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The demographic Background  
of the Land Problem in Russia  
(1880's-1920's)  
-- With special Reference  
to Developments in Germany\* --

by

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In this paper I will try to present an alternative interpretation of the land problem in Russia, that is, the problem of the shortage of arable land which became serious among the Russian peasantry at the end of the 19th century.

According to a popular opinion, the land problem in Russia was caused by the land monopoly of the class of large landed proprietors which was dominant in Russia before the October Revolution. Against this opinion, this paper will suppose, from the standpoint of historical comparison with German development, that the root cause of the problem must be sought in the rural overpopulation caused by the special structure of the Russian village community (mir) and the "household principles" (dvornye printsipy) in the distribution of land. The comparison with Germany would be of particular interest in that the Japanese pattern of development seems to some extent to be a kind of mixture of both the German and Russian patterns of development.

I begin by citing Max Weber, who pointed out the problem concisely. In 1918 Weber observed concerning the Russian Revolution as follows:

"It is certainly important to take into consideration that the Western European peasant has a character other than that of the Russian peasant who is living within his agricultural communism. In Russia the land problem is very critical, while it plays no role at all in Germany. The German peasant is, at least nowadays, an individualist and is clinging to his inherited properties and land. It will be impossible to make him give them up. He will be readier to cooperate with a large landed proprietor than with a radical socialistic labourer, when he believes his private property to be threatened."

In fact there existed in Germany, according to Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "no important peasant movements with revolutionary programs or progressive perspectives till 1914", and the peasantry remained conservative, at least in northern Germany, under the political influence of the "Agrarian League" which was dominated by the Junker class. Even in the course of the German Revolution in the year 1918, there occurred only some sporadic peasant Soviet movements in Bavaria. In Russia by contrast, according to I.D. Koval'chenko, the peasant movements, which remained quiet in the years

1870-80's, became more and more active and radical at the end of the 19th century and, after a peak in the years 1905-1907, 5782 peasant disturbances were to be seen in the year 1917 alone. Moreover it is highly remarkable that the demand for more arable land was the first and foremost requirement of the peasant movements. Now we must ask from where this difference of political attitudes of German and Russian peasantry arose. In other words: Why did the Russian peasantry who lived in that vast territory with its enormous possible land reserve suffer so much from a shortage of land at the time when in relatively tiny Germany there existed rather a severe shortage of labourers (Leutenot) in agriculture? This must be said to be a remarkable paradox, the origins of which we are now to explore.

## 2

The basic cause of the land problem in Russia since the end of the 19th century is usually said to be the dominance of large landed proprietors and their antagonism to peasant landholding in Russia in contrast with Prussian Germany, where the "Prussian way" of capitalistic evolution in agriculture had already come to an end and the land problem had disappeared. V.I. Lenin pointed out the problem classically as follows:

"Ten million peasant households own 73,000,000 dessiatins of land, whereas 28,000 noble and upstart landlords own 62,000,000 dessiatins. Such is the main background of the arena on which the peasants' struggle for the land is developing. On such a main background amazing technical backwardness, the neglected state of agriculture, the oppressed and downtrodden state of the mass of peasantry and an endless variety of forms of feudal corvêe exploitation are inevitable ... What is important is that a clear contrast be made between small landownership, which is striving for more land, and the feudal latifundia, which monopolise an enormous amount of land ... What is the objective tendency, the ultimate point of this struggle? Obviously, it is the abolition of large feudal estates and the transfer of the land (according to certain principles) to the peasants."

No doubt Lenin was right when he emphasized the positive meaning of the abolition of large feudal estates and their transfer to the peasants.

The "feudalist" land monopoly was indeed one basic factor which contributed to the land problem in Russia generally.

