Microeconomics Workshop 2000

日時：
4月20日(火)4:50-6:30pm
※ マクロワークショップ・TCER定例研究会との共催
※ 通常と曜日が異なりますのでご注意下さい
場所：
東京大学経済学部　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告者：
Jean-Jacques Laffont氏 (Universite de Toulouse)
"Collusion and Group Lending with Adverse Selection"
Abstract：
In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lend- ing contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mech- anisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.
日時：
4月25日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
村松 幹二 氏（東京大学 学術振興会研究員）
"Intertemporal Wage Schedules and Information Transmission in the Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem"
Abstract：
This paper concerns dynamic moral hazard problems and intertemporal wage schedules where information transmission from principal to agent is an issue. In employer-employee relationships in the firm, outputs of agent's efforts are often private signal of the principal. And she can transmit this information strategically in commitable way and/or in uncommitable way in long-term contract. We analyze relationships between the principal's information strategies and wage schedules, and show that to make good use of the information she makes "Norm-type" wage schedules, and fixed wage with performance-based bonus schedules, and "Post-based" wage schedules. The type of wage schedule depends on the risk attitude of the agent and power of incentive schemes.
日時：
5月9日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
舘 健太郎氏（東京大学大学院）
"Network Structure under Uncertainty"
日時：
5月16日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
澤田 康幸氏（東京大学総合文化研究科）
"Community Participation, Teacher Effort, and Educational Outcomes: The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program"
Abstract：
Based on a principal-agent model, this paper investigates the organizational structure that made the El Salvador's primary school decentralization program (EDUCO program) successful. First, we employ the "augmented" reduced form educational production function by incorporating parents and community involvement as a major organizational input. We observe consistently positive and statistically significant EDUCO participation effects on standardized test scores. Then we estimated teacher compensation function, teacher effort functions, and input demand functions by utilizing the theoretical implications of a principal (parental association)-agent(teacher)framework. While the EDUCO school teachers receive piece rate, depending on their performance, wage payment is relatively fixed in the traditional schools. Empirical results indicate that the slope of wage equation is positively affected by the degree of community participation. This finding can be interpreted as the optimal intensity of incentive. Hence, theacher's effort level in the traditional schools is consistently lower than that in the EDUCO schools, indicating a moral hazard problem. Community participation through parental group's classroom visits seems to enhance the teacher effort level and thus increases students' academic performance indirectly. Parental associations can affect not only teacher effort and their performance by imposing an appropriate incentive scheme but also school-level inputs by decentralized school management. Our empirical results support the view that decentralization of education system should involve delegation of school administration and teacher management to the community group.
日時：
5月26日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
本多 俊毅氏（横浜国立大学経済学部）
「確率的ボラティリティ・モデルにおける最適ポートフォリオ問題」
日時：
5月30日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
安達 貴教氏（東京大学大学院）
"Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination in the Presence of Consumption Externalities"
Abstract：
This paper analyzes monopolistic third-degree price discrimination in the presence of externalities on the demand side (consumption externalities). Assuming zero marginal cost and linear inverse-demands with the same slope, I investigate an associated change in Marshallian social welfare with the regime change from uniform pricing to price discrimination. It is shown that with negative symmetric externalities between separate markets, even when price discrimination opens a new market that is closed under uniform pricing, it may lower social welfare. When all the markets are open either under uniform pricing or under price discrimination, even if total output is not affected by the regime change, it is possible that social welfare improves. In this case, the sum of consumers' surpluses can also increase. These results stand in sharp contrast to well-known welfare implications of third-degree price discrimination in the literature.
日時：
6月 6日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
Chew Soo Hong氏 (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
"The Market for Sweepstakes"(with Guofu Tan氏, UBC)
Abstract：
We provide a model to study the market for a monopolistically supplied sweepstakes. We derive equilibrium demands for both fixed-prize and variable-prize sweepstakes and determine the corresponding profit maximizing prize level and payout ratio respectively. When there is a large enough population of consumers, who are small-variance risk averse and display a preference for longshot, it can be profitable for the monopoly to offer each type of sweepstakes. For the variable-prize sweepstakes, the monopoly will generally find it profitable to combine the sweepstakes from two populations into a single sweepstakes offered to the combined population. This finding corroborates the recent spate of mergers in the U. S. of smaller state lotteries into larger ones. We also discuss implications of our model on marketing and public finance.
