CIRJE-F-870 "Process Manipulation in Unique Implementation"
Author Name

Matsushima, Hitoshi

Date November 2012
Full Paper   PDF file
Remarks   Revised version of CIRJE-F-673 (2009); further revision will be forthcoming in Social Choice and Welfare.

We incorporate social influence into implementation theory, and highlight the manner in which an informed agent feels guilty with regard to disobeying an uninformed principal's wishes. The degree of this feeling depends on the agent's expectation of others' behavioral modes. We demonstrate a method of process manipulation, through which the principal employs psychological tactics for incentivizing agents to announce information in keeping with his/her wishes. We indicate that with a version of incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he/she wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium without employing any contractual devices. Each agent's psychological cost would be negligible.