Microeconomics Workshop 2001

※ 3月13日現在　近い予定から順に掲載しています
日時：
3月19日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部旧棟地下１階　第４教室
at the classroom No.4 in B1 floor of Old Econ. Building
報告：
新海哲哉(神戸市外国語大学)
（Cross-）Licensing System and R&D Investments in a Weakly Complementary Technologies Economy (joint with Satoru Tanaka and Makoto Okamura)
PAPER      HAND OUT
Abstract:
We consider the R&D investments competition of the two duopolistic firms in a weakly complementary technologies economy. By "the weakly complementary technologies", we mean that each firm can produce the goods without both of the two technologies but it incurs more redundant costs than that in the case with each or both of the technologies. That is, we distinguish "the weakly complementary technologies" from "the strongly complementary technologies" in that the firm cannot produce the goods at all without the use of both of them. We derive the investments competition equilibria in R&D of the two weakly complementary technologies with and without the (cross-)licensing system. By comparing of the R&D investment levels in the two equilibria, we show that the (cross-)licensing system promotes the R&D investments when the duopolistic firms can produce the goods by using of the two weakly complementary technologies.
※ 以下本年度終了分


日時：
4月10日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
鶴　光太郎（経済産業研究所）
"Should banks choose collateral lending or non-collateral lending?: The impact of project's risk, bank's monitoring efficiency and land price inflation"　
Abstract:
We present a two-period model, in which a bank chooses between collateral and non-collateral lending at a contractual date. Collateral lending, with costly collateral requirement, can provide two options for the bank, whether to terminate (and acquire a collateral value) or to refinance a project when it becomes poor. A threat of liquidation thus induces a borrower’s effort. Non-collateral lending is less costly, however, always refinance a project once it has become poor. Refinancing involves bank monitoring, which surely increases the bank’s returns and reduces the borrower’s private benefits. When the use of collateral is too costly, the bank will always choose non-collateral lending. Otherwise, the bank’s ex ante expectations of land prices have an important role in determining lending pattern. When high land prices are likely, the bank tends to choose collateral lending. We also examine the relationship between lending behaviour and bank supervision (and regulation).
日時：
4月17日（火）4:50-6:30pm　※ TCERと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
西村清彦(東京大学経済学部)
尾崎裕之（東北大学経済学部）
"Search and Knightian Uncertainty"　
Abstract:
Suppose that "uncertainty" about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer is drastically different depending on whether an increase in "uncertainty" is an increase in risk or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that the worker thinks she faces) increases the reservation wage, an increase in the Knightian uncertainty (a decrease in her confidence about the wage distribution) reduces it.
日時：
4月24日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Makoto Shimoji下地　誠 (横浜国大経済学部)
"A Proof for Ewerhart’s Conjecture "　
Abstract & Introduction：
In this paper, we prove the conjecture by Ewerhart (Games and Economic Behavior, 2000).
Ewerhart (2000) shows that any finite two-person strictly competitive perfect informa-tion game which ends in one of three possible ways is solvable by applying only two rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies by pure strategies. In addition, he conjectures that this result can be generalized in the following way: any finite two-person strictly competitive perfect information game ending one of n possible ways is solvable by applying only n − 1 rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies by pure strategies. In this paper, we prove his conjecture. Furthermore, we discuss his remark on backward induction.
日時：
5月1日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Kazuya Kamiya and Takashi Sato 神谷和也・佐藤　崇(東京大学経済学部)
"Equilibrium Price Dispersion in a Matching Model with Divisible Money"
Abstract：
The main purpose of this paper is to show that, for any given parameter values, an equilibrium with dispersed prices (two-price equilibrium) exists in a simple matching model with divisible money presented by Green and Zhou (1998). Moreover, a positive welfare effect of price dispersion is analyzed.
日時：
5月8日（火）4:50-6:30pm　　※TCERと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Dolf Talman(Tilburg University)
"Quantity Constrained Equilibria" (co-authored with J-J. Herings, G. vander Laan)　
Abstract:
In a standard general equilibrium model it is assumed that there are no price restictions and that prices adjust infinitely fast to their equilibrium values. In case of price rigidities a competitive equilibrium may not exist and rationing on net demands or supplies is needed to clear the markets. Both Dreze and Benassy proved in the mid 1970s that there exists an equilibrium at which not both demand and supply of a good are rationed simultaneously, at least one commodity is not rationed at all, and there is rationing on the net supply or net demand of a good only if the price of that good is on its lower or upper bound, respectively. In the 1980s disequilibrium models with only rationing on net supplies were introduced. In all these models prices are restricted to positive lower and upper bounds.
