Workshops

Microeconomics Workshop 2007

21世紀COEプログラム「市場経済と非市場機構との連関研究拠点」と、日本経済国際共同研究センター(CIRJE)の共催ワークショップ

※ 2008年3月27日現在 近い予定から順に掲載しています。

※ 特に表記のない限りセミナー発表は英語で行われます(Unless otherwise mentioned, presentations are in ENGLISH)。

Abstract

 

 

本年度終了分:

日時

2007年4月10日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Imad Moosa(Monash University)

Operational Hedging of Transaction Exposure to Foreign Exchange Risk Arising from International Trade Contracts [PDF]

Abstract

A hybrid operational hedging technique is proposed to shift some of the foreign exchange risk from the importer to the exporter when the currency of the exporter is the currency of invoicing. This technique requires the conversion of the cash flows at a range of exchange rates calculated as some weighted average of the rates used under the risk-shifting techniques of risk sharing arrangements and currency collars. The problem of choosing the value of the parameter that determines how much of the risk is to be shifted to the exporter can be resolved by fine tuning the weights in such a way as to eliminate the sensitivity of the cash flows to the value of this parameter. The theoretical results are demonstrated with the use of monthly data on the exchange rate between the British pound and the U.S. dollar over the period January 1993-October 2006.

日時

2007年4月17日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Akihiko Matsui(University of Tokyo)

A Theory of Man That Creates the World [PDF]

Abstract

The present paper proposes a theory of man that tries to construct a model of the world in societal situations where people interact with each other. The present theory takes experiences, or chunks of impressions, as primitives as opposed to an ``objective'' game. A model is something that is constructed by an agent. Each model consists of structural and factual parts. The structural part is represented as a stochastic game. While the factual part is represented as a strategy profile of the game. In constructing a model, the agent uses some axioms. Examples of the axioms that the agent might use are coherence, according to which he can explain his own experiences, consistency with a solution concept adopted by the agent, and simplicity with respect to some measure, again adopted by him. The present paper does not assume the existence of an ``objective'' game, and different agents may construct different models of the world.

日時

2007年4月24日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Atsushi Yoshida (University of Tsukuba)

School Choice and Student Sorting: Evidence from Adachi City in Japan [PDF]

Abstract

We examine whether the school choice program of public junior high schools in Adachi city has caused student sorting and has thus increased the differences in scores between the schools. We find that students are sorted in the sense that the students living in the school attendance areas where there is a higher proportion of high-status occupations are more likely to select private schools even after the introduction of the school choice program, or they select public schools with higher scores. However, the differences in scores between public schools have been decreasing, indicating that the sorting is not related to the scores.

日時

2007年5月8日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Taiji Furusawa (Hitotsubashi University)

Endogenous Present-Biasedness and Policy Implementation [PDF]
Abstract

We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased and time-inconsistent. This may lead to inefficient procrastination of socially beneficial projects. However, procrastination needs not be indefinite. There exist equi-libria in which the project is carried out, maybe even in finite time. The procrastination problem tends to get more serious as the cost of the project gets higher. When the cost is low, there is no procrastination problem. When the cost is high, the project can be procrastinated indefinitely, though there exist equilibria in which the project is implemented gradually, with the process going on for a long time.

日時

2007年5月11日(金 Friday) 12:10-13:30  ※日時と場所に注意

*COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

*Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Emmanuel Jimenez (World Bank)

World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation
Abstract

We are going to have a presentation and discussion on "World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation" with Dr. Emmanuel Jimenez. The report discusses priorities for government action across youth transitions that shape young people's human capital: learning, working, staying healthy, forming families, and excercising citizenship. Dr Jimenez is the lead author of the report, and Director of Human Development in the World Bank's East Asia and the Pacific Department Information on the report is available at <www.worldbank.org/wdr2007>.

日時

2007年5月15日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Yuichi Noguchi (Kanto Gakuin University)

Bayesian Learning with Bounded Rationality: Convergence to ε-Nash Equilibrium [PDF]
Abstract

We provide a class of prior beliefs that (almost surely) lead to playing approximate Nash equilibrium, combined with bounded rationality, i.e., smooth approximate optimal behaviors, in any infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring: converging to ε-Nash equilibrium for any (finite normal form) stage game, any discount factors (less than one), and any ε>0. Furthermore, the class of prior beliefs is smart in the sense that, for any learnable set of opponents strategies, a prior belief in the class ε-weakly merges with all opponents strategies in the learnable set. We also argue the implications of our positive result to impossibility results (Nachbar (1997, 2005) and Foster and Young (2001)). Specifically, we point out that the impossibility in Nachbar (1997, 2005) is obtained because the learnability condition in Nachbar (1997, 2005) requires uniform learning such that each player’s prior belief weakly merges with opponents true strategies uniformly in his own various strategies, including his true one, and that the impossibility in Foster and Young (2001) crucially depends on perfect rationality, i.e., exact optimal behaviors.