日時：
6月13日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
清水　崇氏（東京大学経済学部）
"A Theory of Money with Market Places"
日時：
6月20日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
松島　 斉氏 Matsushima, Hitoshi（東京大学経済学部）
"Private Monitoring, Likelihood Ratio Conditions, and the Folk Theorem"
要　旨：
This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only pure strategies. We show that implicit collusion can be sustained by Nash equilibria under a mild condition, and provide the Folk Theorem when players' private signals are conditionally independent and satisfy the strong zero likelihood ratio condition. We investigate the situation in which players play a Nash equilibrium of a machine game irrespective of their initial states, i.e., they play a uniform equilibrium. We show that there exists a unique payoff vector sustained by a uniform equilibrium, i.e., a unique uniformly sustainable payoff vector, which Pareto-dominates all other uniformly sustainable payoff vectors. We show that this Pareto-dominant uniformly sustainable payoff vector is efficient if and only if the zero likelihood ratio condition is satisfied. These positive results hold even if each player has only limited knowledge on her opponent's private signal structure.
日時：
6月27日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
Gianmarco Ottaviano氏（Bocconi University）
"Multiproduct Multinationals and Reciprocal FDI Dumping" (with Richard E. Baldwin)
Abstract：
Global patterns of FDI and trade are remarkably similar, yet mainstay theory has them as substitutes. We posit a model where multiproduct, final-goods firms simultaneously engage in intraindustry FDI and intraindustry trade. The logic behind this two-way FDI is analogous to that of two-way trade in the Brander-Krugman reciprocal-dumping model. Namely, multiproduct firms use trade costs to reduce inter-variety competition by placing production of some varieties abroad. Since the varieties are differentiated, all varieties are sold in all markets. Thus while FDI displaces some exports, it also creates trade via reverse imports. This naturally leads to parallelism in the trade and FDI patterns.
日時：
7月 4日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
小西 秀男氏（Boston College）
"Coalition Formation as a Dynamic Process"(with Debraj Ray, New York University and CSIC)
日時：
7月11日（火）4:50-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
天谷 研一氏（MIT大学院）
"Dynamic Inconsistency and Implicit Contracting"
Abstract：
This paper analyzes a commitment problem of players with dynamically inconsistent preferences. First, we show that if an individual faces opportunities which might cause a problem of dynamic inconsistency infinitely repeatedly, she could solve the dynamic inconsistency problem even without any explicit commitment devices. Second, we consider the effect of making a promise. Here we assume that players can agree on punishing when a player shirks, but whether the right action was chosen is not verifiable, and thus the players need to have a right incentive to punish as well as a right incentive to work. We show that even when punishing is a costly action, infinite repetition of the interaction enables the players to have a right incentive to punish.
日時：
9月 5日3:00pm-
場所：
東京大学経済学部７階　第一共同研究室
at the meeting room No.1 on the 7th floor of Econ.Building
報告：
3:00pm　尾山 大輔（東京大学大学院）
　　　　　"p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics"
3:30pm　安藤至大（東京大学大学院）
　　　　　"Optimal Wage Structure under Unverifiability"
日時：
9月12日（火）12:00-1:30pm ※マクロワークショップと共催／時間と場所にご注意下さい
場所：
東京大学経済学部7階　第一共同研究室
at the meeting room no.1 on the 7th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Michael Knetter (Dartmouth University)
"Macroeconomic Factors and Antidumping Fillings: Evidence from Four Countries"
日時：
9月19日（火）4:50-6:30pm ※ 都市経済ワークショップと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
Jacques Thisse氏（CORE）
"Agglomeration and Market Interaction"
The most salient feature of the spatial economy is the presence of a large variety of economic agglomerations. Our purpose is to review some of the main explanations of this universal phenomenon, as they are proposed in urban economics and modern economic geography. Because of space constraints, we choose to focus on market interaction models and restrict ourselves to multi-regional models of industrial agglomeration.(Masahisa Fujita, co-author, Kyoto University)
日時：
10月10日（火）4:50-6:30pm ※ マクロワークショップと共催、報告は日本語で行われます。
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ.Building
報告者：
Mark Ramseyer氏（Harvard Law School / CIRJE, University of Tokyo）
"Banks and Economic Growth: Implications from Japanese History" (co-author: Yoshiro Miwa, University of Tokyo)
Abstract：
In the 1950s and 60s, Alexander Gerschenkron claimed that banks facilitate economic growth among "backward" countries. In 1990s and 2000s, many theorists similarly claim that banks promote growth. Banks do so by their superior monitoring and screening capabilities, they reason. Through those capabilities, banks reduce informational asymmetries and the attendent moral hazard and adverse selection, and thereby improve the allocation of credit. As a fast-growth but allegedly bank-centered economy, Japan plays an important part in these discussions of finance and growth. In early 20th century Japan firms relied heavily on bank debt, observers argue. Those firms with preferential access to debt outperformed the others, and those that were part of the zaibatsu corporate groups obtained that preferential access through their affiliated banks. With data from the first half of the century, we ask whether Japanese banks performed the roles Gerschenkron and modern theorists assign them. Notwithstanding the usual accounts, we find that they did not. Japan was not a bank-centered economy; instead, firms relied overwhelmingly on equity finance. It was not an economy where firms with access to bank credit outperformed their rivals; instead, firms earned no advantage from such access. And it was not a world where the zaibatsu manipulated their banks to favor affiliated firms; instead, zaibatsu banks loaned affiliated firms little more (if any) than the deposits those firms had made with the banks. During the first half of the last century, Japanese firms obtained almost all their funds through decentralized, competitive capital markets.
