CIRJE-F-955 "Optimal Mechanism Design:  Type-Independent Preference Orderings"
Author Name

Matsushima, Hitoshi

Date February 2015
Full Paper   PDF file
Remarks Published in The Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018.
Abstract
  

We investigate revenue maximization in general allocation problems with incomplete information, where we assume quasi-linearity, private values, independent type distributions, and single-dimensionality of type spaces. We require a mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and ex-post individual rationality. We assume that each player has a type-independent preference ordering over deterministic allocations. We show that the Myerson’s technique to solve the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem in single-unit auctions can be applied to general allocation problems, where the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem can be reduced to the simple maximization problem of the sum of players’ marginal revenues without imposing any incentive constraint.