日時

2007年5月17日(木 Thursday)16:50-18:30 *金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第2教室
at the Lecture Hall No.2 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Ilya Segal (Stanford University, Economics Department)

An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (joint with Susan Athey) [PDF]
Abstract

This paper constructs an efficient, budget-balanced, Baysian incentive-compatible mechanism for a general dynamic environment with private information. As an intermediate result, we construct an efficient, ex post incentive-compatible mechanism, which is not budget balanced. We also provide conditions under which participation constraints can be satisfied in each period, so that the mechanism can be made self-enforcing if the horizon is infinite and players are sufficiently patient.

In our dynamic environment, agents observe a sequence of private signals over a number of periods (either finite or countable). In each period, the agents report their private signals, and make public (contractible) and private decisions based on the reports. The probability distribution over future signals may depend on both past signals and past decisions. The construction of an efficient mechanism hinges on the assumption of ”private values” (each agent’s payoff is determined by his own observations). Balancing the budget relies on the assumption of “independent types” (the distribution of each agents’s private signals does not depend on the other agents’ private information, except thorough public decisions).

日時

2007年5月22日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Michihiro Kandori (University of Tokyo)

Chicken in Prison: Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring [PDF]
Abstract

The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-freeequilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, the belief-free equilibria, which have played a major role in the existing literature (Ely and Valimaki (2002) and Ely, Horner, and Olszewski (2005)). An example is presented, where a simple weakly belief-free equilibrium outperforms the belief-free equilibria. The present paper also introduces the notion of  reduced games of a repeated game and shows that weakly belief-free equilibria admit a recursive structure in the space of reduced games. The example embeds the chicken game, as the reduced games, in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring.

日時

2007年5月29日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Toyotaka Sakai (Yokohama National University)

Fair waste pricing: An axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem [PDF]
Abstract

A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts that produce different amounts of wastes. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem here is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost with considering fair compensation to the siting district. We provide an axiomatic framework to normatively analyze this problem and seek for desirable decision rules. A fair pricing rule is a rule that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, puts a negative price to wastes according to the loss, and gives a full compensation to the siting district. We show that this rule is the unique rule that satisfies certain efficiency, fairness, and robustness to strategic transfers of wastes. We also establish the nearly robustness of this rule to misrepresentation of disutility information.

日時

2007年6月5日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Yasuhiro Sato(Nagoya University)

Impacts of trade on skill formation: welfare improvements accompanied by rises in inequality (with Kazuhiro Yamamoto) [PDF]
Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the skill formation when considering the trade impacts on labor markets. Although workers are identical as unskilled labor, they differ in their productivity as skilled. Workers become skilled by incurring the training costs. Introducing the above settings into a trade model with monopolistic competition, we show that trade opening enhances skill formation. This is because trade enriches the varieties of differentiated goods and raises the utility of a worker for a given income. This effect works stronger for the skilled than for the unskilled although it makes all agents better off, leading to higher skill formation. However, it may be accompanied by rises in the real wage disparity between skilled and unskilled workers and by rises in the skilled wage inequality. Finally, we examine the possible effects of foreign direct investment on the labor market structure as well.

日時

2007年6月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Nori Tarui(University of Hawaii)

Cooperation on Climate-Change Mitigation (with Charles F. Mason and Stephen Polasky) [PDF]
Abstract

We model greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by countries as a dynamic game in which the emissions increase atmospheric concentrations of GHG that negatively affect all countries' welfare. Each country in each time period chooses a level of emissions, understanding that the combin ation of all countries' emissions influences the evolution of the GHG stock. We allow for heterogeneities in countries' payoffs. Within this setting, we analyze self-enforcing climate-change treaties which are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game. We provide a simulation model to illustrate the conditions when it is possible to support a first best outcome. We also parameterize the simulation model to mimic current conditions to show whether a self-enforcing agreement that achieves optimal climate change policy is possible, the structure of what such a solution might look like, and which countries have the most to gain from such an agreement.

日時

2007年6月19日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Hideo Konishi (Boston College)

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation [PDF]
Abstract

We consider a two-stage public good provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence a third party agent's policy choice (say, the government chooses a level of public good provision). We use a communication-based self-enforcing equilibrium concept in a noncooperative two stage game, perfectly coalitionproof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston, 1987 JET). We show that, in public good economy, the outcome set of this equilibrium concept is equivalent to an "intuitive" hybrid solution concept free-riding-proof core, which always exists but does not necessarily achieve global efficiency. It is not necessarily true that the formed lobby group is the highest willingness-to-pay players, nor is a consecutive group with respect to their willingnesses-to-pay. We also check how the set of equilibrium outcomes would exhibit completely different characteristics when "public good" assumption is dropped.