日時：
10月12日（木）4:50pm-6:30pm　※ マクロワークショップと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
神取 道宏（東京大学大学院経済学研究科）
"Fluctuations and Potential in Search Equilibrium"
Abstract：
We try to extend the theory of coordination failure by constructing a model with rational expectations equilibrium that stochastically visits multiple steady states. We take a prime example of the coordination failure models, Diamond[1982, JPE], where search externalities in trading process create multiple steady states, and construct its finite population version. The finiteness of population implies aggregate randomness due to stochastic arrival of production and trading opportunities, and as a result the economy fluctuates over the multiple steady states in the long run. We define the notion of potential and show that the relative stability of each state can be captured by the value of its potential. In particular, we show that among the multiple steady states identified by Diamond the one that maximizes the potential is selected, as the population size tends to infinity. Such a characterization has been known for what is called a reversible stochastic process. Our model violates the condition for reversibility, but we show that the long run behavior of the system can nevertheless be described approximately by a potential function.
日時：
10月26日（木）4:50pm-　※マクロワークショップと共催（10月17日は休講です）
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
松山 公紀（Northwestern University）
"Financial Market Globalization and Endogenous Inequality of Nations"
Abstract：
This paper analyzes the effects of financial market globalization on the cross-country pattern of development in the world economy. To this end, it develops a dynamic macroeconomic model of imperfect credit markets, in which the investment becomes borrowing-constrained at the lower stage of development. In the absence of the international financial market, the world economy converges to the symmetric steady state, and the cross-country difference disappears in the long run. In the presence of the international financial market, the symmetric steady state could lose its stability, in which case the cross-country distribution of the capital stocks is concentrated into two mass points in every stable steady state. The symmetry-breaking caused by unrestricted flows of financial capital leads to a polarization of the world economy into the rich and the poor. The model thus demonstrates the possibility that financial market globalization may cause, or at least magnify, inequality of nations, and the international financial market is a mechanism through which some countries become rich at the expense of others. The model suggests that the poor countries cannot jointly escape from the poverty trap by merely cutting their links to rich countries. Nor would foreign aids to the poor eliminate the inequalities; as in a game of musical chairs, some countries must be excluded from being rich.
日時：
10月31日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
城所 幸弘（東京大学空間情報科学研究センター）
「ネットワークの費用便益分析」
日時：
11月7日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Miguel A. Garcia-Cestona（バルセロナ自由大学経済学部／神戸大学）
Privatization, Golden Shares and Efficiency　(co-author: Vicente Salas)
Abstract：
We provide an assessment of the implications that the use of "golden share" mechanisms has on the economic efficiency of privatization processes. Within a context of incomplete contracts and renegotiation on decisions that affect "public interest" between government and private investors, we show that the allocation into private hands of the residual decision rights over the use of public assets becomes more efficient than the use of golden shares. The observed gap responds to two sources: first, the government prefers public ownership to income raised through taxes, due to the distortionary nature of the tax system; and second, partial ownership and residual rights alter government incentives to restrain investments on public assets, affecting the firm's market value.
日時：
11月14日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
中泉拓也（東京大学大学院）
Tournament in the Face of Hold Up Problem
Abstract：
Whether a tournament offering jobs as prizes instead of prize money works well or not is investigated, in incomplete contract situation where hold-up problem is occurred and monetary prize is not contractible exante.
As never does better off elimination tournament, in which loser's investment is not used in this relationship, we focus the attention on the cases in which not only winner but also loser are assigned some jobs. Nature of the assigned jobs is shown to be crucial whether the tournament brings the rat race effect and mitigate the hold up problem. Two types of characteristics of jobs are investigated here. One is indispensable type where ex-post surplus cannot be obtained even if only one agent lacks. And the other is dispensable type, where ex-post surplus can be obtained without other agent. It is proved that in indispensable type the surplus is divided equally for agents irrespective of their positions after renegotiation and there are three Nash equilibria like a chicken game. Consequently hold-up problem is severe and coordination problem also occurs. In dispensable type, on the other hand, the hold up problem is proved to decreased not only because the more part of their own surplus reflect only their investments, but also by the rat-race effect between the agents.