But was there no other specific Russian factor which brought about the land shortage among the peasantry especially at the end of the 19th century? In fact, the direct cause which led to the land shortage at that time was the rural overpopulation caused by a rapid increase of population after the emancipation of the peasantry, which contributed to the diminishing of the size of allotment land per capita of peasant population. According to G. Rhode the growth of population in Germany was 50% in the years 1861-1914, while in the same years the Russian population grew by 230%, that is, from 74 millions to 172 millions. L.N. Litoshenko estimates: "In the fifties ... the rural population of the fifty gubernii of European Russia did not exceed 50,000,000; in 1900 it was 83,000,000; and in 1914, 133,000,000." Rhode points out this "tremendous growth of population" as "one of the most astonishing elements in Russian history in the 19th century". As a result, the allotment land per capita of peasant population was reduced by half, from 4.8 dessiatins in 1860, 3.5 dessiatins in 1880, to 2.6 dessiatins in 1900. I.D. Koval'chenko points out, "if we take the extensive character of land utilization into account, this meant a serious shortage of land among the peasantry." Thus in the year 1900, according to S.M. Dubrovsky, overpopulation in the labour force of 23 million (52% of the total labour force) was to be seen in the countryside. Now a mighty class of poor peasantry with no or insufficient land allotment emerged, which accelerated the political radicalization of the village community at that time. N. Oganowsky says that the shortage of land brought about through such an increase of population was precisely "a characteristic of the agrarian problem in Russia."

But Dubrovsky interprets the problem as follows. "In the literature based upon the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, landed aristocracy or petty bourgeoisie, they tried to explain the land shortage of the peasantry only from the Malthusian point of view, namely, in terms of the increase of population. In fact, the land shortage was a historical category combined with a special kind of management system, especially the barshchina system of serfdom management. The shortage of land among the peasantry was a direct result of that land allotment system which was characteristic of the large holdings of the landed aristocracy and the barshchina system of

serfdom management." Thus he denied the causal relation between the rural overpopulation and the shortage of land, and interpreted the latter in the end to be the product of the landed aristocracy's ownership of vast areas of land and barshchina management.

3

It would be false if we tried to explain the shortage of land among the peasantry simply by the increase of population alone. No doubt Dubrovsky is right when he indicates the shortage of land as "a historical category". And we must seek the historical causes of the increase of population as well as the social relations by which that increase and the shortage of land were combined together. But is Dubrovsky right when he interprets that shortage only as the product of the monopoly of landed proprietors? Or, in other words, can we ignore the problem of overpopulation on the pretext of criticizing Malthusianism when we consider the problem of land shortage? Some counterarguments must be here taken into consideration.

For instance, L.N. Litoshenko wrote in the year 1927: "Now everybody agrees in recognizing that the land crisis was solely a symptom of rural overpopulation, of a lag in productivity behind the growth in numbers to be fed. ... After the revolution of 1917, the existence of rural overpopulation is recognized by everybody, including communist writers." Peter Scheibert also says: "The problem of overpopulation in agriculture remained a typical problem of Russian and Soviet history, not only before and during the Russian Revolution, but also after that Revolution up until the collectivization of agriculture." Thus, according to Litoshenko and Scheibert, the problem of land shortage as caused by overpopulation remained unsolved even after the October Revolution as a result of which the whole class of landed proprietors was completely abolished together with the entire structure of Russian capitalism. The following observation of Koichi Yasuda seems also to be important: "The division of peasant households occurred for various reasons and the total number of households increased throughout the whole Soviet Union, from 16 millions in the pre-revolutionary period, to 18-22 millions in the year 1924 and about 25 millions in the year 1928. And the leaders of the Soviet Union could hardly find any effective

policy against this increase, though they knew well enough its social and economic evils." Hélène Carrère d'Encausse says, too, that after the NEP period "the population of the Soviet Union increases every year by 3 millions against 2.5 millions before the First World War." The estimation of S.G. Strumilin indicates the number of the "latent" unemployed in the country-side to be 8-9 millions in 1928, and according to Colin Clark it amounted even to 20 millions. These indications suggest unanimously, though with big differences, the continuation or even intensification of overpopulation in the 1920's. W.W. Eason referred to the year 1928 as the peak year when "the population of the Soviet Union increased at the fastest rate of 2.4% in the history of demographic statistics in Russia as well as the Soviet Union."

This problem was also expatiated by Werner Conze in a broad comparative view. He points out:

"This problem must be considered comparatively. In Germany, of course with various regional differences, overpopulation, or speaking more exactly, rural overpopulation reached its peak toward 1850, on the eve of rapid industrialization. After 1850 this overpopulation (latent unemployment) diminishes rapidly. The exodus of the people from rural to urban regions contributed to the alleviation of population pressure. The rapidly flourishing industries absorbed the rural overpopulation (the younger sons of peasants, rural proletariats or poor peasants). The problem of rural mass poverty or 'pauperism' existed no more at the period of Reichsgründung (1871).