日時

2007年6月21日(木 Thursday) 12:00-13:10 *マクロワークショップと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the New Economics Building
報告

Junichi Fujimoto (University of California, Los Angeles)

Implications of General and Specific Productivity Growth in a Matching Model  [PDF]

Abstract

In this paper, I explore the implications of incorporating long-run productivity growth into a labor market matching model. I allow the productivity growth to be of general or specific nature, and consider an environment in which risk-averse workers are matched with firms and engage in long-term employment contracts, to which the former cannot commit. I claim that such an environment gives rise to two new channels through which growth may affect unemployment. A quantitative analysis of the model shows that these two channels are able to generate the negative effects of growth on unemployment comparable to empirical estimates, while the traditional ”capitalization effect” is negligible. The analysis also finds that while a greater specificity of productivity growth tends to decrease unemployment rate and lengthen workers’ tenure, it makes these variables more responsive to growth and job destruction rates. These results may potentially explain certain labor market differences among US, Europe and Japan.

日時

2007年6月26日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Mamoru Kaneko(University of Tsukuba)

Small and Partial Views derived from Limited Experiences (with J. J.Kline)[PDF]
Abstract This paper develops a theory of inductive derivations of personal views from experiences focusing on limited trials and partial memories. The theory allows us to discuss how a player might simplify his view of a complicated situation. Two new concepts of marked information pieces and tested actions are introduced for this purpose. Each player accumulates local memories as long-term term memories up to marked pieces and tested actions, and constructs a view. At unmarked pieces, he behaves following his prescribed regular behavior pattern without thinking about it. A derived view is typically small, partial, and sometimes prejudiced relative to the original game situation. This paper studies the emergence of such views. One result is the characterization of a Nash equilibrium relative to the relevant domain of the objective game based on the limited and partial views of the individual players.
日時

2007年6月28日(木 Thursday) 12:10-13:10 

*Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

場所 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第3共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.3 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building
報告

Susumu Imai (Queens University)
1. Protection for Sale or Surge Protection [PDF]
2. A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model When Political Organization is Unknown [PDF]

Abstract

 

日時

2007年7月3日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Daisuke Nakajima(University of Michigan)

Theory of Choice by Elimination (Joint with Yusufcan Masatlioglu) [PDF]
Abstract

We provide a descriptive model of choice by elimination that includes for its foundation. The basis of the model involves a decision procedure based on elimination rather than selecting an alternative. In this model, the alternative that cannot be eliminated by any of its comparables ends up being chosen. The necessary and sufficient condition for the model, which we call "axiom of choice by elimination" (ACE), reflects the idea of "bounded rationality." This condition is also normatively appealing since it is immune to "money pump"type of arguments despite the fact that it is weaker than the independent of irrelevant alternative (IIA). Our framework makes it possible not only to provide two characterizations for IIA and Simon's satisficing but also to accommodate endogenous reference-dependent choice.

日時

2007年7月4日(水 Wednesday)12:00-13:20 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Aminur Rahman(International Finance Corporation, the World Bank)

Donor Fragmentation: Trends and Effects

Abstract

The presentation will be on the emerging issue of donor fragmentation in the foreign  aid. The speaker will draw from the recently published paper, Stephen Knack and  Aminur Rahman (2007), "Donor Fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid  Recipients," Journal of Development Economics, May 2007, which analyzed the impact  of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient  nations both theoretically and empirically, and another paper on aid fragmentation in  the transition countries.

日時

2007年7月10日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

In-Koo Cho (University of Illinois)

Perishable Durable Goods [PDF]
Abstract We examine whether the Coase conjecture [7, 14, 4, 10] is robust against slight ability of commitment of the monopolist not to sell the durable goods to con-sumers. We quantify the commitment ability in terms of the speed that the durable goods perish, while keeping the time between the offers small. We demonstrate that the slight commitment capability makes a substantial difference by constructing two kinds of reservation price equilibria [10] that refute the Coase conjecture. In the first equilibrium, the monopolist can credibly delay to make an acceptable offer. All consumers are served, but only after extremely long delay. Most of gains from trading is discounted away, and the resulting outcome is extremely inefficient. In the second equilibrium, the monopolist’s expected profit can be made close to the static monopoly profit, if the goods perish very slowly. By focusing on the reservation price equilibria, we rigorously eliminate any source of reputational effect. In fact, by using the ?rst kind of reservation price equilibrium as a credible threat against the seller, we can construct many other reputational equilibria [2] to obtain the Folk theorem. Various extensions and applications are discussed.
日時

2007年7月17日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *マクロワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Hideo Akabayashi (Keio University)

Who suffered from the superstition in the marriage market? The case of Hinoeuma in Japan [PDF]
Abstract

The births in 1966 in Japan dropped by 25% because of the Hinoeuma ("Fiery Horse") superstition, which says that a woman born in that year cannot be a good wife. Since the sex of birth is random and there is no prejudice toward Hinoeuma men, this shock can be used as a natural experiment to investigate the effects of cohort size and prejudice in the marriage market. Using data from the 1990-2000 Population Census, I estimate a net marital matching probability function of single men and women disaggregated by prefecture and cohort combination of couples. I find the matching efficiency among 1966 cohort is unusually lower than the predicted trend for both sexes, especially for men. Additional data and analyses suggest that it is difficult to account for the results solely by education and family background of Hinoeuma children. I suggest a likely story that explains why this has happened.