日時：
11月21日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Randall S. Kroszner（University of Chicago）
Is It Better to Forgive than to Receive? Repudiation of the Gold Indexation Clause in Long-Term Debt during Great Depression
Abstract：
This paper examines the consequences of large-scale debt relief during the Great Depression in order to examine theories of debt overhang and the costs of financial distress. An analysis of this episode also is relevant to current debates over debt restructuring policies towards countries that have recently experienced sharp currency devaluations. When the U.S. went off the gold standard and devalued the dollar with respect to gold, the government declared that the courts would no longer enforce gold indexation clauses that were contained in virtually all long-term private and public debt contracts. If the gold clauses had been enforced, the debt burden of borrowers would have increased by the extent of the devaluation, which was 69 percent. I examine asset price responses to the Supreme Court's decision to uphold this effective debt forgiveness. Equity prices rise, but more surprisingly, the debt relief also leads to higher prices for corporate bonds (all of which contained gold clauses). In contrast, government bonds with gold clauses fall in value. These responses suggest that the benefits of eliminating debt overhang and avoiding bankruptcy for private firms more than offset the loss to creditors of some chance of trying to recover the additional 69 percent. Consistent with large costs of debt overhang and distress, in the cross section, stock and bond prices rise more the closer the firm is to bankruptcy. The results suggest that in these circumstances it is indeed better to forgive than to receive.
日時：
11月28日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
松島　斉（東京大学経済学部）
"Small Verifiability in Long-Term Relationships"
Abstract：
This paper investigates a finitely repeated game at the beginning of which players agree to write an explicit contract with full commitment. This contract conditions the budget-balancing vector of side payments on the complete history of their action choices. However, this history is not always verifiable to the court, and each player's liability is severely limited. We show, in the general case, that even if the probability of the complete history being verifiable is small and the amount of possible fines is negligible compared with the differences in long-run payoffs, every efficient payoff vector induced by an action profile, which Pareto-dominates a Nash equilibrium action profile, is uniquely and exactoly implementable either in terms of perfect equilibrium or in terms of perfect iterative undominance. Moreover, we show, in a wide class of component games, that even if this probability is close to zero and the amount of fines is negligible compared with the differences not only in long-run payoffs but also in instantaneous payoffs, every efficient payoff vector induced by an action profile, which Pareto-dominates a Nash equilibrium action profile, is uniquely and virtually implementable either in terms of perfect equilibrium or in terms of perfect iterative undominance.
日時：
12月 5日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
江口 匡太（東京大学経済学部）
Job Rotation Enhancing Trainers' Incentives
日時：
12月12日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm　※都市経済ワークショップと共催
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Jan Brueckner (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
"Urban Sprawl and the Property Tax"　(co-authored with Hyun-A. Kim)
Abstract：
This paper explores the connection between the property tax and urban sprawl. While the tax's depressing effect on improvements reduces population density, spurring the spatial expansion of cities, a countervailing effect from lower dwelling sizes may dominate, raising densities and making cities smaller. The analysis shows that this latter outcome is guaranteed under CES preferences when the elasticity of substitution 3/4 is high. But numerical results for the Leontief case (where 3/4 is zero) suggest that the property tax encourages urban sprawl when substitution between housing and other goods is low. Thus, the distortions generated by the property tax may include inefficient spatial expansion of cities, suggesting the tax may belong on the list of causal factors identified by critics of urban sprawl.
日時：
12月19日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
宇井貴志 (筑波大学社会工学系)
「ポテンシャル関数を用いた均衡選択理論について」
Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria
Abstract:
This paper studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game where payo s are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some element in the set. We introduce generalized potential function of complete information game and provide suffcient conditions for the robustness in terms of an argmax set of generalized potential function.
＜修士論文報告会＞
1月9日（火）
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
4:50-5:30　　清水大昌　On the Superiority of Salop's Circular City Model
5:40-6:20　　坂原樹麗　Efficient Discriminatory Auction
6:20-7:00　　中條健一郎　Relationship Banking
＜研究報告＞
1月16日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
石黒真吾 （立命館大学）
Collusion and Discrimination in Organizations
This paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal-multi agent relationship where agents may collude. The principal faces the problem of assigning several agents to different tasks, in the ab-sence of ex ante commitment. Then agents have the incentives to write the side-contracts that affect their effort choices and the principal's decision of task assignment. In this situation we show that the optimal collusion proof contract is to introduce some "discriminatory policy" in the sense that the wage schemes offered to agents depend on their identities even if they are identical with respect to productive abilities. Such discriminatory wage scheme explains the organizational strategy of \divide and conquer" as an optimal response to collusion.