On the contrary it is difficult to find in Russia a point in time corresponding to the year 1850 in Germany as the peak year of rural overpopulation and as the beginning of its absorption by growing industries. ... The beginning of peasant emancipation, the industrialization combined with the construction of railways, the encouragement of further industrialization in the 1890's and lastly the agrarian reform by P.A. Stolypin -- all these were factors which might have solved or contributed to the solution of the problem of overpopulation. And in reality there were in Russia some regions where the above mentioned factors promoted the development of wealthy peasantry with economic abilities. But on the whole the problem of overpopulation remained unsolved, because the level of industrialization, of the development of transportation and hence of the

development of the market was not enough. Also in the 1920's, namely after the October Revolution, the rural overpopulation continued to exist through the diminishing of the size of allotment land, its own increase in numbers and the corresponding increase of population. --- People suffered from these unfavourable developments in the countryside. Only thereafter, historians find the date to show the peak of agrarian decomposition and overpopulation as coming immediately before transition through the outflow of the population from rural areas. It was the year 1929 in Russia which corresponds to the year 1850 in Germany. In this year the first Five Year Plan started and in the course of time, the mutual relation between industrialization and population, or in other words, the elimination of the population pressure of rural areas through the rapid development of industries on the one hand and the radical reform of the agricultural system on the other hand, became visible."

In this way Conze compared the year 1850 in Germany to the year 1929 in the Soviet Union. The former was a turning point when a mass of the lower social stratum was obliged to leave rural areas spontaneously, whereas the latter was a turning point when a large numbers of people, mainly of the upper social stratum, the kulaks, were banished to Siberia etc. violently.

Nicolas Werth reports that between 1929 and 1939 circa 25 millions Russian peasants left their villages. Their destinations were the cities, factories, mines, various works and workhouses. Now structural changes were to be seen for the first time. As we know, the October Revolution abolished the landed proprietors and the collectivization of agriculture dissolved the village community with its customs of land redistribution. It seems important to notice that the solution of the land problem or the problem of rural overpopulation was connected not with the former, but with the latter.

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Litoshenko, Conze, Scheibert, Yasuda and Werth suggest that the root cause of rural overpopulation and land shortage may be sought mainly in the system of the village community which was alive until the collectivization of agriculture. Now I want to pursue this problem through a comparative

analysis of the structure of German and Russian village communities as well as the peasant family as their basic unit.

In Germany (with the exception of the Rhein-Main-Neckar river basin) patriarchal families based on the virgate system (Hufenverfassung) were widespread in the late feudal period. This type of feudal family had a strong independence against the intervention from the village community in daily life. However, it is important to notice that there occurred a split of sons within this family. In other words, the virgate system and the custom of primogeniture enabled only one son, generally the eldest son as the successor of his father's virgate, to be an ordinary member of the village community, while all other sons and daughters had to go out of the family to become agricultural servants (Knechte und Mägde) or join the rural proletariat. They were excluded from the right to succession of their father's properties (virgate) and hence from ordinary membership of the village community. Thus we can say that the German village community in the middle ages was a closed corporation which permitted only virgate holders to be ordinary members of it. These members stood at the top of the hierarchical rural society with its various categories of dependent and poor peasants and landless servants. These were the typical characteristics of feudal village communities. It is interesting to add that the Japanese ie (patriarchal family) and mura (village community) had basically the same character.

Now we must ask about the structural relation between the patriarchal family based upon the virgate system, the corporative and hierarchical structure of a feudal village community, and the problem of population as our main subject. In this connection it is necessary for us to take into account the John Hajnal's hypothesis concerning the European marriage pattern. According to Hajnal, this pattern, which developed in the late middle ages in Europe westward of the diagonal between Leningrad and Trieste, is characterized as follows. First, both sexes married late. The average age of male first marriage was over 26, female over 23. Second, marriage requires independence of household. That means that unless a young man succeeds to his father's land or virgate, he has no chance to be married and establish a new household. This condition made marriage difficult, and many young people were therefore obliged to live unmarried or to be married late, which resulted in a high age of first marriage and a low



birthrate. Third, young people, in general, spent their lives before marriage as various kinds of servants. Thus the village community based upon the virgate system functioned oppressively on the growth of population. Incidentally, it is interesting to notice that the eastern border of the geographical spread of the type of village community based on the virgate system studied by W. Conze coincided with that of the European marriage pattern proposed by J. Hajnal.

