Workshops

3月14日（火 Tuesday） 10:20-12:00, 15:00-16:40

*COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series

*金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Information in Mechanism Design [PDF]

We survey the recent literature on the role of information in mechanism design. First, we discuss an emerging literature on the role of endogenous payoff and strategic information for the design and the efficiency of the mechanism. We specifically consider information management in the form of acquisition of new information or disclosure of existing information. Second, we argue that in the presence of endogenous information, the robustness of the mechanism to the type space and higher order beliefs becomes a natural desideratum. We discuss recent approaches to robust mechanism design and robust implementation.

3月15日（水 Wednesday） 15:00-16:30

Jeffrey Kline (Bond University)

Inductive Game Theory:  A Basic Scenario (joint with Mamoru Kaneko) [PDF]

 The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we will give a more developed discourse of the theory. The paper is written to show one entire picture of the theory: From individual raw experiences, short-term memories to long-term memories, inductive derivation of individual views, classification of such views, decision making or modification of behavior based on a view , and repercussion from the modified play in the objective game. We focus on some clear-cut cases, forgetting a lot of possible variants, but will still give a lot of results. In order to show one possible discourse as a whole, we will ask the question of how Nash equilibrium is emerging from the viewpoint of inductive game theory, and will give one answer.

3月15日（水 Wednesday） 16:50-18:30  *金融センターワークショップと共催

Dirk Bergemann (Yale University)

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms [PDF]

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict contraction property on the preference which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility and the strict single crossing property is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism.   The contraction property essentially requires that the interdependence is not too large. In a linear signal model, the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having an eigenvalue less than one. The contraction property is also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism.

2005年4月12日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

COE Distinguished Reserach Seminar

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Charles Plott (California Institute of Technology)

The Dynamics of General Equilibrium and

Multi Market Systems in Multiple Experimental Markets

[PDF: Distributed for the seminars on April 12 &14]

2005年4月14日（木 Thursday） 15:00-16:40 *Presentation in English

金融教育研究センター(CARF)特別セミナー

*COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series 共催

Charles Plott (California Institute of Technology)

The Basic Laws of Market Economics:

The Application of Laboratory Methods in Economics

場所： 東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟4階 第5教室

at the Lecture Hall No.5 (E) on the 4th floor of the New Economics Building

*場所が変更になりましたのでご注意下さい。

2005年4月19日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

中馬宏之 Hiroyuki Chuma (一橋大学イノベーション研究センター Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University)

Increasing Complexity and Limits of Organization in the Microlithography Industry: Implications for Japanese Science-based Industries [PDF]

The purpose of this paper is to identify characteristics of the complexities and organizational limits that science-based industries in Japan are facing, to clarify the causes and effects of those characteristics and to show how they are related to the recent decline in global competitiveness in these industries. The microlithography industry is used for this purpose as a typical example of sciencebased industries. In this industry, Nikon and Canon were quite dominant until around the mid 1990s, while ASML of the Netherlands began to increase its competitive strength rapidly in the mid 1990s. The paper introduces the new concept of "interim modularity" vis-a-vis "ex ante modularity" a la Baldwin and Clark (2000) to explain how ASML tries to cope effectively with the drastically increasing complexity of such a technology. The concept of interim modularity is defined as the communication benefits induced by the modular architecture during trial-and-error development processes, no matter how incomplete such architecture may be. The paper emphasizes that extremely complex tools like microlithography require interim modularity to effectively orchestrate the dispersion of specialized knowledge and know-how over a wide range of professionals inside and outside of corporations and that interim modularity is more effectively pursued by ASML than by Nikon or Canon. The paper also indicates that the insufficient cognition of the importance of interim modularity has been widely weakening the competitiveness especially in Japanese science-based industries.

2005年4月26日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Kong-Ping Chen (Academia Sinica)

Internal Control vs External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion (joint with C. Y. Cyrus Chu, Academia Sinica) [PDF]

The purpose of this paper is to offer a formal model of corporate income tax evasion. While individual tax evasion is essentially a portfolio selection problem, corporate income tax evasion is much more complicated. When the owner of a firm decides to evade taxes, not only does it risk being detected by the tax authorities but, more importantly, the optimal compensation scheme offered to the employees will be altered. Specifically, due to the illegal nature of tax evasion, the contract offered to the manager is necessarily incomplete. This creates a distortion in the manager's effort, and reduces the efficiency of the contract. Tax evasion thus increases the profit retained by the firm not only at the expense of the risk of being detected, but also in the efficiency loss of internal control.