＜修士論文報告会＞
1月17日（水）
場所：
東京大学経済学部７階　第１共同研究室
at the meeting room No.1 on the 7th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
4:00-4:40　　蓮池勝人　環境保全のインセンティブ機能を念頭においた自動車関連税制の検討
4:40-5:20　　佐藤優子　中心市街地の空洞化
5:20-6:00　　金田芳子　地域間人口移動と都市経済成長
6:00-6:40　　高野久紀　信用制約と労働市場の不完全性
＜研究報告＞
1月23日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
吉原直毅 (一橋大学経済研究所)
On procedurally fair allocation rules in economic environments
　(co-authored with Reiko Gotoh and Kotaro Suzumura)
＜研究報告＞
1月30日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
関口 格（神戸大学）
Product Quality, Reputation and Turnover
joint with Rafael Rob (University of Pennsylvania)
＜修士論文報告会＞
1月31日（水）
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
3:20-4:00　　塩村賢史　空間競争モデルに関する競争
4:00-4:40　　八木伸行　Organization Design
4:40-5:20　　A・サラム　Individual Penalty, Payment Incentive and Group Formation in Group Lending
5:20-6:00　　小野裕介　コミュニケーション環境と意思表示
6:00-6:40　　浦島祥代　特許制度の経済分析
＜研究報告＞
2月6日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
和田哲夫 (学習院大学)
"Post-Contracting Innovations and Contingent Payment Scheme in Patent Licensing Contracts"
joint with Noriyuki Yanagawa（東京大学）
＜修士論文報告会＞
2月7日（水）
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
4:00-4:40　　鶴田大輔　企業間取引によるモニタリング
4:40-5:20　　斎藤都美　日本の自動車保険市場における情報の非対称性の検証
5:20-6:00　　奥村重史　The Auction in Dutch Flower Auction
6:00-6:40　　佐藤　崇　Another Characterization for the Equilibrium of Green-Zhou Model
＜研究報告＞
2月13日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
桜川昌哉 （名古屋市立大学）
『資産価格の暴落と金融危機』
＜研究報告＞
2月20日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Sunku Hahn（政策研究大学院大学）
The Advertising of Well-Known Quality Products
Abstract:
It has been pointedout that a problem in the cash-burning model of advertising is that it cannot explain an advertising of an already well-known quality product. This paper tries to explain such advertising as an act ofthe incumbent firm when it tries to protect its market share against the entering firm.
＜研究報告＞
2月27日（火）予定されていた発表は中止となりました。ご了承下さい。
＜研究報告＞
3月27日（火）4:50pm-6:30pm
場所：
東京大学経済学部5階　視聴覚教育研究室
at the audiovisual room on the 5th floor of Econ. Building
報告：
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara（東京大学） co-authored with Nobue Suzuki（一橋大学）
"How Work Ethic Determines the Government Size and How It Evolves Over Time?　Reinventing Max Weber"
Abstract：
We use two ideas to explain how work ethic affects government size and how it evolves over time. One idea is that there are two different elements in utility, which is to be maximized when one faces a decision-making. These two elements are the psychological value and the material value. The former depends upon not only the consequence of (one's own and others') actions, but also action's justness and/or fairness. The latter determines the fitness of the individual. The other idea is that the fitness determines the evolution of the population distribution of different psychological values. Thus, psychological value determines one's action, which determines his/her fitness, which determines the evolution of psychological values. The more fitted is a psychological value, its population increases more. We assume that there are two types, H and L. H (L, resp.) has a high psy-chological value in working (shirking, resp.). Both types face the choice of either work or shirk. The latter produces unemployment with some positive probability but saves disutility of working hard. We characterize several equilibrium concepts in order. The short-run equilibrium of unemployment rate, the balanced-budget equilibrium of unemployment rate and unemployment benefit, the political equi-librium of tax rate, where tax rate is determined by the mean voter theorem, and evolutionary equilibrium of population distribution, while the population dynam-ics obeys the rule of the survival of the most fitted. We also analyze co-evolution dynamics of tax rate and population distribution. The major finding of the co-evolution dynamics is that, for at least under some parameter values, there are two stationary points in this co-evolution process; one with no tax with no type L surviving, while the other with all income being taxed away and only type L population survives. The basins for these two attractors depend upon the parameter values.