April 10, 2017 (Monday)10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Guido Kuersteiner (University of Maryland)

Estimation with Aggregate Shocks (joint with Jin Hahn and Maurizio Mazzocco) [paper 1] [paper 2]

[paper 1] "Central Limit Theory for Combined Cross-Section and Time Series"

Combining cross-section and time series data is a long and well established practice in empirical economics. We develop a central limit theory that explicitly accounts for possible dependence between the two data sets. We focus on common factors as the mechanism behind this dependence. Using our central limit theorem (CLT) we establish the asymptotic properties of parameter estimates of a general class of models based on a combination of cross sectional and time series data, recognizing the interdependence between the two data sources in the presence of aggregate shocks. Despite the complicated nature of the analysis required to formulate the joint CLT, it is straightforward to implement the resulting parameter limiting distributions due to a formal similarity of our approximations with the standard Murphy and Topel’s (1985) formula.

[paper 2] "Estimation with Aggregate Shocks"

Aggregate shocks affect most households’ and firms’ decisions. Using three stylized mod els we show that inference based on cross-sectional data alone generally fails to correctly account for decision making of rational agents facing aggregate uncertainty. We propose an econometric framework that overcomes these problems by explicitly parametrizing the agents’ inference problem relative to aggregate shocks. Our framework and examples illus trate that the cross-sectional and time-series aspects of the model are often interdependent. Estimation of model parameters in the presence of aggregate shock requires, therefore, the combined use of cross-sectional and time series data. We provide easy-to-use formulas for test statistics and confidence intervals that account for the interaction between the cross-sectional and time-series variation.

April 11, 2017 (Tuesday) 16:50-18:35 ※日時に注意

※主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kensuke Teshima (ITAM)

Job Loss and Violent Crime in Mexico

April 17, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Nathaniel Hilger (Brown University)

Upward Mobility and Discrimination: the Case of Asian Americans [paper]

Asian Americans are the only non-white US racial group to experience long-term, institutional discrimination and subsequently exhibit high income. I re-examine this puzzle in California, where most Asians settled historically. Asians achieved extraordinary upward mobility relative to blacks and whites for every cohort born in California since 1920. This mobility stemmed primarily from gains in earnings conditional on education, rather than unusual educational mobility. Historical test score and prejudice data suggest low initial earnings for Asians, unlike blacks, reflected prejudice rather than skills. Post-war declines in discrimination interacting with previously uncompensated skills can account for Asians' extraordinary upward mobility.

April 28, 2017 (Friday) 9:00-10:15, 13:00-14:45

Graudate Level Special Lecture

※日時に注意、共催：応用統計ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Songnian Chen （Hong Kong University of Science and Technology）

Semiparametric Estimation of Transformation Models

April 28, 2017 (Friday) 16:50-18:35

※日時に注意、共催：応用統計ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Songnian Chen （Hong Kong University of Science and Technology）

Estimation of Censored Regression Models with Endogeneity

日時

GRIPS-UTokyo Empirical Workshop "Economics of Education"

2017年5月15日（Monday）13:00-17:40　※日時に注意

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

場所

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 第1セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Program

 

13:00　Reception

 

13:30　Eric Hanushek (Stanford University)

The Value of Smarter Teachers: International Evidence on Teacher Cognitive Skills and Student Performance

 

14:45　Break

 

15:05　Hisaki Kono (Kyoto University (presenter))

         　Yasuyuki Sawada (The University of Tokyo)

        　 Abu Shonchoy (New York University and Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) JETRO)

DVD-based Learning Program for University Entrance Exams: Experimental Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

 

15:50　Yuta Kikuchi (Hokkaido University (presenter))

         　Ryo Nakajima (Keio University)

Evaluating Professor Value-added: Evidence from Professor and Student Matching in Physics

 

16:35　Break

 

16:55　Tomohiko Inui (Gakushuin University)

            Naomi Kodama (Hitotsubashi University)

            Masaru Nagashima (The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS))

The Effect of Saturday School on Private Tutoring Demand in Japan

 

17:40　Adjourn

 

Organizers:
Stacey H. Chen (The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)), Daiji Kawaguchi (The University of Tokyo)

Sponsors:
Japan Society of Promotion of Science (#16H06322, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University) and The University of Tokyo

 

May 22, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Seung-Gyu Sim (The University of Tokyo)

Can Prosocial Behaviors Be Nurtured? Experimental Evidence from the Scholarship Program Reform by Korea University (joint with Yeonju Baik, Sung Jin Kang and Yasuyuki Sawada)

By enlarging the standard viewpoint of economic research that individuals' preferences are exogenously given and/or shaped by exogenous shocks, we probe whether and to what extent an artificial policy intervention requiring adult individuals to engage in certain social activities can nurture their pro-social attitudes. In particular, we exploit the novel experience of Korea University's scholarship program obligating its recipients to teach children in low-income families. A hybrid approach, randomized laboratory experiment and structural estimation, is taken to disentangle the nurturing, self-selection, and screening effects. The estimated model provides a strong evidence for the nurturing hypothesis, 'social engagement enhances pro-social attitudes.

