Workshops

2009年4月21日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Karl Warneryd（Stockholm School of Economics)

TBA

2009年5月26日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Oleksandr Movshuk (Toyama University)

Household Saving over the Life Cycle: International Evidence from Micro Data

In this paper I estimate age-saving profiles from micro data in six countries (Italy, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, the UK, and the US) to verify whether households are saving as postulated by the life- cycle theory. The level of household savings depends on age, cohort and period effects, and the perfect collinearity among these effects is broken by applying a nonparametric regression model. In this model, the cohort effect is assumed to be an arbitrary smooth function, and the model is estimated by the generalized additive model with a penalized smoothing spline approach. Estimated saving-age profiles showed declining savings in the old age for the majority of examined countries. An interesting feature for Asian households was a double hump in savings, with a temporal dip for households for the age bracket at around mid-40s.

2008年4月3日（木 Thursday）12:00-13:30 ※ Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

※日時と場所にご注意ください

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第3共同研究室
in Conference Room No.3 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Muttur Ranganathan Narayana（CIRJE, and Institute for Social and Economic Change）
Substitutability between Mobile and Fixed Telephones: Evidence and Implications for India [PDF]

This paper estimates the determinants of household subscription to mobile and fixed phones in India based on a binary logit model and using the household sample survey data from the Karnataka State in South India. The determinants include access and usage price of mobile and fixed phone services, income, age, social caste, education, and occupation of head of household and family size. Using the econometric estimates, marginal effects and elasticities of probability of subscription to mobile services are computed. Elasticities are distinguished by own price elasticity, cross-price elasticity, and income elasticity. Estimated cross price elasticity offers empirical evidence for substitutability rather than complementarity between fixed and mobile phone services. This evidence is symmetric in mobile and fixed phone models. The implications of empirical results are shown to have relevance for on-going policy discussion on subsidization under Universal Service Obligation and Access Deficit Charge.

2008年4月8日（火 Tuesday）12:10-13:20 ※ Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

※日時と場所にご注意ください

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第3共同研究室
in Conference Room No.3 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Atsushi Iimi/飯味淳（世界銀行）
Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed

※Presentation in Japanese※

Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently. Without doubt a key is competition in public procurement systems. We analyze procurement data from multi- and bi-lateral official development assistance for three main infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. It is found that the competition effect may be underutilized in some areas. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. It is also shown that not only competition but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for containing procurement costs. Based on the estimated efficient unit cost of infrastructure procurement, the financial needs are reassessed. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 7.6 percent of total infrastructure development costs.

2008年4月8日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Naoki Yoshihara/吉原直毅 （The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University ）
Injustice of exploitation (Joint with Roberto Veneziani)

2008年4月16日（水 Wednesday）16:50-18:30 　

※曜日と場所にご注意ください

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Junichiro Ishida/ 石田 潤一郎（Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University）
Decisiveness [PDF]

  This paper investigates how the presence of strong leadership influences an organization's ability to acquire and process information. The key concept is the leader's decisiveness. A decisive leader can make a bold move ("betting against the odds") in response to a large change in the underlying landscape, whereas an indecisive leader biases her position excessively towards the status quo. An organization led by an indecisive leader needs to accumulate unrealistically strong evidence before it changes the course of action, thereby hindering the organization's ability to adapt to a changing environment. The analysis identifies several attributes and environmental factors that impair one's decisiveness and illuminates how leadership emerges or fades in organizations. The paper also sheds light on a classical issue of whether leaders can be made, rather than are born: our answer is partially "yes" in that mutual trust among members of the organization is a critical ingredient of effective leadership.

2008年5月13日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Meg A. Sato/佐藤愛 (University of Tokyo)
A Theory on Board Decisions about CEO Replacement [PDF]

2008年5月20日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30 ※金融センター・ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Guillaume Rocheteau (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and National University of Singapore)
Money and Competing Assets under Private Information [PDF]

This paper studies random-matching economies where .at money coexists with a real asset, and no restrictions are imposed on payment arrangements. The real asset is partially illiquid due to informational asymmetries about its fundamental value. The extent to which the real asset is used as means of payment depends on the variance of its dividend as well as monetary policy. The e?ects of in.ation on payment arrangements, asset prices, and welfare are analyzed.

2008年5月27日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Tadashi Hashimoto/橋本理 (University of Tokyo)
Generic Impossibility of Partial Ex Post Implementation with General Utility Functions [PDF]

This paper examines possibility of partial ex post implementation under general utility functions which is not necessarily differentiable or quasi-linear with respect to money. We deal with an interdependent-value model in which there are two agents, two alternatives and each agent receives more than two dimensional private signal. The main result of this paper is that under generic utility functions, a public decision rule must be almost constant if it can be ex post incentive compatible with some transfer rule.