2005年5月10日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

* 都市経済ワークショップ Urban Economics Workshop と共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

John Weymark (Vanderbilt University)

Public Good Provision and the Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation (with Craig Brett) [PDF]

2005年5月17日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Chongwoo Choe (Australian Graduate School of Management)

Financial Intermediation: Theory and Lessons for Japan's Banking Reform

How are banks different from markets in playing the fundamental role of a financial system? What makes banks a more efficient way of channelling funds from the surplus sector to the deficit sector, despite additional costs of intermediation? The purpose of this note is twofold. First, I present a simple model to address several key questions pertaining to financial intermediaries. In particular, I focus on the following questions: (a) what are the key issues in external financing arrangements; (b) what are the costs and benefits of using financial intermediaries; (c) what makes financial intermediaries a robust, viable mechanism? Based on the insight from the theoretical model, I then discuss policy implications for reforming Japan's banking sector.

5月26日（木 Tursday） 16:50-18:30 *Macroworkshopと共催

Steve Davis  (University of Chicago)

Electricity Pricing to U. S. Manufacturing Plants, 1963-2000 (with John Haltiwnager and others)

2005年5月27日（金 Friday） 17:00-18:30

*Presentation in English, 都市経済ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

James Harrigan (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

Airplanes and Comparative Advantage

Airplanes are a fast but expensive means of shipping goods. This fact has implications for comparative advantage. The model of the paper shows that countries that are far from their export markets will specialize in high value/weight products, which will be shipped on airplanes. Less remote exporters will specialize in low value/weight products which will be sent by ship, train, or truck. These implications are confirmed using detailed data on U.S. imports from 1990 to 2003. Distance from the US and air shipment are associated with much higher import unit values.

2005年5月31日（火 Tuesday）16:50-18:30

*Presentation in English

*Professor Herakles Polemarchakis's seminar was CANCELLED.

16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (University of Tokyo)

Voluntarily Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (with Takako Fujiwara-Greve)[PDF]

Abstract: We introduce a new model of voluntarily repeated games where the length of repetition is endogeneously determined. We consider a large society of homogeneous players, in which players are randomly matched in each period to play prisoner's dilemma as well as to choose whether to play the game again with the same partner. When newly matched, players have no information about the past actions of each other. Therefore ordinary folk theorem does not apply. We show that neutrally stable strategy (NSS) must have some periods of trust-building followed by disciplinary cooperation (cooperate and keep the partnership if and only if the partner cooperated.) Myopic defection is not NSS even though it is a Nash equilibrium strategy. The minimum length of trust-building depends on the gain of deviation and the death probability. When the number of trust-building periods is even smaller than this minimum, polymorphic NSS may exist, in which a variety of trust-building periods co-exist, and thus some are exploiting others even though the players are homogenous. When cheap talk is introduced at the beginning of the game, most efficient NSS becomes the unique NSS strategy.

2005年6月7日（火 Tuesday） 16:00-17:40  ※時間帯と場所に注意

*Presentation in English, joint with CARF Workshop 金融センターワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟4階 第5教室
at the Lecture Hall No.5 on the 4th floor of the New Economics Building

Sean Masaki Flynn (Vassar College, New York)

Arbitrage, Noise-trader Risk, and the Cross Section of Closed-end Fund Returns[PDF]

I find that despite active arbitrage activity, the discounts of individual closed-end funds are not driven to be consistent with their respective fundamentals. In addition, arbitrage portfolios created by sorting funds by discount level show excess returns not only for the three Fama and French (1992) risk factors but when a measure of average discount movements across all funds is included as well. Because the inclusion of this later variable soaks up volatility common to all funds, the observed inverse relationship between the magnitude of excess returns in the cross section and the ability of these variables to explain overall volatility leads me to suspect that fund-specific risk factors exist which, were they measurable, would justify what otherwise appear to be excess returns. I propose that fund-specific noise-trader risk of the type described by Black (1986) may be the missing risk factor.