May 29, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Chun-Fang Chiang (National Taiwan University)

The impact of Xi's anti-corruption Campaign on politically connected listed companies in China (joint with Bei Qin) [paper]

This paper examines how the anti-corruption campaign initiated by President Xi in November 2012 affected the politically connected listed companies in China. We use the ratio of newspaper articles talking about corruption cases as the time varying intensity measure of anti-corruption campaign, which is exogenous to individual companies. Based on current background of board members and previous working experiences of firm leaders and politicians, we construct explicit and implicit connection measures for each company. With measures of anti-corruption campaign strength over time and connection measures of firms, we estimate the effects of anti-corruption policy on firms' value from 2012 to 2014. We find that one standard deviation increase in Xi's anti-corruption policy intensity will lower the long-run Cumulative Abnormal Return of connected companies by 0.005 to 0.034, or 0.01 to 0.06 standard deviation, varying across the connection types. We further investigate the heterogeneous effects by ownership, industries and local business environment of the campaign. We find that the impact is driven by the non-government owned companies, and companies in regions where corruption is prevalent. We also find that industries that subject to strict government regulations or target at government customers are affected more by the anti-corruption campaign.

June 5, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jin Hyuk Kim (University of Colorado Boulder)

The Unintended Consequences of Crowd-sourced Patent Examination [paper]

There have been repeated calls for improving the quality of patent examination at the United States Patent and Trademark Office. One program aimed to address this, piloted between 2007 and 2009, sought to crowd-source information for patent examiners to help them examine emerging technologies. Since then, calls have been made to re-instate or expand this Peer-to-Patent program, but there has not been a systematic study of the causal links between program participation and the …final outcome of the patent applications. By comparing the participating applications to a control group, we show that the program marginally reduced the incidence of patent allowance, but it resulted in a doubling of the examiner’s search effort afterwards. Contrary to the aims of the patent office, participation in the pilot also led applicants to …le more requests for continued examination, and this extended prosecution did not lead to a change in the average outcome of the patent application, meaning both applicants and the o¢ ce incurred higher cost at no additional benefit.

June 9, 2017 (Friday) 11:30-12:15, 12:15-13:00 ※日時に注意

共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ、マクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

1) 11:30 - 12:15 David Jinkins (the Copenhagen Business School)
"Wage Inequality and the Location of Cities"

2) 12:15 - 13:00 Marcus Asplund (the Copenhagen Business School)
"Multi-agent Bargaining under Asymmetric Information: Retrofitting an Elevator"

June 16, 2017 (Friday) 10:30-12:00 ※曜日に注意

共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Till von Wachter (University of California, Los Angeles)

Firming Up Inequality (joint with Jae Song, David J. Price, Fatih Guvenen and Nicholas Bloom) [paper]

Using a massive, new, matched employer-employee database that we construct for the United States, we show that the rise in earnings inequality between workers over the last three decades has primarily been a between-firm phenomenon. Over two-thirds of the increase in earnings inequality from 1981 to 2013 can be accounted for by the rising variance of earnings between firms and only one-third by the rising variance within firms. This rise in between-firm inequality was particularly strong in smaller and medium-sized firms (explaining 84% for firms with fewer than 10,000 employees). In contrast, in the very largest firms with 10,000+ employees, almost half of the increase in inequality took place within firms, driven by both declines in earnings for employees below the median and sharp rises for the top 50 or so best-paid employees. Finally, examining the mobility of employees across firms, we find that the increase in between-firm inequality has been driven by increased employee segregation—high- and low-paid employees are increasingly clustering in di ↵ erent firms.

June 19, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：Tokyo Workshop on International Development

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jamie McCasland (University of British Columbia)

Are Small Firms Labor Constrained? Experimental Evidence from Ghana (joint with Morgan Hardy)

June 21, 2017 (Wednesday) 11:00-12:30

※共催：応用統計ワークショップ、日時・会場に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 第3セミナー室
in Seminar Room 3 on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Eric Gautier （Toulouse School of Economics）

Point identification and estimation in random coefficients models when the regressors have limited variation (joint with Christophe Gaillac)

We presents sufficient conditions for identification in various random coefficients models when the support of the regressors is a proper subset, possibly discrete. We characterize nonparametric classes of distributions of the random coefficients and proper subsets for which functionals of the observed data belong to classes of functions that could be identified on such a proper subset. This, in turn, allows to use known and new results on identification of the distribution of random coefficients. Estimation is considered in the particular case of the linear random coefficients. There we obtain minimax lower bounds and an adaptive estimator.