Prussian agricultural policy in the first half of the 19th century was also determined by this structural relation. It was intended to maintain the upper part of the virgate peasantry as a productive and wealthy peasantry, while the lower part had to be expropriated to form a proletariat. The Peasant Emancipation required of the peasantry, first, to have been able to serve their lords with their horses (spannfähig), and second, to have been situated in their home village longer than the standard year prescribed for each occasion. In the course of the Emancipation the upper part of the peasantry had to cut off circa 4 million acres (Morgen) of their land for their former lords. In order to accomplish this duty, they sent out their younger children to Berlin and other big cities. Thus these upper peasants remained ordinary members of a village community as closed corporation which was obliged now to help the poor people in the village.

At this period the German population increased from 24 millions in 1800 to 35 millions in 1859, fostered by the development of so called proto-industries and the diminishing death-rate. The failure of the proto-industrialization caused "Pauperismus" among the rural overpopulation, which led to the social and political crisis of the March Revolution in 1848. But the political movements of the early proletariat had no chance of being successful owing to the political conservatism of the German peasantry, which was privileged economically and socially in village life. Then in the second half of the century the rural proletariat had to emigrate massively to the industrializing cities, where they became factory labourers. Thus the urban industries played an important role in overcoming the political crisis of rural areas through absorbing the overpopulation.

We can summarize the whole process as follows: first, the virgate (Hufen) principle of land distribution in the feudal village community functioned as an oppressor of population growth. Second, the Prussian peasantry was already conservative concerning the land problem at the

beginning of the "Prussian way" of agricultural development. Third, because of its closed and hierarchical character, the German village community fostered among the servants and proletariat who were alienated in the village life because of having no property, the "drive for freedom" (M. Weber) which resulted in their massive outflow into the cities. Gustav Schmoller mentioned as early as the 1860's the new tendency of a shortage of agricultural labourers. In this way the feudal community adjusted itself to the development of German capitalism (Prussian type of previous accumulation). A.M. Anfimov was quite right when he said, "there existed in rural Germany no such overpopulation as characterized the Russian rural regions."

Incidentally, the economically advanced regions of the Rhein-Main-Neckar basin show another, Western European type of development. In these regions the custom of equalized inheritance made the virgate system and the corporative village community gradually dissolve. At the same time the development of intensive agriculture and the gradual spread of rural industries helped the rural labourers to find more opportunities for labour within the rural areas. The social and economic differences between the virgate peasants, poor peasants and labourers within the traditional village community which characterized the other regions of Germany diminished here relatively early.

But in Germany as a whole, the corporative social structure was maintained, which became one important factor fostering the totalitarian system in the first half of the 20th century (Der deutsche Sonderweg).

5

Now we must return to Russia. Here we find no virgate system such as was to be seen in Germany. The household (dvor) as the basic component of the Russian village community (mir), lacking the virgate system, had no material basis for a strong and independent patriarchal family. Rather it was a kind of management organization based upon a fictitious blood relation (artel'). Within the dvor no split of sons was to be seen as observed in feudal Germany. On the contrary there existed a family based upon a "solidarity of brothers" (Chie Nakane), which was widespread in the Eurasian

Continent. Indeed, we can speak of a dominance of pater familias based on the development of the house-and-gardenland as the "private" property of the dvor. However all sons had access to that property, and their father was not a private proprietor but only a manager of the common property of the dvor. Therefore, his position within the family was not so strong and authoritative as in Germany. His position was relatively weak not only against intervention from the village community, but also within the family. More important was the advantageous situation of younger sons. Not only the eldest son but also younger sons obtained allotment land from the mir, unless they left it. They were permitted to stay in the home village as ordinary members of it and could be married there. This "household principle" of land allotment was the custom which corresponded to the German virgate principle and the institutional basis upon which the redistributory village community developed. Also foreign labour forces entered into the household not as agricultural servants, as in Germany, but through the custom of adoption as fictitious family members. If they contributed enough to the development of the household through their labour, they could be promoted to ordinary members of that family (trudovoe nachalo, the principle of diligence). While the German village community based upon the virgate principle was characterized by its stability, formality, closedness and hierarchy, the Russian village community based on the household principle was characterized by its mobility, openness, egalitarianism and democratic character.