In this paper the set of admissible prices is allowed to be an arbitrary convex set. For such an arbitrary set it can not be guaranteed that there exists a constrained equilibrium satisfying that a price will be on its upper or lower bound in case of rationing. We introduce a more general equilibrium concept, called Quantity Constrained Equilibrium (QCE). At such an equilibrium the levels of supply and demand rationing are completely determined by the components of a direction in which the price system can not be moved further without leaving the set of admissible prices. When the set is compact, we show the existence of a connected set of QCEs, containing two trivial no-trade equilibria. Moreover, the set contains for every commodity a generalized Dreze equilibrium, being a QCE at which this commodity is not being rationed, and also a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium without demand rationing. We apply this main result to several special cases, including the case of an unbounded set of admissible prices.
日時：
5月15日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Akihiko Matsui 松井彰彦(東京大学経済学部)
"Organizations and Overlapping Generations Games: Memory, Communication, and Altruism" (co-authored with Roger Lagunoff)　
Abstract:
This paper studies the role of memory and communication in games between on-going orgainzations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. Entry across distinct organizations are asynchronous: no two individuals alive at a date t have entered at the same time. We model these as repeated games between overlapping generations of individuals(OLG games). It has been shown elsewhere that Folk Theorems hold in OLG games with long enough lived individuals who can perfectly observe the past. However, the Folk Theorem fails for many games when individuals have no prior memory, i.e., no individual can witness events that occur before his entry into the game. We examin OLG games without prior memory. We then examine such games when the past can be communicated by onr generation to the next through "cheap talk" communication. With costly communication, an approximate Folk Theorem holds only when there is some altruistic link between cohorts in an organizaiton. The equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is sometimes carried out long after both victim and perpetrator have left the game. Without this special structure, altruism may in fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible.
日時：
5月22日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Yuichi Noguchi 野口雄一(一橋大学経済学部)
"Nonmyopic Optimality of Conditional Learning"
Abstract:
We study nonmyopic optimality of conditional learning. In the learning literature, most studies focus on cases players are myopic or naive in some sense. In this paper, we investigate some sophisticated learning behavior of a nonmyopic player. We suppose that a player is sophisticated in the sense that he is able to recognize many strategic regularities that his opponent strategy might follow (for example, computable pure strategies, Markov strategies, and so on). An important foundamental problem in that case is how well the player learns to optimize nonmyopically against those regularities. In order to evaluate it, we propose a strong nonmyopic optimality criterion. Passing the criterion means that a player may eventually obtain almost as high realized discounted payo sums as if he knew a true opponent strategy. We define some class of patient strategies which is called conditional smooth nonmyopic play; it is a nonmyopic extension of conditional smooth fictitious play. Then, we explicitly construct a sophisticated learning rule for the play, so that one may understand how a patient player learns to play. A main result in this paper is that single conditional smooth nonmyopic play on the learning rule passes the strong criterion for all regular opponent strategies.
日時：
5月29日（火）4:50-6:30pm　※ 事前配付資料はありません no paper distributed in advance
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Ayumu Yasutomi 安冨　歩(東京大学大学院総合文化研究科)
多様性のダイナミクス―自由度の可変的なレプリケータ方程式―
日時：
6月 5日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
J. Mark Ramseyer (University of Tokyo/Harvard Law School) ※Presentation in English
Does Ownership Matter? (joint with Yoshiro Miwa, University of Tokyo)
Abstract:
In 1985, Demsetz & Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns would yield insignificant results.
To test the Demsetz- Lehn hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from late-1940s Japan as a natural experiment: an exogenous shock to the pre-war ownership equilibrium. Through that program, the U.S.- run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the most successful Japanese companies. By focusing on the way firms and investors responded to the mandated sell- off, we accomplish two goals: (a) we avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and (b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward their optimal ownership structure .