June 22, 2017 (Thursday)13:10-14:55

※日時に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yingyao Hu （Johns Hopkins University）

Dynamic Decisions under Subjective Beliefs: A Structural Analysis

June 23, 2017 (Friday) 12:15-13:30

※日時に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Edward Norton (University of Michigan)

Moneyball in Medicare

July 3, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University)

Cooperative Behavior in Group Giving (joint with Shigeharu Okajima, Hiroko Okajima and Nobuyuki Uto)

Given the growing popularity of group giving in practice and the lack of corresponding academic research, this study examines the effectiveness of group giving in different rebate schemes. The laboratory experiments find that the group influence in group giving positively influences giving rates in a stepwise rebate scheme but negatively influences giving rates in a proportional rebate scheme. Threshold effects and fairness issues are associated with these results.

July 10, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Soohyung (Soo) Lee (Sogang University)

Endogenous Market Formation: Theory and Evidence from Chilean College Admission (joint with Ricardo Espinoza and Hector Lopez)

Policy makers around the world have adopted market-design-inspired centralized match- ing systems for assigning students to public schools. However, the question of whether policy intervention is necessary for such adoptions has been little studied. Examining a setting with application costs and heterogeneity in college quality, we show that sizable application costs and small heterogeneity in college quality may lead to voluntary transition to a centralized matching system. Using the 2012 system change in Chile, we demonstrate the plausibility of our theoretical setting and show that the enlarged pool of colleges in the centralized admission is welfare-improving, particularly for those students facing high application costs.

July 20, 2017 (Thursday) 10:30-12:00 ※日時に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

John C Ham (National University of Singapore)

The Perils of Relying Solely on the March CPS: The Case of Estimating the Effect on Employment of the TennCare Public Insurance Contraction (joint with Ken Ueda) [paper]

We would like to thank, without implicating, Thomas Buchmueller, Amy Finklestein, Robert Moffitt, and Lara D. Shore-Sheppard, as well as colleagues and seminar participants at the Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Maryland, the NBER, and the National University of Singapore, for very helpful comments. Ham thanks the National Institutes of Health for financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Institutes of Health. We both thank the University of Maryland and the National University of Singapore for financial support. Of course, we take responsibility for all errors, and emphasize that our thanks to the individuals above in no way implies that they agree with the arguments in this paper

July 24, 2017(Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：Tokyo Workshop on International Development

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Ryoko Sato (World Bank)

Income tax collection and non-compliance in Ghana (joint with Edward Asiedu, Chuqiao Bi, Dan Pavelesku and Tomomi Tanaka) [paper]

 

Tomomi Tanaka (World Bank)

Monetary and non-monetary poverty in urban slums in Accra: Combining geospatial data and machine learning to study urban poverty (joint with Ryan Engstrom, Dan Pavelesku and Ayago Wambile) [paper]

Ryoko Sato (World Bank)

Income tax collection and non-compliance in Ghana (joint with Edward Asiedu, Chuqiao Bi, Dan Pavelesku and Tomomi Tanaka)

Ghana’s tax collection is very low compared with other lower middle-income countries. The revenue from income tax is particularly low, lower than the average of low-income countries. Non-compliance of tax payments is an urgent issue in Ghana, as the government has been suffering from a widening fiscal deficit and a rising debt burden. This paper combines data from household surveys, the business census, and administrative income tax data, and examines the scale of non-compliance and potential revenue gains from the enforcement of tax collection in Ghana. Business census data suggests the actual number of formal sector workers is higher than the number of formal sector workers reported both in the household survey and the administrative income tax data in Ghana. The income tax files do not include the individuals who work for formal sector firms which failed to file PAYE (Pay As You Earn), whereas the household data suffers from under-sampling and under-reporting of high-wage income earners. By combining the household survey data and the administrative income tax data, and adjusting the number of formal sector workers using the business census, we reconstruct the distribution of wage earners in the formal sector who are subject to income tax, and estimate potential income tax revenue gain from the enforcement of tax collection. We find the income tax revenue could have been higher by 582 million Cedi (equivalent to 0.5 percent of the GDP) if everyone who filed income tax in 2014 had paid the full amounts of income tax due. If all formal sector firms and organizations, regardless of whether they actually filed income tax or not in 2016 paid the full amounts of PAYE for all their employees, the income tax revenue could have been higher by 1.2 billion Cedi (equivalent to 1.4 percent of GDP). In 2016, we observe a further reduction of income tax revenue. The total income tax revenue could have been higher by 3.6 billion Cedi (2.2 percent of GDP) if all formal sector firms and organizations, regardless of whether they actually filed income tax or not in 2016, paid the full amounts of PAYE for all their employees.