2005年6月14日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *Presentation in English

*金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Lu Jingfeng (National University of Singapore)

Stochastic Private Values in Auctions: Identification and Estimation [PDF]

2005年6月17日（金 Friday） 16:50-18:30

*Presentation in English, 都市経済ワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building

Kenneth A. Small (U.C. Irvine)

On the Optimal Fares for Public Transport (with Ian W.H. Parry)

This paper derives formulas for optimal peak and off-peak urban rail and bus fares, and applies them to Washington DC, Los Angeles and London. The model accounts for congestion, pollution, and accident externalities on all modes; scale economies in transit supply; costs of accessing and waiting for transit service as well as service crowding costs; pre-existing fuel taxes; and agency adjustment of transit frequency, vehicle size, and route network to changes in demand for passenger miles. We find that optimal fare subsidies can be quite substantial, but their major determinants differ greatly according to time period, mode, adjustment of service frequency, and city.

2005年6月21日（火 Tuesday）

16:00-17:40 TIME CHANGED *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

太田　亘 Wataru Ohta (名古屋大学経済学部助教授 Associate Professor of Economics, Nagoya University)

演題：ディーラー市場のマーケット・マイクロストラクチャー
(Market Microstructure of Dealer Markets: A Survey)

Topic: マーケット・デザイン （On Market Design）

2005年6月28日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

*金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

大湾秀雄 Hideo Owan (John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University)

Formation, Competition, and Ownership of Internet Intermediaries

We analyze the formation and competition of market intermediaries when there are positive participation externalities between the two sides of the market and negative participation externalities within the same side. Registration with two intermediaries (i.e. multihoming) is allowed. There are two types of market intermediaries: one where multihoming always provides an additional benefit (additive type); and the other where connections with two intermediaries are substitutes (substitutable type). In the analyses of competition, we also consider three different ownership structures: third-party-owned (i.e. independent public exchange), buyer-owned (i.e. buy-side consortium exchange), and seller-owned. To deal with multiple equilibria, we assume that decisions made by potential participants are coordinated by a "pessimistic belief" about formation and entry of a new intermediary, and consider Stackleberg competition (i.e. there always are incumbent and entrant intermediaries) in the competition case.

Our primary results are as follows: first, we show that cross-subsidization is necessary to form a new intermediary even without competition because the pessimistic belief requires the intermediary owner to implement the desirable full participation outcome as the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, the incumbent can foreclose the entry of a third-party-owned intermediary if it is a substitutable type but cannot do so if it is an additive type. Third, the incumbent can deter the entry of a substitutable-type, seller-owned intermediary but make almost no profit by doing so, while the incumbent can never deter the entry of a substitutable-type, buyer-owned intermediary however small is the number of buyers participating in the consortium. Our work explains why independent public exchanges have been replaced by buy-side consortium exchanges in many industries in recent years.

2005年7月5日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

*COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Rafael Rob (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Is Bigger Better? Customer Base Expansion through Word of Mouth Reputation (with Arthur Fishman) [PDF]

A model of gradual reputation formation through a process of continuous investment is developed. We assume that the ability to produce highquality products requires continuous investment and that as a consequence of informational frictions, such as search costs, information about firms' past performance diffuses only gradually in the market. This leads to a dual process of growth of a firm's customer base, and a steady increase in the firm's investment in quality. As long as a firm continues to deliver high quality products, its reputation as a high quality firm grows, new customers are attracted and the firm increases in size. However, if quality deteriorates, the firm's customer base shrinks and remains stagnant until it is able to resurrect its reputation through successful investment. Since a good reputation is costly to acquire and takes a long time to regain once it has been lost, it becomes increasingly valuable the longer a firm's tenure as a high quality producer. Therefore, the longer its tenure, the more a firm stands to lose from tarnishing its reputation and, hence, the more it invests to maintain it.

