability to evolve over the manager's career, where much of our focus is the determinants of span of control. We then empirically investigate testable predictions from this theoretical analysis using a unique single firm dataset that contains detailed information concerning the reporting relationships at the firm. Our investigation provides strong support both for the model's predictions concerning wages, wage changes, and probability of promotion, and also for the model's predictions concerning span of control including predictions derived from the learning component of the model. Overall, our investigation supports the notion that the scale-of-operations effect and additionally learning are important determinants of the internal organization of firms including span of control.

日時

※ 2013年1-2月 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

1.下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

(Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

2.発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

(Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

発表者の方へ

発表論文についてはCIRJEにて印刷し、当日会場にて配布いたします。つきましては、下記の期日までに最終稿のファイルまたはハードコピーをご提出ください。

 

発表論文提出期限(厳守):

1月9日(水)発表者=1月8日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月15日(火)発表者=1月15日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月16日(水)発表者=1月15日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月22日(火)発表者=1月21日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 23日(水)発表者=1月22日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月 24日(木)発表者=1月23日(水)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月29日(火)発表者=1月28日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

 

提出先:学術交流棟(小島ホール)6階CIRJE・田中公子(kimiko [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp)

  1. 上記提出期限の日時を過ぎたものについてはいかなる理由があっても受け付けられません。ご自身で15部のコピーをご用意の上、当日会場にご持参ください。
  2. 論文は必ず最終稿をご提出ください。提出後の差し替えは受け付けませんので、差し替えなければならない事態が発生した場合には、論文はご自身で印刷して(15部)当日持参して頂くことになります。
  3. 添付ファイルが破損している等、ファイルが開けない場合は連絡を差し上げるため、ファイルで提出される方はお申し込み時に携帯電話番号等、当日すぐに連絡のつく連絡先をお書き添え下さい。
  4. 別途、正式な修士論文口述試験が行なわれるので、修士論文提出時に大学院係 から配付される審査日程を参照のうえ、必ずご出席下さい。
  5. パソコン・ポインターはセミナー室ロッカー内の機器をご使用のうえ、設置・片づけは最初と最後の発表者が各自で行って下さい。(プロジェクターは会場に備え付けられています。)

Your thesis paper is distributed at the seminar venue.  Please send an electronic file of it to Kimiko Tanaka at kimiko [at mark] e.u-tokyo.ac.jp, so that CIRJE can duplicate it.  You can also bring its hardcopy directly to the CIRJE office on the 6th floor of Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall). 

 

The submission deadline is (please be punctual):

January 9 … by 9:00am., January 8 (Tuesday)
January 15…by 9:00am., January 15 (Tuesday)

January 16…by 9:00am., January 15 (Tuesday)

January 22…by 9:00am., January 21 (Monday)

January 23…by 9:00am., January 22 (Tuesday)

January 24…by 9:00am., January 23 (Wednesday)

January 29…by 9:00am., January 28 (Monday)

 

Make sure that

  • Submission behind the deadline is not accepted for any reason.
  • The file/hardcopy submitted to CIRJE should be the final version.
  • You need to send your emergency contact information such as cell phone number together with your thesis file, so that CIRJE can immediately reach you in case the file cannot be opened/is broken.

Those who missed the deadline or those who would like to revise the thesis paper after the submission, are required to make 15 hardcopies of it and bring them to the seminar venue on the presentation day.

You MUST attend the oral examination in addition to this master thesis presentation:  for details, please see the schedule information to be distributed by the Graduate Office when you submit your thesis.

Presenters can use equipment such as a computer and a pointer in a locker in the seminar venue:  make sure they should be back into place after use.


日時

2013年1月9日(水 Wednesday)16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

加藤隆太 (Readers: 松井 神取 (松島))

Generalization of House Allocation with Existing Tenants

日時

2013年1月9日(水 Wednesday)18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

糸賀孝明 (Readers: 松井 神取 (松島))

Partial Trade Liberalization - A Fair Wage Model

日時

2013年1月9日(水 Wednesday)18:40-19:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

市橋翔太 (Readers: 神取 神谷 (松井))

Application of POSG (partially observable stochastic game) to Economics

日時

2013年1月15日(火 Tuesday)16:00-16:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

砂田健揚 (Readers: 松村 佐々木 (大橋))