Tomomi Tanaka (World Bank)

Monetary and non-monetary poverty in urban slums in Accra: Combining geospatial data and machine learning to study urban poverty (joint with Ryan Engstrom, Dan Pavelesku and Ayago Wambile)

As Sub-Saharan Africa continues to urbanize, slum populations are growing at 4.5 percent per year. Providing housing to slum dwellers, protecting them from natural disasters and diseases, and connecting them to jobs and services through improved infrastructure are urgent policy issues in many Sub-Saharan African cities. Identifying the location and living conditions of slums is a critical step toward designing effective urban policies. By combining household survey data and census data with high spatial resolution satellite imagery and other geospatial data using multiple methodologies, including machine learning, we attempt to define slums objectively within the city of Accra. Within these defined slum areas, the patterns of monetary and non-monetary poverty are assessed. Poverty rates are estimated at the neighborhood level and indicate that living in slums is strongly correlated with higher monetary poverty, higher fertility among women, and lower school attendance among children. Poverty is more prevalent in communities in areas of lower elevation, which in Accra are generally flood-prone areas. Ethnic, religious, and regional ties are important reasons people live in slums for long periods of time. People born in the community and ethnic majorities are more likely to get jobs in the manufacturing sector, while ethnic minorities, and new migrants tend to get jobs in the wholesale sector in poorer slum communities. Overall, the results indicate a wide range in economic opportunities between slum communities. These results have important policy implications and are crucial to understand the impact of social networks and how they generate economic opportunities in slums so that effective urban policies can be designed.

August 7, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yuhei Miyauchi (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Market Thickness and Agglomeration: Theory and Evidence from Firm-to-Firm Trade Data in Japan

This paper assesses the importance of market thickness of input trade as a mechanism of agglomeration. Using the panel of firm-to-firm input trade data of over a million Japanese firms, I empirically show that, upon exogenous bankruptcies of suppliers (identified by the reported reasons of bankruptcy), buyer firms are less likely to exit and more likely to match with alternative suppliers in thicker supplier market. To quantify the implication of the reduced-form effect on the degree of agglomeration, I build a general equilibrium model of dynamic supplier-customer matching with endogenous entry of firms, where key structural parameters are estimated to match the reduced-form causal parameters. Counterfactual equilibrium simulation of shutting down the thick-market externality shows substantial part of industry agglomeration observed in Japan is explained by thick-market externality. I also discuss policy implications.

August 21, 2017 (Monday) 11:30-13:00 ※時間に注意

主催：マクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Andrew H. McCallum (Federal Reserve Board)

The Structure of Export Entry Costs

September 25, 2017 (Monday)

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

GRIPS-UTokyo workshop

Empirical Studies on Innovation and Entrepreneurship [program]

Registration Required by September 14 [Registration]

 

Japan Society of Promotion of Science (#16H06322, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University) and The University of Tokyo

 

Call for Papers

Registration Required by September 14 [Registration]

The third meeting for GRIPS-UTokyo workshop will take place on 25 September 2017, Monday, at University of Tokyo. Professor Pierre Azoulay from MIT Sloan School will keynote the workshop.

We invite submissions of extended abstracts (2-4 pages including title and research question along with a summary of methods and results) for papers relating to Empirical Studies on Innovation and Entrepreneurship. Please feel free to forward this invitation to interested scholars (including Ph.D. students) whom it might not otherwise reach.

For submission, please upload an anonymous copy of your extended abstract   HERE   (https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/conference.cgi?action=login&db_name=GRIPSUTokyo).

Please help us to implement a single-blind submission process by removing author names in any place of the abstract.

Submissions must be received by 3 August 2017.

Based on the anonymous abstracts, Professor Azoulay will shortlist speakers for the meeting in the middle of August.

If you have any question, please contact us at <s-chen_at_grips.ac.jp> , or <owan_at_iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>. (Please replace "_at_" with @ mark.)

We look forward to receiving your submissions.