2008年6月2日（月 Monday）12:00-13:10
※ 応用統計ワークショップ・Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

※日時と場所にご注意ください※

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第2共同研究室
in Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Hiroyuki Kasahara/笠原博幸 (The University of Western Ontario)
Sequential Estimation of Structural Models with Fixed Point Constraint [PDF]

This paper considers the estimation problem of structural models of which empirical restrictions are characterized in terms of fixed point constraint, such as a structural dynamic discrete choice model and a model of dynamic games. We analyze the conditions under which the nested pseudo-likelihood (NPL) algorithm achieves convergence and derive its convergence rate. We find that the NPL algorithm may not necessarily converge when the fixed point mapping does not have a local contraction property. To address the issue of non-convergence, we propose alternative sequential estimation procedures that can achieve convergence even when the NPL algorithm does not and, upon convergence, some of our proposed estimation algorithms produce more efficient estimators than the NPL estimator. We also show that the similar convergence results hold for models with (time-varying) unobserved heterogeneity, where the EM algorithm is incorporated into the NPL algorithm. Furthermore, we extend the idea behind the NPL algorithm to the moment estimators, developing a recursive extension of popular two-step moment methods called the sequential generalized method of moments (GMM) algorithm. The sequential GMM algorithm has the convergence properties similar to those of the NPL algorithm.

2008年6月3日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Mamoru Kaneko/金子守 (University of Tsukuba)
An Equilibrium-Econometric Analysis of Rental Housing Markets with Indivisibilities（with Tamon Ito) [PDF]

We develop an equilibrium-econometric analysis in the context of rental housing markets with indivisibilities. The theory provides some bridge between a (competitive) market equilibrium theory and a statistical/econometric analysis. First, we develop this theory: The listing service of apartments, which we call the housing magazine, provides the information to both households (and landlords) and the econometric analyzer. Our theory explains this double use of the information sources. We apply our theory to the data in the rental housing markets in the Tokyo area, and we examine the law of diminishing marginal utility for the household. It does not hold at a significant degree for the marginal utility with respect to the size of apartment, but it does strictly with respect to the commuting time-distance and consumption other than the housing services.

2008年6月10日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Mitsukuni Nishida/西田充邦 (University of Chicago)
The Effect of Zoning Regulations on Entry in the Retail Industry [PDF]

Zoning regulations restrict location decisions of .rms in retail markets. This paper inves- tigates how signi.cantly the zoning regulations a?ect .rms.coordinated entry decisions using land use regulation introduced in Japan in 1968. I specify a static game of two retail chains that engage in multilocational competition. Both chains strategically choose their store network, tak- ing into account the role of geography. Using data on outlet locations and local demographics, I estimate the model parameters by method of simulated moments (MSM). I use the estimated model to conduct counterfactual experiments demonstrating the impact of change in zoning policy environments on the number of convenience stores in Okinawa, Japan. The preliminary results suggest that removing the current zoning restriction increases entry of stores by around 4 percent.

2008年6月17日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Alistair Munro (GRIPS/政策研究大学院大学)
An experimental test of household models in East Uganda (joint with Vegard Iversen, Cecile Jackson, Bereket Kebede, and Arjan Verschoor)[PDF]

We test core theories of the household using experimental data from 240 couples in rural Uganda. Spouses do not maximise surplus from cooperation and realise a greater surplus when women are in charge. This violates assumptions of unitary and cooperative models. When women control the common account, they receive less than when men control it; this contradicts standard bargaining models. Women contribute less than men and are rewarded more generously by men than vice versa. This casts doubt on postulates in Sen (1990). We find evidence for opportunism. The results are put in a socioeconomic context using survey data. Accompanying socio-economic data provides measures of bargaining power that are correlated with behaviour in the experiments. Our findings suggest that a 'one-size fits all' model of the household is unlikely to be satisfactory.

2008年6月24日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Yukiko Abe/ 安部由起子 (Hokkaido University)
A Cohort Analysis of Male and Female Employment in Japan[PDF]

This article uses repeated cross sectional data to study the labor force experiences for cohorts of prime-aged men and women in Japan. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, participation in regular, full-time employment fell for less educated men and women. The cohorts who finished schooling in the late 1990s and early 2000s experienced a severe decline in regular employment at young ages, although this phenomenon was concentrated for single men and women and not for the married. Part-time work has become increasingly common for women of recent cohorts.