2005年7月19日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30 *presentation in English

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

武岡則男 Norio Takeoka (Department of Economics, University of Rochester)

Subjective Probability over a Subjective Decision Tree [PDF]

Since Savage's seminal work, a state space has been assumed as a primitive, which requires the analyst to know all the uncertainties a decision maker perceives. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) derive a unique subjective state space from preference on a suitable domain.
In a dynamic setting, a state space S and a filtration {Ft} T t=0 over S have been taken as primitives. We derive the triple (S, {Ft} T t=0, P) from preference, where S is a subjective state space, {Ft}T t=0 is a subjective filtration over S, and P is a subjective probability over S. We also show uniqueness of the epresentation.

2005年8月2, 3, 9日14:30-16:10 *COE Frontier Economics Lecture Series

*8月2, 3日（ 火 Tuesday ・ 水 Wednesday）

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

*8月9日（火 Tuesday）

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第2教室
at the Lecture Hall No.2 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Jenny Lanjouw (University of California, Berkeley)

"Economic Perspectives on Global Patent Law and Pharmaceutical Regulation: R&D and Access to New Products" [Reading List]

2005年8月9日16:50-18:30 *COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第2教室
at the Lecture Hall No.2 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Kiminori Matsuyama (Northwestern University)

"Strategic Complementarities:  Some Macroeconomic Perspectives"

2005年8月10日16:50-18:30 *COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第2教室
at the Lecture Hall No.2 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Jenny Lanjouw (University of California, Berkeley)

Welfare in Villages and Towns: Disaggregated Estimation Using Census and Survey Data [Reading List]

2005年9月16日(金) 16:50-18:30

* 都市経済ワークショップ Urban Economics Workshop と共催

*COE Distinguished Research Seminar Series

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Nicholas Economides (Stern School of Business, New York University)

Competition Policies in Network Industries

2005年10月3日（月 Monday） 12:00-13:15 ※日時と場所に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building.

John Riew (Pennsylvania State University)

The U.S. Information Technology Revolution and Its Impact on U. S. Economy and Beyond

Phenomenal advances, which many would call a "revolution," in U.S. information technology (IT) sectors of the 1990s gave rise to dramatic productivity gains. They had profound effects on economies of the U.S. and other nations. We begin with an overview of the IT industries of the nineties and examine their impact on U.S. economy, at large, and by industry. To see the development in perspective, we proceed with a discussion of the perceived catalysts of the revolution. Then we explore how the remarkable sequence of events in the decade affected the rest of the world, most significantly the developing economies of East Asia. The paper ends with a review of Korea and Taiwan, with specific references to their rapidly changing industrial structures in the course of the deepening U.S. IT revolution.

2005年10月11日(火) 16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

清水崇 Takashi Shimizu (関西大学、Kansai University)

A Dynamic General Equilibrium Model with Centralized Auction Markets [PDF]

A model of centralized auction markets with a large number of agents is considered. In the model, there is no friction in trades in the sense that there is no transaction cost and no asymmetry of information. As contrasted with a conventional wisdom, which says that the outcome is Walrasian regardless of institutional differences as far as competitive
conditions are met, the equilibrium in our model does not coincide with that in the Walrasian market. More precisely, the set of equilibrium in our model with auction markets is a continuum which includes the Walrasian equilibria. A model of decentralized auction markets with a large number of agents is also investigated and a similar result is
obtained.

2005年10月21日(金 Friday） 15:00-18:30 ※日時と場所に注意

  *Search Theory Workshopと共催

東京大学・赤門総合研究棟１階　第７番教室

at the Lecture Hall No.7 on the ground floor of  Akamon-sogo-kenkyutou, University of Tokyo

松井彰彦、Akihiko Matsui (東京大学、University of Tokyo)

A Theory of International Currency and Seigniorage Competition [PDF]

尾崎裕之、Hiroyuki Ozaki (慶應義塾大学、Keio University)

Multiple-belief Rational-expectations Equilibria in OLG Models with Ambiguity [PDF]

2005年10月25日(火) 16:50-18:30   *金融センターワークショップと共催

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Ricard Gil (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Renegotiation and Relational Contracting [PDF]

2005年11月1日(火) 16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

関口洋平 Yohei Sekiguchi  (University of Tokyo)

Condorcet Jury Theorem or Rational Ignorance (joint with Minoru Kitahara) [PDF]