With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the equilibrating mechanism behind Demsetz-Lehn: between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu firms did reconcentrate their ownership structure. As of 1953, the unlisted ex-zaibatsu and new firms still had not been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to approach their profit - maximizing ownership structures. Even the listed firms had not fully undone the effect of the occupation- induced changes on managerial practices. By 1958 the firms had done this, and the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared. By then, firm profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or piecewise specifications. We further find no evidence that ex-zaibatsu firms sought to strengthen their ties to banks over 1953 - 58.
日時：
6月12日（火）4:50-6:30pm ※TCERと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Roberta Romano (Yale Law School) PAPER 1  PAPER 2
Event Studies and the Law
日時：
6月13日（水）4:50-6:30pm ※TCERと共催、曜日と場所にご注意下さい
場所：
東京大学経済学部7階　第１共同研究室
at the meeting room No.1 on the 7th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Masanao Aoki (UCLA/CIRJE) and Hiroshi Yoshikawa (University of Tokyo)
A New Model of Economic Fluctuations and Growth
Abstract:
This paper presents a new model of the economy with many sectors which face quantity constraints. Depending on the sign of the sectoral excess demand, the size of each sector either increases or decreases stochastically. We assume that reallocation of resources is not instantaneous, and rely on the notion of holding or sojourn time of continuous time Markov chains to select the sector which changes its size. We demonstrate that the output of this model fluctuates, and more importantly, that the level of the aggregate economic activity depends on the pattern of demands of the sectors of the economy. Since the model is extremely simple, these results are believed to be generic.
日時：
6月19日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Munetomo Ando and Daisuke Oyama (GS of Economics, University of Tokyo)
A Model of Spatial Economies with Trading Posts
Abstract:
This paper develops a framework in which exchange takes place at pairwise markets in an economy with locations. In the economy there are several towns, each of which has pairwise markets characterized by trading posts a la Shapley and Shubik (1977). At each trading post, taking prices as given, agents submit commodities or money simultaneously with no resale. Commodities can be transported across towns with costs. In this setting, a decentralized economy with one town being a trading center may emerge in equilibrium.
Key Words:
trading posts; transportation costs; agglomeration and dispersion of transaction activities
日時：
6月26日(火) 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th fllor of Econ. Building
報告：
Eric Rasmusen (Indiana University/CIRJE)
Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One's Own Private Value in Auctions
Abstract:
Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions. This can explain sniping―flurries of bids late in aucitons with deadlines―as the result of bidders trying to avoid stimulating other bidders into examining their bid ceiling more carefully.
日時：
7月3日(火) 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th fllor of Econ. Building
報告：
Ryo Kambayashi (Tokyo Metropolitan University)
Employment Agencies in Antebellum Japan---Public or Private?
戦前期日本の職業紹介制度―国営紹介と民営紹介
Paper 1: 「国営化までの職業紹介制度―制度史的沿革」（当日配布のみ）
本稿の中心的な課題は、職業紹介事業が公的独占のもとにおかれるまでの紆余曲折を観察することによって、職業紹介事業の機能について考察することである。戦前期の職業紹介事業は、公営紹介と民営紹介が併存したところに特徴がある。しかし、法律的な後ろ盾を有した公営紹介が、民営紹介を押しのけて順調な発展を遂げたわけではなかった。民営紹介は、公営紹介に比較して身元保証などの機能で優れ、1930年代中ごろまでは市場においても政府見解においても一定の存在意義が認められていたのである。それにもかかわらず、38年に職業紹介事業が公的独占のもとにおかれたのは、民営紹介の存在意義を覆い隠すに足る統制経済の強い影響ゆえであった。
Paper 2:「戦前期日本の職業紹介制度―公営紹介と民営紹介」downloadable paper in Japanese
※ 7月10日（火）は休講です No Lecture on July 10
日時：
7月17日(火) 3:20-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部２階　第５教室
at the classroom No.5 on the 2nd floor of Econ. Building
報告：
3:20-4:50pm Mitsuhiro Kaneda (Georgetown University)
"Do Profit Maximizers Maximize Profit?" (joint with Akihiko Matsui)
Abstract: This paper questions the time withstanding justification behind modeling firms as profit maximizers, that is, survival of firms depends on profits. By distinguishing profit maximization as an objective and as a result, it is shown that firms with the profit maximization objective do not necessarily attain profits higher than firms that do not have the profit maximization objective, in a simple Cournot oligopoly model with full rationality. Applying Friedman's as-if logic, a firm with a non-profit maximizing objective function can qualify as an as-if profit maximizer. This opens the door to revisit the managerial theory of the firm.
