CIRJE-F-148 | "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness" |
Author Name | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
Date | March 2002 |
Full Paper | PDF file@ |
Remarks | @ |
Abstract |
We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the Condorcet winner among its range. We introduce plurality mechanisms, where each agent makes a single announcement and the lottery associated with the opinion announced by the largest number of agents is enforced. We show that a social choice function is virtually implementable via plurality mechanisms combined with constrained random dictatorship, if and only if it is Condorcet-decisive.
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