日時

2007年7月20日(金 Friday)12:00-13:10 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the New Economics Building

報告

Hiroyuki Nakata (University of Essex)

Entropy characterisation of insurance demand
Abstract

This paper characterises the insurance demand in terms of the entropy of the underlying probability distribution for losses. In particular, such a characterisation provides a prediction without deviating from the standard expected utility framework albeit subjective that insurance for big losses with small probabilities tends to be less subscribed compared to insurance for moderate losses with higher probabilities. Issues regarding rationality are also discussed.

日時

2007年7月23日(月 Monday)12:00-13:20 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the New Economics Building

報告

Jonathan Conning (Hunter College and The Graduate Center City University of New York)

Social Finance (joint with Jonathan Morduch, NYU) [Paper]
Abstract

 

日時

2007年7月24日(火 Tuesday)10:20-12:00 *COE Frontier Economics Lecture

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Ming Hsu (University of Illinois)

Neuroeconomics: What Economics Can Learn from Neuroscience [slide]

Abstract

 

日時

2007年7月24日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Tomomi Tanaka(California Institute of Technology)

Risk and time preferences: Experimental and household survey data from Vietnam(joint with Colin F. Camerer, California Institute of Technology, and Quang Nguyen, University of Hawaii) [PDF]
Abstract

We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to investigate how wealth, political history, occupation, and other demographic variables (from a comprehensive earlier household survey) are correlated with risk and time discounting measured in experiments. Experimental results show that in villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Villagers in the north who had worked on collective farms and received food from the government on a regular basis are less averse to loss. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those simple approximations with prospect theory and a three-parameter discounting model.

日時

2007年7月26日(木 Thursday)10:20-12:00 *COE Frontier Economics Lecture

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Ming Hsu (University of Illinois)

Methods in Neuroeconomics [Slide]

Abstract

 

日時

2007年7月27日(金 Friday)10:20-12:00 *COE Distingished Research Seminar

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Ming Hsu (University of Illinois)

Individual and Social Decision-Making in the Human Brain [Slide]

Abstract

 

日時

2007年8月6日(月 Monday)16:50-18:30 *COE Distingished Research Seminar

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Colin F. Camerer (HSS, California Institute of Technology)

The neuroeconomics of risky choice [PDF]

Abstract

 

日時

2007年10月16日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Julio Davila (Paris School of Economics)

Expectations Formation and Volatility [PDF]

Abstract

I show in this paper that the possibility of expectations-driven volatility of prices and trades as an equilibrium phenomenon has been downplayed by the use of the rational expectations hypothesis. Starting from the fact that the rational expectations hypothesis remains silent about how the agents may have ended up holding the expectations they hold, I consider the consequences of imposing rationality assumptions on the way the agents form their expectations. More specifically, I assume that each agent holds rationally formed expectations in the sense that any other expectations consistent with his choices that he might have held would imply a smaller likelihood for the history he observes. Then I establish that in simple overlapping generations economies without intrinsic uncertainty there are expectations-driven fluctuations of prices and trades that are rationally formed expectations equilibrium outcomes, but would never be the outcome of a rational expectations equilibrium. This result suggests that the strong requirements underlying the rational expectations hypothesis may have led to a serious underestimation of the role of expectations in the generation of volatility of equilibrium prices and allocations.

日時

2007年10月18日(木 Thursday)10:30-11:45 ※ITPU Workshop と共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Jurgen Muller(The Berlin School of Economics)

Privatization, restructuring and its effect on performance: a comparison between the German and British airport sector

Abstract

 

日時

2007年10月22日(月 Monday)12:10-13:10 ※ Empirical Micro Brown-Bag Lunch Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Sebastien Lechevalier (EHESS(Paris)- Centre Japon Researcher at Maison Franco Japonaise(Tokyo))

Yukio Ikeda (YNU & Maison franco japonaise)

Junichi Nishimura (Hitotsubashi university & MFJ)

Evaluating the R&D consortia in Japan. The case study of the robot technology [PDF]