Keywords: managerial theory of the firm, non-profit maximization objective, as-if profit maximization
5:00-6:30pm Hiroshi Ohashi (UBC)
"Anticipatory Effects of Voluntary Export Restraints: A Study of Home Video Cassette Recorders Market, 1978-86"
Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of VERs at the pre-implementation stage when exporters have a good prospect for the VERs. Distinctive features of the VCR market in 1978-86 provide a testable hypothesis to analyze the effect of the EC-Japan VERs, which were implemented in the fiscal years of 1983-85. The paper finds consistent evidence that the VERs affected firms' pricing behavior in the U.S. market prior to the VER period, as a result of Japanese exporters' anticipation of the VERs.
Keywords: voluntary export restraints, anticipation, supply constraint, video cassette recorders
＜CIRJE-TCER Conference on Economic Theory＞
日時：
7月24日（火）10:30am-6:30pm ※すべてTCER, Macroworkshopと共催
場所：
午前の部：東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
午後の部：同学部2階 第5室となります
Morning Session: at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
Afternoon Session: at the classroom No.5 on the 2nd floor of the same building
報告：
10:30-12:00am Dilip Abreu (Princeton University) "Bubbles and Crashes" (with Markus Brunnermeier)
Abstract:
We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem together with the individual incentive to time the market results in the persistence of bubbles over a substantial period of time. The model provides a natural setting in which public events, by enabling synchronization, can have a disproportionate impact relative to their intrinsic informational content.
Keywords:
Bubbles, Crashes, Temporal Coordination, Synchronization, Market Timing, 'Overreaction', Limits of Arbitrage, Behavioral Finance
1:20-2:50pm Rafael Rob (University of Penn.) "Vintage Capital, Distortions and Development" (joint with Samuel de Abreu Pessoa)
3:00-4:30pm Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (LSE) "Liquidity, Asset Price, and Monetary Policy" (joint with John Moore)
4:50-6:30pm Michael Woodford (Princeton University) "A Neo-Wicksellian Framework for the Analysis of Monetary Policy"
日時：
9月4日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
芹澤成弘 Shigehiro Serizawa （東北大学経済学部）
Efficient and Strategy-Proof Allocation Rules: Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
(joint with Chew Soo-Hong)
Abstract:
This paper studies the allocation of heterogeneous commodities to agents whose private values for combinations of these commodities are strictly monotonic by inclusion. This approach can accommodate the presence of complementarity and substitutability among the heterogeneous commodities. We establish that the Vickrey combinatorial auction cor-responds to the unique efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational allocation rule. This yields a revenue equivalence result: For any profile of values, efficient, strategy proof, and individually rational auctions generate the same revenue as the Vickrey combinato-rial auction. We further show that the Vickrey combinatorial auction minimizes revenues among all mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules in dominant strategies. This addresses the concern arising from several recent auction sales of spectrum rights that the excessively high revenues raised may compromise the successful bidders' abilities to provide the requisite service at the intended quality and coverage.
日時：
9月11日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
高野久紀 Hisaki Kohno (東京大学大学院)
"Connection and Exploitation: Negative Network Effects"
In less developed countries (LDCs),it is widely observed that employers hire workers through employee referrals;for instance,their brothers, relatives,or friends.Job applicants try to make best use of this kind of networks to get jobs. In this paper,we show the extension of such networks may decrease applicants' payoff. In contrast,the diversification of networks raises their payoff. Further, we argue the relationship between farmers and traders with interlinked contracts in the same context.

清水大昌 Daisuke Shimizu（東京大学大学院）
"Product Differentiation in Spatial Cournot Markets"
The concept of product differentiation is introduced to the spatial markets model with Cournot competition, via the inverse demand function of Deneckere (1983). We show that there are two distinct factors, strategy effect and location effect, that affect the equilibrium structure. The former dominates in the circular city model, making the equilibrium dependent on whether the competing goods are substitutes or complements. In the circular city model the latter dominates, causing the variance in the degree of product differentiation to have no effect on the equilibrium.