2008年7月1日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Takao Asano/ 浅野貴央 (Toyo University)
Precautionary Principle and the Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy under Ambiguity [PDF]

We consider a problem in environmental policy design by applying optimal stopping rules. The purposes of this paper are (1) to provide an economic foundation for the precautionary principle and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (2) to derive the optimal timing rule that governments should adopt in order to deal with emissions of SO_2 or CO_2 and increases in greenhouse gas concentrations under ambiguity in continuous time, and (3) to show that this optimal timing rule has a reservation property. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of an increase in ambiguity on the optimal timing of adopting some environmental policy, and show that an increase in ambiguity decreases the optimal timing of adopting the environmental policy.

2008年7月3日（木 Thursday）12:00-13:00

※日時と場所にご注意ください※

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Bernard Cornet (University of Paris I and University of Kansas)
Financial equilibria with restricted participation

2008年7月8日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Susumu Kato/ 加藤晋（University of Tokyo）
A Role of Common Morality in Social Choice [PDF]
※Presentation in Japanese※

2008年7月11日（金 Friday）16:50-18:30
※応用統計ワークショップおよびマクロワークショップと共催

Richard Blundell(University College London)

Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Design of Earned Income Tax Credits

This paper examines the optimal schedule of marginal tax rates and the design of earned income tax credits. The analysis is based on a structural labour supply model which incorporates unobserved heterogeneity, fixed costs of work and the detailed non-convexities of the tax and transfer system. An analytical framework is developed that allows explicitly for an extensive margin in work choices and also the partial observability of hours of work. This is contrasted to the standard case in which only earnings (and non-labour income) are observable to the government. The empirical motivation is the earned income tax credit reforms in Britain which include a minimum hours requirement at 16 hours per week and a further bonus at 30 hours. Our analysis examines the case for the use of hours-contingent payments and lends support for the overall structure of the British tax credit reforms. However, we also provide a strong case for a further reduction of marginal rates for lower earners but only those with school age children.

2008年7月14日（月 Monday）12:00-13:30　
※日時と場所にご注意下さい

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Toshiaki Iizuka/ 飯塚敏晃 (Aoyama Gakuin University)
Agency relationship and the choice of generic pharmaceuticals

In many countries, increasing the use of generic pharmaceuticals is an important policy agenda. Pharmaceutical expenditures are one of the fastest growing segments of medical expenditures, and governments around the world hope to reduce them by substituting generic drugs for brand-name drugs. On the other hand, policy makers are also aware that a quick diffusion of generic drugs will reduce incentives to innovate by reducing the rents for pioneer drugs. Regardless of the potential importance, we still know little about when and when not generic drug are used. In this paper, I examine generic substitution using micro data from the Japanese market. Dynamic probit models are estimated that take into account the incentive to dispense generics, doctor and patient heterogeneity, and state dependence. I found that doctor prescription choice exhibits strong state dependence: a generic prescription in the previous visit increases the probability of getting a generic in the next visit by as much as 60%. Financial incentives for dispensing agents are also important: small clinics, who both prescribe and dispense drugs and thus can pocket the price-cost difference, are responsive to the markup, and they are more likely to prescribe generic drugs that generally offer higher markups in my data. Doctors also differ in their preferences for generic drugs, and this substantially affects the likelihood of generic substitution.

2008年7月15日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Haruko Noguchi/ 野口晴子 (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research/国立社会保障・人口問題研究所)
Does Physician Specialty Affect the Survival of Elderly Patients with Myocardial Infarction? [PDF]

Objective. To determine the effect of treatment by a cardiologist on mortality of elderly patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI, heart attack), accounting for both measured confounding using risk-adjustment techniques and residual unmeasured confounding with instrumental variables (IV) methods.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Medical chart data and longitudinal administrative hospital records and death records were obtained for 161,558 patients aged > 65 admitted to a nonfederal acute care hospital with AMI from April 1994 toJuly 1995. Our principal measure of significant cardiologist treatment was whether a patient was admitted by a cardiologist. We use supplemental data to explore whether our analysis would differ substantially using alternative definitions of significant cardiologist treatment.
Study Design. This retrospective cohort study compared results using least squares (LS) multivariate regression with results from IV methods that accounted for additional unmeasured patient characteristics. Primary outcomes were 30-day and oneyear mortality, and secondary outcomes included treatment with medications and revascularization procedures.
Data Collection/Extraction Methods. Medical charts for the initial hospital stay of each AMI patient underwent a comprehensive abstraction, including dates of hospitalization, admitting physician, demographic characteristics, comorbid conditions, severity of clinical presentation, electrocardiographic and other diagnostic test results, contraindications to therapy, and treatments before and after AMI.
Principal Findings. Patients admitted by cardiologists had fewer comorbid conditions and less severe AMIs. These patients had a 10 percent (95 percent CI: 9.5-10.8 percent) lower absolute mortality rate at one year. After multivariate adjustment with LS regression, the adjusted mortality difference was 2 percent (95 percent CI: 1.4- 2.6 percent). Using IV methods to provide additional adjustment for unmeasured differences in risk, we found an even smaller, statistically insignificant association between physician specialty and one-year mortality, relative risk (RR) 0.96 (0.88- 1.04). Patients admitted by a cardiologist were also significantly more likely to have a cardiologist consultation within the first day of admission and during the initial hospital stay, and also had a significantly larger share of their physician bills for inpatient treatment from cardiologists. IV analysis of treatments showed that patients treated 1093 1094 HSR: Health Services Research 35:5 Part II (December 2000) by cardiologists were more likely to undergo revascularization procedures and to receive thrombolytic therapy, aspirin, and calcium channel-blockers, but less likely to receive beta-blockers.
Conclusions. In a large population of elderly patients with AMI, we found significant treatment differences but no significant incremental mortality benefit associated with treatment by cardiologists.