We analyze a symmetric model of an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is desirable for them. For each voter, an only information resource about the alternatives is a noisy signal, and she must pay some cost to reduce the noise. Although there are many possibilities of the signal structure, by focusing on {\itshape unbiased} voting strategies, we find that the problem can be reduced to one parameter: the probability that the desirable alternative in reality looks more plausible to the signal receiver. Another problem is a possibility of multiple equilibria. We show, however, that for any sequence of unbiased voting equilibria, the probability of electing the desirable alternative converges to the same value as the number of voters grows. Combining our results with the result of Martinelli (2005), we show that if the second order derivative of the information cost function is zero at no information then this probability converges to one, that is, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is valid, and otherwise converges to some value less than one, that is, the ``rational ignorance" hypothesis is valid.

2005年11月8日(火) 16:50-18:30  

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Joe Chen (University of Tokyo)

The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Fromation and the Cartel Price Path (joint with Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.) [PDF]

2005年11月15日(火) 16:50-18:30  

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

Olivier Tercieux (PSE, Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, CNRS)

Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria (joint with Daisuke Oyama)

[paper download]

This paper introduces the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 (1997)) and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). These results generalize existing results in the literature. Our proofs exploit the similarity between the mathematical structures of incomplete information elaborations and perfect foresight dynamics.

2005年11月18日(金 Friday) 16:50-18:30  ※曜日と場所に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第2教室
at the Lecture Hall No.2 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

西村直子 Naoko Nishimura (Sinshu University)

SPITE and COUNTER-SPITE IN AUCTIONS [PDF]

(joint with Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Timothy Cason, and Yoshikazu Ikeda)   

In the second-price auction and the English auction, a loser’s bid determines a winner’s payment for an auctioned object. Though, their transaction rule makes value-revealing bidding a dominant strategy, especially under the complete information, it is known that their Nash equilibrium set is too large, and the superiority of dominant strategy has not been empirically supported. Noting that this transaction rule also gives the losers means to manipulate the level of winner’s payment, we depart from the conventional model by allowing each bidder to collect psychological payoff from such manipulation.

Within this setting, we investigate theoretically as well as experimentally the competitive equilibrium bidding behavior of the above two forms of independent private values auction for a single item. We introduce a psychological interaction where the losing bidders are tempted to reduce the winning profit by overbidding, but at the same time, the winning bidder, anticipating such losers’ intention, is prepared to retaliate by underbidding. Unlike the conventional model, the set of equilibrium strategies become dramatically small. The value-revealing bidding strategy is no longer dominant nor Nash, yet the equilibrium set contains a point which is outcome equivalent to the value-revealing strategy profile. In addition, the two auction forms are no longer isomorphic, in that the equilibrium set in English auctions is even smaller toward the point outcome equivalent to the value-revealing strategy.

In our experiments, spiteful overbidding as well as counter-spite underbidding appears when bidders know each other’s values. In particular, spiteful overbidding gets more moderate in English auctions, leading to the significantly lower prices than in the second-price auctions. The result indicates that the two auction formats perform much better with psychological interaction, and the English auction is superior being effective in inhibiting too much of overbidding. When values are unknown, the value-revealing bidding strategy gains predominance. While English auction has been around through human civilization, we rarely observe the second-price auction in use. This may be evidence that a market was originally devised to take advantage of such “irrational” human nature to restore efficiency, contrary to the conventional view of super rational market.

2005年11月22日(火) 16:50-18:30  * Presentasion in JAPANESE

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

藤中裕二 Yuji Fujinaka (Kobe University)

Allocations most realizable through strategic manipulation [PDF]
(joint with Toyotaka Sakai)

This paper studies the consequences of the strategic manipulation of resource allocation rules in the problem of assigning an indivisible object with monetary transfers.   We introduce the notion of most realizable allocations, which are allocations chosen as ε-Nash equilibria for arbitrary small ε>0 in the direct revelation game of any rule.  We show that for every rule satisfying certain normative requirements, the set of most realizable allocations is non-empty and in fact coincides with the set of efficient and envy-free allocations. Thus possible strategic manipulation achieves efficiency and envy-freeness, while any other distributional objective cannot be attained.   This result much contrasts with the well-known non-existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules in the literature. Our result also suggests a way not to depend on the Groves rules, which violate budget balance.