日時：
10月2日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
小井田伸雄 Koida, Nobuo （東京大学大学院）
Endogenous Preferences for Information by Updating Ambiguous Beliefs
Abstract:
  This paper analyses the decision of an economic agent confronting Knightian uncertainty in the sense of Schmeidler (1989). We show that when the probability capacity is represented by a transformation of probability measure (when the probability is rank-dependent (Quiggin (1982)) or it is represented by "probabilistically sophisticated (Machina and Schmeidler (1992))" Choquet expected uitility) and the updating rule is Bayesian or Dempster-Shafer with a threshold information partition, the curvature of this function determines relation of folding-back and one-shot Choquet expected utilities, which extends the law of iterated expectation to the case of non-additive probability.
  Especially, we show that if we adopt Bayesian updating rule, the transformation function is convex and its curvature is monotone decreasing, the decision maker shows an aversion to information in the sense that her Chouquet expected utility decreases if there is information resolution in the halfway.
  And we consider two cases of increasing "accuracy of information." One is increasing the number of thresholds and the other is increasing the number of iteration. We show that in the former, iterative expected utility approaches to the one-shot expected value, whereas it approaches to the minimum value of utility in the latter with some information structure.
日時：
10月9日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Johannes Moenius （Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University / CIRJE）
The Effect of Technical Standards on Trade-Flows: Why is Japan different?
Abstract:
In recent years, technical standards as non-tariff barriers to trade have gained importance in the political debate. In this work-shop, I present evidence that standards that differ across countries do not necessarily pose a barrier to trade. Standards provide information about the technical and economic environment of countries and lower product adaptation costs. By that, they can actually promote trade relative to a world without standards. Japanese standards, however, don’t fully match that pattern: While Japanese standards seem to promote Japanese exports, they also seem to hinder imports into Japan. I currently investigate two possible causes for this phenomenon: (1) coordination within industries may be different in Japan as compared to other countries and (2) the institutional set-up of the standardization process in Japan is different to the one of its main trading partners. Preliminary evidence for both causes conclude the presentation.
日時：
10月16日（火） 4:50-6:30pm　※ TCERと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
下村研一 Shimomura, Ken-Ichi （大阪大学国際公共政策研究科, Osaka University）
Product Liability and Signaling in a Monopolistic Market （鷹岡澄子と共著; joint with Sumiko Takaoka, GS of Economics, Osaka University）
Abstract:
We explore the allocation system of liability costs between the consumer and the firm based on the model of Daughety and Reinganum (1995, AER), where prices signal product quality which is the probability of a defective product. We examine the effect of a change in the allocation system of liability costs on social welfare under both complete and incomplete information.
Under complete information, welfare is independent of the allocation system. Under incomplete information, the demand is dependent of allocation system and the firm's profit increases as the firm's liability costs increase. Then the social welfare increases as the firm's marginal cost of product risk approaches to zero.
日時：
10月23日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
二神孝一 Koichi Futagami （大阪大学経済学部, Osaka University）
Signal-Extracting Education in an Overlapping Generations Model (joint with Shingo Ishiguro)
日時：
10月30日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
小西秀樹 Konishi, Hideki （学習院大学経済学部, Gakushuin University）
A Theory of Reelection Pressure Approach to Fiscal Reconstruction　
Abstract：
This paper formalizes the role of budget policies as a signal of an incumbent government's unknown preference for political transfers, using a model of political competition via lobbying and voting. It is shown that in an undominated equilibrium with large reelection rents, the retrospective voting by unorganized citizens leads a less corrupt government to reduce budget deficits placing a higher priority on cutting excessive spending rather than on increasing taxes. The effect of imposing a balanced budget rule is also examined.
日時：
11月6日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
常木　淳 Tsuneki, Atsushi （大阪大学社会経済研究所, Osaka University）
エッセンシャル・ファシリティの法理に関する「法と経済学」的一考察 (安念潤司（大阪大学）と共著）　
日時：
11月13日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
三輪芳朗 Miwa, Yoshiro（東京大学大学院経済学研究科/CIRJE, University of Tokyo）
Directed Credit? Capital Market Competition in High-Growth Japan (joint with Mark Ramseyer, Harvard Law School) : CIRJE Discussion Paper 2001-F-132
Abstract:
  Observers routinely claim that the Japanese government during the high-growth 1960s and 70s rationed and ultimately directed credit. It banned investments by foreigners, barred domestic competitors to banks, and capped loan interest rates. Through the resulting credit shortage, it manipulated credit to promote its industrial policy.
