CIRJE-F- 541. Mochida, Nobuki, "Subnational Borrowing in Japan : from 'Implicit Guarantee' to Market Discipline and Fiscal Rule", January 2008.

In many countries, local borrowing is an important source for long-term development projects such as roads, bridges, and waterworks. Local borrowing for such projects is justified on the ground that benefit of these projects often last decades and the cost of these projects should be borne by future tax payers. However, there are serious concerns with issuance of local bonds by decentralized local governments. Local governments in Japan would not default on their borrowing because of such "implicit government guarantee." As a result, lenders and tax payers have lost incentive to monitor subnational government because they view their investment as protected by a central government. The purpose of this paper is to review the local borrowing in Japan. At first, the transition from administrative control to rule-based, market oriented system is described. Following this, soft budget constraint and effectiveness of market discipline is investigated. Third, bank lending and local bonds as a way of financing long-term infrastructures are compared. Finally, we shed light on the credibility of local bonds in Japan and offer some proposals.