2005年11月29日(火) 16:50-18:30  

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

西條辰義 Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Osaka University)

Design Science: A Prelude

<References>

1. 西條辰義・大和毅彦「自然なメカニズムデザインをめざして」

2. "Secure Implementation Experiments: Do Strategy-proof Mechanisms Really Work?"

(Timothy N. Cason, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Tomas Sjostrom, and Takehiko Yamato)

3. "Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments"

The goal of my talk is to build up a scientific framework for designing institutions.  For this purpose, as a first step, I will review several topics in the field of public good provision: (1) choice of equilibrium concepts, (2) theoretical framework, and (3) research methodology.

2005年12月6日(火) 16:50-18:30  

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

飯塚敏晃 Toshiaki Iizuka (Aoyama Gakuin University)

Durable Goods Price Cycles:  Theory and Evidence from the Textbook Market

(joint with Eric W. Bond) [PDF]

We develop a model of the monopoly pricing of a durable good when there are heterogeneous buyers. Our durable good has the features of a textbook: each period new consumers enter the market and the introduction of a new edition kills off used goods. We show that, unlike the traditional Swan-type models, durable good price could go up over the life of an edition if consumers are heterogeneous. Our empirical analysis using textbook pricing data supports our model: textbook prices increase as the share of used textbooks increases and the last period of the current edition arrives. In contrast, we find no evidence that textbook prices fall over the life of an edition.

2005年12月13日(火) 16:50-18:30

東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟3階 第3教室
at the Lecture Hall No.3 on the 3rd floor of the New Economics Building

小島武仁 Fuhito Kojima (Department of Economics, Harvard University)

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

(joint with Parag A. Pathak, Harvard University) [PDF]

The paper analyzes incentives and stability in two-sided matching markets when the number of participants is large and the length of the preference list is finite. Building on and extending Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), we first investigate the scope for manipulation in a many-to-one market. When preference lists are drawn from an arbitrary distribution for one side of the market and under a mild independence assumption on the distribution for the other side, we establish that the fraction of participants who can profitably misrepresent their preferences via truncation is small. Moreover, the scope of manipulations via capacities and pre-arranged matches approaches zero as the size of the market becomes large. With an additional bounded distribution assumption, truthful reporting is an approximate equilibrium, implying efficiency of the resulting matching.

2005年12月20日(火) 15:00-18:30 ※時間と場所に注意

Muhamet Yildiz (MIT)

Generic Uniqueness of Rationalizable Actions [PDF]

Joel Watson (University of California, San Diego)

Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail [PDF]

<reference>

Contract and Mechanism Design in Settings with Multi-Period Trade [PDF]

<Yildiz>

For a finite set of actions and a rich set of fundamentals, consider the rationalizable actions on the universal type space, endowed with the usual product topology. (1) Generically, there exists a unique rationalizable action profile. (2) Every model can be approximately embedded in a dominance-solvable model. (3) For any given rationalizable strategy of any finite model, there exists a nearby finite model with common prior such that the given rationalizable strategy is uniquely rationalizable for nearby types.

<Watson>

 This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings with nondurable trading opportunities and complete but unverifiable information. The framework explicitly accounts for the parties’ individual trade actions. The sets of implementable state-contingent payoffs, under various assumptions about renegotiation opportunities, are characterized and compared. The results indicate the benefit of modeling trade actions as individual, rather than as public, and they highlight the usefulness of a structured game-theoretic framework for applied research.

※ 2006年1-2月　修士論文報告会 Master's Thesis Presentations ※

１．下記の予定は変更の可能性もありますのでご注意下さい

（Please note that the schedule below might be changed)。

２．発表は基本的に日本語で行われます

（Presentations are basically in Japanese)。

全日程とも東京大学大学院経済学研究科棟 新棟12階 第1共同研究室
を予定しています。

All the presentations will be made at the Conference Room No.1 on the 12th floor of New Economics Building