Thus we can say that the entire structure of the Russian dvor and mir prohibited the "European marriage pattern" from developing.

Of course this does not mean that Russia was in its history always overpopulated. On the contrary Russia, having suffered under the Mongol-Tartarian occupation for a long time, was said to be underpopulated prior to the 18th century. The existence of the household principle in land distribution itself was originally possible only because of the affluence of land resources. It was after the First Census in 1724 by Peter the Great that the Russian population turned towards increase. From the beginning of the 18th century to the middle of the 19th century it increased more than five times, which was speedier than that of England at the time of the Industrial Revolution. But this remarkable natural increase was welcomed at

that time as it represented an important factor in developing "the national power". There still existed no overpopulation.

Unlike the German Peasant Emancipation which emancipated only traditional virgate peasants, the Russian Peasant Emancipation emancipated all peasants with the exception of household servants (dvorovye). We see here also the same egalitarian principle which was seen in the character of the dvor and mir.

On the basis of these preconditions rural overpopulation finally prevailed in the second half of the 19th century, the mechanism of which is to be analyzed as follows.

[1] Boris Mironov mentions the peasant's view of marriage as well as legal and economic conditions which fostered that view as important factors for the increase of population. First, all young people were considered as fully-fledged only after they were married and had set up a household independently or within an extended family. Only then did they obtain the right to speak out at meetings of the family or the village community. Second, when they were married and had established a household, they were given their portion of arable land from the village community as their natural right. And only when the young couple functioned as a labour unit, that is, only when they maintained the household through the division of labour by husband and wife, did the peasant economy flourish so that they could pay various kinds of taxes. Third, children were estimated highly as labour powers and also as nursers of their parents in their old age. Hence, taking a high infant mortality into account, at least six children (3 sons and 3 daughters) were regarded as desirable. In addition, childcare expenses were absolutely low. --- Thus in daily village life an unmarried person was considered "antisocial", "idle", "parasitical" and a couple without children "very unhappy".

On this background it is easy to understand that the custom of early marriage was dominant (the average age of male first marriage 18-20, female 16-18) in contrast to the situation in Germany where servants of the same age remained still largely unmarried. There was no "family planning" such as current elsewhere and as a result every peasant family obtained many children (10-11 per family), of course with high infant mortality. The Russian Church supported this situation of a high birthrate.

The improvements in medical care in the 1870's, on the other hand, contributed to the lowering of the deathrate.

Thus just at the end of the 19th century when in Germany the agricultural population was already diminishing absolutely, there occurred in Russia by contrast a rapid growth in agricultural population. We can conclude that while the German village community before the end of the 18th century, based on the principle of the virgate system, had the tendency to hold down the increase of population, the Russian village community based on the household principle tended to foster the increase of population. Some authors may be cited here who support this conclusion.

G. Pavlovsky points out pertinently, "The main count in the indictment against the mir, or redistributory rural commune, as such, was that it contributed to the development of agrarian overpopulation by relieving the individual peasant from responsibility for the excessive increase of his family."

J. Nötzold goes further and says that the redistributory rural commune accelerated rural overpopulation because "under the condition of land shortage, large households have a big advantage."

Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's following observation seems to be most comprehensive. "One thing has been ascertained, and indeed is easy to understand: it is that the mir system encourages marriage and increase of population, since each family is entitled to land in proportion to the number of labourers it musters. On the other hand, the communal system, by setting, so to speak, a premium on large families and partly relieving parents from the cares that children bring, is apt indirectly to foster proletariats, --- in other words, the supply of land being limited, the population, under this system, is apt to increase faster than the means of subsistence or comfort. On this point collective land tenure is at odds with individual, hereditary tenure. The latter ... tends to limit, in each family, the number of children who are to share the paternal loaf. ... Thus it is that, under the property question, the population problem is found to lurk."