Abstract

This paper aims at evaluating the government-supported R&D consortia in Japan. These programs have already been the object of numerous studies. We provide further empirical evidences by focusing on the case of the robot technology (RT). Despite RT is one of the priorities in the government policy and one of the most promising field of development, it has been surprisingly relatively ignored by economic studies on R&D consortia. By comparison to previous studies, our paper has the following characteristics. First, whereas most of papers are using the number of patents as indicator for the outcomes of the programs, we are using indicators of quality of patents like claims or number of citations. It allows us to provide an estimation of quality adjusted research productivity. Second, we investigate indirectly the impact of the evolution of the design and the organization of the government programs in RT. Third we conduct a comparison between government-led collaboration and privately organized R&D collaboration. Our results are as follows. First, we find that participation by firms to government programs has a positive impact on the quality of their patents. Second, if we divide the sample period into two sub-periods, 1991-1997 and 1998-2004, we find there was no impact during the first sub-period, yet there is a positive impact during the second sub-period. Our interpretation is that this is the consequence of the changing orientation and structure of government programs in this field. Third, if we compare between government-led collaborative patents and private led collaborative patents, we find the significant effect of the former and the non significant effect of the latter.

日時

2007年10月23日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Yves Smeers (Universite catholique de Louvain)

Evaluating the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industrial Sector in the European Emission Trading Scheme [slide]

Abstract

The degradation of the competitiveness of part of the European industry is progressively emerging as one of the possible consequences of the combination of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) and the restructuring of the electricity sector. Power intensive industrial consumers claim that the high electricity price endangers their competitive position on international markets and that they may relocate some or all of their production activities in extra-Community countries where there is no carbon emission restriction. They further argue that power companies exercise market power in order to maintain these high electricity prices. A relocation of these industries outside of the European Community would entail a serious loss of welfare for European countries together with an additional environmental damage due to more lenient norms in non European countries. We take up some proposals of the industrial sector and explore the possible introduction of special contracts, which would mitigate the impact of CO2 allowance cost on their electricity prices. We, first, analyze a reference scenario of a perfectly competitive market where all consumers pay identical electricity prices based on the short-run marginal costs. We then apply two innovative pricing policies to the industrial consumer segment that rely on an average cost mechanism. Our methodology is structured in two steps: a first scenario applies a single average cost price to all industrial consumers; we then extend the model and simulate the case when industries can conclude those special contracts with local producers. Our models are formulated as mixed complementarity problems, which enable to tackle large-scale markets. They are developed in the GAMS environment adopting PATH as solver. They account for emissions and some representations of the network constraints and assume fixed installed capacities. We illustrate the model by presenting results obtained on a prototype representation of the Northwestern Europe market (Belgium, France, Germany and The Netherlands).

日時

2007年10月24日(水 Wednesday)12:00-13:00 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

John Riew (The Pennsylvania State University)

Japan’s Competitive Advantages in the Global Market [PDF]

Abstract

The paper analyzes Japan's competitive advantages in trade, comparing the nation with other industrialized (G-7) countries. Japan's paucity in resources, we note, is commonly overstated. Endowments such as climate and geography, for example, are unacclaimed but important bounties of nature. Important also in this analysis are factors of population and culture, as well as events of history, the role of the government (investment in physical and human capital, industrial policy and trade promotions), and the private sector behavior. These elements combine to promote competitiveness with a magnitude that far more than compensates for the dearth of natural resources. The main sources behind Japan's spectacular rise as a major economic power and a dominant player in trade originates as early as the last quarter of the19th century. This study provides other countries with a referential model with trade history and development strategy.

日時

2007年10月30日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30   ※Presentation in Japanese※

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Taiju Kitano(北野泰樹)(University of Tokyo)

Did US Safeguards Resuscitate Harley-Davidson in the 1980s?[PDF]

Abstract

This paper examines US safeguards applied to the motorcycle market in the 1980s. After receiving temporary protection by means of a maximum tariff of over 45%, Harley-Davidson sales recovered dramatically. Simulations, based on structural demand and supply estimates, indicate that while safeguard tariffs did benefit Harley-Davidson, they only account for a fraction of its increased sales. This is primarily because consumers perceived that Harley-Davidson and Japanese large motorcycles were poorly matched substitutes for each other. Although Harley-Davidson must have earned extra profits from innovation by receiving safeguard protection, it is unclear whether protection was necessary for Harley-Davidson to innovate. Our results provide little evidence that safeguard provisions triggered restructuring in Harley-Davidson.