下記の期日までにセンター研究支援室の厚谷（atsuya@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp）まで発表論文のファイルを送るかハードコピーをセンター研究支援室（経済学研究科棟７階７０９号室）までご持参下さい。提出されたファイルはすぐに印刷にまわしてしまいますので、その後の差し替えがないよう、最終稿を１度だけ提出してください。期限内に届いたものについては当日配布用印刷物を用意いたしますが、間に合わない場合やその後の差し替えについては、当日ご自分で１５部ほどコピーをご持参下さい。

発表論文提出期限：

1月17日発表者＝1月16日朝9:00（必着）まで

1月18日発表者＝1月17日朝9:00（必着）まで

1月24日発表者＝1月23日朝9:00（必着）まで

1月31日発表者＝1月30日朝9:00（必着）まで

1月17日（火 Tuesday）15:00-15:40

金澤　和彦

合併の効果：ＪＡＬとＪＡＳの事例より

1月17日（火 Tuesday）15:40-16:20

森岡　拓郎

交通社会実験による需要関数の推定

1月17日（火 Tuesday）16:20-17:00

神谷　安都子

特許法の経済分析：医薬品産業を事例として

1月17日（火 Tuesday）17:00-17:40

湯佐　友洋

Endogenous Monitoring in Multiprincipal Model

1月17日（火 Tuesday）17:40-18:20

矢野　智彦

Ineffective Monitoring As The Interaction Between Two Boards

1月17日（火 Tuesday）18:20-19:00

矢部　誠

コモンエージェンシーに関する研究

1月18日（水 Wednesday）15:00-15:40

ワン　ティ

CAMBODHIA'S ECONOMY:Reforming Its Financial System Towards Economic Growth

[paper]

1月18日（水 Wednesday）15:40-16:20

若森　直樹

Optimal Levels of Strategic Switching Costs

1月18日（水 Wednesday）16:20-17:00

バトジャルガル　ウランビレグ

The Newest Poverty Targeting Program in Mongolia -Child Money Program- :Evaluation and assessment of Its Targeting Methodology

[paper]  [appendix]

1月24日（火 Tuesday）15:40-16:20

長尾　以久
O'Nell's game を用いた実験とその分析

1月24日（火 Tuesday）15:00-15:40

宮崎　由佳
How Does Decentralization Control Government's Dicision Making? -Policy Innovation and Policy Imitation-

1月24日（火 Tuesday）16:20-17:00

山本　裕一
A Belief-Free Review Strategy in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

1月31日（火 Tuesday）15:00-15:40

齋籐　元由樹
建設業における共同研究開発投資について

1月31日（火 Tuesday）15:40-16:20

石原　章史
Relation Specific Investment with Cooperativity and Conditions of Efficient Breach Remedy

1月31日（火 Tuesday）16:20-17:00

大木　良子

過剰債務企業におけるファイナンス構造

1月31日（火 Tuesday）17:00-17:40

吉川　徳明

Who should be an FTA partner?

1月31日（火 Tuesday）17:40-18:20

大村　浩二
Optimal Monetary Policy and its Limitations

1月31日（火 Tuesday）18:20-19:00

高山　直樹
Foreign Direct Investment under Political Risk

1月18日（水 Wednesday） 12:00-13:10 ※日時と場所に注意

Hongbin Li (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Testing the External Effect of Household Behavior:  The Case of the Demand for Children [PDF]

This paper tests the external effect of household childbearing behavior by drawing on micro-fertility data from China. The test is executed by regressing one household’s fertility on the average fertility of neighboring households. This exercise is complicated by endogeneity problems from three sources: simultaneity, omitted community variables and sorting by fertility preference. China’s household registration and birth control policies provide a natural experiment for solving all three sources of endogeneity. First, these policies prevent household from moving for fertility reasons, thus endogenous sorting is not a problem. Second, the unique affirmative birth control policy allows us to conduct two natural experiments: (1) testing the external effect from the dominant Han Chinese to minority households; and (2) identifying the external effect using Instrumental Variables that are based on the differences-in-differences. We find fertility has a large external effect in general, and in particular among households that appear to have more social interactions.

1月24日（火 Tuesday） 16:50-18:30

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (Johns Hopkins University)

Collusion under Monitoring of Sales (joint with Andrzej Skrzypacz) [PDF]

Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms’prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized which does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quotas compensating those firma with sales below their quotas. In practice, cartels could have performed such transfers through sales among the cartel members.