CIRJE-F-178 | "Honesty-Proof Implementation" |
Author Name | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
Date | October 2002 |
Full Paper | PDF file@ |
Remarks | Revised as CIRJE-F-244 (2003). |
Abstract |
We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to lotteries and may depend on factors other than agents' preferences. We assume that agents are not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a lexicographical way. We define iterative honesty-proofness by iteratively removing messages dominated by more honest messages. We show that in the complete information environments with small fines, every social choice function is implementable in iterative honesty-proofness. This is in contrast with the standard implementation model, because any 'normative' social choice function depending on non-preference factors is never implementable when agents are not influenced by factors other than pure self-interest. We extend this result to the incomplete information environments with quasi-linearity and with correlated private signals. |