Best,

Stacey Chen, Daiji Kawaguchi, and Hideo Owan

 

October 2, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jess Diamond (Hosei University)

CSR As Insurance: The Case of Japanese Automobile Manufacturers (joint with Masahiro Abe and Jumpei Ito) [paper]

We combine rm-level data on CSR activity with product recall data in the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry to test whether the stock price of rms who engage in CSR activities is hurt less when recalls are announced than rms who do not engage in CSR activity. Using an event study framework, we nd that rms that do engage in CSR activity enjoy a 2.5%-3% abnormal return on their stock price when recalls are announced, suggesting that CSR functions as insurance for a rm's reputation.

October 10, 2017 （Tuesday） 16:50-18:35　 ※日時に注意

※主催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

Rong Hai (University of Miami)

* Seminar Cancelled / 開催中止となりました。

November 6, 2017 (Monday) 8:30-17:05

Colloquium on Personnel Economics [program]

Registration is Required

Room 549, the 5th Floor, Akamon General Research Building, The University of Tokyo [Map 1] [Map 2 (No.37)]

 

Registration: by October 23

8:30 am	Reception
9:00 am	Paul Oyer, Stanford GSB The Gender Gap in the Gig Economy: Evidence from over a Million Uber Drivers" (tentative title)
10:10 am	Break
10:30 am	Shingo Takahashi, Hiroshima Shudo University Hideo Owan,  University of Tokyo Tsuyoshi Tsuru, Hitotsubashi University Katsuhito Uehara, University of Shizuoka "Multitasking Incentives provisions and the Informativeness of Subjective Performance Evaluation"
11:20 am	Break
11:25 am	Jun Goto, Hitotsubashi University Yasuyuki Sawada, Asian Development Bank Takeshi Aida, GRIPS "Economic Incentives and Crowding-Out Effects in the Workplace: Identifying Mechanisms through Field Experiments"
12:15 pm	Lunch
1:45 pm	Hirofumi Kurokawa, Doshisha University Shusaku Sasaki, Keio University Fumio Ohtake, Osaka University "Peer Effects on Working Hours"
2:35 pm	Break
2:45 pm	Kentaro Nakajima, Hitotsubashi University Tsuyoshi Tsuru, Hitotsubashi University Katsuhito Uehara, University of Shizuoka "Communication Network and Productivity: Evidence from Face-to-Face Communication Data using Wearable Sensors"
3:35 pm	Break
3:45 pm	Ye-Jin Heo, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Switzerland "Population Aging and Housing Prices: New Definitions for Old Age"
4:15 pm	Break
4:20 pm	Kiho Muroga, University of Tokyo Hideo Owan, University of Tokyo "How Informative Is Three Hundred Sixty Degree Evaluation?"
5:05 pm	Adjourn

Organizers :
Stacey H. Chen, GRIPS, s-chen@grips.ac.jp
Ryo Kambayashi, kambayas@ier.hit-u.ac.jp
Hideo Owan, University of Tokyo, owan@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>

Sponsors :
Hitotsubashi University
Japan Society of Promotion of Science (#16H06322, PI: Kyoji Fukao, Hitotsubashi University)
University of Tokyo

 

 

Schedule Added

November 13, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Hitoshi Shigeoka (Simon Fraser University)

Patient Cost-sharing and Health Care Utilization among Children

This paper examines the effect of the patient cost-sharing on health care utilization among children. By exploiting newly collected data on the drastic expansion of subsidy for child health care which substantially differs by municipality, age, and time in Japan, we find that reduced cost-sharing significantly increases utilization of outpatient care. The arc-price elasticity is relatively constant around -0.1 for all ages 7-14, smaller than the conventional estimate of -0.20 for adults. We also provide the suggestive evidence that most increases in utilization reflect moral hazard rather than beneficial care. In fact, we document the increases in costly after-hour visits and unnecessary use of antibiotics. Finally, we find little evidence of the offset effects: the increase in outpatient care does not seem to reduce future inpatient admissions. Taken together, our findings suggest that the benefit of such generous subsidy for child health care is unclear.

November 20, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Bicheng Yang (The University of British Columbia)

A Salesforce-driven Model of Consumer Choice (joint with Tat Chan and Raphael Thomadsen)

November 27, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※共催：Tokyo Workshop on International Development

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Tomomi Tanaka (World Bank)

The impacts of conflicts, economic shocks, and death on depression, economic activities and human capital investment in Nigeria (joint with Julian Jamison, Kevin Robert McGee, Gbemisola Oseni, Julie Perng, Ryoko Sato, Renos Vakis)