日時

2007年11月6日(火 Tuesday)16:00-17:40 *金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 4階トレーディング・ラボ

at the Trading Lab. on the 4th floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Chiaki Hara(原千秋) (Kyoto University)

Heterogeneous impatience in a continuous-time model

Abstract

 

日時

2007年11月13日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *都市経済ワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Masahisa Fujita(藤田昌久) (Konan University)
Knowledge Diversity, Innovation, and Economic Growth [PDF]

Abstract

How is long run economic growth related to the diversity of knowledge? We formulate and study a microeconomic model of knowledge creation, through the interactions among a group of R & D workers, embedded in a growth model to address this question. Income to these workers accrues as patent income, whereas transmission of newly created knowledge to all such workers occurs due to public transmission of patent information. Our model incorporates two key aspects of the cooperative process of knowledge creation: (i) heterogeneity of people in their state of knowledge is essential for successful cooperation in the joint creation of new ideas, while (ii) the very process of cooperative knowledge creation affects the heterogeneity of people through the accumulation of knowledge in common. The model features myopic R & D workers in a pure externality model of interaction. Surprisingly, in the general case for a large set of initial conditions we find that the equilibrium process of knowledge creation converges to the most productive state, where the population splits into smaller groups of optimal size; close interaction takes place within each group only. Equilibrium paths are found analytically. Long run economic growth is positively related to both the effectiveness of pairwise R & D worker interaction and to the effectiveness of public knowledge transmission.

日時

2007年11月20日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Andrei Hagiu (Harvard Business School)
Designing a Two-Sided Platform: When To Increase Search Costs?[PDF]

Abstract

We propose a model for analyzing an intermediary's incentives to increase the search costs incurred by consumers looking for sellers (stores). First, we show that the quality of the search service offered to consumers is more likely to be degraded (i.e. the probability that consumers find their favorite store in the first round of search is less than 1) when the intermediary derives higher revenues from consumers shopping at the lesser-known store relative to revenues from consumers shopping at the more popular store. Second, the intermediary may have an incentive to degrade the quality of search even further when its design decision influences the prices charged by stores. By altering the composition of demand faced by stores, the intermediary can force the latter to price lower and thereby increase total consumer traffic.

日時

2007年11月27日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Akira Okada(岡田章) (Hitotsubashi University)
Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application [PDF]

Abstract

We consider a noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers. In a general case that the recognition probability is arbitrary and players have different discount factors for future payoffs, the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) is proved, and the condition for the grand coalition to be formed is provided. We also prove that the grand-coalition SSPE is a unique symmetric SSPE for any discount factor in a symmetric game with nonempty core. In the last part of the paper, we apply the bargaining model to a production economy with one employer and multiple workers. When players are sufficiently patient, the economy has a unique SSPE payoff. The equilibrium allocation is compared with cooperative solutions such as the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus. The SSPE payoff and the nucleolus have similar distributional properties.

日時

2007年12月4日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30  ※Presentation in Japanese※

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Akira Nagae(長江 亮) (Waseda University)

The disability employment policy evaluation for the quota-levy system in Japan ―Evidence from natural experiment on stock prices― [PDF]

Abstract

The disability employment policies in Japan form the quota-levy system, which aims to equalize the cost accompanied by the disability employment in each firm. This paper attempts to test the ramifications of the information disclosure of each firm’s rate of disability employment by using such natural experiment in Tokyo and Osaka in 2003. Concretely, we verified, after the information had been disclosed, the difference of the stock-price change the two groups: the firms employing the disabled at lower rate than the legal requirement and those satisfying the standard by the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation. At that time, we also find the efficient market hypothesis holds to the information disclosure. In addition to this, we estimated the cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of employed disabled and the profit for each firm in 2000 when the information had collected. The estimation results are summarized as follows. First, there is no significant difference between the above two groups of firms in terms of the disability employment in the excess return of long-term stock prices after the information disclosure. Second, among the small and medium-sized manufacturing firms, a significantnegative difference between those two groups of the firms exists in the excess  return of short-term stock prices after the disclosure. Third, among the large-scale non manufacturing firms in Tokyo, there is significant positive difference between the two groups of the firms in the excess return of short-term stock prices after the event. Fourth, those results are consistent with the cross-sectional relationship between the proportion of the employment disabled and the profit of for each firm. From these estimation results, it is possible to insist on the following three. First, we cannot reject the possible inefficiency caused by the penalty of the Japanese disability employment policies, the disclosure of the firms’ names. Second, among small and medium-sized and manufacturing firms, the numbers of disabled employees required by the law exceed their optimal levels. Third, the cost of employing the disabled is neither equalized among manufacturing nor non-manufacturing firms. We thus need more inclusive policy assessment of the disability employment policies, especially of its cost side.

日時

2007年12月11日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Daisuke Oyama(尾山大輔) (Hitotsubashi University)
Trade and Entrepreneurship with Heterogeneous Workers [paper]

Abstract

This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness, technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the formation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model. We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of international specialization, in which the share of entrepreneurial firms in the large (small) country first increases (decreases) and then decreases (increases), with the global economy exhibiting first de-industrialization and then re-industrialization. When countries have the same size, we also show that strong technological externalities make the symmetric equilibrium unstable, generating equilibrium multiplicity, while sufficient heterogeneity of individuals leads to the stability and uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium.