2008年7月22日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building
※　場所が変更になりました

孫 寧 (上海財経大学経済学院、京都大学経済研究所)
An efficient dynamic auction for multiple complements
※Presentation in Japanese※

2008年7月29日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
in Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

Nori Tarui/ 樽井　礼 (University of Hawaii)
Child Maltreatment and Educational Attainment: Evidence from Add Health Data (joint with Xiangming Fang)

This paper examines the effects of three forms of child maltreatment (neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse) on the victims' subsequent high school graduation outcome using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health) study. Structural estimations, which take into account endogeneity of child maltreatment and simultaneity of the three maltreatment forms, indicate that neglect and physical abuse experiences are both negatively associated with high school graduation. Under all specifications, sexual abuse is not associated with high school graduation. This finding about the relative impacts of different types of maltreatment is consistent with some of the findings in child psychology literature. The finding sheds light on how parents' attitudes and behavior toward children influence their long-term human capital accumulation outcomes.

2008年8月11日（月 Monday）12:00-13:00
※Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

※日時と場所にご注意ください※

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Tomoki Fujii/藤井朋樹 (Singapore Management University)
How Well Can We Target Aid with Rapidly Collected Data? Empirical Results for Poverty Mapping from Cambodia

We compare commune-level poverty rankings in Cambodia based on three different methods: small-area estimation, principal component analysis using aggregate data, and interviews with local leaders. While they provide reasonably consistent rankings, the choice of the ranking method matters. In order to assess the potential losses from moving away from census-based poverty mapping, we used the concentration curve. Our calculation shows that about three-quarters of the potential gains from geographic targeting may be lost by using aggregate data. The usefulness of aggregate data in general would depend on the cost of data collection.

2008年9月5日（金　Friday）16:50-18:30 　※マクロワークショップと共催

Kazuo Nishimura/西村和雄（京都大学経済研究所）

Complementarity and Optimality:Two Dimensional Dynamical Systems　

2008年9月22日（月　Monday）17:30-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No. 1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

※日時と場所にご注意ください

Hodaka Morita（University of New South Wales）

Discrete innovation, continuous improvement, and competitive pressure (joint with Arghya Ghosh and Takao Kato) [PDF]

Does competitive pressure foster innovation? In addressing this important question, prior studies ignored a distinction between discrete innovation aiming at entirely new technology and continuous improvement consisting of numerous incremental improvements and modifications made upon the existing technology. This paper shows that distinguishing between these two types of innovation will lead to a much richer understanding of the interplay between firms' incentives to innovate and competitive pressure. In particular, our model predicts that, in contrast to previous theoretical findings, an increase in competitive pressure measured by product substitutability may decrease firms' incentives to conduct continuous improvement, and that an increase in the size of discrete innovation may decrease firms' incentives to conduct continuous improvement. A unique feature of this paper is its exploration of the model's real-world relevance and usefulness through field research. Motivated by recent declines in levels of continuous improvement in Japanese manufacturing, we conducted extensive field research at two Japanese manufacturing firms. After presenting our findings, we demonstrate that our model guides us to focus on several key changes taking place at these two firms; discover their interconnectedness; and finally ascertain powerful underlying forces behind each firm's decision to weaken its investment in traditional continuous improvement activities.

2008年9月26日（金 Friday）12:10-13:30 ※ Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

※日時と場所にご注意ください/Schedule Changed

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Chikako Yamauchi（Australian National University）

Community-based Targeting and Initial Local Conditions: Evidence from Indonesia's IDT Program [PDF]

Community-based selection of social program recipients has the potential to benefit from local knowledge about individuals in need. This informational advantage however might be offset by local elite capture and administrative incompetency. Using Indonesia's anti-poverty program, this paper investigates which pre-program conditions are associated with community-based targeting outcomes. Results show that wealthier and more unequal villages constantly target better. This suggests that, though there is much concern about local capture in communities with large inequality, the ease of identifying the poor could overwhelm the possibly larger political influence of local elites. Also, villages headed by young, educated persons initially exhibit better targeting, but lose this advantage over time, as the monitoring of loan disbursement becomes more difficult for village heads. I explore Indonesia's political context, which provides insight into these findings.