This paper examines the impacts of conflicts, economic shocks, and death on depression, and investigates whether depression and shocks affect economic activities and investment on children’s education. The results of our analysis suggest experiencing any of the shocks (conflict, death and economic shocks) impact the level of depression, as well as an increased probability of being chronically depressed, after controlling for consumption. The effect of idiosyncratic or personal shocks and conflicts on depression are worth around $16.34 USD and $34.38 USD (around 4.4% of the average per capita consumption), respectively. Experience of conflicts in the past two years has the largest and strongest impacts on the respondent’s depression, as it is associated with a nearly 88% increase in the probability of being depressed. In experimental evidence, people who experienced conflicts were not affected by a priming of their past conflicts, deaths, and shocks, suggesting people do not need to be reminded about their experience of conflicts because experiencing conflicts is enough to lead to an increased probability of depression without a reminder. On the other hand, those with a personal shock who were primed had an increased probability of being classified as chronically depressed of 27.3%. Depression is associated with lower labor participation and child educational investment. Depressed people have a lower likelihood of engaging in any work, mainly in agricultural (particularly for men) and non-farm work (particularly for women). Parental depression is correlated with a lower likelihood that s/he spends any money on educational expenditures for his/her children.

December 4, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jiro Edouard Kondo (McGill University)

Make vs. Buy in Contracting: Theory and Evidence on Contractual Agency

December 11, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Eric Weese (Kobe University)

Insurgency and Small Wars: Estimation of Unobserved Coalition Structures

December 18, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Ken Yamada (Kyoto University)

Household sharing and commitment: evidence from panel data on individual expenditures and time use (joint with Jeremy Lise)

In this paper, we analyze the nature of intra-household allocations and commitment using unique panel data on individual-specific consumption expenditures and time used for leisure, market production and home production. We find that the household weight on the wife is strongly related to her relative market opportunities at the time of marriage in the cross-section. Additionally, within households the weight is related to unpredicted changes in relative wages, indicating a lack of full commitment to time of marriage allocations. Relative to ex ante efficiency, hours respond too little and consumption responds too much to wage shocks. We explore what types of constraints are preventing households from attaining ex ante efficient allocations by introducing additional variables in the Pareto weight that proxy for the relative size of marital surplus, the size of shocks, and the likelihood of asymmetric information.

December 21 （Thursday）14:55-16:40　※日時に注意, Venue has been changed.

※　共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kei Kawai (University of California, Berkeley)

Missing Bids and Scoring Auctions

We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. We prove that in a general class of mod- els, missing bids robustly indicate non-competitive behavior. In addition, we provide evidence that missing bids coincide tightly with known cartel activity. Finally, we show that missing bids are consistent with ecient collusion in environments where it is dicult for bidders to coordinate on precise bids.

December 25, 2017 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Michihiro Kandori (The University of Tokyo)

Cooperation and Dynamic Network Formation: A Case Study (joint with Shinya Obayashi)

* This is work in progress (no final paper ready for distribution yet).

Cooperation has been associated with “closely knit” organizations, where members know each other well and stay in the organization for a long time. In contrast, we show that cooperation is also possible in a “loosely knit” organization, where members do not know each other well and they enter and exit frequently. In particular, we present a case study of a labor union of a quite unusual form, that has the features of the loosely knit organization. The structure of the union closely resembles the OLG repeated game under private monitoring. We collected original data set to examine how the network of cooperation has been formed among union members. Finding the mechanism (equilibrium) to sustain cooperation is challenging, because members have limited information about who helped whom. With the help of interviews and data, we identified the mechanism to sustain cooperation in the union, which is surprisingly similar to the belief-free equilibrium identified in the theoretical literature on repeated games with private monitoring.

Some preliminary results were announced in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences:  

 

January 15, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

※　共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Pieter A. Gautier (VU University Amsterdam)

Priority Rules in School Assignment (joint with Monique de Haan, Hessel Oosterbeek, Sándor Sóvágó and Bas van der Klaauw)

The Student-proposing Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (DA) does not respond to students' cardinal preferences, which entails inefficiencies. However, DA complemented with priority rules that are correlated with the intensity of student preferences may overcome these inefficiencies. To study the effect of priority rules in school assignment on student welfare, we combine administrtive and survey data on school choice and student preferences from the school district of Utrecht. We compare student welfare under different school assignment mechanisms: DA with random tie-breaking, DA with priority rules, and choice-augmented DA. In the choice-augmented DA mechanism, students submit a rank-ordered list of schools and name a target school where they have priority (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2015). We consider three priority rules: distance priority, sibling priority, and priority of high-achieving students in academically oriented high-schools. First, we show that these priorities are correlated with students' ordinal and cardinal preferences. Second, by comparing counterfactual allocations, we find that choice-augmented DA results in a minor welfare improvement relative to DA. DA complemented with distance-to-school-based priority yields the highest student welfare. Survey-based and estimated measures of cardinal utility are highly correlated and rank the different school assignment mechanisms similarly.