日時

2007年12月18日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Kazuharu Kiyono(清野一治) (Waseda University)

Incentives towards Economic Integration as the Second-Best Tariff Policy [PDF]

Abstract

Economic integration such as free trade areas (FTA) and customs unions (CU) allows importing countries to circumvent the constraint of non-discriminatory tariffs posed by the most favored nation clause in WTO and to employ (incomplete) tariff discrimination. Thus the second-best choice for the importing country, if it does regional integration, is to choose as the partner the exporting country which would have been subject to the lower tariff under the full tariff discrimination. Regardless of the mode of competition, we will find that such a partner tends to be less efficient than other exporting countries, which implies that voluntary regional integration leads the world economy to less efficient resource allocations.

日時

2007年12月21日(金 Friday)12:00-13:20 *Micro Brown Bag Seminarと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Tomomi Tanaka (田中知美) (Arizona State University)
The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps [PDF]

Abstract

We introduce an experimental approach to study the effect of institutions on economic
growth. In our experiment, agents produce output, which they trade in a market and allocate between consumption and investment in each of a sequence of periods. Capital productivity is higher if total capital stock is above a threshold. The threshold externality generates two steady states - a suboptimal "poverty trap" and an optimal "rich country steady state" - which differ by a factor of approximately three in the income they yield. In baseline sessions, in which agents make independent consumption decisions in a decentralized economy, the economies typically converge to the poverty trap and the optimal steady state is never reached. However, the ability to (a) make public announcements, or to (b) vote on competing and binding "industrial policy" proposals, increases output, welfare, and capital stock. Combining both of these simple institutions guarantees that the economies escape the poverty trap.

日時

2008年1月8日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Yasuyuki Sawada(澤田康幸) (University of Tokyo)
How Is Consumption Smoothed against Income and Asset Shocks Induced by an Earthquake? The Case of Yamakoshi Village(joint with Hidehiko Ichimura and Satoshi Shimizutani)

Abstract

We investigate how people insured themselves against unexpected losses caused by the Chuetsu earthquake in 2004. A novelty of our analysis is in the use of geological information as exogenous variations to identify the effects of the earthquake. While our empirical results show that our data  is consistent with the conventional full consumption risk-sharing hypothesis for the entire village, liquidity constraints seem to inhibit the consumption risk sharing. Further examinations of each risk coping measures reveal that with all the employed measures, there are more than 22 percent of  households whose net damage exceed 10 million yen or ninety thousand US dollars. These findings suggest a limitation of the standard test of full risk sharing using consumption data. The most important measure to cope with the earthquake risk was earthquake insurance, followed by donation and government transfer. On the other hand, private transfers play relatively and absolutely a small role. Finally, reductions in consumption and dissaving are measures employed only by well-off households.

日時

2008年1月22日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30 *金融センターワークショップと共催

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Shyam Sunder (Yale University)
1. Everyone-a-banker or the Ideal Credit Acceptance Game: Theory and Evidence.(joint with Juergen Huber and Martin Shubik)  [paper]
2. Three Minimal Strategic Market Games: Theory and Experimental Evidence.(joint with Juergen Huber and Martin Shubik) [paper]

Abstract

 

日時

2008年1月28日(月 Monday)11:00-12:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第2共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.2 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Hyun Song Shin (Princeton University)
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (joint with Stephen Morris) [paper]

Abstract

We provide a characterization of when an action is rationalizable in a binary action coordination game in terms of beliefs and higher order beliefs. The characterization sheds light on when a global game yields a unique outcome. In particular, we can separate those features of the noisy information approach to global games that are important for uniqueness from those that are merely incidental. We derive two sufficient conditions for uniqueness that do not make any reference to the relative precision of public and private signals.

日時

2008年2月12日(火 Tuesday)16:50-18:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Jong-Rong Chen (National Central University)
Bidding Strategies in Parallel Internet Auctions [paper]

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple model for multiple second-price auctions which run parallel to each other, in the sense that though they might not begin or end at the same time, they have certain periods of overlap. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy of the buyers and the equilibrium price of each auction. Last-minute bids arise naturally in the equilibrium. We show that, except for the last auction, the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay is less than his valuation, and that the ex ante expected transaction prices are identical for all auctions. A simple empirical test is also performed to verify the theoretical implication of the model.

日時

2008年2月20日(水 Wednesday)16:50-18:30 

※曜日が通常と異なりますのでご注意下さい※

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of the Economics Building

報告

Kai Konrad (Free University of Berlin)
Love, Taxes and Matching Institutions(joint with Kjell Erik Lommerud) [paper]

Abstract

Imperfect assortative matching induces inefficiencies if marriage contracts are incomplete and love and other emotional rents from being married to one another play a role. A high income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income earner even though they would
be a perfect match emotionally, because the high-income earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the marriage. Redistributive income taxation may solve this problem, as it reduces the income di?erences. Finally, we consider the role of matching institutions and their interaction with optimal taxation. We also consider the option of divorce and its ambivalent role for the decision to marry and to stay in a marriage.