The effect of advertisement competition on the social welfare: The case of mixed oligopoly market

日時

2013年1月15日(火 Tuesday)16:40-17:20  ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

大竹理英 (Readers: 大橋 松村 (佐々木))

発送配電の法的分離が送電投資に与える影響

日時

2013年1月15日(火 Tuesday)17:20-18:00  ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

NGUYEN, Nghia Huu (Readers: 佐々木 松村 (大橋))

On the Endogeneity of Market leader-follower formation on Quantity-Setting Competition

日時

2013年1月15日(火 Tuesday)18:00-18:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

久保田昌幸 (Readers: 松島 柳川 (神取))

Sequential Auction with Common Ranked Objects

日時

2013年1月16日(水 Wednesday)17:20-18:00

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

堀江幸広 (Readers: 市村 大湾 (Sim))

Skill-biased Organizational Change of Japanese firms

日時

2013年1月16日(水 Wednesday)18:00-18:40

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

YANG, Ting (Readers: 中林 大湾 (佐々木))

A New Approach to Evaluate NBA Players: Several Behavior Assumptions

日時

2013年1月16日(水 Wednesday)18:40-19:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

ZHANGAL, Aigerim (Readers: 中林 玄田 (佐々木))

Labor market in Russia in transition from USSR to the present

日時

2013年1月22日(火 Tuesday)16:40-17:20 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

中川万理子 (Readers: 田渕 佐々木 (林))

Segregation Patterns under Labor Skill Heterogeneity

日時

2013年1月22日(火 Tuesday)17:20-18:00 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

ワーニッターウォン ワンマー (Readers: 田渕 澤田 (大橋))

Is the Impact of Natural Disaster on City Permanent? the case of Great Hanshin Earthquake

日時

2013年1月22日(火 Tuesday)18:00-18:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

宇野雄哉 (Readers: 林 田渕 (岩本))

中国の戸籍制度と財政調整制度が人口移動に与える影響

日時

2013年1月23日(水 Wednesday)16:00-16:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

采川香織 (Readers: 大湾 玄田 (市村))

日本企業の人事データを用いた中途採用者の賃金と昇進の分析

日時

2013年1月23日(水 Wednesday)16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

工藤嵩泰 (Readers: 澤田 市村 (鈴木))

Which is better explanation; Temptation or Hyperbolic discounting

日時

2013年1月23日(水 Wednesday)17:20-18:00 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

西塚あすか (Readers: 澤田 市村 (玄田))

選好と学校選択の関係

日時

2013年1月23日(水 Wednesday)18:00-18:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

茂木洋之 (Readers: 市村 澤田 (鈴木))

Test of the difference of the employment mobility between permanent workers and temporary workers in Japan

日時

2013年1月24日(木 Thursday)18:00-18:40 ※Schedule and Venue Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

鈴木遼 (Readers: 神取 神谷 (松井))

Diffusion Process and Take-off Conditions of the Online Platform

日時

2013年1月24日(木 Thursday)18:40-19:20 ※Schedule and Venue Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

諸岡千裕 (Readers: 松井 神取 (松島))

Folk Theorem for the Asynchronously Repeated and Imperfect Monitoring Prisoner's Dilemma

日時

2013年1月29日(火 Tuesday)16:40-17:20

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

今泉允聡 (Readers: 岩本 林 (藤本(淳)))

Politico economic equilibrium: The effect of endogenous political process on social infrastructure and economic growth

日時

2013年1月29日(火 Tuesday)17:20-18:00 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

戸矢通義 (Readers: 岩本 鈴木 (市村))

Empirical Analysis of DPJ's Child Benefit Programme

日時

2013年1月29日(火 Tuesday)18:00-18:40 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

中村仁 (Readers: 岩本 小枝 (植田))

国債利回りと財政状況期待の形成 費目別予算割合の与える影響

日時

2013年1月29日(火 Tuesday)18:40-19:20 ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

澤田真行 (Readers: 澤田 市村 (Griffen))

子どもの数と質におけるトレードオフの存在:IV推定量の非妥当性と構造推定

日時

2013年1月29日(火 Tuesday)19:20-20:00  ※Schedule Changed

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 (小島ホール)1階 セミナー室
in Seminar Room on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall)
報告

矢ヶ崎将之 (Readers: 市村 松井 (神谷))

Pride, Shame and Social Image