2008年9月30日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Eiichi Miyagawa/ 宮川栄一（Kobe University）

Contribution Dynamics in Joint Projects with Incomplete Information (joint with Yusuke Samejima)

2008年10月7日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Makoto Yano/矢野誠（Kyoto University）

Market Quality and Competitive Fairness in an Open Market Bargaining Model

2008年10月14日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:10
※ミクロワークショップ特別セミナー　※時間と場所にご注意下さい※　

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

Lakshmi K. Raut（Social Security Administration）

Intergenerational Long Term Effects of Preschool - Estimates from a Structural Dynamic Programming Model　[PDF]

Using the NLSY79 (National Longitudinal Study of Youths, 1979) and the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults datasets, this paper formulates and then empirically estimates an altruistic model of parental preschool investment within a structural dynamic programming framework. The paper provides conditions for identification of the structural parameters of the dynamic programming model and carries out a Lucas-Critique free policy analysis using the estimated structural parameters. The paper empirically estimates the production processes for social, motivational and cognitive skills of a child and the role that the parental preschool investment plays in such production processes. It then examines the effect of a publicly provided preschool policy to disadvantaged children on their educational and labor market achievements, and also on the intergenerational long-term effect on social mobility, schooling mobility, and earnings inequality. The paper calculates the tax burden of such a social contract policy taking into account these intra- and inter-generational effects.

2008年10月14日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Ryuji Sano/佐野隆司（Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo）

The Bidding Strategy in the Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Complementarities
※Presentation in Japanese※

This paper investigates the bidding strategy in the Ausbel-Milgrom's "ascending proxy auction" (Ausubel and Milgrom (2002)) in an incomplete information model. The Ausubel-Milgrom auction is a sealed-bid package auction whose incentive properties are not well-known when goods may be complements and when there's private information about buyers' valuation. In our model, each bidder wants a unique bundle of the goods and evaluate them as perfect complements. We derive the condition under which bidders report their values truthfully in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium even when there're complementarities. Truthful reporting is optimal when bidders' geographic relationships about their wants are transitive. Our results also give some implications for the general values model and other familiar package auctions.

2008年10月21日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Hiroko Okudaira/奥平寛子（Osaka University）

The Economic Costs of Court Decisions Concerning Dismissals in Japan: Identification by Judge Transfers

The goal of this paper is to detect the degree to which court decisions control the stringency of employment protection and investigate how such judicial discretion affects labor market performance. However, Identification difficulty arises because court decisions are volatile against economic and social conditions. This paper overcomes the endogeneity problem by exploiting the triennial judge transfer system in Japan, or the exogenous allocation of judges to prefectures. Specifically, I estimated the judge-specific effects from litigation records and instrumented them to the judgment indicator in the original model. A key finding in this paper is that prefecture employment rate is reduced by approximately 1.5% if a prefecture receives more pro-worker judgments than pro-employer ones in a given year. Interestingly, the result is robust to the instrumental variable estimates only if the sample includes observations of the Tokyo and Osaka Prefectures. Thus, judges assigned to these prefectures have played leading roles in exogenously establishing the doctrine of abusive adjustment dismissals, whereas the rest of the variation in judgments is reversely explained by local labor market performance.

2008年10月28日（火 Tuesday）12:00-13:10
※マクロワークショップ・CIRJE特別セミナーと共催
※時間と場所にご注意下さい※

John Riew (Pennsylvania State University, USA)

Japan's Competitive Advantages in the Global Market [PDF]

The paper analyzes Japan's competitive advantages in trade, comparing the nation with other industrialized countries. Paucity in resources, often mentioned in reference to Japan, we note, is overstated. Favorable climate and certain other aspects of the geography, for example, are unacclaimed but important bounties of nature. Relevant also in the context are such other factors as population, culture, and events in history, as are the role of the government (investment in physical and human capital, trade promotions policy). These factors together could more than compensate for the dearth of narrowly defined natural resources, land and minerals. The main underlying forces behind Japan's spectacular rise as a major economic power and a dominant player in today's global market find their original impetus in the early Meiji era, well into the second half of the19th century. This study, which ends with commentary, would provide other countries with a referential model with trade history and development strategy.