  In fact, the government did nothing of the sort. It did not bar foreign capital, did not block domestic rivals, and did not set maximum interest rates that bound. Using evidence on loans to all 1000-odd firms listed on Section 1 of the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1968 to 1982, we show that the observed interest rates reflected borrower risk and mortgageable assets, and that banks did not use low-interest deposits to circumvent any interest caps. Instead, the loan market probably cleared at the nominal rates.
  We follow our empirical inquiry with a case study of one of the industies where the government tried hardest to direct credit: ocean shipping. We find no evidence of credit rationing. Rather, we show that non-conformist firms funded their projects readily outside authorized avenues -- so readily that the non-conformists grew with spectacular speed and earned their investors enormous returns.
日時：
11月20日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
神戸伸輔 Kambe, Shinsuke （学習院大学経済学部, Gakushuin University）
Subject Evaluation in Agency Contracts
Abstract:
We study how a principal uses her subjective evaluation of the agent's performance in the incentive contract. It is shown that subjective information can be utilized either 1) when there is no other information than the principal's subjective evaluation and she can commit herself to discard money, and 2) when the subjective information is sufficiently accurate. The optimal contract in either case pays a fixed wage when the subjective evaluation is sufficiently high.
日時：
11月27日（火） 4:50-6:30pm　※TCERと共催。
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
石黒真吾 Ishiguro, Shingo （立命館大学経済学部, Ritsumeikan University）
Contracts and Endogenous Inequality (joint with Koichi Futagami, Osaka University)
Abstract:
This paper presents a contractual framework to investigate the dynamic relation between income inequality and occupational choice in an overlapping generations model. Depending on the natures of equilibrium loan contracts, ex ante expected utilities (or average lifetime incomes) of different occupations in economy are not equal and such inequality persists in the long run. This result is, in contrast to exist-ing literature, derived without intergenerational linkage of wealth and heterogeneities among individuals. We also examine the dynamical patterns of how income inequality tends to decrease or increase over time and identify the set of parameter values under which there exist multiple steady states, some of which experience income inequality but others do not. Finally welfare comparison among different steady states shows that the steady state with income inequality may end up with lower welfare than that without it.
日時：
12月 4日（火） 4:50-6:30pm　※この回以降、場所が地階第４教室に移動となります。ご注意下さい。
場所：
東京大学経済学部第４教室
at the classroom No.4 down in the basement of Econ. Building
報告：
宍戸善一 Shishido, Zenichi （成蹊大学法学部, Seikei University）
ジョイント・ベンチャーにおける動機付けゲーム
日時：
12月12日（水） 4:50-6:30pm ※TCERと共催。通常と異なりますので曜日、場所にご注意下さい。
場所：
東京大学経済学部第４教室（旧棟地階）
at the classroom No.4 down in the basement of Econ. Building
報告：
John E. McLaren （University of Virginia）
Globalization and Insecurity" (joint with Andrew Newman, University College, London)
Abstract:
We construct a simple model of the effect of increased international openness on risk bearing in an environment in which the only risk-sharing institutions are self-enforcing agreements. We show how increased openness can weaken long-term relationships, and hence risk sharing, by increasing the effectiveness of the market, much as some critics of globalization have argued. However, the harm thereby done is tempered by the fact that in order to have such a negative indirect effect, openness must have a direct effect that reduces risk. It is shown that on balance, globalization reduces risk and raises welfare for those in small countries, but increases risk and reduces welfare for those in large countries.