When, then, did the rural overpopulation become obvious? Mironov says. "Till 1861 the rapidly increasing population could be absorbed easily within the village. But the first generation after the abolition of serfdom

suffered already from the shortage of land. After the 1880's the rural overpopulation came into existence in the central governments."

[2] Thus generated rural overpopulation made the custom of redistribution of land more frequent, which made agricultural productivity more stagnant, while this rural overpopulation had little tendency to flow out into the cities in contrast to the German case. Dubrovsky meaningfully spoke of "insufficient migration into the cities." First, Russian industry was originally not urban industry but simply spread in the countryside as subsidiary business of the peasant economy. Hence the cities had little capacity to absorb the rural overpopulation as factory workers. Of course, the *dvor* and *mir* did have a kind of mobility outwards, because they set loose various kinds of emigrants. But his mobility remained temporary as the emigrants were bound to their mother villages through the passport system. The emigrants did not leave the villages permanently as the German emigrants did in the second half of the 19th century; rather they always had a latent propensity to return home. Second, as the village community gave all male peasants lots of land to maintain their families and permitted them to remain there as ordinary members, no "drive for freedom" was to be seen among them as among the alienated German servants. P.I. Lyashchenko says relevantly, "the absolute shortage of land came into existence because the land community prevented the outflow of population and in doing so called forth the rural overpopulation." In other words, the Russian *mir* had little tendency to select out a class of wealthy and productive peasants. On the contrary, a basic tendency to general poverty was to be seen.

Thus "it became the main economic task for Russia to eliminate the agrarian overpopulation." (Nötzold)

## 6

I have analyzed the demographic background of the social and political crisis in Russia which led to the Russian Revolution and the regime of J.V. Stalin. Once August von Haxthausen, bearing the conservatism of the German peasantry in mind, prophesied that Russia would dispense with that proletariat which threatened Europe, because in Russia they had that egalitarian village community which hindered the proletarian development.

According to Haxthausen the German village community as a corporation produced an alienated class of proletariat, whereas the Russian village community was a kind of association and all members of it were equally righted and were endowed on egalitarian principles, hence there could be no proletarian development. However, against this prophecy, the Russian peasantry showed a tendency to become revolutionary as a whole because of the egalitarian character of the mir, supporting rather the populist idea of Alexander I. Herzen.

Thus a democratic and egalitarian character was intrinsic in the political radicalism of the Russian peasant movement. Through the "whole village resistance" (S. Hinada), they fought stubbornly and successfully against the individualistic agrarian reform by P.A. Stolypin, who intended to destroy the village community and develop a class of "wealthy peasants, politically conservative but economically powerful and progressive" (N. Oganovsky). And after the fateful failure of Stolypin they fought against the class of landed proprietors in the process of the October Revolution and succeeded in annihilating them. But the same radical peasants soon after accepted the policy of agrarian collectivisation through J.V. Stalin who, quite contrary to Stolypin, annihilated the elements of wealthy peasants within the village. This political development reflects the Eurasiatic "agrarian communism" which was intrinsic in the Russian peasantry.

At last people succeeded in overcoming the social and political crisis brought about by population pressure, though they had to suffer from the vital decline of agricultural productivity through enforced collectivisation. This collectivisation meant an important turning point in the history of economic policy in Russia and the Soviet Union because the necessary policy of a previous accumulation which Stolypin failed to accomplish in Russia, could be achieved successfully by Stalin, who understood and knew how to utilize the basic character of the Russian village community and especially poor peasants (socialistic form of previous accumulation, pervonachal'noe sotsialisticheskoe nakoplenie). The main regions of European Russia which we have been considering experienced an important demographic change after the 1930's through the stabilization or even decline of population, the geographic shift of population from the west to the east of the Soviet Union, a general tendency towards urbanization and a tendency towards slower growth rate in the total population. A structural

change is to be seen in Soviet society from the 1930's onwards, involving an increase in the number of collective farmers and wage labourers on the one hand and a decline of agricultural population and an increase of non-agricultural population on the other hand.