2008年10月28日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Tadashi Sekiguchi/関口格（Kyoto University）

Repeated Games with Costly Imperfect Monitoring (joint with Eiichi Miyagawa and Yasuyuki Miyahara)

We study repeated games where players can make costly investments in monitoring and improve quality of information about the other players' actions. We assume players can pay for arbitrarily precise information, but unlike our previous work, we allow the case where perfect information cannot be bought. For repeated prisoners' dilemma, we show that the standard folk theorem obtains in the model with arbitrarily large observation costs. The folk theorem is based on the belief-free approach, and extends existing approximate folk theorems to a setting with endogenous, costly monitoring.

2008年11月4日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Hitoshi Matsushima/松島斉（University of Tokyo）

Implementation and Social Influence [PDF]

2008年11月11日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Hisaki Kono/高野久紀（Institute of Developing Economies/アジア経済研究所）

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates? Evidence from Framed Field Experiments in Vietnam [PDF]

Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity problems. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers' repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others' investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.

2008年11月18日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Yoshihiro Ohashi/大橋賢裕（Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo）

Speculative Bubbles Prevention by Market Makers

This paper investigates how market makers should set prices in order to prevent speculative price bubbles in sequential trading stock markets. The author analyzes a situation in which a rational speculator can gain by a speculation which exploits irrational feedback traders and it causes a price bubble. Under the assumption that market makers set prices by a linear pricing rule, this paper characterizes ``speculation-proof'' linear pricing rules. In an application to a 3 periods trading model under asymmetric information, competitive market makers can set prices which follow a speculation-proof linear pricing rule in equilibrium.

2008年11月25日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Ryo Nakajima/中嶋亮（University of Tsukuba）

The Effect of Collaboration Network on Inventors' Job Match, Productivity and Tenure. (Joint work with Nobuyuki Hanaki and Ryuichi Tamura) [PDF]
※Presentation in Japanese※

It has been argued in the economic literature that job search through informal job networks improves the employer―employee match quality, especially in high wage sectors. This paper argues that inventors' research collaboration networks reduce the uncertainty of firms about the match qualities of inventors prior to hiring. We estimate the effect of inventors' collaboration networks on their productivity and mobility using the U.S. patent application database. It is found that network-recruited inventors are more productive and have longer tenure than publicly recruited inventors. The evidence from fixed-effect regressions shows that the higher productivity and longer tenure of network-recruited inventors are not solely attributable to their unobserved ability. These results are consistent with the job match hypothesis between inventors and firms through their collaboration networks.

2008年12月2日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Fuhito Kojima/小島武仁（Yale University）

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (joint with Yeon-Koo Che) [PDF]

The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their chances of obtaining more preferred objects. Such an inefficiency is eliminated by the recent mechanism called probabilistic serial, but this mechanism is not strategy-proof. Thus, which mechanism to employ in practical applications has been an open question. This paper shows that these mechanisms become equivalent when the market becomes large. More specifically, given a set of object types, the random assignments in these mechanisms converge to each other as the number of copies of each object type approaches infinity. Thus, the inefficiency of the random priority mechanism becomes small in large markets. Our result gives some rationale for the common use of the random priority mechanism in practical problems such as student placement in public schools.

2008年12月9日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Takanori Adachi/安達貴教（Tokyo Institute of Technology）

A Life-Cycle Model of Entrepreneurial Choice: Understanding Entry into and Exit from Self-Employment [PDF]

Data from the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) show that self-employment (nonfarm or nonprofessional) accounts for as high as 7 percent of all yearly labor supplies by young white males (ages 20-39 in years 1979-2000). On the other hand, nearly 30 percent of individuals in the data have at least one year of experience as a self-employer in the covered years. The goal of this paper is to give a coherent framework that accounts for these two contrasting figures which together suggest the importance of understanding not only entry into but exit from self-employment as well. Specifically, I present and estimate a life-cycle model of entrepreneurial choice and wealth accumulation, using a subsample of white males aged 20 to 39 from the NLSY79. The model also includes two basic components of human capital (educational attainment and labor experience) aimed at a better capturing of the observed patterns of labor supply as well as those of income profiles and wealth accumulation over the life cycle. The estimation results show that non-pecuniary benefits from continuing self-employment are large enough to justify the observed persistence of being self-employed. Policy experiments with the use of the estimated model, however, indicate that pecuniary factors also have large impacts on the formation and continuation of self-employed businesses. Specifically, I find that while both direct subsidies for self-employment and enhancement of the human capital specific to self-employment only encourage entries with short durations, relaxation of borrowing constraints, on the other hand, encourages entries into self-employment and makes the average duration longer, especially for the non-college educated.