January 15, 2018 (Monday) 16:50-18:35 ※時間に注意

※　共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kailing Shen (The Australian National University)

Gender-Targeted Job Ads in the Recruitment Process: Evidence from China (joint with Peter Kuhn) [paper]

Explicit requests for applicants of a specific gender are widely used in emerging-economy labor markets. The extent to which these requests affect the allocation of workers to jobs depends on two factors: how much workers comply with firms’ requests in their application decisions, and how much firms enforce their own requests when they encounter gender-inappropriate applicants. Using internal data from a Chinese job board, we show that both compliance and enforcement are substantial, but compliance accounts for the vast majority of the gender segregation associated with employers’ explicit gender requests. Using firm*occupation fixed effects for our compliance analysis and worker fixed effects for our enforcement analysis, we argue that both effects are causal, in the sense that (a) changing the gender label on an ad leads to large differences in the gender mix of applications that arrive, and (b) the same worker is much less likely to be called back when applying to a job requesting the other gender than when applying to an observationally-identical ad with no stated gender preference.

January 18, 2018 (Thursday) 16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意

※　共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第2セミナー室
in Seminar Room 2 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Yasutora Watanabe (Amazon Japan GK/The University of Tokyo)

Voter Turnout and Preference Aggregation (joint with Kei Kawai and Yuta Toyama)

We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of voter preferences in elections. Given that voting is costly, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show that the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy is identified, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 U.S. Presidential election data, we find that young, lowincome, less-educated, and minority voters are underrepresented. All of these groups tend to prefer Democrats except for the less-educated. Democrats would have won 9 more states if all eligible voters turned out.

January 22, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）1階 第１セミナー室
Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Hiroyuki Kasahara (University of British Columbia)

Grain Exports and China's Great Famine, 1959-1961: County-Level Evidence (joint with Bingjing Li) [paper]

This study provides evidence that the over-export of grains aggravated the severity of China's Great Famine. We collect county-level data for the 1953-1965 period on death rates, birth rates, amounts of grain procured, output of different types of grain, crop productivity, weather conditions, distance to railways, and the number of Chinese Com- munist Party (CCP) members. We exploit county-level variations in the types of crops each county specialized in to construct Bartik-style measures of export shocks. We regress the death rates on the Bartik export measures and use the weather shocks as instruments for measuring output and consumption. The regression results suggest that increases in grain exports substantially increase death rates, and the effect of grain exports on death rates is larger in counties with lower current output, higher two-period lagged out- put, larger distance to railways, and a smaller percentage of local CCP members. We also estimate the effects of the procurement policy, examine the relationship between the death rates and the average level of consumption at the county-level during the famine period, and conduct counterfactual experiments to quantify the relative importance of different causes of the Great Famine. The counterfactual experiments indicate that the effect of grain exports explains 12 percent of the excess deaths, which amounts to 1/5 of the effect of the increase in procurement rates between 1957 and 1959. By comparing the distribution of county-level counterfactual changes in death rates if the amount of grain exports in 1959 had been the same as that in 1957, we fnd that the distribution of the high-export-exposure counties first-order stochastically dominates that of the low-export-exposure counties.

January 26, 2018 (Friday) 16:50-18:35 ※日時・場所に注意

※　共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）2階 小島コンファレンスルーム
in Kojima Conference Room on the 2nd floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Ryo Nakajima (Keio University)

Examining Patent Examiners: Present Bias, Procrastination and Time Pressure (joint with Michitaka Sasaki, and Ryuichi Tamura)

This research studies present-biased procrastination of U.S. patent examiners. We describe patent examination work as a problem of intertemporal effort allocation by the agent who must complete a task in a fixed deadline, and adopt the standard two-parameter model (β-δ model) to characterize a conflict between short-run and long-run preferences. We show by a calibration exercise of the model that (i) increased deadline-related time pressure raises the odds that the examiner fails to finish the assigned task on time, (ii) the effect of time pressure on the failure odds varies systematically across examiners with different degrees of present-bias, and (iii) the examiners with less present-bias (with exponential discounting) respond more (the most) elastically to the change of time pressure. The testable predictions lead us to propose a logit regression method to elicit the distributional pattern of individual short-run preferences. We apply the approach to a large-scale administrative data from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with information on daily transaction history of patent applications in the field of Biotechnology and Organic Chemistry. The empirical results support evidence for procrastination by present-biased patent examiners. Furthermore, the observed patterns of task failure are in line with substantial heterogeneity in the short-run preferences across examiners. The estimated results also reveal that the examiners with more present bias tend to be in lower pay grade level and have shorter tenure in the patent office.