Now we must conclude by citing L.N. Litoshenko, who says: "Russian chronic illness was organic and was due to rural overpopulation" and also P. Scheibert, who says: "we cannot understand Russian history well unless we take demographic factors into sufficient consideration."



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Table 1. Reported Birth and Death Rates Per Thousand Population and Percentage Rates of Natural Increase, Imperial Russia (European Part) and the USSR, 1801-1958

Year	Birth rates	Death rates	Annual increase (per cent of total population)	Year	Birth rates	Death rates	Consistent with birth and death rates	Annual increase (per cent of total population)	
								Annual average between census totals	Adjusted for consistency with inter-censal annual average
1801-1810	43.7	27.1	1.66	1926	43.6	20.0	2.36	} 1.24 }	1.90
1811-1820	40.0	26.5	1.35	1927	42.7	21.0	2.17		2.14
1821-1830	42.7	27.5	1.52	1928	42.2	18.2	2.40		1.64
1831-1840	45.6	33.6	1.20	1929	39.8	20.3	1.95		1.59
1841-1850	49.7	39.4	1.03	1930	39.2	20.4	1.88		1.65
1851-1860	52.4	39.4	1.30	1931	38.2	19.1	1.91		(-.03)
1861-1870	51.9	38.7	1.32	1932	—	—	1.25		(-.03)
1871-1880	49.1	35.5	1.36	1933	—	—	—		(-.03)
1881-1890	48.7	34.2	1.45	1934	—	—	—		(-.03)
1891-1895	49.0	36.2	1.28	1935	28.6	16.3	1.23		1.05
1896-1900	49.4	32.4	1.70	1936	32.3	18.8	1.35	1.17	
1901-1905	47.7	31.0	1.67	1937	38.7	17.9	2.08	1.92	
1906-1910	45.2	29.0	1.62	1938	38.3	17.8	2.05	1.90	
1911-1913	43.3	26.9	1.64	1940	31.3	18.1	1.32		
1913	43.4	27.9	1.55	1950	26.7	9.7	1.70		
1914	41.0	25.3	1.57	1951	27.0	9.7	1.73		
				1952	26.5	9.4	1.71		
1920	29.1	38.1	-0.90	1953	25.1	9.1	1.60		
1921	34.1	29.1	0.50	1954	26.6	8.9	1.77		
1922	32.1	33.8	-0.17	1955	25.7	8.2	1.75		
1923	40.5	21.5	1.90	1956	25.2	7.6	1.76		
1924	43.1	22.0	2.11	1957	25.4	7.8	1.76		
1925	44.7	23.2	2.15	1958	25.3	7.2	1.81		

W. W. Eason, Population Changes, in: C. E. Black (ed.), *The Transformation*, p. 75.

Table 2. POPULATION BY ECONOMIC REGION  
(Urban : cities of 15,000 and over)