日時

2008年3月10日(月 Monday)16:50-18:30

※曜日が通常と異なりますのでご注意下さい※

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

Ivan Png (National University of Singapore / Hitotsubashi Law and Economics Visitor)
Copyright Law, Movie Production, and Video Pricing: the European Rental Directive [PDF]

Abstract

In November 1992, the European Economic Community issued Directive 92/100/EEC (the “Rental Directive”) to harmonize copyright laws with regard to rights of rental and lending, and the neighboring rights of performers, music and film producers, and broadcasters.  Member countries of the European Economic Area were required to comply with the Directive with effect from July 1994.

We studied the impact of the Rental Directive on movie production and video pricing in 17 European countries during the period 1993-2005. 

The Rental Directive was associated with movie production being 2.46% (±1.55%) to 4.43% (±2.76%) higher.  Importantly, the impact was higher in countries where piracy was lower.  These findings were robust to various specifications, including the measure of compliance with the Rental Directive and the measure of piracy, changes in government funding, other significant changes in copyright law, and exclusion of a possible outlier country.

The Rental Directive enabled movie producers to directly discriminate between video tapes for sale vis-a-vis rental.  It was associated with retail rental revenues being 0.85% higher and retail sale revenues being 1.81% higher. 

 

日時

※ 2008年1-2月 修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

1.下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

(Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

2.発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

(Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

発表者の方へ

下記の期日までにセンター研究支援室の田中まで発表論文のファイルを送るかハードコピーをセンター研究支援室(経済学研究科棟7階709号室)までご持参下さい。 提出されたファイルはすぐに印刷にまわしてしまいますので、その後の差し替えがないよう、最終稿を1度け提出してください。 期限内に届いたものについては当日配布用印刷物を用意いたしますが、間に合わない場合やその後の差し替えについては、当日ご自分で15部ほどコピーをご持参下さい。期限内に提出されなかった場合は、印刷を受け付けられませんのでご注意ください。

※ 印刷物は発表が始まる迄にご用意致しますので、発表直前にセンター研究支援室へお立寄りいただき、各自で会場までお持ち下さい。

発表論文提出期限:

1月15日(火)発表者=1月15日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月16日(水)発表者=1月15日(火)朝9:00(必着)まで

1月29日(火)発表者=1月28日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

2月5日(火)発表者=2月4日(月)朝9:00(必着)まで

日時

January 15, 2008(Tuesday) 16:50-17:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

後藤陽一
Does cohabitation induce more children?

日時

January 15, 2008(Tuesday) 17:30-18:10

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

土居直史
農業製品に関する貿易政策の評価: 1990年前後の日本の牛肉市場の分析

日時

January 15, 2008(Tuesday) 18:10-18:50

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

花田真一

政策誘導型の法律の市場における効力

日時

January 15, 2008(Tuesday) 18:50-19:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

安井武志

CDレンタルがCD売上げに与える影響

日時

January 16, 2008(Wednesday) 16:50-17:30

場所

東京大学赤門総合研究棟 第13演習室
at the Lecture Hall No.13 on the ground floor of  Akamon-sogo-kenkyutou, University of Tokyo

報告

庵原さおり

医療政策をめぐる政治経済学的分析: 公的医療保険の規模と民間医療保険との関連性について

日時

January 16, 2008(Wednesday) 17:30-18:10

場所

東京大学赤門総合研究棟 第13演習室
at the Lecture Hall No.13 on the ground floor of  Akamon-sogo-kenkyutou, University of Tokyo

報告

森 浩太
Horizontal differentiation model of multi-product duopoly when reservation price is low

日時

January 16, 2008(Wednesday) 18:10-18:50

場所

東京大学赤門総合研究棟 第13演習室
at the Lecture Hall No.13 on the ground floor of  Akamon-sogo-kenkyutou, University of Tokyo

報告

山田英嗣
The evaluation of global supply chain under uncertainty

日時

January 29, 2008(Tuesday) 16:50−17:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

橋本 理
Generic impossibility of partial ex-post implementation with general preference spaces

日時

January 29, 2008(Tuesday) 17:30−18:10

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

前川   淳

ねずみ講ゲーム

日時

January 29, 2008(Tuesday) 18:10−18:50

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

松木佑介
Pros and cons in decision making: Confrontation in persuading a group

日時

February 5, 2008(Tuesday) 16:50−17:30

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

早川 仁

How to overcome coordination failure in organizations: Experimental design of "corporate turnaround game"

日時

February 5, 2008(Tuesday) 17:30−18:10

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

大野 仁

チャリティ・ビジネスの可能性: 営利企業に寄付ができるか

日時

February 5, 2008(Tuesday) 18:10−18:50

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the Economics Research Building

報告

木村剛継
電子上の商取引に関わる第三者機関と企業との共謀について