2008年12月16日（火　Tuesday）12:10-13:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
in Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building
※時間と場所にご注意ください

Harrison Cheng (University of Southern California)

Auctions with Resale and Bargaining Power [PDF]

We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) .rst-price auction model with resale and a model of .rst-price common-value auction, when the resale market satis.es a minimal ef- .ciency property and the common value is de.ned by the transaction price. This implies that the speculator-buyer model of auction with resale is observationally equivalent to the Wilson drainage tract common-value model. With an application of the Coase Theorem, we show two polar cases in which auctions with resale have opposite properties. We examine the e?ects of bargaining power on the revenue and e¢ ciency of .rst-price auctions with resale. This is done for three types of bargaining models: (a) bargaining with commitment, (b) bargaining with delay costs, and (c) k-double auctions resale market. We also provide conditions under which the .rst-price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auc- tion when resale is allowed.

2008年12月16日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Takashi Hayashi/林貴志（University of Texas at Austin）

Choice and Individual Welfare (joint with Christopher P. Chambers) [PDF]

We propose an abstract method of systematically assigning a "rational" preference to non-rationalizable choice data. We define an individual welfare functional as a mapping from stochastic choice functions into weak orders. A stochastic choice function (or choice distribution) gives the empirical frequency of choices for any possible opportunity set (framing factors may also be incorporated into the model). We require that for any two alternatives x and y, if our individual welfare functional recommends x over y given two distinct choice distributions, then it also recommends x over y for any mixture of the two choice distributions. Together with some mild technical requirements, such an individual welfare functional must weight every opportunity set and assign a utility to each alternative x which is the sum across all opportunity sets of the weighted probability of x being chosen from the set. It therefore requires us to have a "prior view" about how important a choice of x from a given opportunity set is.

2009年2月17日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30　
※一橋GCOE　社会科学の高度統計・実証分析拠点構築
(Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences（Hitotsubashi GCOE Hi-Stat）)と共催※

Marc Rysman（Boston University）

Dynamics of Consumer Demand for New Durable Goods(joint with Gautam Gowrisankaran) [PDF]

This paper specifies and estimates a dynamic model of consumer preferences for new durable goods with persistent heterogeneous consumer tastes, rational expectations about future products and repeat purchases over time. Most new consumer durable goods, particularly consumer electronics, are characterized by relatively high initial prices followed by rapid declines in prices and improvements in quality. The evolving nature of product attributes suggests the importance of modeling dynamics in estimating consumer preferences. We estimate the model on the digital camcorder industry using a panel data set on prices, sales and characteristics. We find that dynamics are a very important determinant of consumer preferences and that estimated coefficients are more plausible than with traditional static models. We use the estimates to evaluate cost-of-living indices for new consumer goods and dynamic demand elasticities.

2009年2月23日（月　Monday）16:50-18:30
※曜日にご注意ください
※経済学高度インターナショナルプログラムと共催※

Bruno Strulovici（Northwestern University)

Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order (joint with John Quah) [PDF]

We identify a natural way of ordering functions, which we call the interval dominance order and develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on this order. This way of ordering functions is weaker than the standard one based on the single crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) and so our results apply in some settings where the single crossing property does not hold. For example, they are useful when examining the comparative statics of optimal stopping time problems. We also show that certain basic results in statistical decision theory which are important in economics - specifically, the complete class theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956) and the results connected with Lehmann's (1988) concept of informativeness - generalize to payoff functions obeying the interval dominance order.

2009年3月3日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Atsushi Kajii/梶井厚志（Kyoto University）

Sunspot Equilibria in a Production Economy: Do Rational Animal Spirits Cause Overproduction? [paper]

We study a standard two period economy with one nominal bond and one firm. The firm finances the input with the nominal bond in the first period, and its profits are distributed to the shareholders in the second period. We show that in the neighborhood of each efficient equilibrium, a sunspot equilibrium also exists. It is shown that the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the efficient level, and that there is over production in the sunspot equilibrium, under some conditions. However, there is no sunspot equilibrium if the profit share of the firm can be traded as well as the bond.

※ 2009年1-2月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

下記の期日までにセンター研究支援室の田中まで発表論文のファイルを送るかハードコピーをセンター研究支援室（経済学研究科棟７階７０９号室）までご持参下さい。提出されたファイルはすぐに印刷にまわしてしまいますので、その後の差し替えがないよう、最終稿を１度だけ提出してください。 期限内に届いたものについては当日配布用印刷物を用意いたしますが、間に合わない場合やその後の差し替えについては、当日ご自分で１５部ほどコピーをご持参下さい。期限内に提出されなかった場合は、印刷を受け付けられませんのでご注意ください。