MAJOR ECONOMIC REGION	1851		1897		1926		1939		1959	
	TOTAL POPULATION	PERCENT URBAN	TOTAL POPULATION	PERCENT URBAN	TOTAL POPULATION	PERCENT URBAN	TOTAL POPULATION	PERCENT URBAN	TOTAL POPULATION	PERCENT URBAN
Northwest	4,481,678	21.5	8,019,875	23.9	10,341,034	40.8	12,366,560	52.4	11,474,054	52.4
West	3,160,075	14.0	5,708,883	19.8	5,638,518	17.6	5,816,773	21.1	6,001,694	32.2
Central	10,630,958	12.1	15,245,585	17.6	21,049,713	5.2	25,308,098	34.6	24,789,349	49.0
Volgo-Viatsk	4,074,566	1.9	6,181,344	5.2	7,255,893	7.3	8,698,149	15.6	8,253,038	29.2
Central Chernozem	5,486,750	7.4	8,285,760	11.3	11,036,261	11.3	10,439,270	10.9	8,697,909	21.4
Volga	5,301,509	8.6	9,712,792	8.8	12,433,500	11.3	12,124,989	23.7	12,454,354	41.6
Belorussia	3,183,908	6.9	6,463,422	8.8	7,640,980	8.8	8,909,994	13.7	8,054,648	21.1
Moldavia	748,689	13.4	1,534,261	11.4	2,042,449	11.4	2,452,023	8.6	2,884,477	15.2
Southwest	—	7.2	17,553,568	10.3	21,468,191	10.3	21,705,248	13.6	20,254,509	18.9
South	1,591,449	22.7	3,759,355	22.7	4,608,252	22.7	4,852,279	31.7	5,066,132	38.7
Donetsk-Dnepr	4,111,753	10.6	7,846,363	14.1	11,961,856	14.1	14,760,227	38.8	16,548,405	49.7
North Caucasus	1,338,170	10.1	6,225,625	16.3	9,268,453	16.3	10,511,511	26.8	11,785,606	37.9
Transcaucasus	—	11.5	4,595,096	18.0	5,861,528	18.0	8,027,511	25.4	9,504,810	38.0
Ural	4,732,868	5.6	9,105,907	9.6	11,847,333	9.6	14,443,875	27.3	18,613,230	47.4
West Siberia	625,656	6.5	1,975,600	9.8	6,257,867	9.8	7,936,870	26.5	10,159,437	47.0
East Siberia	988,499	3.7	2,097,908	8.8	3,624,449	8.8	5,279,392	23.4	6,960,535	37.4
Far East	—	14.6	422,564	16.3	1,559,354	16.3	2,820,416	40.5	4,346,803	47.4
Kazakh	—	2.5	4,822,838	5.5	6,179,050	5.5	6,093,507	21.8	9,309,847	34.5
Central Asia	—	11.4	5,444,228	13.5	7,601,154	13.5	10,530,453	17.2	13,667,813	27.0
TOTAL USSR	125,005,974	9.8	167,675,835	13.1	193,077,145	25.1	208,826,650	37.8		

R. A. Lewis and J. W. Leasure, Regional Population Changes in Russia and the USSR since 1851, in: *Slavic Review*, vol. 25, 1966, p. 667.

Table 3. The Population by Socioeconomic Groups,  
USSR, 1928, 1932, 1938, and 1955

Socioeconomic groups	1913	1928	1932	1938	1955
Population, including dependents, in thousands					
Wage and salary workers	23,300	26,100	44,600	55,500	86,900
Coop. handicraftsmen	0	2,000	4,200	4,900	4,000
Noncoop. handicraftsmen	(10,000)	4,100	1,900	1,500	1,400
Collective farmers	0	2,400	66,300	82,800	75,000
Private farmers	97,800	108,800	33,400	4,000	300
"Bourgeoisie"	5,000	3,700	371	—	—
Employed labor force categories	136,100	147,200	150,700	148,700	167,600
Unemployed and transients	?	1,900	1,100	—	—
Discrepancies in deviation	0	0	4,400	12,900	13,600
Civilian labor force categories	136,100	149,100	156,200	161,600	181,200
Military	1,100	700	700	1,900	5,000
Total labor force categories	137,200	149,800	156,900	163,500	186,200
Others, economically active	2,100	2,500	4,100	5,400	10,000
Total population	139,300	152,300	161,000	168,900	196,200
Nonagricultural population	31,029	38,100	48,100	57,400	80,500
Agricultural population	108,271	114,200	108,000	91,300	87,100
Percentage distribution					
Wage and salary workers	16.7	17.1	27.7	32.9	44.3
Coop. handicraftsmen	0	1.3	2.6	2.9	2.0
Noncoop. handicraftsmen	7.2	2.2	1.2	.9	.7
Collective farmers	0	1.6	41.2	49.0	38.2
Private farmers	70.2	71.5	20.7	2.4	.3
"Bourgeoisie"	3.6	2.4	.2	—	—
Employed labor force categories	97.7	96.6	93.6	88.1	85.5
Unemployed and transients	?	1.2	.7	—	—
Discrepancies in deviation	0	0	2.7	7.6	6.9
Civilian labor force categories	97.7	97.8	97.0	95.7	92.3
Military	.8	.5	.5	1.1	2.5
Total labor force categories	98.5	98.3	97.5	96.8	94.9
Others, economically active	1.5	1.7	2.5	3.2	5.1
Total population	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nonagricultural population	22.3	25.0	30.8	38.6	48.0
Agricultural population	77.7	75.0	69.2	61.4	52.0

W. W. Eason, op. cit., p. 88.