日時：
12月 18日（火） 4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部第４教室
at the classroom No.4 down in the basement of Econ. Building
報告：
成生達彦 Nariu, Tatsuhiko （京都大学大学院経済学研究科, Kyoto Univeristy）
我が国の小売店舗密度に関するパネル分析　(松井健二と共著）
要約：
1980年代を通して零細過多であると指摘されてきた我が国の小売店舗の数は、1982年の172万店をピ−クに、それ以降減少している。本稿では、成生(1992)およびFlath and Nariu(1996)に倣う形で、1979年から1997年までの都道府県別のパネルデ−タを用いた実証分析を行い、店舗密度（または店舗数）がいかなる要因に規定されているかを検討する。
主要な結論は、まず第1に、小売店舗数の時系列的な減少傾向は、乗用車の普及と住戸あたり床面積の拡大という2つの要因によって説明されるということである。これらの要因が消費者の買い物・在庫費用を低め、社会的物流費用を最小にするという意味での「効率性」の観点から必要とされる店舗数が減少したのである。したがって、1980年代中盤以降の店舗数の減少は、効率的水準への調整プロセスとして理解することができる。また第２に、小売店舗密度は都市部の方が低いことが一般的に知られているが、それは見せかけであり、消費者・小売店の流通コストを代理する諸変数でコントロールすると、むしろ三大都市を中心とした都心部ほど実質的な小売店舗密度は高く、効率的水準を上回っていることが明らかとなる。このことは、家電製品などの買い回り品を販売する店舗の都市部での集積効果を反映しているように思われる。
修士論文報告予定 ※発表時間・発表者に多少変更が出ておりますのでご注意下さい。
　
場所：東京大学経済学部第４教室
at the classroom No.4 down in the basement of Econ. Building
　
1月15日（火）
  • 17時00分―17時40分　竹内大介 『垂直的製品差別化における製品革新』(product innovation in a vertically differentiated duopoly)
  • 17時40分―18時20分　吉野大喜 『並行輸入の研究―垂直的取引制限下の数量競争モデル』
  • 18時20分―19時00分　河野敏鑑 『環境税が排出削減投資に与える影響について』
1月22日（火） 17:00-19:00
  • 16時20分―17時00分　CANCELLED
  • 17時00分―17時40分　小川　昭 『Vogelsang-Finsingerメカニズムと企業の戦略的行動』 resume
  • 17時40分―18時20分　高橋　悟 "K-Coordination Games with Perfect Information" resume
  • 18時20分―19時00分　岩田正隆 "Comparison of Commodity Money and Fiat Money"
1月29日（火） 15:40-19:00 ※ 場所が第３教室に変更になりました。ご注意下さい。
  • 15時40分―16時20分　成川正之 『中古市場における不完全性の及ぼす影響』
  • 16時20分―17時00分　牧野邦昭
  • 17時00分―17時40分　寺崎友芳 『東京CBDにおける容積率緩和効果に関する考察―土地価値増大効果と通勤混雑による増加疲労費用の計測―』 resume
  • 17時40分―18時20分　山田真毅 『将来価格の上昇と住宅購入のタイミング』
  • 18時20分―19時00分　吉野　薫
2月5日（火）15:40-19:00 ※ 場所が第３教室に変更になりました。ご注意下さい。
  • 15時40分―16時20分　加藤和彦 "Environmental Regulation in a Mixed Oligopoly"
  • 16時20分―17時00分　山森哲雄 "An Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Equilibrium Selection"
  • 17時00分―17時40分　山田浩之 "Economic Analysis on Government-NGO Relationships in Developing Countries" resume
  • 17時40分―18時20分　下松真之 "State Capture and Reform Progress"
  • 18時20分―19時00分　島崎麻子
日時：
2月20日（水）4:50-6:30pm ※日にち・場所が変更になっていますのでご注意下さい
場所：
東京大学経済学部新棟12階　第2共同研究室
at the conference room B (No.2) in 12th floor of New Econ. Building
報告：
Andy McLennan(Department of Economics, University of Minnesota/大阪大学社会経済研究所)
"Strategic Candidacy for Multivalued Voting Procedures" (joint with Hulya Eraslan)
日時：
3月12日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部旧棟地下１階　第４教室
at the classroom No.4 in B1 floor of Old Econ. Building
報告：
石橋郁雄(東京大学大学院経済学研究科博士課程)
Price Leadership in a Repeated Game with Endogenous Timing
Abstract:
This paper investigates price leadership when firms interact in a long-term relationship. Firms have different capacities and endogenously determine their timing of moves. We show that a collusion with price leadership maximizes the joint profit even when firms are far from patient. Which firm becomes the leader depends on the agreed allocation of sales, which is determined arbitrarily if firms' prices are same. The firm which has small profit relative to its capacity becomes the leader.