※　印刷物は発表が始まる迄にご用意致しますので、発表前にセンター研究支援室へお立寄りいただき、各自で会場までお持ち下さい。

発表論文提出期限：

1月20日（火）発表者＝1月16日（金）朝9:00（必着）まで

1月27日（火）発表者＝1月26日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

2月3日（火）発表者＝2月2日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

2月10日（火）発表者＝2月9日（月）朝9:00（必着）まで

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）14:00-14:40

小窪明日香

新薬の開発プロセスにおける経験の効果−日本の主要医薬品メーカーに対する実証分析−

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）14:40-15:20

五十川大也

ガソリン価格が自動車需要に与える影響

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）15:20-16:00

上田倫子

アフリカ経済の転換とオランダ病

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）16:00-16:40

松山普一

地域振興券政策の効果の推定

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

長町康平

イノベーションと地域経済格差

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10

市川智秀

災害リスクがJREITの取得価格等に与える影響

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50

大瀧逸朗

Land Use Patterns and Growth in a Two-City Model

2009年1月20日（火　Tuesday）18:50-19:30

菅沼健司

小都市における人口変化の分析

2009年1月27日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10
！時間が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい！

岩田未佳

利益団体からの献金を組み込んだレトロスペクティブ投票モデル

2009年1月27日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50
！時間が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい！

菅野早紀

Aging Population and Social Security in Political Economy

2009年1月27日（火　Tuesday）18:50-19:30
！時間が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい！

平田大祐

A Model of Dynamic All-Pay Auction

2009年2月3日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

新井雅之

War Incentive

2009年2月3日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10

梁　実

ベルトラン競争における第三種価格差別の内生化問題の研究

2009年2月3日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50

森田洋任

事業の多角化が企業評価に与える影響

2009年2月10日（火　Tuesday）16:50-17:30

室岡健志

A　Theory of Emotion and Communication in Psychological Games

2009年2月10日（火　Tuesday）17:30-18:10

今井泰佑

Group Formation and Peer Pressure

2009年2月10日（火　Tuesday）18:10-18:50

小川博雅

階層型組織とフラット型組織の効率性比較

2009年2月10日（火　Tuesday）18:50-19:30

小松（藤井）貴義

Model of Multiple Temptations

2009年3月10日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Katsutoshi Wakai(若井克俊)（Kyoto University）

Modeling Non-Monotone Preference: In the Case of Utility Smoothing

Conventional models for intertemporal choices assume monotonicity, that is, an increase in consumption at any period increases overall utility. On the contrary, if a decision maker pays more attention to smoothing consumption over time, monotonicity may not be an appropriate assumption. A typical example is a habit formation model, where the decision maker has an incentive to decrease current consumption if future consumption is expected to be low. Motivated by this example, this paper investigates non-monotone time preference. In particular, we study the case of utility smoothing as proposed by Wakai (2008) and derives the representation that captures a strong desire for loss aversion. We then apply our model to a consumption saving problem in a partial equilibrium setting. Our model shows that there exists a threshold asset price above which the decision maker prefers a complete consumption smoothing. Since the habit formation model does not imply the threshold property, our result shows that once non-monotonicity is assumed, gain/loss asymmetry is a key characteristic that induces the decision maker to avoid decreasing consumption sequences.

2009年3月12日（木 Thursday） 14:00-15:40
※経済学高度インターナショナルプログラムと共催

Rodney Ludema（Georgetown University）

The Most-Favored-Nation Clause [PDF]

The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations. To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation. We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier rule. We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the Herfindahl- Hirschman index of export shares: higher concentration in a sector reduces free riding and thus causes a lower tariff. Estimation of our model using sector-level tariff data for the U.S. provides strong support for this relationship.

2009年3月17日（火　Tuesday）16:50-18:30

Minjung Park（University of Minnesota）

Advertising and Market Share Dynamics [PDF]

This paper examines the role of advertising in the evolution of market structure in the US mutual fund industry. First, I present empirical evidence that mass advertising in this industry creates en- dogenous sunk costs, resulting in patterns consistent with Sutton.s (1991) predictions. In particular, I contrast evolutionary patterns of advertising spending and market structure between two segments of the industry, one in which mass advertising is e?ective (no-load segment) and the other in which mass advertising is much less so (load segment), due to di?erences in their distribution methods. I then estimate a dynamic model of advertising using the two-step estimator proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007). No-load .rms and load .rms face di?erent advertising elasticities of demand because of the way their funds are marketed to consumers, and it leads to di?erent optimal advertising choices and market structure dynamics in the two segments. I recover the structural parameters of interest, such as the advertising elasticity of demand in each segment, goodwill accu- mulation equation, entry costs, and sell-o? values. Using the model estimates, I simulate market share dynamics when .rms follow di?erent advertising strategies. Thus, this paper provides insights on how strategic advertising decisions in.uence market structure.