January 29, 2018 (Monday) 16:50-18:35 ※ 時間に注意

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Jiro Yoshida (The Pennsylvania State University)

The Real Estate Production Function: Variation by Property Type, Country, and Building Age

This study analyzes the production function for both new and seasoned real estate assets by defining the quantity of an asset as the discounted sum of real service flows. I estimate returns to scale, factor shares, and the elasticity of substitution between land and structure by using data for commercial and residential properties in Japan and the U.S. The result demonstrates wide variation by country, property type, building age, and capital intensity. Returns to scale are approximately constant in Japan for both commercial and residential properties regardless of building age. However, the US housing exhibits decreasing returns particularly between 30 and 50 years of building age. The equilibrium share of land value is almost constant across locations within a city although the capital intensity is greater at central locations. The value share of land is approximately 5% for houses in the US, 30-55% for houses in Japan, and 60-70% for commercial properties in Japan, but it is greater for older properties with large lot sizes. These results imply that the elasticity of substitution between land and structures is greater than or equal to unity.

February 5, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

＊共催： Tokyo Workshop on International Development

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Josselin Thuilliez (CNRS,Sorbonne University)

Disease and Human Capital Accumulation: Evidence from the Roll Back Malaria Partnership in Africa (joint with Maria Kuecken and Marie-Anne Valfort) [paper] [appendix]

We study the eect of a large-scale anti-malaria campaign on an unprecedentedly rich set of human capital outcomes in 27 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using pre-campaign malaria risk as a proxy for treatment probability, we first run a standard difference-in-differences strategy that exploits and synthesizes the period and cohort dimensions of our survey data. We then develop a more sophisticated empirical strategy that takes advantage of individuals' continuous exposure to campaign timing and disbursements. The estimates reveal a globally positive impact of health aid. A conservative interpretation shows that the campaign reduces infant mortality (5.2 percentage points) and fertility (0.4 births) and increases adult labor supply (5.3 percentage points) and educational attainment (0.5 years), although this average treatment effect hides variation by demographic characteristics and age groups. Our results underscore the importance of understanding how the effects of large-scale efforts to reduce disease extend beyond health outcomes.

　　　Yoshito Takasaki

February 19, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Patrick DeJarnette (National Taiwan University)

Effort Momentum [paper]

This paper examines how past effort can impact current effort, such as when effort is reduced following an interruption. I study incentivized real-effort experiments in which both piece rates and leisure options were manipulated and find effort displays significant stickiness, even in the absence of switching costs. I demonstrate that this intertemporal evidence is indicative of effort “momentum”, rather than on-the-job learning, reciprocity, or income targeting. When employing an instrumental variables approach, approximately 50% of the effort increase persists for 5 minutes after incentives return to baseline. I further demonstrate that advanced knowledge does not significantly reduce this productivity loss. This finding of effort momentum is especially important for potential labor economics studies that intend to employ individual fixed effects and for firms concerned with worker interruptions.

Hideo Owan

March 5, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Costas Meghir (Yale University)

Marriage, Labor Supply and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net (joint with Hamish Low, Costas Meghir, Luigi Pistaferri and Alessandra Voena)

Hidehiko Ichimura

March 19, 2018 (Monday) 10:30-12:00

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Kevin Schnepel (The University of Sydney)　

TBA

Ayako Kondo

March 26, 2018 (Monday)10:30-12:00

※共催：ミクロ経済学ワークショップ

東京大学大学院経済学研究科 学術交流棟 （小島ホール）１階 第１セミナー室
in Seminar Room 1 on the 1st floor of the Economics Research Annex (Kojima Hall) [Map]

Hongliang Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University)

Parental Send-down Selection and Children's Reverse Altruism — The Twins Experiment in China

In the mass rustication movement of sending urban youths to the countryside during China's Cultural Revolution, many families with multiple age-eligible children faced a Sophie's choice of selecting whom to send down. We exploit this fact and employ survey data on urban twins in China to investigate the effect of parental send-down choice on children's reverse altruism. We find that the send-down children behave less altruistically toward their parents in terms of both financial transfers and companions (e.g.,co-residence, visits, phone calls). While children's altruistic behaviors to parents are jointly determined by their earnings and reverse altruism, both of which can be affected by the send-down experience, we rule out earnings differences or reverse altruism endowment differences as the driving force for the send-down children's less altruistic behaviors, leaving the adverse effect of the send-down experience on reverse altruism preference as the only explanation.

Hidehiko Ichimura